



PERISCOPE

NEWSLETTER OF AFIO
NATIONAL AND CHAPTER
EVENTS, PLANS & NEWS

Association of Former Intelligence Officers

Volume XXVI, Number 1, 2003



**The Changing Face
of Intelligence**
**AFIO's
National Intelligence
Symposium 2003**



at The National Reconnaissance Office,
The Central Intelligence Agency,
and other locales

1 - 4 November 2003 — Tyson's Corner, VA

Save the date! And make plane and hotel reservations NOW. The AFIO National Intelligence Symposium 2003, 1 through 4 November 2003, will be one of our best ever, with distinguished speakers from the intelligence community, law enforcement, and homeland security talking about the incredible changes taking place in the way we do business. We will also look at intelligence lessons learned in Iraq and in the War on Terrorism.

And the event—for the first time—will be held at two different Agencies. On Monday, 3 November, our host will be the **National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)** in Chantilly, Virginia. Tuesday, November 4, will place us all day at the **Central Intelligence Agency** at Langley, Virginia.

Symposium 2003 will be combined with the AFIO Convention and Awards Banquet again this year, but the Banquet will start the event. The AFIO Convention runs 1 and 2 November at the Sheraton Premiere Hotel on Leesburg Pike in Tysons Corner, Virginia. The Sixth Annual AFIO Awards Banquet will be held on Saturday evening, 1 November, after a day full of interesting speakers, the General Membership meeting and the Chairman's reception at The Capitol Club. We will also be visiting the International Spy Museum and "Spy Touring" in the Washington, D.C. area.

For room reservations, call the Sheraton Premiere at (800) 325- 3535 or (703) 448-1234 and ask for the AFIO group rate. ✱

Symposium Agenda & Registration on page 16

Boston Pops Meets the Men in Black

Special AFIO Evening
Hosted by Albano F. Ponte

AFIO recently held a ground-breaking event in Boston at Symphony Hall on Tuesday, July 2, 2003. The Boston Pops Esplanade Orchestra performed to a sold-out performance including one hundred AFIO members and supporters and AFIO President Gene Poteat, all of whom enjoyed a program titled *An American Salute*.



Backstage post-concert were [L to R] AFIO Board member & Endowment Fund Director **Albano Ponte**; Boston Pops conductor **Keith Lockhart**; AFIO President **Gene Poteat**, and AFIO Member and Chairman of Boston Pops Event Committee **Gary Wass**.

Conductor Keith Lockhart, led the Boston Pops in a stirring patriotic program of American favorites with guest performers soprano Indra Thomas and Pianist Michael Lewin.

Ms. Thomas sang the Star-Spanned Banner; *Ebbled, ne andro Lontana* from La Wally (Catalani) with an encore *Ride On King Jesus* (Trad. -Floyd) and pianist Michael Lewin performed *Rhapsody in Blue* (Gershwin) with an encore *The Flight of the Bumblebee* (Rimsky-Korsakov).

The Pops performed *Hoe Down*, from Rodeo (Copland); *Letter from home* (Copland); *A Salute to our*

Boston Pops continues on page 3

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AFIO PUBLICATIONS

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Intelligencer – Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies—AFIO's flagship publication—substantive articles ranging from historic surveys of intelligence practices, to current cutting-edge concerns and directions. Includes book reviews, essays, reprints and columnists. 2x/year.

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President's Message

S. Eugene Poteat

Most of us in AFIO have been asking ourselves, "Is the Intelligence Community well postured to deal with the post-9/11 world?" While the Intelligence Community has responded well to 9/11 and subsequent attacks, the aftershocks continue with each new attack or warning we receive. At the same time our Intelligence Community must also adjust to a more demanding, integrated and supporting role with our military during wartime, both strategically and tactically.

Much has already been said, and will continue to be said, by the media about the changing face, roles, mission and indeed the mistakes of intelligence before and

after 9/11—and valid concerns the public has about maintaining their privacy and freedom. It will come as no surprise to you that AFIO would like to take a "closer to home" look at these issues. Thus the theme for this year's symposium will be The Changing Face of Intelligence. By now, you are all probably well aware that this year's symposium will include a day at the National Reconnaissance Office and another at the Central Intelligence Agency, for an inside view of these critical questions and issues.

We expect to have a stellar, unprecedented slate of intelligence officials from the expanded, and new, Intelligence Community to address these subjects for our members and corporate partners. We have not ignored the other important AFIO convention activities; they will take place over the weekend, with the grand banquet on Saturday evening, November 1. Equally important, we look forward to meeting again with our AFIO friends. ❁

What's New in AFIO

*Roy K. Jonkers
Executive Director*



A FIO National Intelligence Symposium 2003 planning is in full swing. Letters of invitation have gone out to the Intelligence Community leadership, and to experts for addressing the crucial issues confronting intelligence. We expect we will cover them all, achievements, challenges and problems, and provide our members and other conference attendees with an updated idea of US intelligence in transformation – the changing face of intelligence - terrorism, technology and policy - as part of our educational mission.

I also want to express our immense appreciation for old and new Foundation and donation support, reflecting confidence

in the quality of our programs, including the greatly valued steadfast support from Mrs. Maria Ransburg's Foundation as well as her personal generosity, and your support in donations large and small. They are crucially important in providing the means to continue to enhance AFIO and its mission in support of an effective US Intelligence Community. We are also updating our records to note the intelligence background of our members – an astounding variety of rich contributions to national security.

AFIO is humming, busy, growing in impact. The membership is steadily increasing. AFIO is built on membership participation in a National mission. It has been, is now, and will continue to be, a worthy cause. We invite you to be active, to become part of the AFIO Legion of Merit for 2003 by sponsoring a colleague for membership, and to participate in your local Chapter. See you at the Convention in November! ❁



Fund Director **Albano Ponte** and AFIO member and Chairman of Boston Pops Event Committee **Gary Wass** attended a backstage post-concert private meeting with a relaxed Conductor **Keith Lockhart** who commented that he was with the *Men in Black!*

Boston Pops Event, continued from page 1

Armed Forces (arr. Hayman); *Strike Up the Band* (Gershwin-Green); *Sing, Sing, Sing* (Prima/Goodman-Hyman); *Don't Touch That Dial!* '60s TV Memories (arr. Troob) and *All That Jazz*, from Chicago (Kander/Ebb-Besterman).



[L to R] Mrs. Maria Da Gloria Ponte, Mrs. Sue Ann Ponte — mother and wife, respectively of event organizer Al Ponte, with AFIO President Gene Poteat at far right.

Patriotic Sing-Along (arr. Hayman) included *America, America the Beautiful*, *Yankee Doodle*, *The Yankee Doodle Boy*, *This Land is Your Land*, *You're a Grand Old Flag*, *God Bless America* with a finale *1812 Overture* (Tchaikovsky) and Encore *The Boogie-Woogie Bugle Boy* (Raye/Prince-Hayman).

AFIO members enjoyed conversing with friends and new acquaintances before the eight-o'clock performance at tables set up cabaret style while enjoying their favorite beverages along with food selected from a light menu.

AFIO President **Gene Poteat**, AFIO Board Member & Endowment



Mr. & Mrs. Roy Baker with Mr. James K. Ray, Assistant Vice President - Lending, Watertown [MA] Savings Bank

Mr. Lockhart acknowledged his interest in the Intelligence field and would like to hear more about AFIO.

Photographers for the Night at the Pops included **Adam & Iris Ponte**, Boston Pops Committee members and **Blair Hamaty**.

This AFIO Fund-Raising Patriotic celebration in Boston was developed as part of the Asso-



[L to R] Peter and Michael Nobile, new father & son members

ciation's mission to increase awareness of the importance of the Intelligence Community and to provide Schol-

arships to students interested in the Intelligence Fields.

We are pleased to announce that the Second Annual AFIO "Night at the Pops" will take place on 19 June 2004 with a host of activities that may include an awards banquet.



[R - back row] AFIO Board Member **Albano Ponte** surrounded by several lovely attendees. Front row, second from right is **Pamela Donnaruma**, Publisher and Editor, The Boston Post-Gazette, at her left **Yolanda M. Cellucci**, president/CEO of Yolanda Enterprises in Waltham, MA and fashion editor for the Post-Gazette.

AFIO and the Boston Pops are planning a program based on James Bond film music themes (*Music To Spy By*).

Now is the time to start planning your Boston spring vacation! Dates and information to follow—check the AFIO website for details.



Iris and Adam Ponte — young tech-savvy AFIO members / supporters.



Boston Pops Committee Chairman **Gary Wass** with special events fund-raiser **Karin Doolin**

As Chairman of the Boston Pops Event Committee, I would like to thank all our AFIO members and supporters who attended the Fund-Raiser, along with the event Photographers, Boston Pops Organization, AFIO Central Office, AFIO President **Gene Poteat** and most of all to the man who made the event happen and by selling most of the one hundred reserved tickets, **Albano Ponte**. ❀

— Gary Wass, Event Chairman

All Photos Columns 2 and 3 Credit: Blair Hamaty, Adam Ponte or Iris Ponte

MEETINGS

Mercyhurst College Intelligence Colloquium

by **Bob Heibel, FBI (Ret)**
Professor, Mercyhurst College



Professor Bob Heibel

The Fifth Annual International Colloquium on Intelligence was held June 9-11, 2003 at Mercyhurst College. Hosted by the school's Research/Intelligence Analyst Program (R/IAP) and sponsored by TMI Data Corporation and Lexis-Nexis. It was designed as a follow up to a number of recent national meetings and events, which have called for greater intelligence sharing and awareness, but had not thoroughly explored the overarching need for improved intelligence education and training.

This gathering brought sixty intelligence managers and trainers from the public and private sectors together with academics teaching applied intelligence. Keynote speakers included Mark Lowenthal, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis & Production; Steven Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and Ryan Dunlavey, [former] legislative assistant to U.S. Congressman Phil English (R), 21st District of Pennsylvania. English is currently proposing legislation to generate a National Intelligence Education Act that could have significant nationwide impact on intelligence training and education.



Phil English, Rep (PA)



Mark Lowenthal, CIA



Steven Casteel, DEA

Besides the speakers, a series of panels and breakout groups attempted to clarify the current status of intelligence education and training, identify steps necessary to improve the training/education profession, and provide greater communication between educators. A finding of these sessions will be published shortly.

AFIO Board Member LTG C. Norman Wood, USAF(Ret) participated in a panel, which explored the role of various intelligence-related professional organizations in the intelligence education process. ✿

"It was an impressive Colloquium. I was particularly impressed by two factors: there was a near perfect balance of academia and practitioners from all levels of government intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and, it was very evident that Professor Bob Heibel has been the driving force in preparing a model for other academicians to follow."

— C. Norman Wood, LTG, USAF(Ret)

AFIO Night at the Pops 2004 'MUSIC TO SPY BY'

The second "AFIO Night at the Pops" is scheduled for
Saturday, 19 June 2004
in **Boston, Massachusetts.**
Conductor **Keith Lockhart** will lead the
Boston Pops Esplanade Orchestra in a 'shaken and stirred' evening full of surprises including **James Bondian melodies.** Save the date, and make your plans for a clandestine weekend in Boston.

For further information, check the AFIO website [www.afio.com] regarding ticket prices and the pre-concert reception agenda.



CiCentre's "SpyMoscow" Intelligence Conference and Tour

by **Andre Martino**

The tour – held Sunday, May 25, 2003 to Wednesday, May 28, 2003 in Moscow – was arranged by AFIO member Dan Mulvenna, a former RMCP Officer and currently of the CiCentre in Alexandria, VA.



The attendees met at the Aerostar Hotel on Sunday, May 25th for a wine and cheese reception. We were introduced to our Russian host Col. Oleg Tsarev, and Lev Koshliakov, (both KGB-Ret.). Mr. Mulvenna had the attendees introduce themselves to the group and say a little about themselves.

On Monday we met in a conference room at the Aerostar where we heard three lectures. Gen. Alexander Zdanovich, (KGB/FSB Ret.) discussed *Cheka/OGPU Counterintelli-*



gence Operations Against the British and French Secret Services. One of our host Col. Oleg Tsarev discussed *Cold War Intelligence at Stalin's Disposal.* The third lecture was given by Ivan

Kusmin, former Senior Analyst and current a professor at the Diplomatic Academy. His topic was *The Final Years of the Cold War: Intelligence and Decision Making*.



Later in the morning there were case briefings on Oleg Penkovsky and Peter Popov. After lunch we all got on a comfortable bus (with a bathroom!) and visited agent meeting locations and former apartments of Penkovsky and Popov. We also went to the Border Guards Museum where we saw the things found on U-2 pilot Gary Powers. This included the keys to his apartment.

Dinner was at a Moscow restaurant which was attended by former KGB officers assigned to the KGB's London stations during the Cold War. The guests were former field officer Mikhail Lyubimov, former field officer Yuri Kobaladze and former Deputy Chief, 1st Chief Directorate Sergey Kondrashev. Dinner was filled with toasts, short recollections of happy times in the Russian intelligence service and informal discussions.

The second day we were back in the conference room of the hotel. Oleg Nechiporenko, (KGB-Ret.) was to talk about *Intelligence Services and Counter Terrorism*. Col. Nechiporenko is the author the Lee Harvey Oswald book *Passport to Assassination*. The discussion focused mostly on his book. The Colonel was assigned to the KGB station in Mexico in the 1960s and met Oswald when Oswald was desperately trying to get a visa to go to Russia at one point.



Igor Shevchuk, (KGB-Ret) discussed *Old KGB Guards in the New Market Economy*. He gave a well received presentation on what former KGB officers are doing now. He talked about the former officers that were not at the age of retirement. They are involved in private security for businesses and in private investigations.

General Zdanovich ended the morning lectures with a discussion of Stalin's SMERSH unit.

There was a review of recently published books on intelligence. All of the books discussed are in Russian only (at the moment). The morning ended with a case briefing on the Adolf Tol-kachev (betrayed by Aldrich Ames).

After lunch there were visits to intelligence sites and to the Russian Army Museum where we viewed a SMERSH exhibit and saw some of the wreckage of the U-2 Spyplane flown



by Gary Powers. We also visited the graves of famous "illegals" Rudolph Abel (Willie Fisher) and Konon Molody (Gordon Lonsdale).

Dinner was at a restaurant in Moscow. The guests of honor were General Vadim Kirpichenko, Former First Deputy Chief, First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) and currently Chief Consultant to the SVR.

General Vasily Dozhadalyov, (KGB-Ret.) formerly of the Illegals Department and principal in the Konan Molody and Kroger/Cohen cases.

Husband and wife Oksana Barkovskaya and Igor Prokopenko both television producers for REN-TV.

Former KGB officer and now business consultant Igor Shevchuk-also attended.

Ms. Barkovskaya discussed female Russian illegals and told us how she and her husband produced a series on the subject. She invited us to the studio to view one of the episodes.

On Wednesday, the final day we visited the KGB Museum we were allowed to take pictures of some of the exhibits. This is normally forbidden.

This should have been the end of the conference-tour. A small group of us arranged to go to the REN-TV offices to view an episode of female Russian illegals. We were taken to a television studio at the network and viewed a documentary about Irina Ali-

mov. Her cover name was Khatycha Sadyk and her code name was BIR. She was an actress who worked for the KGB. Ms. Sadyk was sent to Japan and spied there with her partner, whom she was later ordered to marry. The production included clips from her past as a spy. They were provided by the SVR. The producers of the documentary put the clips from the past next to present day footage of the former Russian spy. Our host Ms. Barkovskaya stated Ms. Alimova cried after watching the finished documentary.

Mr. Mulvenna announced that there will be another conference and tour next year. ❁

Martino is a second year law student at the Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, DE, interested in National Security Law and International Law.

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Congressional Proceedings

by *P. Stephen Minor, Director*
AFIO Legislative Affairs Office

Within a global framework rife with elusive enemies, ubiquitous threats of terrorist activity, sustained weapons proliferation, and resultant high and low-intensity conflict; America is currently witnessing, in order to counter and subdue these numerous international instabilities, its Intelligence Community being engaged by U.S. policymakers – as well as encouraged by a majority of the American public – on an intensified level. Along with this growing utilization of intelligence in shaping strategic national policy, there is a growing emphasis on seeking ways to substantially reform the Intelligence Community to most efficiently react to these less-than-predictable security concerns.

Procedurally, as is typical with community reform efforts of this magnitude, oversight originates within the United States Congress. From the National Security Act of 1947, the legislation that officially founded the Intelligence Community, to its mid-life oversight and scrutiny seen during the Church Committee hearings in 1973, to the horrific acts of September 2001 that awakened the risk-averse eyes of the Intelligence Community’s critics; there have been sweeping changes derived from legislative activity. It is in this context of post September 11th reshuffling that AFIO deems it crucial to begin, in furtherance of our educational and promotional mission, tracking the volumes of intelligence and related security legislation moving through Congress. Through this effort AFIO seeks to help overcome the ongoing imperative reform challenges facing Congress and to eventually mobilize the substantive and experienced membership-base that buttresses our organization. Today’s Congressional proceedings constitute a vital opportunity to begin actively assisting the reorganization of our brotherhood, thus creating an Intelligence Community that will be more finely-tuned in facing the challenges of tomorrow.

Legislative Activity within the **SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE**

S U M M E R 2 0 0 3 *

Title of Bill	Status	Effect	Intro Date / Sponsor(s)
— S E N A T E —			
S.1025 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004	Latest Major Action: On 7/31/2003, the Senate incorporated S. 1025 in H.R. 2417 and passed H.R. 2417 in lieu of S. 1025. The bill was sent to Conference Committee for resolution of amendments..	This is the Senate version of the bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. The bill has been incorporated by the Senate into H.R. 2417 (the House version of the intelligence authorization bill) and was passed with minor amendments that, in addition to many traditional and non-traditional provisions, require regular situation reporting to the appropriate congressional committees from DHS’s Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), as well as provide increased funding requests for programs such as counter-narcotics operations in Columbia. Notwithstanding these amendments, the unprecedented budget in HR. 2417 for fiscal year 2004 -while classified- amounts to a significant increase from 2003.	-8 May 03 -Sen. Pat Roberts, [R-KS] -Co. Sponsors - none
S.410 - Homeland Intelligence Agency Act of 2003	Latest Major Action: 1/30/2003 referred to Senate committee. Read twice and referred to the Committee on Intelligence	Establishes the Homeland Intelligence Agency [HIA] as an element of the Department of Homeland Security, with the primary mission of supporting the Director of Central Intelligence in the collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence in the United States, including the plans, intentions, and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. It transfers to the Agency all homeland intelligence functions currently performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, National Security Agency, and Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and it replaces the FBI with the Agency [HIA] as an element of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Additionally, it establishes, in the FBI, the Office of Foreign Intelligence Coordination.	-13 Feb 03 -Sen. John Edwards, [D-NC] -Co. Sponsors - none

S.1520 - 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act	Latest Major Action: On 7/31/2003 referred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for consideration.	This bill was conceived shortly after the release of the 9-11 joint bipartisan Congressional report. In a direct effort to address the specific issues cited in the report, this bill seeks to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to establish the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to be composed of a Director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence; as well as establishing a separate integrated National Terrorist Watchlist Center, new accountability standards for employees, and a top-to-bottom review of classification standards. Effectively, this bill seeks to reorganize the Central Intelligence Agency, designating as its lead official the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (rather than the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI). The new law will prohibit any individual from serving simultaneously as Director of National Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Essentially, the bill requests that Congress make the Director (DNI) a cabinet-level office. If ultimately signed into law, this bill could amount to a dramatic transformation of the Intelligence Community and thus necessitates careful consideration.	-7 July 03 -Sen. Bob Graham, [D-FL] -Co. Sponsors - 2
S.113 - Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)	Latest Major Action: 6/25/2003 Referred to House subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security	Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to extend the meaning of "agent of a foreign power" to any person, other than a U.S. person, that engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for them (regardless of whether affiliated with groups engaging in such terrorism or activities), for purposes of securing FISA warrants authorizing the electronic surveillance of communications between and among foreign powers. The bill also requires the U.S. Attorney General to consistently report to designated congressional committees regarding any surveillance warrants issued which require significant interpretation of established FISA provisions.	-9 Jan 03 -Sen. Jon Kyl, [R-AZ] -Co. Sponsors - 8

— HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES —

— HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES —			
H.R.2417 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004	Latest Major Action: 6/27/2003 Senate preparation for floor. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 184.	This House Resolution which now encompasses S. 1025, authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. Notable provisions of the bill include requirements that the DCI provide a report on "intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom (section 344); that 'certain qualified aliens' be allowed to receive, possess and transport 'explosive materials' if they are in the United States to cooperate with the CIA or the United States military (section 332); and – according to chairman Porter Goss – the bill 'posture[s] the United States for the future with a unified overhead imagery intelligence architecture.'"	-11 June 03 -Rep. Porter Goss, [R-FL] -Co. Sponsors - none
H.R. N/A - Academy for Law Enforcement Intelligence Act	Final drafting	This bill is being formulated to create an intelligence academy for training law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels in analysis, dissemination, and other intelligence-related purposes. The bill will also seek to create an intelligence analyst training program similar to that of the ROTC at the collegiate level.	- Introduction expected in early fall -Rep. Phil English, [R-PA] -Cosponsors - N/A

* The bills listed are a selected version of the totality of legislation currently queued within Congress. They represent AFIO's view of proposals that could substantially change the organizational framework of, or operational capability within, the Intelligence Community. Additionally, because the release of this publication coincides with the end of the Congressional summer recess, some of the reported Congressional activity may expire or remain incomplete. Future issues of *Periscope* will track these changes and provide a more current picture of legislative activity.

Source: Congressional Research Service [CRS]

LETTERS

CLANDESTINE CASE OFFICER?

Gerhard Thamm[†] writes regarding Frederick Rustmann's "Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth" in *Periscope*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 and 2, 2002.

With all due respect for Frederick W. Rustmann, Jr., and his 24 years in the clandestine service, I believe that Robert Gates was correct when he said, "Look at you - you all look alike."

I agree with Mr. Gates, that this was, and still is, the CIA's problem. Mr. Rustmann's article contains many truths, some half truths, but his core premise is a strong defense of the status quo. He correctly states that some of the criticism of CIA operations is the "result of a complete misunderstanding of how the intelligence collection process works." He is correct in saying that a case officer cannot possibly infiltrate a terrorist cell, just as it is almost impossible for a foreign case officer to become a member of the Joint Chiefs, the FBI, the CIA, or for a U.S. case officer to join the GRU, or the Soviet Naval staff—that is why we cultivate the "inside man," the recruited traitor, and we pay him well.

However, this former US Army NOC—Non Official Cover—case officer disagrees with Mr. Rustmann's premise that the CIA does not need case officers who can blend into the environment of foreign countries.

Intelligence operatives everywhere hope that their operation will run its course unnoticed; that it will flow silently past rocks and shallows and that their operation will pass others silently, unnoticed, like ships at night in bygone days. The essence of a successful operation is normality - total normality. The operation must follow a logical sequence. If it does not, someone may wonder the lack thereof - and question it; then the entire plan could become unraveled. When the embassy-based case officer meets his principal agent in the agent's home country they

operate outside the parameter of total normality.

One of Mr. Rustmann's fallacies is the belief that "case officers work out of U.S. official installations abroad...who blend perfectly into that diplomatic culture...that's their cover."

There is no cover working out of an embassy. Every counterintelligence (CI) operative knows that the embassy, any embassy, is the hub of espionage.

Every one on the staff of the Ambassador, no matter how highly or lowly placed, is at least suspected of being a spy. It takes little time for the CI operatives to ferret out the information gatherers, the real spies, the CIA, the military, or the economic case officers. Anytime this case officer leaves the secure compound of the embassy, or his embassy day office, to meet with his "principal agent," he places the principal agent at risk.

Modern surreptitious surveillance is both an art and a science. It is almost impossible to escape a team of five to ten highly trained and experienced CI operatives. They are equipped with the best infrared sensors money can buy. They have the latest directional microphones with computerized filters to eliminate ambient noises, magnetized tracker locator buttons to be dropped on the diplomat's automobile, aerial trackers, and much more. They are the death of the principal agent who meets an embassy-based case officer on the agent's home turf. This is particularly true in countries ruled by brutal dictators, such as the former Soviet Union, or today's Iraq or North Korea where paranoia drives CI, and where money for CI operations is virtually unlimited; where every city block has its block warden, where it is every citizen's duty—under threat of death for assisting the infidels or "enemies of the state"—to report any—and I mean any—unusual activity by neighbors or passers-by. Into these areas even the NOC case officer will not tread; he will restrict his activity to recruit working in third countries, and recruiting agents from the target area, those few allowed to travel abroad.

But, even there, the NOC case officer can at least blend into the background; he can look, speak, and act like his source, his agent, and he might even know how to chew khat or puff on a water pipe. His meeting with the agent is far more secure than one conducted by a white, Anglo-Saxon college graduate who reeks "American" from miles away; an American who must operate through a principal agent.

Furthermore, working through a principal agent leaves the case officer without access to the one who has, what the Soviets/Russians call "Razvedka," true intelligence, i. e., information gathered directly by a secret informant.

Another one of Mr. Rustmann's fallacies is that the case officer is "entrusted with the most sensitive national secrets the U.S. possesses." That is only because the CIA case officer wants to belong to "the club." All a case officer really needs to know are the Essential Elements of Information, the EEI (I know I am now showing my age) for his area of operation, or for his target perimeter; in other words, he has to know what elements he must collect, and the order of collection priority.

The CIA's problem has always been elitism; an inheritance from the golden days of OSS where the "Eastern Establishment" recruited agents from ivy league colleges with a strong concentration on European language skills. CIA was forced to modify this concentration to include Slavic languages, but the agency's favorite operational area still remained Central Europe, especially the garden spots of Berlin and Vienna. It also made switching to other, less cultural operating areas, difficult.

The bottom line however is that Mr. Rustmann's insistence to maintain the status quo, i.e., case officers operating out of embassies and other diplomatic missions via principal agents appears to have been unsatisfactory when case officers are deployed against world terrorists.

[†] GERHARD B. THAMM AT gbthamm@msn.com IS AN AFIO MEMBER AND RETIRED DOD CLANDESTINE OFFICER.

Fred Rustmann[†] responds:

Mr. Thamm makes some excellent points in his letter – points that others have raised and that continue to be debated within the Intelligence Community. I will try to address his major disagreements to explain further my point of view on the subject.

Aside from the inherent security concerns of using ethnic case officers, a point that Mr. Thamm apparently does not debate, the main issue of contention appears to be one of cover: Should the case officer blend into the official US government environment, or into the ethnic operational environment of a particular country?

I contend that the case officer must first blend into what is called “cover for status.” This is the cover that permits him or her to live and work in a particular country. If the case officer is under official cover, this means he must blend into the environment of an embassy or other official US installation abroad. When the case officer leaves the US government installation for a clandestine meeting with a Non-Official Cover (NOC) clandestine officer or agent, he or she must revert to what is known as “cover for action.” This cover, combined with the use of appropriate clandestine tradecraft techniques (e.g. alias, disguise, darkness, surveillance detection routes to and from meetings, etc.) is what provides cover and security for the clandestine meetings. When the operational environment is so hostile as to preclude personal meetings between case officers and NOC’s or other agents within a country, other forms of clandestine communications are used (e.g. electronic, satellite, secret writing, dead-drops, etc.), and any personal meetings are held outside the country.

A word about NOCs. They are essentially high level principal agents, staff employees (often with dual nationality) who live and work inside a particular country employing a wide variety of covers for status, ranging from employment in a large US corporation, to a foreign corporation, to a small private company. Most of them require handling by an inside

Case Officer just like any other agent. Intelligence requirements are passed down to, and reports are collected from the NOC officer or agent by the ‘inside’ case officer. The inside case officer has access to all of the operational traffic and intelligence reporting on a particular subject by virtue of his position in a secure USG facility. He passes this information on to the NOC during their meetings. Unless the NOC agent can operate without this lifeline, he will never replace the inside Case Officer.

Regarding elitism, the CIA’s case officer corps is an elite outfit. That’s a fact and it requires no excuses. It’s a good thing. If it were not elite it would not attract the high caliber of dedicated men and women it has always attracted. (FR)

[†] Frederick W. Rustmann, Jr. at ctcinfo@ctcintl.com is an AFIO member and a 24-year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service and author of *CIA, Inc.: Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence*.

THE NEW TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER (TTIC) COMBINES WITH FBI AND CIA COUNTER-TERRORISM UNITS

From: Tom Briggs
[briggs@toad.net]; Sent Monday,
March 31, 2003

Roy,

You wrote [in AFIO WIN 12-03 dtd 26 March 2003]: “The decision to create the TTIC, along with the other noteworthy decision—to co-locate the new TTIC with the current FBI and CIA counter-terrorism units at a single site in Virginia, is remarkable.”

It will, indeed, be interesting to see how this plays out.

From my days as a Special Agent in DEA I remember that criminal investigators (in DEA and I believe all federal investigative agencies) would only file in case files that information which would clearly help make an eventual court case and would survive pre-trial discovery. Other information, which national security intelligence officers would call just “intelligence,” went

into intelligence files. Of course, these files could be kept out of the discovery process. If such criminal intelligence eventually led to a prosecutable case then it could be moved into a case file. I bring this up because one infers from the media hype over this new unit that all intelligence exchange problems are going to be solved just by putting all of the various personnel together in one organization. I would suggest that there will be severe problems associated with the difference between criminal intelligence collection and any other “actionable” intelligence and just how much information will get to the new unit. This also results from cultural differences, which I’ll mention at the end of this message.

From my days as a CIA case officer I remember that there is a big difference between what goes into an intelligence dissemination to be sent to the Intelligence Community consumers and “operational information” that did not rise to the level of being “disseminable.” This “operational information,” however, can be the very kind of information that goes into law enforcement intelligence files and can be used to guide further investigation. The CIA is loathe to disseminate beyond its walls such “operational information.” If the new organization gets to receive such information that will initiate a new paradigm for case officers, that is, there will no longer be a formal process for deciding what to disseminate and, thus, how to protect the sources. It has long been part of the CIA culture that operational intelligence stay within the DO. Until the creation of centers like CTC, DI analysts almost never got to see operational intelligence. The centers, some say for good and some might say not so good, broke down this barrier. Additionally, the inclusion of officers from other agencies, like the FBI, detailed to centers also got to see operational intelligence. The significance of this is that the identity of the source is no longer protected by all the mechanisms used in disseminated intelligence to protect the identity of the source.

What will happen, will operational intelligence just be shipped over to the new unit without regard to

the protection of source identities? As I said, this is a new paradigm. After so many years of being very protective of source identities now sources will be less protected. It can work if the majority of sources are from liaison operations and maybe that is how it will work. Of course, then the nature of liaison relationships comes under scrutiny outside the DO. This may actually be worked out to everyone's satisfaction but to anyone from the old school it makes one nervous. The more casual a service becomes with source identity the more likely sources will be revealed. That is not the compact that a recruiter makes with a source at the time of recruitment.


Finally, I observed the clash of cultures when BNDD, Customs, FBN and other counter-narcotics law enforcement agencies were combined into the DEA. There were a lot of problems that never made the light of day and the clash was among law enforcement people. This new unit intends to blend together a variety of cultures. This is never easy and is never well understood by the people involved, their masters, the legislative branch or the public. It is a long hard road fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. The media and the legislators often make it sound simple, just reorganize the same people that have been accused of failing and somehow a new set of boxes and lines to connect them will result in a new successful solution. Since the War on Drugs began with either the 1968 creation of the BNDD or the 1973 creation of the DEA, take your pick, and each was trumpeted as the reorganization that would lead to victory - and has not - who among us who understands these problems thinks that simply creating new entities will lead to a victory in the War on Terrorism. ❀

Tom Briggs is a former intelligence officer with CIA and is the current webmaster for CIRA—the Central Intelligence Retirees Association.

HIGHLIGHTS

Chapter Activities in Recent Months

The **AFIO Florida Miami Chapter** had a record turnout at its most recent luncheon where local DHS Director Jose Pinon was the featured speaker for over 100 attendees. Additionally, in support of homeland defense, the Miami chapter has been sponsoring several programs including CERT "Citizens Emergency Response Team," to assist Coast Guard and law enforcement in carrying out their missions. This fall AFIO Miami expects Sen. Bob Graham – former Intell. Committee chairman and presidential hopeful— as one of its many speakers, as well as joint luncheons planned with AFIO Palm Beach. —Contact the AFIO Miami Chapter - Pres. Vq Ur ppegt "cVVTUO ko kB cqrteqo 0



The **AFIO Florida Palm Beach Chapter** held its second meeting of the season on 22 January, at Le Mont restaurant in West Palm Beach. They had the pleasure of listening to fellow AFIO member Major General (Ret) Wayne Jackson speak on the topic "The Army, a Force in Transition." 35-plus members attended the January Luncheon.

AFIO Palm Beach Chapter is a seasonal chapter, and they expect their next meeting to be held sometime in mid-November. —Contact the AFIO Palm Beach Chapter - Pres. F.W. Rustmann - at (561) 655-3111 or fwr@ctcintl.com.


The **AFIO Florida Satellite Chapter** held a meeting on 17 May where Col. Danny McKnight, USA (ret), now the Brevard County Director of Homeland Security, spoke on strategies and focus regarding terrorism. Col.

McKnight also spoke to approximately 90 AFIO members and guests about his personal experiences in Mogadishu in 1993 and his assistance in making the movie "Black Hawk Down." The AFIO Satellite Chapter had Col. Steve Warner, Command of the 45th Space Wing Mission Support, who spoke in August. —Contact the AFIO Satellite Chapter - Pres. John Hilliard - at (321) 777-0927 or hilli@infionline.net.

The **AFIO Florida Suncoast Chapter** had a meeting this past spring in which they were honored by the presence of AFIO National's President S Eugene Poteat who spoke regarding "changes in American intelligence and its role and capabilities in the war on terrorism." The Florida Suncoast Chapter has been holding meetings on a regular basis at MacDill AFB in Tampa. —Contact the AFIO Suncoast Chapter - Pres. LTC Bernie Tauber - at (813) 968-4932 or jovetblt@aol.com.


The **AFIO Northern Florida Chapter** recently had a changing of the guard where Ken Meyers, Vince Carnes, and Quiel Begonia assumed command. One of their first orders of business has been to establish a new projected meeting schedule with four meetings a year in Sept., Dec., March, and June, through 2005. These regular meetings are being held at the Orange Park Country Club, just south of Jacksonville. Additionally, Northern FL is in the process of establishing a speaker's bureau as well as adding new activities to its itinerary including family picnics, evening dinners, and joint luncheons with other nearby AFIO Chapters. For updated information contact AFIO Northern Florida - Pres. Capt. Ken Meyer - at (904) 630-1212 or meyer@coj.net.

The **AFIO California San Diego Chapter** has been going strong and recently hosted a luncheon on July 9 that featured the former Director of NSA and DDCI Admiral Bobby Inman who spoke about the "politics of terrorism." AFIO San Diego had over 45 people in attendance and



boasts a member and guest list of over 70 regular attendees. —Contact the AFIO San Diego Chapter - Pres. Darryl Thibault - at (619) 297-9959 or drt1083@aol.com.

The **AFIO New Mexico Chapter**, now with a new meeting destination at JB's Restaurant located at Hotel Circle in Albuquerque, continues



to be an active and highly organized AFIO chapter. On July 23rd, Dr. Mark Peceny, Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico, spoke to the chapter about a range of topics while requesting feedback regarding speakers and subject matter for his newly formed Intelligence Studies Club at UNM. A prime example of AFIO's core mission! —Contact the AFIO New Mexico Chapter - Pres. Dick Callaghan - at (505) 992-1338 or bajaloie@worldnet.att.net.

The **AFIO Hawaii Chapter** held its spring meeting on April 10 at the home of Hope and David Doyle where renowned British author and intelligence historian Nigel West briefed the chapter, among other things, about "Mossad and Iraq." —Contact the AFIO Hawaii Chapter - Pres. Dr. Paul Kenyon - at (808) 946-0686 or horis001@hawaii.rr.com.

The **AFIO Texas Alamo Chapter**, while relatively small in size, prides itself on its members' close, personal, informal, and educational bond. They continue to meet the first Thursday of each month where members speak to their current professional assignments and endeavors. Recently local member Dr. Bob Jensen spoke about experiences and conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. —Contact the AFIO Alamo Chapter - Pres. Henry Bussey - at (210) 490-5408 or hmbus@stic.net.

The **AFIO Illinois Midwest Chapter** has been as active as it possibly can. A typical year for AFIO Midwest includes at least 4 regular meetings, some of which entail travel and exploration. Unfortunately, due to mobilizations for war at key military installations where the chapter planned

to hold meetings, they were forced to cancel. However, on the weekend of September 18, AFIO Midwest will have its annual convention at Great Lakes Naval Base and will hear from speakers from the FBI, the DEA, the State Department, and the USNR. All local and able members are encouraged to attend. —Contact the AFIO Midwest Chapter - Pres. Col Angelo Diliberti - at (847) 931-4184 or airbornewop@aol.com.

The **AFIO Northern Ohio Chapter** has been busy actively sponsoring a variety of events including a speech on May 18 by fellow member Michael Goldstein regarding the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, on 13 July a Bastille Day picnic, on Sept. 7 a BBQ and museum tour, and in Dec. AFIO Ohio will hold its annual Christmas party. All events are hosted with the generosity of local members and friends of the organization. —Contact AFIO Northern Ohio - Pres. Valdis Berzins - at (440) 842-6688 or valdi40@ameritech.net.



The **AFIO Nevada Northern Sierra Chapter** on June 21, in furtherance of AFIO's community involvement and educational principles, donated \$200 to the "We the People" team of Incline High School in Lake Tahoe. Incline High School is a three time state champion of this "We the People" competition that is designed to foster a knowledge and competency of constitutional principles within American high school students. AFIO's donation will offset the team's costs of traveling to Washington to compete. —Contact AFIO Northern Sierra - Pres. Bart Bechtel - at (775) 833-0181 or bnbechtel@yahoo.com.

The **AFIO Nevada Las Vegas Chapter** has been holding meetings regularly on every second Saturday of the even months of the year at the Boulder Station Hotel and Casino. In April, AFIO Las Vegas was joined by the DCI representative to Los Angeles and, in June, they were fortunate enough to hear from the Director of Operations from the 547th Intelligence Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base. In addition to regular meetings, AFIO Las Vegas

has initiated a community outreach partnership and career education program called "Exploring is Learning for Life" with the Boy Scouts of America. —Contact the AFIO Las Vegas Chapter - Pres. Richard Cohn - at (702) 871-9916 or at afiolasvegas@att.net.

The **AFIO New York Derek Lee Chapter** is currently undergoing efforts to reorganize and rejuvenate itself with regular meetings and expanded programs, and is asking that interested persons in the surrounding areas of Manhattan and other boroughs, southern Connecticut, Long Island, or eastern New Jersey, willing to participate or offer assistance in efforts to schedule activities and increase membership, contact Don Milton (Chapter President) at (516) 621-5262, email afiony@aol.com; or C. Emerson Cooper (VP of AFIO Chapters) at sinon@worldnet.att.net. The AFIO New York Chapter has incredible potential and we expect to see great things happening in the near future in this major metro area.

The **AFIO New England David Atlee Phillips Chapter** recently held its summer meeting on July 18 and 19 at The Hotel Northampton. Here, in Northampton MA, chapter attendees were able to absorb the art and culture of the city and were given a presentation by Ralph Barger of the Defense Security Service. Mr. Barger spoke about technology theft in the U.S. and what the DoD is doing to combat it. —Contact the AFIO New England Chapter - Pres. Peggy Ann Adler.

The **Newly Forming AFIO Maine Chapter of Kennebunk** held its first organizational meeting on Sat. July 26 where Dr. Bill Anderson presided as the founding president. Enthusiastic efforts are underway as this up and coming chapter is diligently working to gather support, write by-laws, and expand its membership. If anyone lives near by and is interested in becoming part of this new venture, you can contact Dr. Anderson or Allan Swenson at (207) 985-3216 or at aswenson@gwi.net. ✨

e-Bulletin Board Selections

RESEARCHERS SEEKING ASSISTANCE

[IMPORTANT: AFIO does not "vet" inquiries and offers. Responders are urged to exercise normal caution and good judgment when responding]

Interviews requested: "My name is Rosemary N. Dew, an AFIO member. I am a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. My book, *No Cover*, about my career in the FBI, will be published by Carroll & Graf in January, 2004. For my second book, which is about the FBI's Special Intelligence Service, I would like to interview anyone who has information about the FBI's Special Intelligence Service. Anyone with assistance can contact me by email at rndew@yahoo.com."

USTAMP Research Inquiry: "I am Julian Schofield, professor of political science at Concordia University (Montreal), and retired Capt Canadian army engineers. I am conducting research on doctrine in Pakistan's SSG and the US's role in helping developing it. I was hoping to draw upon the advice and experience of AFIO to find out what doctrine was taught by Colonel Kelly Thompson's USTAMP and his fifteen member staff. Half of these were civilians directed by the CIA in the U.S. embassy, and the remainder have unknown military affiliations. Names include: Lord, Buckley, Dunn, Murray, Hicks, and Sommers. I am speculating that these are 77th SFGA, and civilians were drawn from OSS Jedburg teams etc. Anyone with assistance can contact Mr. Schofield at julian.schofield@sympatico.ca"

NEW BOOKS, WEBSITES, & MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF INTEREST

Now in Paperback – A new paperback version of Ronald Kessler's book "THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI" is now out with an epilogue on the events since

publication of the hardcover a year ago.

Law Enforcement Counterintelligence - AFIO member and acclaimed author Lawrence B. Sulc's book entitled *Law Enforcement Counterintelligence* is now available in paperback for \$24.96; ISBN: 1888644745. Published by Varro Press in October of 1996, this 229 page book is an insightful look into the logistics and processes involved in CI and law enforcement. To order and read reviews of his book, visit www.Amazon.com.

AFIO Member Publishes Fourth Book: Arthur E Gerringer, a former U.S. Army CI Agent, Federal Agent and President of The Inter-Sec Group has released his newest book. His specialty is counter-terrorism and the book is entitled "Terrorism, From One Millennium to the Next". It is over five hundred pages and is packed with hundreds of profiles on terrorist organizations and individuals, from both the right and the left, both domestic and international. It was published by the Writers Press Guild and is available for online purchase via www.IUniverse.com.

Calling all Packrats — OLD INTELLIGENCER ISSUES - Reward for missing Intelligencer Issues! We are looking for selected copies of the "Intelligencer" to complete the AFIO archive. Needed: Any issue from 1989 (Vol.1), the first 1990 issue (Vol.2, Num.1), and a 1994 summer issue (Vol.5, Num.2). If you have the issues we need, we would greatly appreciate lending us your copy to be promptly returned. Contact AFIO (MKStinson@afio.com) and we will arrange your reward.

UPCOMING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BY DATE

3 October 03 - Washington, D.C. - Learn the Secret of Doing Business in Today's China - Risk Assessments from the American Intelligence Profession. National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges and co-sponsor American Management Association host this current issues forum. American firms must contend

with a wide variety of issues, including China's recent admission to the WTO, changing priorities of the Chinese government, the ups and downs of U.S.-China relations, and the difficulties of dealing with a unique culture. This timely, new Current Issues Forum can guide you confidently past such potential obstacles—put you on the inside track to a successful venture in this large and challenging market. Conference will be held October 3, 2003 at the AMA Executive Conference Center in Washington, D.C. Information and Registration are at www.amanet.org/events/latin_america/register.htm

16 - 18 October – CASIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 2003 – The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies is hosting its annual security conference this year in Vancouver, British Columbia. This year's conference, entitled "Homeland Insecurities: The Shifting Borders of Security, Intelligence and Law Enforcement" will provide a forum for discussing trends in terrorism as well as homeland security issues facing Canada and the U.S., specifically focusing on borders and security. This three day conference will be held at the Simon Fraser University Harbour Centre at 515 West Hastings St., Vancouver, BC. The Conference will run from 1:00 pm on Thursday, October 16th to 5:30 pm on Saturday, October 18th, 2003 followed by the CASIS Annual General Meeting on the 18th. For more information involving this popular conference, email registrar@casis.ca.

24 - 25 October - Kennebunkport, ME - AFIO/NEW ENGLAND CHAPTER holds Fall meeting at The Nonantum Resort, on the banks of the Kennebunk River in historic Kennebunkport, Maine. Their speaker will be Chapter member Dr. William H. Anderson, senior psychiatrist at Massachusetts General Hospital and lecturer at Harvard, who will tell us about "The Mind of The Terrorist." Inquiries to PA Adler at (860) 669-7706

30 - 31 October - Ft. Meade, MD – The Center for Cryptologic History hosts the NINTH SYMPOSIUM ON CRYPTOLOGIC

HISTORY at the Maritime Institute, a conference complex near the Baltimore-Washington International Airport (a few miles north of the NSA campus on Fort Meade). The Symposium will have panels on pre-war and World War II cryptology as well as the Cold War. See advertisement on page 18 of this issue of *Periscope*.

18 - 20 November - Sciax Counter-Terrorism Conference (SCTC)— This is a nonprofit conference hosted by Sciax and Tactical Watreborne Operations (T.W.O.) with the goal of exposing capable people to current counter-terrorist philosophies, techniques and equipment. This year's conference has recently been announced and will feature Lt. Col. Dave Grossman conducting his full 7-hour seminar, as well as AFIO members speaking and presenting. SCTC 2003 will be held November 18,19,20 at the Sheraton Oceanfront Hotel in Virginia Beach, VA. E-mail info@sciax.com for registration details. You can also contact Teena Rumak, Sciax, by Phone (416) 778-6770; Toll Free (877) 997-2429; Fax (416) 778-8775; or E-mail trumak@sciax.com



5 December 03 - Atlanta, GA - Business Opportunities and Pitfalls in Today's Latin America - Risk Assessments from American Diplomatic and Intelligence Professionals. National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges and co-sponsor American Management Association host this current issues forum. American firms must contend with a wide variety of issues, including the potential distancing of some South American countries from U.S.-centric economic policies, the obstacles of narco-terrorism and resurgent populism, the ups and downs of U.S. relations, and the continuing challenges for foreign investment. This timely, new Current Issues Forum can guide you confidently past such potential obstacles—put you on the inside track to a successful venture in this large and challenging market. Conference will be held December 5, 2003 at AMA Executive Conference Center, Atlanta. Information and Registration at www.amanet.org/events/latin_america/register.htm ❀

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Rocky Mountain Chapter
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Texas Alamo Chapter
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- Washington—Seattle
Pacific Northwest Chapter
Pres. George Knudtzon
360.698.1403
audax@compuserve.com

The Composition of Current AFIO Membership

as of 22 August 2003



GROWING Corporate Partnerships with AFIO



**Robert E.
Redding,**
VP CORPORATE
DEVELOPMENT
RobRedding@earthlink.net

In our most recent flagship publications, President Gene Poteat uttered the following challenge: "AFIO's mission of educating the public is no longer just a goal, it is essential and critical action we need to implement. It will take the best from all of us."

Fortunately, AFIO's human resources are very impressive. We have 11 members of our Honorary Board which includes two past Presidents and the most recent addition of R. James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 26-member Board of Directors is chaired by Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF (Ret), onetime Director of the National Security Agency, and the Vice Chairman is E. Peter Earnest, former senior official at CIA and current Executive Director of the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC. Our indefatigable trio of Executive Officers include President Poteat, Senior Vice President Lt. Gen. Edward J. Heinz USAF (Ret), and Executive Director Roy K. Jonkers. These 40 alumni intelligence veterans are the best of us.

In addition, the AFIO human resources include a new high level of 3,500 former intelligence officers who have accumulated countless years, days and hours of public service in the intelligence/law enforcement field. They served not only the U.S. Government but also state and local governments, also with corporate and academic connections. Indeed, this immense peer group includes many

spouses supportive of AFIO. For example, Mrs. Richard Colby, widow of the former Director of the CIA, attended the most recent AFIO luncheon.

This exclusive collection of AFIO leaders and members is what makes us the private support organization with the greatest access to the top officials of the Intelligence Community. I'll say it again: THE GREATEST ACCESS TO THE TOP OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

The business and industrial corporations of America have their own mission, i.e., providing contractual services and goods to the U.S. Government, including the Intelligence Community. This means, however, that they need to be familiar with current Congressional and Executive Branch policies and programs for which they can qualify and obtain profitable contracts.

In this highly competitive world, how can they gain such knowledge?

- AFIO provides a unique opportunity for senior level corporate officials to obtain a deeper insight about the critical conditions in our daily terrorist world, through Symposia and Conferences.

- AFIO provides its corporate partners access to experienced intelligence experts by personal contact at AFIO-sponsored events, and in written publications, such as (1) the semi-annual **Intelligencer**, a journal of U.S. intelligence studies; (2) semi-annual **Periscope**, a printed commentary, speeches and articles on intelligence; (3) monthly **E-Bulletin Board Notices** of IC events, author assistance requests, job openings, and positions wanted; (4) AFIO Web Site; (5) monographs, and (6) most important, the **Weekly Intelligence Notes [WINs]**, emailed weekly commentaries on intelligence issues. WOW, WHAT A BARGAIN!

This is why we have enlarged our AFIO family of corporate partners, now 33 in number, and are looking to grow this number by 100%. With your help we can do it! Drop me a note, let's talk. You can reach me at the AFIO at afio@afio.com or at RobRedding@earthlink.net. ❁

CURRENT AFIO CORPORATE PARTNERS

AS OF
AUGUST 2003

ACS DEFENSE, Inc.
ANONYMOUS - 1
BLUE TECH, Inc.
CACI INTERNATIONAL - FEDERAL
CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS
CHLORINE CHEMISTRY COUNCIL
DISCOVERY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES
DUPONT INVESTMENT BANKERS
GEO-CENTERS
HILL & ASSOCIATES (Americas)
INCRIS
INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL SPY MUSEUM
LITTON PRC
LOCKHEED MARTIN (M&DS)
MAJOR, CAPPs & ASSOCIATES
MANTECH-AEGIS RESEARCH Corp.
MOTOROLA
NORTHROP GRUMMAN Corp.
ORINCON Corp.
PHILLIPS INTERNATIONAL, Inc.
PORTBLUE Corp.
RAYTHEON, Inc.
RSA SECURITY, Inc.
SECURITY SERVICE SPECIALISTS, Inc.
SPARTA, Inc.
STG, Inc.
TAYLOR & FRANCIS BOOKS, Ltd.
TRUMP ORGANIZATION
TRW SPACE & DEFENSE
VERIDIAN
THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
THE WINDERMERE GROUP



AFIO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYMPOSIUM AND CONVENTION 2003

THE CHANGING FACE OF INTELLIGENCE

TENTATIVE AGENDA as of 15 September 2003

Convention/Symposium Co-Chairmen: S. Eugene Poteat, AFIO President Roy K. Jonkers, AFIO Executive Director

AT SHERATON PREMIERE HOTEL Tysons Corner, VA, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, and at CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES TO ATTENDEES

- Session is unclassified, Background-Use Only, Not-For-Attribution
- Do not use cell phones, tape recorders or other recording devices. Place cell phones or pagers on silent mode. You may otherwise be asked to leave.
- Security personnel are on duty.

AFIO CONVENTION 1 & 2 NOVEMBER 2003

SHERATON PREMIERE HOTEL

SATURDAY 1 NOVEMBER —DAY ONE—

- (1) Luncheon speaker (invited) Dr. Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for S. Asia / Middle East.
- (2) Mid-East Situation Report & Discussion
- (3) CI Centre - Israeli Intelligence & CI over the years
- (4) Medical Intelligence Center - Biological WMD threat & risks
- (5) DEA - Narcotics Intelligence
- (6) National Counter Intelligence Executive (NCIX)
- (7) Congeniality Hour(s) - Enjoy a strong beverage on AFIO

- (8) "Spies in Black Ties" – AFIO Annual Awards Banquet, Sunday Evening
Formal attire recommended but not mandatory. Includes Open Bar Reception & Banquet with distinguished Keynote speaker, music, entertainment, awards.

SUNDAY 2 NOVEMBER —DAY TWO—

— SUNDAY MORNING —
SPECIAL CONVENTION PROGRAMS

- (1) **Option A** - Exclusive private (no public admitted) tour of International Spy Museum, with introduction by Peter Earnest, ISM Executive Director.

OR

- (2) **Option B** - Bus tour from hotel covering sites relating to the FBI traitor Hanssen & the KGB, (limit 50).

— SUNDAY AFTERNOON —
CONVENTION PROGRAM AT HOTEL

- (1) Luncheon with distinguished guest speaker/author
- (2) Korea/China Assessment
- (3) Intelligence Issues Panel
- (4) Intelligence Book Review panel, Ward Warren et al., – Review of Intelligence Literature of the past year.
- (5) General Membership Meeting - President, Sr. VP & Executive Director
- (6) Congeniality Hour(s) / Have a drink on AFIO

— SUNDAY EVENING —
CONVENTION CHAPTER PROGRAM AT HOTEL

Chapter Workshop – restricted to current and prospective Chapter representatives, conducted by AFIO VP for Chapters Emerson Cooper. No cost, but must register. Limited attendance.

CONVENTION ENDS

AFIO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYMPOSIUM 3 & 4 NOVEMBER 2003

The Changing Face of Intelligence

MONDAY 3 NOVEMBER —DAY 3—
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, CHANTILLY, VA

NOTE: Special security restrictions & screening apply. No cell phones, cameras or recording devices allowed at either NRO or CIA. Those attending must provide AFIO your SSN, Place and Date of Birth (provide by phone, fax, mail if desired)

Agenda subject to confirmation and amplification

Registration and Security at NRO – 8:20 - 9:10

- (1) Hon. Peter Teets, Director NRO – Space Reconnaissance Today and Tomorrow
- (2) Lt. Gen. (ret) James Clapper, Director NIMA – Global Geo-Spatial Intelligence Achievements and Plans
- (3) Dr. Anthony Tether, Director DARPA – Advanced technologies & Systems for National Security
- (4) Dr. Donald Kerr, CIA Deputy Director for S&T – Achievements in Technology in the War on Terrorism
- (5) BG Michael Ennis, Director of Intelligence, USMC – Iraq War ISR Lessons
- (6) FINCEN – Financial Counter-Terrorist Achievements & Challenges
- (7) DoD – Cyber Information Operations
- (8) Reception

TUESDAY 4 NOVEMBER —DAY 4—
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LANGLEY, VA

NOTE: Special security restrictions & screening apply. No cell phones, cameras or recording devices allowed at either NRO or CIA. Those attending must provide SSN, Place and Date of Birth (provide by phone, fax or mail if desired)

AGENDA subject to confirmation and amplification

Registration and Security at CIA – 7:30 to 8:20

- (1) Hon. Porter Goss, HPSCI Chairman, – Congressional Perspectives on the Intelligence Community
- (2) CIA Official – CIA Intelligence Achievements and Challenges
- (3) Hon. Robert Mueller, Dir. FBI – FBI in Transition,
- (4) Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, Director NSA – NSA in the Information Age
- (5) Hon. Stephen A. Cambone, Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence – Defense Intelligence in Transformation
- (6) John Brennan, Director TTIC – Terrorist Intelligence - Terrorist Threat Integration Center operation, achievements and challenges
- (7) Dr. John Gannon, House Committee Staff Director – Homeland Security - Congressional Perspectives
- (8) Ambassador Robert Hutchings, National Intelligence Council Director – US Intelligence Requirements for the 21st Century
- (9) Reception

SYMPOSIUM ENDS

REGISTRATION
AFIO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYMPOSIUM/CONVENTION 1-4 NOVEMBER 2003

COMPLETE STEPS

- The Changing Face of Intelligence -

Space limited. Priority given to Members and Guests. Registration is accepted on a date-of-receipt basis

[SEPARATE FORM REQUIRED FOR EACH ATTENDEE]

① THRU ⑥

① **Name:** _____
 U.S. Citizen ____ yes ____ no Current AFIO Member? ____ yes ____ no
 or Member of related Association? Name: _____ or Govt. Agency: _____
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③ **CONVENTION PACKAGE**
AFIO CONVENTION [SATURDAY & SUNDAY] - Includes
 Banquet, reception, two lunches, refreshments,
 discussion sessions, and 'congeniality' hours
 [does not include Sunday Tour Options A or B]
MEMBERS OR INVITED GUESTS,
 OR NON-MEMBERS \$189

OR

③ **SYMPOSIUM PACKAGE**
AFIO SYMPOSIUM [MONDAY & TUESDAY] - Includes
 lunch, refreshments, receptions, and discussion
 sessions
MEMBERS OR INVITED GUESTS..... \$258
WITH OPTIONAL BUS [to NRO/CIA] \$298
NON-MEMBERS \$318
WITH OPTIONAL BUS [to NRO/CIA] \$358

③ **COMBINED EVENTS PACKAGE**
[FOR MEMBERS OR GUESTS ONLY]
SYMPOSIUM PACKAGE + CONVENTION PACKAGE
 No Bus \$399 // WITH BUS \$439
 [DOES NOT INCLUDE OPTIONAL SUNDAY TOURS - SELECT ONE BELOW]

④ **EXTRA Options for Sunday**
For Tours, Choose Option "A" OR "B"
Option A: Spy Museum Private Tour
 without bus [meet at Museum].....\$20
 With bus from/to Sheraton\$45
Option B: Hanssen Spy Tour,
 includes bus from/to Sheraton.....\$59
Chapter Workshop Sunday Evening
Sign-Up: \$nc
 Checkmark this item if you are a member of a chapter
outside the DC metro area and want to attend the
Sunday Evening Chapter Workshop [PRE-REGISTRATION
REQUIRED FOR WORKSHOPS. NO COST TO CHAPTER OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS. ALSO OPEN TO MEMBERS SEEKING TO START A NEW LOCAL
CHAPTER IN THEIR AREA]

⑤ **À LA CARTE SELECTIONS**
Saturday/Sunday, 1 & 2 Nov, afternoon Sessions. [Includes
 two lunches, congeniality hours, refreshments, bar]
AFIO MEMBERS, GUESTS, OR
CORPORATE PARTNERS \$109
Saturday Evening, "Spies in Black Ties" Reception
& Banquet, 1 Nov, 6 - 9 pm [Includes open bar, 3-course dinner
 with wine, music, etc.]
AFIO MEMBERS, GUESTS, OR
NON-MEMBERS \$99
Monday, 3 Nov, at NRO [includes coffee, refreshments,
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AFIO MEMBERS, GUESTS,
OR CORPORATE PARTNERS \$129
WITH BUS FROM/TO SHERATON .. \$149
NON-MEMBERS \$159
WITH BUS FROM/TO SHERATON .. \$179
Tuesday, 4 Nov, at CIA [includes coffee, refreshments,
 lunch, reception]
AFIO MEMBERS, GUESTS,
OR CORPORATE PARTNERS \$129
WITH BUS FROM/TO SHERATON .. \$149
NON-MEMBERS \$159
WITH BUS FROM/TO SHERATON .. \$179

⑥ **→ Total of selections: \$ _____ ←**
Credit Card: ____ VISA ____ MasterCard ____ AMEX
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Cancellation Schedule: AFIO must commit to the facility
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 POLICY: 90% up to 7 October; 65% from 8 Oct to 22 Oct; 50%
 from 23 October to 27 October; 10% from 28 October to 31 October.
 No refund thereafter.

HOTEL INFORMATION: Reserve by 15 October to ensure special \$89/night rate. Reservations may be made at convention rate at: The Sheraton Premiere, 8661 Leesburg Pike, Tysons Corner/Vienna, VA 22182. [1.800.572.ROOM or 703.448.1234].



The Center for Cryptologic History hosts the Ninth Symposium on Cryptologic History

30-31 October 2003 - Ft. Meade, Maryland

at the Maritime Institute, a conference complex in Linthicum, MD near the Baltimore-Washington International Airport (a few miles north of the NSA campus on Fort Meade).

The Symposium will have panels on pre-war and World War II cryptology as well as the Cold War. All symposium sessions will be unclassified.

The confirmed speaker list includes David Kahn, Nigel West, Tony Sale (formerly of Bletchley Park), and a World War II operator who copied Japanese traffic on Guadalcanal.

The National Cryptologic Museum Foundation is administering the registration process on behalf of the Center for Cryptologic History.

The Maritime Institute will provide lunch for all conference attendees.

REGISTRATION: The National Cryptologic Museum Foundation is handling registration for the symposium. If you'd like to join this exploration of cryptologic history, complete the online form at

<http://www.nsa.gov/docs/history/2003Symposium.html>

and send it, with a check of \$25/person/day, to:

The National Cryptologic Museum Foundation, P. O. Box 1682, Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-9998

The Maritime Institute has rooms for 29 and 30 October. To make reservations, call 410-859-5700 and press option 0 (zero). Reservations should be made by 1 October.

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SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

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**BALLOT
FOR ELECTION OF BOARD MEMBERS FOR 2004**

YOUR VOTE REQUESTED

For those who have **not** already cast votes by e-mail,
please send us your vote **no later than 25 October 2003**.

[VOTE FOR FIVE CANDIDATES, ONLY]

I vote for both nominated candidates below

OR

I vote for selected candidates as follows:

Clearly **PRINT** your name below so we can verify your membership status and that it is current.

Jack G. Downing, former Deputy Director of Operations [DDO-CIA] entered the CIA in 1967. During his illustrious CIA career he served as Station chief in both Moscow and Beijing, and as Chief of the DO East Asia Division. He retired in 1995, but was talked into serving another two year tour by the DCI in 1997. He graduated from Harvard University majoring in Chinese language and history and Asian studies, spent two combat tours as an infantry officer in the US Marine Corps in Vietnam.



Edward J. Heinz, Lt. Gen., USAF(Ret), former Director, Intelligence Community Staff, CIA. As the principal Deputy for Intelligence Community matters to the Director of Central Intelligence, he was responsible for policy, planning, coordination, legislative liaison and budget issues of the intelligence community. He also served as the senior military adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence. He has degrees in economics and geography from the University of Minnesota and a master's degree in public administration from Auburn University. The General completed Squadron Officer School in 1961, Air Command and Staff College in 1966 and the Air War College in 1974. He retired from the military in April 1990.



[write-in candidate]

[write-in candidate]

[write-in candidate]

Send vote to **AFIO - Votes, 6723 Whittier Ave Ste 303A, McLean, VA 22101**.

If you have **not** done so by e-mail but are able, send your vote **instead** by e-mail to vote@afio.com supplying the names of your selections, or just write "BOTH" if applicable.

New AFIO Appointment Effective 2004





To replace VP Lt. Gen. Ed Heinz [USAF-Ret], now moving to the AFIO Board, will be André Kesteloot. Kesteloot, born in Belgium, retired from CIA at the end of 1994 and has since worked as a consultant for various Government contractors. He is the author of "Why Did Lafayette Come To America?" which



appeared in the Winter 2000 issue of *Intelligencer*. He is the recipient of CIA's "Intelligence Star," given by the Agency for a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous conditions or for outstanding achievements or services rendered with distinction under conditions of grave risk.


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Weekly Intelligence Notes [WINS] SELECTIONS

*WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE NOTES
ARE SENT TO ALL MEMBERS BY E-MAIL*

Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINS) are produced, edited and written by Roy Jonkers, and sent electronically to AFIO members and WIN subscribers for non-profit educational uses. They may not be reproduced without permission from the Producer.

RADM (ret) Don Harvey contributes articles to selected WINS, and AFIO members' commentaries may also be included in Section VI, Letters.

The following articles are extracted (and occasionally abbreviated) from WINS 26-03 to 32-03. They are a sample of possible use by members in getting new members to join AFIO, and this section may be reproduced for that purpose.

CONTENTS of WINS

- SECTION I - Current Intelligence
- SECTION II - Context and Precedence
- SECTION III - Cyber Intelligence
- SECTION IV - Books and Sources
- SECTION V - Notes & Announcements
- SECTION VI - Letters

SECTION I CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

**JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
REPORT ON FBI TRAITOR
HANSSEN** – The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 14 August released an

unclassified report entitled “**A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Detering, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen.**” It examines the performance of the FBI in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage of Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Hanssen’s espionage began in November 1979 – three years after he joined the FBI – and continued intermittently in three phases for over 20 years until his arrest in February 2001, just two months before his mandatory retirement date. The FBI is the lead agency for detecting and investigating espionage committed in the United States. The report paints a painful picture of our Cold War FBI counter-espionage posture.

The OIG report comes in three versions. The full 674-page report is classified at the Top Secret/Codeword level because it contains extremely sensitive classified information regarding sources involved in the Hanssen case and FBI counterintelligence activities. There also is a 383-page report, classified at the Secret level, which does not contain the detailed information on the sensitive sources that is included in the Top Secret/Codeword version. In addition, a 31-page unclassified executive summary was prepared to provide a public summary of the main findings in the more extensive classified reports. The Inspector General previously provided a copy of all three versions of the report to the FBI for its comments on their factual accuracy and classification, and made changes where appropriate.

Selected excerpts from the OIG report follow. “The FBI’s penetration efforts in the late 1970s and 1980s suffered from a lack of cooperation with the CIA and from inattention on the part of senior management. In 1985 and 1986, the CIA and FBI lost nearly every significant human asset then operating against the Soviet Union. These losses were unprecedented in scope, quantity, significance, and timing, yet the FBI undertook no sustained effort to determine their cause. Senior management was almost entirely

unaware of the scope and significance of these losses, and throughout the 1980s the FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to resolve the cause of these losses or to thoroughly investigate whether an FBI mole could be responsible for these setbacks. We now know that Hanssen compromised many of the assets and operations lost during the mid-1980s.

The early 1990s saw significant improvement in FBI/CIA cooperation, with the two agencies undertaking a joint investigation concerning the cause of the 1985-86 asset losses. The FBI drastically increased the number of squads and personnel devoted to espionage investigations, and the FBI’s senior management took a much more active role in supervising penetration investigations. The energized penetration efforts led to successful espionage prosecutions of CIA officers Aldrich Ames and Harold Nicholson, FBI Special Agent Earl Pitts, and NSA detailee David Boone. While the FBI worked closely with the CIA’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU) on most of these cases, the SIU was not an equal partner. The FBI’s failure to keep the CIA apprised of information concerning non-CIA espionage investigations – such as the case involving FBI agent Earl Pitts – undermined the effort to identify Hanssen.

In attempting to identify the mole who turned out to be Hanssen, the FBI intensively pursued a CIA suspect. This investigation culminated in the submission of a report to the Justice Department that appeared to seek the prosecution of that CIA suspect, despite the fact that some senior FBI managers had serious reservations about the conclusions of the report and doubted whether the officer – who has since been exonerated by the FBI – was the correct target.

Although the FBI pursued penetration leads in the 1990s that we now know related to Hanssen, he received no investigative scrutiny until late 2000. Indeed, the FBI never opened even a preliminary inquiry on any FBI employee in connection with the search for the mole ultimately identified as Hanssen. This was true even though

the FBI had access to information suggesting that the mole might be an FBI employee, and believed that the mole had compromised certain FBI assets and operations.

Longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program played an important role in the FBI's failure to uncover Hanssen. Most importantly, the FBI demonstrated a reluctance to consider itself as a possible source for a penetration in the absence of leads identifying a specific FBI target. Thus, the FBI maintained a focus on the CIA as the mole's employer despite information indicating that the mole might be an FBI employee.

Ineffective oversight by FBI management and poor coordination with the Justice Department also contributed to the length of the FBI's investigation of the wrong suspect and the failure to pursue alternative avenues. The FBI managers with supervisory authority over the investigation often deferred to line personnel – even when the managers harbored serious doubts about the progress of the investigation – resulting in a tacit endorsement of erroneous analysis and conclusions. This problem was compounded by the FBI's poor coordination with the Justice Department components responsible for overseeing intelligence investigations – the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and the Criminal Division's Internal Security Section (ISS). Because the FBI did not provide the Justice Department with complete information about its investigation – omitting crucial information about weaknesses in proof and investigative setbacks – the Justice Department could not properly evaluate the strength of the FBI's case against the CIA suspect.

Although Hanssen escaped detection for more than 20 years, this was not because he was a “master spy.” While Hanssen took some important steps to maintain his security – such as refusing to reveal his identity to his Russian handlers – and used his knowledge of the FBI's counterintelligence practices and poor internal security to his advantage, much of Hanssen's con-

duct when committing espionage was reckless. For example, Hanssen (1) set up an FBI camera on a drop site he used for exchanges with the GRU during his first period of espionage; (2) used an FBI telephone line and answering machine for communications with the KGB in 1986; (3) deposited much of the KGB's cash directly into a pass-book savings account in his name in the late 1980s; (4) suggested to his Russian handlers in 1991 that they attempt to recruit Jack Hoschouer, his best friend; (5) directly approached a GRU officer in 1993 and revealed that he was an FBI agent who had previously committed espionage for the KGB – an approach that led to a diplomatic protest from the Russians and an FBI investigation that could have identified Hanssen as a mole; and (6) searched the FBI's computer system, during his last period of espionage, for references to his own name, address, and drop and signal sites – conduct that would have been difficult to explain if the FBI had utilized the computer system's audit feature. In sum, Hanssen escaped detection not because he was extraordinarily clever and crafty, but because of longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program and a deeply flawed FBI internal security program.”

The report of this long-running espionage and treason-from-within is disturbing reading. It confirms my own suspicion, based on career observations, of the security (or systemic insecurity) of some HUMINT assets, even if never imagined in this proportion and magnitude. The report shows the damage from leadership feuds and bureaucratic turf protection, such as between the Justice Department and the FBI, which possibly colors this DoJ/OIG report on the FBI to some extent. It highlights systemic shortcomings. The 21 OIG recommendations (omitted from this article), many of which can be viewed from the outside as useful, are hopefully already accepted and put into place. Ultimately we must and can rely on the integrity of our government personnel and on our constitutional system of checks and balances, and that confidence can be restored (if needed, as in this case)

and reinforced by constructive critique and correction. One may remember that anyone can be made to look bad with perfect hindsight. The betrayal by Hanssen was counter-intuitive to his personal profile and uncharacteristic of the general FBI agent profile or departmental esprit. The FBI (and other departments and corporations) internal CI system must adapt to this insight, without going overboard. This is an interesting report, worth reading in full. (Jonkers) (Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 14 August 2003 //Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, & 9-member investigative team). (HTML version: <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-08/index.htm>) (PDF version: <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-08/final.pdf>)

INTELLIGENCE STOPS POTENTIAL AIRLINE DISASTER – In the ongoing unending war against the al-Qaeda terrorist threat, the intelligence community has scored a great many successes, including the capture or killing of 65% of the al-Qaeda leadership. The latest event of note is the arrest of a British national, a reputed arms dealer (albeit seemingly small-time and stupid), alleged to have planned to smuggle Russian IGLA-18 man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, with a 4 to 5 lbs explosive warhead and infra-red homing capability, into the continental US. The man was caught in a Russian-British-US sting operation, in which the agents mentioned that they were interested in buying the missiles for shooting down an airliner ‘as part of the Jihad,’ and to ‘inflict economic damage on the US.’ The sting began five months ago in Moscow, where Russian operatives provided the man with a dummy sample missile.

Attempts to smuggle surface-to-air missiles into the US have been anticipated and feared since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Testifying before Congress in February, DCI George Tenet said “Al Qaeda is also developing or refining new means of attack, including use of surface-to-air missiles...” They have indeed already done so abroad. In June 2002, a captured terrorist, Abu Huzifa, who led

an al Qaeda cell in Saudi Arabia, told investigators he slipped through Saudi security around Prince Sultan Air Force Base with two shoulder-fired SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. He fired at an American plane that was taking off, but his missile failed to “lock on.” Frightened, he buried the second missile in the sand and ran away.

In November 2002, two shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles were fired at an Arkia Israeli Airlines passenger jet at Moi International Airport in Kenya. Investigators found a launcher for an SA-7 Strela, a Soviet-designed shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile and two missile casings in the Changamwe area of Mombasa, about a mile from the airport. The serial number on the launcher was from the same series as the launcher tube found in May 2002 near Prince Sultan Air Force base in Saudi Arabia.

Such missiles are relatively easy to use, but without some training on the weapon, the hit/kill probability is greatly diminished. The IGLA warheads are small and marginal to bring down a large aircraft, but if the hit is made on an engine, could be lethal. Military aircraft undoubtedly possess countermeasures. Civil aircraft protection devices are probably under discussion. Meanwhile, make your airline reservation and chalk one up for the FBI, the Intelligence Community, and international anti-terrorist collaboration. (Jonkers) (ABC 12 Aug 03 //B. Ross) (WIN 32-03) (http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/misile_arrest030812.html)

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED (AGAIN) IN IRAQ – In what will probably be the first of several intelligence “lessons learned” reports from the US Operation designated “Iraqi Freedom,” the First Marine Division assessment can be summarized in one sentence: “The Marine Corps has a tremendous void in its intelligence collection capabilities at the echelon that needs it the most.”

Some systems received praise in the Division report. “The presence of a Joint STARS control ground station [CGS] at the division had a tremendous positive effect for integrating

this information into a comprehensive intelligence picture. No other collection asset provided the wide-area, all-weather coverage of the battle space that the Joint Stars did with the MTI [Moving Target Indicator] radar. When other platforms failed or were unavailable, the CGS/Joint STARS combination ensured that we were not blind on the battlefield.”

Also, the AIP [Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program] - P-3 (aircraft) “provides a tremendous Indications and Warning capability, provided that the support unit has a rider [liaison officer] on board to direct employment of the sensor to meet the tactical needs of the ground user.”

Continuing, “The Pioneer (UAV) worked great when the bureaucracy between the [Pioneer unit] and the division G-2 could be negotiated, but the lack of a habitual relationship and adequate rehearsal time limited our ability to do so.” Systems such as the Pioneer, P-3AIP, ATAR and other theater and national assets “were great for developing deep targets, (but) subject to the prioritization of higher headquarters.”

According to the division, “a superb example of a successful UAV system was the Dragon Eye, which was fielded to selected battalions and allowed to collect against the commander’s priorities, locations and schedule without interference from higher headquarters.”

But once the war started, the Division complained that it received “very little actionable intelligence from external intelligence organizations” and that it had to assemble a coherent picture from what it could collect with organic and direct support assets alone. Said the report: “On a fluid high-tempo battlefield, the highly centralized collections bureaucracy is too slow and cumbersome to be tactically relevant. Navigating the labyrinth of collection tasking processes proved too difficult in most cases to get reporting on division targets, and certainly for battalion-level collections. The best employment option is to push more assets in direct support to the lowest tactical level, and increase available organic col-

lections... Maneuver units have limited ability to see over the next hill, around the next corner or inside the next building... Generally, the state of the Marine Corps’ tactical intelligence collection capability is well behind the state-of-the-art...”

Intelligence officers from the last century may not recognize the acronyms, but the general thrust of the complaints has a near-cliché ring only too familiar from similar “lessons-learned” reports in the 1900s. (Harvey) (Jane’s Defence Weekly 6 Aug ‘03 //T. Ripley) (WIN 31-03)

NORTH KOREA SITREP – North Korea announced that it has completed reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods it removed from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, which would give it enough plutonium to manufacture three nuclear weapons. How to deal with this member of the “axis of evil” is obviously being debated within the Administration. President Bush has announced the official line – that multilateral regional negotiation, also involving China, Japan and South Korea, is the best way to handle the crisis. Others in the administration hold that further economic sanctions, or, in due time, surgical military strikes or even an invasion might be necessary to curb the North Korean program and regime. Such action would undoubtedly have to wait for the removal of US troops from the current line of demarcation to locations further south.

Intelligence leaks may be selectively used to push various particular approaches to the problem. For example, recent media reports indicated that there are not one, but multiple North Korean nuclear production sites. A precision strike is obviously less attractive or effective if North Korea has dispersed and hardened its processing sites. Other media reports indicate that US sensors are now picking up traces of krypton gas indicative of nuclear reprocessing activity. This is an argument for urgent action. One must evaluate all these media reports carefully, as intelligence, true or false, may be purposefully ‘leaked,’ for internal political reasons, or as part of a complex game of international power poli-

tics. (Jonkers) (Wall St Journal 22 July 03// C. Cooper)

POLICY FUTURES MARKET CANCELED – The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has the charter to think “out of the box.” It is an entrepreneurial organization that has performed magnificently in technology achievements, but has recently encountered some political turbulence when proposing “social-science” information projects (such as the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project). Admiral (ret) John M. Poindexter, the head of DARPA’s Information Awareness Office, now has just resigned under Congressional pressure over the “Policy Analysis Market” project, called FutureMAP (Futures Markets Applied to Predictions).

The project was conceived by a math and computer science specialist who joined DARPA in 2000. Using a model of a political futures market developed at the University of Iowa, which has proven better than pollsters and pundits in predicting the outcome of presidential elections, he proposed a “market” for assisting analysts in predicting regional political events and terrorist threats. After approval in 2001, DARPA awarded initial design contracts to two small firms. They proposed setting up a market to anticipate major events in the Middle East and South Asia that would be internal to the Government, limited to intelligence analysts and others within the Government. This approach, however, ran into legal prohibitions against moving money among agencies. So the next iteration envisioned a public market. It also narrowed the scope to eight countries in the Middle East. Under the plan, most of the trading was to have centered on predictions based on general indices regarding economic health, civil stability and military posture, but there were also provisions for future contracts on the possibility of a terrorist attack, assassinations, or a coup.

In late 2002 Adm. Poindexter approved field testing the project, which envisioned registering traders by 1 August and starting trades on 1 October. The intelligence agencies and the

Securities and Exchange Commission were briefed. There were no objections. The project did not make it to the Secretary of Defense or his senior officials – but this is not unusual for such a minor project. But in May the project came to the attention of some lawmakers, who were tipped-off to look at the Web site, which showed trading examples to include betting on the possibility of the assassination of Yasser Arafat. The senators called a press conference and denounced the project as bizarre and morally repugnant, prompting the SecDef to cancel it, and the Admiral has now quit. (Jonkers) (WashPost 1 Aug 03 p. A1 - // WP 30 July p. A17 - V. Loeb and B. Graham // WP 31 July p. A-19 Prof. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Stanford) (WIN 30-03)

CIA INTERNAL REVIEW ON IRAQ INTELLIGENCE – A first part of a classified draft report on Iraq WMD intelligence, written by a small team headed by former CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, was completed in mid-June. The team reviewed the major intelligence reports written for policy-makers, including the NIE issued in October 2002. An unclassified CIA report on this (classified) NIE stated that “Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program and invested more heavily in biological weapons. Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.” This unclassified CIA report has been criticized for failing to mention the caveats of uncertainty or doubt expressed by analysts about these propositions in the classified version. Nevertheless, Mr. Kerr reportedly stated publicly that “It is unlikely that even the most critical review of reporting would have led to the conclusion that (WMD) programs were not being continued.”

The second part of the report will compare US intelligence reports with evidence found within Iraq. A significant and intensive effort is underway in Iraq to track WMD programs and evidence. As Mr. Kerr stated on the Intelligence Community national estimates, “It is a set of judgments. It may be completely inaccurate.” (Jonkers)

(WashTimes 4 July 03, p. A-10) (WashPost 4 July 03, p. A20 //W. Pincus) (WIN 26-03)

CIA’S MOST RECENT GRADUATES – To mark the occasion of the June graduation of its largest class of new officers, CIA recruiters recently spoke on a on-the-record basis to the press. This was the first class enrolled after the 11 September attacks. The teaching of the craft of intelligence work was conducted at the “Farm” – the officially unacknowledged site outside Williamsburg, Virginia. The group averages 29 years in age, and one-third are women. Twelve percent are ethnic minorities, three-quarters of the class speak a foreign language with “considerable” fluency; 70 percent had not been in the military or worked for the government. Some gave up more lucrative jobs in the private sector, and starting salaries will range between \$45,000 and \$60,000 a year. The chief of CIA human resources, Bob Rebelo, noted it takes a certain kind of mind to be a spy. He continued by noting that CIA is always in need of people proficient in foreign languages. “If you walked into this room with 100 native Arabic speakers, I’d give them all offers this afternoon, if they had the other qualifications we need,” he said. “Same with Chinese. Same with Persian. Same with Urdu. Same with Pashto.”

Understandably, Mr. Rebelo did not dwell on the fact that the “other qualifications” frequently preclude making an offer. Another possibly limiting factor is the long range question of how valuable will Pashto proficiency, for example, be to the organization ten years from now. (Harvey) (Dallas Morning News 21 Aug ‘03 //AP) [WINS 34-03, 5 September 2003]

SECTION II CONTEXT AND PRECEDENCE

DCI VIEWS ON IRAQ NIE 2002 – DCI George Tenet recently provided his current perspective on the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate

(NIE) on 'Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,' in a letter to the Washington Post, with full text reproduced in WIN 32-03, but abbreviated here for Periscope. The DCI stated:

"A great deal has been said and written about the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Much of this commentary has been misinformed, misleading, and just plain wrong. It is important to set the record straight.

We stand by the judgments in the NIE. Building upon ten years of analysis, intelligence reporting, and inspections that had to fight through Iraq's aggressive denial and deception efforts, including phony and incomplete data declarations to the UN and programs explicitly designed with built-in cover stories, the Intelligence Community prepared the NIE on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In it we judged that the entire body of information over that ten years made clear that Saddam had never abandoned his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear program. The NIE points out that by 2002, all agencies assessed that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make any, but never abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions. Moreover, most agencies believed that Iraq's attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools, as well as Iraq's efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Even though the tubes constituted only one of the six elements underpinning the other agencies' judgment on reconstitution, I will discuss it briefly. We need to point out that DOE is not the only agency that has experts on the issue. CIA has centrifuge and rocket experts. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—the US military's center for analysis of foreign conventional weaponry—has battle-field rocket experts. These experts, along with those from DOE, were involved in the NIE process and their

views were recorded. All agencies agreed that the tubes could be used to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment program, so we are talking about differences in agency views about intent.

CIA, DIA, and NSA believed the tubes were intended for that purpose.

DOE believed they probably were not part of the nuclear program and that conventional military uses were more plausible. INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for use as centrifuge rotors and considered artillery rockets as the most likely purpose. NGIC believed that these tubes were poor choices for rocket motor bodies.

Not surprisingly, the Iraqis went to great lengths to mask their intentions across the board, including in their efforts to acquire tubes with increasingly higher sets of specifications. Thus, the fact that we had alternative views on the issue would be expected. But the NIE went to great lengths to spell out those views. Many reading these alternative views, however, almost certainly recalled how far Iraq had come in the early 1990s toward a nuclear weapon without our knowledge, making all the factors leading us to the reconstitution judgment more important.

Biological Weapons. All agencies of the Intelligence Community since 1995 have judged that Iraq retained biological weapons and that the BW program continued. In 1999 we assessed Iraq had revitalized its program. New intelligence acquired in 2000 provided compelling information about Iraq's ongoing offensive BW activities, describing construction of mobile BW agent production plants—reportedly designed to evade detection—with the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year. Thus, it was not a new story in 2002 when all agencies judged in the NIE that Iraq had biological weapons—that it had some lethal and incapacitating BW agents—and was capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax. We judged that most of the key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program were more

advanced than before the Gulf war.

Chemical Weapons. As early as 1994, all agencies assessed that Iraq could begin limited production of chemical agents almost immediately after UN sanctions, inspections and monitoring efforts were ended. By 1997, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was protecting a breakout capability to produce more weapons and agent quickly. We further assessed in 1997, that within months Iraq could restart full-scale production of sarin and that pre-Desert Storm agent production levels—including production of VX—could be achieved in two to three years. And so it was not a surprising story when all agencies judged in the NIE in 2002 that Baghdad possessed chemical weapons, had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX and probably had at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents, much of it added in the last year.

Delivery Systems. The Intelligence Community's assessment on the possibility of Iraq having a few covert Scuds has been consistent since at least 1995. As Iraq continued to develop its short-range missiles, we collected more data and by 1999 were able to begin determining that both missiles were capable of flying over 150 km. Also by 1999 we had noted that according to multiple sources, Iraq was conducting a high priority program to convert jet trainer aircraft to lethal UAVs, likely intended for delivering biological agents. Again, not a new story for the NIE to judge that Iraq maintained a small missile force and several development programs, including an UAV that could deliver a biological warfare agent.

In sum, the NIE on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was the product of years of reporting and intelligence collection, analyzed by numerous experts in several different agencies. Our judgments have been consistent on this subject because the evidence has repeatedly pointed to continued Iraqi pursuit of WMD and efforts to conceal that pursuit from international scrutiny. Modifications of our judgments have

reflected new evidence, much of which was acquired because of our intensified collection efforts. Thus, noting that Saddam had continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction was not startling. That he probably was hiding weapons was not new. That he would seek means to improve his capabilities using alternative-use cover stories would have been expected. That we would have alternative views is respected as part of the process. We stand by the soundness and integrity of our process, and no one outside the Intelligence Community told us what to say or not to say in this Estimate.

As with any other topic addressed in an NIE, the acquisition of further evidence may confirm some of our judgments while calling others into question. Operation Iraqi Freedom obviously has opened a major new opportunity for learning about the WMD activities of Saddam Hussayn's regime. We have no doubt, however, that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq's WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced." (Jonkers/ text deleted) (DCI George Tenet) (www.washingtonpost.com) (www.cia.gov) (WIN 32-03)

WHEREFORE ART THOU, OSAMA BIN LADEN? – The Al-Qaeda leader has been hunted for years. President Clinton in 1998 reportedly signed a secret Presidential Finding authorizing CIA to capture or kill bin Laden. Soon afterward CIA provided "specific, predictive, actionable" intelligence, and President Clinton authorized a lethal attack on al Qaeda training camps near Khost, Afghanistan. Bin Laden escaped, having left one hour before the attack. Was he warned? The President then allegedly signed additional Presidential Findings, authorizing the killing of the top leadership and permitting planes carrying them to be shot down. That also was not successful. The Navy reportedly posted two submarines in the Indian Ocean to shoot missiles at bin Laden, but the time lag between sighting and locating the target and the arrival of the missile did not lead to success.

As General Hugh Shelton,

Chairman of the JCS, noted, "You can develop military operations until hell freezes over, but they are worthless without intelligence." An intelligence breakthrough in the war on terrorism and Al-Qaeda came with the Predator UAV. In 2000, the Predator, an Air Force one-thousand pound unmanned propeller plane, came on line and provided an intelligence break-through – live video surveillance, day or night, and through cloud cover. It provided spectacular surveillance coverage and pictures. Live video feeds now captured the daily routines inside Al-Qaeda training camps and operating areas. It was deployed under CIA auspices. By the spring of 2001 the USAF was planning the further step of arming the Predator, allowing the reaction time from intelligence analysis to operational strike decision to be enormously condensed. USAF was initially looking at a three-year test plan. It was condensed to three months with White House and CIA encouragement, and the armed version of Predator was declared operational by the summer of 2001.

September 11 cleared away all bureaucratic cobwebs. President Bush reportedly signed a Top Secret Memorandum of Notification calling for Bin Laden to be either captured or killed on sight on a high priority basis. By November the armed Predator was deployed to help destroy what video surveillance showed to be a high-level Al-Qaeda meeting outside Kabul. This first strike was a brilliant success, killing Al-Qaeda's military chief, Mohammed Atef, but again, Bin-Laden was spared. A week later his voice was allegedly intercepted on a satellite phone in the Tora Bora mountain cave complex, and the area was pounded by B-52's. This was the last place Bin Laden was reportedly detected as definitely alive. The best estimate is that he either walked, rode a donkey or took a bus across the border into Pakistan, sometime in December 2001.

With continuing hints of his survival detected by Intelligence, the hunt continued throughout 2002 by intense CIA, FBI and Military Special Forces and other resources. In March 2003 there was success in cap-

turing Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Pakistan. He was believed to be the third most important figure in the Al Qaeda organization, but although he sang like a canary, he did not lead investigators to the chief. Days later Intelligence traced a phone call from Saad bin Laden (son) to a location in Baluchistan, a tribal province bordering Afghanistan. An unmanned surveillance plane then spotted a convoy in the area moving at night, consisting of about a hundred people on horseback and on foot, advancing along an old smuggler's route. It was intercepted by a team of CIA and Delta forces, but no luck – the convoy was only a group of refugees. In this "war," innocents are inevitably killed.

Where is Osama? Media reports have it that bin Laden is protected by tribal leaders in the border area who have an arms-length relationship with the Pakistani government. He is surrounded by devout followers, in a sea of impoverished, fundamentalist tribal people. He cannot move except at night, and cannot communicate by phone, radio or walkie-talkie. He reportedly sends hand-written notes and taped messages transmitted by a human chain. He seems to be nearly alone, but keeps in touch with the remnants of his inner circle, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, the fugitive leaders of the Taliban. He no longer sends video tapes of himself, possibly due to wounds he is said to have sustained.

The role of Pakistani forces is always debated. There is a sense that lower-level Pakistani intelligence (ISI) officials remain sympathetic to the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban (not the same as the Al Qaeda terrorist organization). But according to Cofer Black, famed CIA counter-terrorist officer, "The Pakistani government is a strong and key player in the global war on terrorism, and their contribution has been second to none." More than 25 Pakistani security officials have been killed helping the US capture an estimated 480 Al Qaeda members and sympathizers. (Globally two-thirds of the Al Qaeda leadership is thought to have been captured or killed.)

President Musharraf must contend with internal political opposition, including an increasing hold of Islamic fundamentalism on the democratic electorate in the North-West Frontier province. He must deal with the fickleness of American support, and accept the weakening of serious American counter-terrorist forces that were diverted to Iraq (e.g. Arabic-speakers, collection systems). Finally he must persuade and obtain American understanding that the approach to the tribal area 'sinkholes' must be more political and anthropological rather than primarily military. Kill innocent people, and you and your clan have enemies for a hundred years.

Bin Laden still exists. His Al-Qaeda organization has been damaged severely, but has somewhat adapted and decentralized. His regional support base is also regenerating. There are reports that the Taliban have regrouped in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Osama remains the 'spiritual' leader of the Al Qaeda terrorists. His death would not stop terrorism, but nevertheless could have a profound political effect, either positive through fear of US power, or negative if he lives on as an inspiring "martyr." Perhaps, as one wit put it, he should be left as 'Osama bin forgotten.' (Jonkers) (The New Yorker, 4 August 03, p. 26, //J. Mayer) (WIN 31-03)

CHINESE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION – Chinese intelligence collection in the US continues, as does US intelligence collection in China, each with their own methodology and requirements. The Defense Department's annual report to Congress on Chinese military power this year includes a relatively detailed account of one of Beijing's most recent acquisitions of American defense technology. The espionage allowed China's military to develop a version of the substance known as Terfenol-D, created by the Navy at the cost of millions of research dollars. Terfenol-D is a high-tech material that changes shape in response to magnetic energy, and can be used in both sensors and mechanical devices. Used by the Navy in an advanced sonar system, the material has applications

for advanced aircraft and spacecraft. Although unclassified, any sale of the technology is strictly controlled and requires an export license.

Two Chinese students, one of whom attended Iowa State University where he worked closely with the DOE's Ames Lab and a second who studied at Penn State University, were apparently used by China's Defense Science and Technology Information Center to acquire the information. One of the students has admitted sending Terfenol-D data to the PRC. US officials say "a small percentage" of the 50,000 Chinese students in the United States are involved in technology-gathering work for the PRC.

It is not known whether US counter-intelligence authorities have instituted a coherent program to ensure that US academic institutions engaged in advanced technology research, likely to be targeted by PRC Intelligence, are cautioned about, or discouraged, or forbidden, to allow Chinese students close association with sensitive technological innovations at the institution. (Harvey) (Washington Times 5 Aug '03, pg. 1 //B. Gertz) (WIN 32-03)

CIA TURNOVER OF STASI AGENT FILES – Major revelations are not expected from the "Rosenholz" (Rosewood) files on West German residents who spied for the former East Germany's Stasi security agency. Like the KGB, the Stasi enforced the Communist Party's iron grip on society by persuading or intimidating ordinary people to spy. More than 2.4 million people were placed under the Stasi's observation during the communist era.

Germany has decoded large numbers of Stasi files, but most of those include only the agents' codenames. The Rosenholz files are understood to reveal their true identities. Unnamed experts noted that of the 200,000 names on the microfilm copies of personal index cards, about 12,000 could be former Stasi spies in West Germany and 40,000 were agents who worked within the former East Germany. It will take German officials at least six months to organize and begin compiling information from the files,

which are copied on 381 CD-ROMs. Although the files may result in revelations that would be of interest to the public and historians, criminal charges are unlikely because of the German 10-year statute of limitations.

The documents, created by the Stasi during its existence from 1950 until 1989, were obtained by the CIA in one of the Cold War's last great intelligence coups, allegedly in 1992 from a KGB officer in Moscow who had previously worked in East Berlin. Germany has reportedly been struggling unsuccessfully for years to recover the files from the CIA. The utility of the files for CIA operations, which delayed the return of the files to Germany, is left to the imagination. (Jonkers) (London Times, 9 July 03) (The Guardian, 8 July 03 //B. Aris) (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 11 July 2002) (WIN 27-03) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,993697,00.html>

AIR AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE PLATFORMS – The struggle for the proper mix of intelligence satellites and aircraft (now increasingly, UAVs as well) has gone on for years. Satellites can collect where aircraft cannot go, but airborne systems have greater flexibility and are easier to upgrade. In the recent past, steps have been taken to integrate signals intelligence (SIGINT) airborne and satellite systems better, e.g., linking systems to allow triangulation of emitter positions, and using satellite identifications to alert airborne collection platforms. Now a wide-ranging review of intelligence needs, the Transformation Space Air Project (TSAP), is underway to help determine the optimum balance between intelligence satellites and aircraft by addressing all aspects of technical intelligence collection.

At the same time, Defense discussions are on-going about Navy joining Army's next-generation airborne SIGINT program, the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), which is slated to replace the Army's fleet of RC-12 Guardrails and RC-7 Airborne Reconnaissance Lows. Since Army expects to award a single development contract for the SIGINT system in early 2004, there will be pressure for

Navy decisions in the relatively near future. Congress has expressed concern about the Navy's aging EP-3s, urging that their collection requirements be shifted to the RC-135 Rivet Joint fleet. The Navy had planned for its EP-3 collection platforms to be replaced by the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), but has dropped that plan.

The new Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen Cambone, has encouraged the services to pursue common mission equipment. The advent of an intelligence 'czar' in Defense with real power, coupled with the growing awareness of the importance of intelligence in modern warfare, could actually redress the customary tendency in the military of favoring paying for 'things that go bang' versus 'paying for things that make smart bangs possible.' (Harvey) (Aviation Week and Space Technology 14 July '03, pg. 26, // R. Wall)

US SPACE CONTROL WARFARE PLANS—The US Air force plans to field ground-based systems to neutralize the reconnaissance (and communications) satellites of unfriendly powers, when necessary. The USAF 'Counter-Surveillance Reconnaissance System' is slated for deployment in 2005 to 2008. It is a part of the emerging Defense effort for space control, which is defined as 'guaranteed US access to our satellite capabilities, coupled with the ability to counter the space assets used by adversaries.

In terms of offensive space control capabilities, the Pentagon in 1997 conducted a space control demonstration in which a ground-based laser was fired at one of our own satellites. Presumably such a laser might dazzle and blind an imaging satellite's sensitive optics. The counter-surveillance program is budgeted at \$66 million in 2004. As for our own satellite's defenses, the first task is to provide a warning system to detect and identify potential threats to them, involving both ground and space-based sensors. This effort is budgeted at \$6.6 million for 2004. The two space control programs together are budgeted at \$250 million over the next five years. The control of space is a fundamental part

of the Pax Americana strategy, superseding the old Mahan formulation of "Who controls the seas, controls the world," to "Who controls Space, controls the world." (Jonkers) (Defense News 21 July03, p./ 38 //J. Singer)

THE BADGER SPY – Brian P. Regan, a former Air Force intelligence analyst and father of four from Bowie, MD, was convicted of attempted espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment last February. He had been arrested in 2001 at Dulles Airport on his way to Switzerland with the addresses of European embassies for Iraq, Libya and other nations. He had earlier written to Hussein and Gaddafi offering to sell top-secret documents for \$13 million in Swiss francs. Writing of his job at the NRO where he administered the Intelink Web site, he said, "I feel I deserve more than the pension I will receive for all the years of service."

The remarkable aspect of attempted treason was the dedicated manner during 1997 to 2000 in which Regan went about procuring and hiding the documents, compartmented as well as top secret, in preparation for their sale. A lengthy program with the spy's post-conviction cooperation to recover the secreted papers appears to have taken months to unearth the more than 20,000 pages buried in 19 separate locations. Twelve locations were found in Pocahontas State Park in central Virginia with seven more dug up in Patapsco Valley State Park near Baltimore. The FBI dig was delayed at times because Regan forgot the complex codes he used to record the locations of the buried packages; the FBI took about a month with Regan's help to break the codes, some of which had been buried in a toothbrush holder along Interstate 95 near Fredericksburg. Wrapped in garbage bags, lightweight plastic or Tupperware, the caches of documents were buried 18 inches deep.

The amazing volume of 20,000 pages of detailed information about US satellites, early warning systems and weapons of mass destruction raises the question of how they could be removed from a classified, secure installation

without detection. Punishment for those who allowed it to happen or preventive measures to avoid recurrence were not addressed in the news account. Presumably CI authorities were aware of the spy's activities before his arrest, but it would appear likely the bulk of his stealing and burrowing occurred prior to his detection. (Harvey) (WashPost 31 Jul 03, page B1 //J. Markon) (WIN 32-03)

SECTION III CYBER INTELLIGENCE

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COMMON ACCESS CARDS – A California company has been hired to provide software so the Defense Financing and Accounting Service can use the high-tech features of its identification cards. SSP-Litronic of Irvine, Calif., will provide the organization with 23,000 software licenses for so-called 'Common Access Cards' (CAC), the Defense Department's new ID cards with smart card technology and biometric security. When DOD deploys the necessary software, the cards will not only provide access to installations, but to workstations and networks as well. (Levine 6 August 03)

NATIONAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE CERTIFICATION – The government's plan to pressure software vendors to build more secure products seems to be gathering a bit of momentum. A major part of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the idea involves using market pressures and the government's purchasing power to influence vendors' development practices. An important component of this plan is the National Information Assurance Partnership's (NIAP) Common Criteria testing program, which validates the security and reliability of a given product. The program is a partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (Levine 6 Aug 03) <http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,1211299,00.asp>

POLICE MATRIX DATABASE – 'Matrix' Offers Law Agencies

Faster Access to Americans' Personal Records. Police in Florida are creating a counter-terrorism database designed to be model to give law enforcement agencies around the country a powerful new tool to analyze billions of records about both criminals and ordinary Americans. (Levine 6 Aug 03) (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21872-2003Aug5.html>)

COMPUTERIZED VOTING VULNERABLE TO FRAUD – An electronic voting system used in some states as an alternative to the troublesome punch-card ballots is highly vulnerable to fraud, computer security experts warned in a study released Thursday. (Levine 07/24) <http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/6376399.htm> http://news.com.com/2100-1009_3-5054088.html <http://www.msnbc.com/news/943558.asp>

FBI WANTS TO TAP INTERNET PHONES – Internet telephone calls are fast becoming a national security threat that must be countered with new police wiretap rules, according to an FBI proposal presented quietly to regulators this month. Representatives of the FBI's Electronic Surveillance Technology Section in Chantilly, Va., have met at least twice in the past three weeks with senior officials of the Federal Communications Commission to lobby for proposed new Internet eavesdropping rules. The FBI-drafted plan seeks to force broadband providers to provide more efficient, standardized surveillance facilities and could substantially change the way that cable modem and DSL (digital subscriber line) companies operate. (Levine 07/29) (http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105_2-5056424.html) (<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39115339,00.htm>) (http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5056424.html) (<http://www.msnbc.com/news/945608.asp>)

FEDS HELP LOCAL POLICE IN IDENTITY THEFT FRAUD – Stolen credit card and Social Security numbers. Check fraud. Drained bank accounts. Ruined credit. Nightmares for victims, identity crimes also can be vexing to local police departments trying to unravel the crimes. To help

local police officers better understand and investigate these crimes, the Secret Service will mail out an electronic package to more than 40,000 police departments and other law enforcement authorities. (Levine 07/29) <http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/07/29/identity.crime.ap/index.html>

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY STANDARDS – Calling the Homeland Security Department “incapable of doing anything to save the civilian IT infrastructure,” former White House cyber-security ‘czar’ Richard Clarke called on software users and buyers to set security standards themselves. “You can’t count on the government to defend critical networks,” Clarke said at the National Information Assurance Leadership Conference. (Levine 22 July 03) http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/22845-1.html

PUBLIC INTERNET TERMINALS EXPLOITED – For more than a year, unbeknownst to people who used Internet terminals at Kinko's stores in New York, Juju Jiang was recording what they typed, paying particular attention to their passwords. Jiang had secretly installed, in at least 14 Kinko's stores, software that logs individual keystrokes. He captured more than 450 user names and passwords, using them to access and even open bank accounts online. (Levine 22 July 03) (<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/6359407.htm>) (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-07-22-terminal-fear_x.htm)

SECTION IV BOOKS AND SOURCES

CONGRESSIONAL 9/11 REPORT RELEASED – The joint panel of the House and Senate intelligence committees released its 900 page report on the failure of the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to prevent the terrorist plot from succeeding. It is entitled “**Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.**” As expected there are many pages of criticism of the intelligence

agencies, a renewed recommendation to establish a cabinet-level Secretary/Director for Intelligence, and some controversy about pages relating to Saudi Arabia that remain classified.

The report states that the F.B.I., C.I.A. and other agencies had amassed a huge amount of information about al Qaeda before the attacks, but that none of the intelligence offered a “smoking gun” that indicated exactly how, when or where the attacks would take place. It provides new insights into the hijackings and details about the activities of the F.B.I. and C.I.A., but leaves unanswered questions about precisely how the plot for 9/11 was hatched. There are plenty of blanks still left to be filled in. As expected, a further, more broad-range study is underway.

The Administration has shown little interest in the panel's proposal to create a single cabinet-level intelligence chief. One doubts that such an official would have made one iota of difference in preventing 9/11

Representatives of the country's intelligence agencies noted that the report offers little new information, and is seen by some as an ‘advocacy’ document. Since the 9/11 attack all agencies have taken further steps to expand and improve counter-terrorism efforts – including the sharing of information. The FBI has completely re-made itself, so that intelligence analysis is now a desirable career field within the Bureau, a remarkable achievement. More importantly, the externals have changed – the former legal restrictions on intelligence and law-enforcement guarding our constitutional civil liberties have been relaxed or changed (e.g. the “PATRIOT” act) under the impetus of the “war” on terrorism, the Executive and Congressional political will is now mobilized and focused behind this “war,” and significant new financial resources have been made available to the intelligence agencies. The environment in which intelligence operates has therefore fundamentally changed from what it was before 9/11, and throwing stones at former shortcomings without considering the contextual fabric is less and less relevant.

Finally, there is a classified por-

tion of the report dealing with Saudi Arabia that has not been released. Most of the 9/11 terrorists were Saudi nationals, part of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda movement, whose primary objective is to overthrow the Saudi government, which it views as corrupt. The US is an al Qaeda target only by extension, because of its support of the House of Saud and tangentially for what has been happening in Palestine. The Saudi government, which remains in power through a network of financial support distributions, whatever one may think of it, is therefore on the same side as the US Government, a target for the al-Qaeda terrorists. This is a complex issue, and a political hot potato for Congressional posturing because of the various domestic political constituencies involved. (Jonkers) (New York Times 25 July 03, p.1 //D. Johnston) (<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>)

UK vs US DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE APPROACH – Should the United States establish a new domestic intelligence agency along the lines of Britain's Security Service (MI5) to take over the intelligence duties currently assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Such a proposal has been advanced by Sen. John Edwards (D-NC), among others, who have argued that "the law enforcement responsibilities of the Bureau are inconsistent with, and will continue to undermine, its ability to be an effective intelligence agency." One tends to be skeptical, but the issue is 'out there.' The proposal was critically examined in a Congressional Research Service report entitled "Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States" by Todd Masse, May 19, 2003. Ref. <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf>. See also: "Intelligence Critics Urge U.S. to Look to British Spy Agency" by Don Van Natta, Jr., New York Times, July 26, 2003. (Secrecy News 08/06/03)(RJ)

REVISITING THE ASSASSINATION BAN – U.S. policy as set forth in President Reagan's 1982 Executive Order 12333 formally prohibits assassination. But exactly what does that mean? The term is not defined. An

introduction to various thorny legal issues is provided in "Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief Summary" by Elizabeth B. Bazan, Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2002. With all the talk about killing this and that leader, the intellectually curious may find this issue interesting. See also <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21037.pdf>, (Secrecy News 08/06/03) (RJ)

SECTION V NOTES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

AFIO SURVEY – A number of you were asked to fill in some blanks on your background in our personnel system – your responses showed again what a tremendously rich association this is, in terms of its members and their accomplishments across all phases and aspects of the national intelligence endeavor. Thank you! (RJ)

SECTION VI LETTERS

William W. writes on Policing Iraq – *The Wall Street Journal* printed a number of articles concerning the need for effective US assistance to Iraqi police. (see June 18 editorial page and page A3 for June 20). We should pay attention to lessons learned.

In occupied Japan after WWII Gen. McArthur's intent was to install a Japanese-run government as soon as possible. MacArthur wisely foresaw that an indigenous internal security element was fundamental to economic, social and political development within defeated Japan. The rapidly re-trained Japanese police quickly and effectively put down insurgent efforts as well as efforts to disrupt public facilities and the incumbent Japanese government. The new Japanese police were instilled with the idea that they would be responsible for providing a safe environment so that the Japanese could recover and lead their own destiny without having an occupation force dictate their fate.

We learned those same lessons

in reverse in Vietnam. Our office, the Office of Public Safety (OPS), worked in tandem with other US assistance officials to prepare trained indigenous police forces to operate in a post conflict environment. The police were being prepared to provide a secure internal environment after the war in order that the economic, social and political development of South Vietnam could flourish. But our lawmakers and the administration, through their inability or even intentional refusal to win the war, never provided us with a post-conflict environment in which to operate.

In Iraq we seem to have forgotten the lesson of Japan and reenacting a version of the situation in Vietnam. We seem to be fumbling about instead of rapidly developing and training an indigenous internal security force (using available cadres of civil police) to achieve the environment for post-conflict Iraqi social, economic and political development. We need a "safe-streets" strategy for Iraq. (WW)

Gus W. wrote in response to the NIGER article in WIN 29: "500 tons of uranium" really means uranium oxide, U3O8, or yellow cake. Yellow cake has two meanings, unpurified or purified. U3O8 has to be converted into UF6 before it can be distilled into weapons grade U235 by centrifuge or gaseous diffusion.

REF: CELL PHONES AND GAS PUMP FIRES – A number of members sent emails stating that the information in last week's WIN 28-03 (Larry S. writes etc) was a hoax. (See - www.snopes.com)

PERHAPS. It appears that the three specific cell phone fire incidents mentioned have not been confirmed and may well be phony, an attention-getter. But at the local Shell station in McLean where I fill up the warning against using cell phones while pumping gas is listed just below the line about not smoking. It says "Turn Off Your Cell phone and do not use them around the pumps." I believe the underlying warning was and is valid. You draw your own conclusion! (RJ) ❄

BOOK REVIEWS

TRUST NO ONE—THE SECRET WORLD OF SIDNEY REILLY

by Richard B. Spence

W. Adam Mandelbaum, Esq.

NYLAWMAN@Justice.com

Reviewer

The serious student of intelligence history will appreciate the exhaustive research that author Spence put in to his revealing story of “The Ace of Spies,” Sidney Reilly, (Born Salomon Rosenblum, Poland).

A Professor of History at the University of Idaho, Spence has provided a density of detail that one seldom encounters in an espionage biography. But, that density is a two edged sword. On the one hand, the academically oriented will relish the microscopic facts from fantasy discussion of Reilly’s life and



world. On the other hand, those seeking more drama and less detail may find Trust No One, a rather slow going read.

Spence often conjectures where facts are absent, but his “maybe” and “perhaps” offerings add to the mystery that was Sidney Reilly, without subtracting from the author’s monumental efforts at ferreting out the truth of the man who trusted no one.

In reading this new biography of an old spy, we see the world of finance, oil, espionage and war is not very different today than it was in the early years of the last century—only the technology has improved. The international stew of greed, double dealing and conflicts of interest which made up the main course of Sidney Reilly’s diet,

is still being served up hot on today’s international menus.

AFIO members will want to add this one to their shelves.

W. Adam Mandelbaum, Esq., Attorney at Law, is author of *The Psychic Battlefield – A History of the Military Occult Complex* previously reviewed in AFIO journals.

CORPORATE WARRIORS The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

by P.W. Singer

Cornell University Press

August 2003, ISBN 0801441145



Major Western governments have been privatizing services once performed by their uniformed services, as described in P.W. Singer’s book. Singer divides corporate participants in three categories, (1) Firms that provide combat-training and consulting, including participation in armed conflict, (2) Consultants who offer advice, but do not engage in combat, and (3) Support firms that offer non-lethal aid, such as mine-sweeping, maintenance, software, logistics and supply. The Defense Department understands how much faster and cheaper things can be done if they are contracted out. Private contractors are used in anti-drug operations in Colombia. Many security tasks in Iraq are already being done by private companies. US intervention in Liberia could be accomplished more easily if private contrac-



Peter W. Singer

tor personnel augmented American combat forces. It goes without saying that all of this impacts on the Intelligence Community and its operations. (Jonkers) (unread, based on Defense News, 21 July 03, p. 64 //G. Ratnam)


CHARLIE WILSON’S WAR The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History

by George Crile

Atlantic Monthly Press

April 2003, ISBN 0871138549

Representative Charlie Wilson, who is quoted to the effect that his



power in the House of Representatives had come primarily “as a result of his work with the Israeli lobby,” apparently played a key role in supporting anti-Soviet guerillas in

Afghanistan by fostering ties between Israel and Pakistan. Journalist Crile tells the story as a rollicking tale involving beautiful women (including those escorted by Wilson to and from Israel), clandestine arms deals involving unlikely partners, and involvement by the Congressman with CIA operative Gust Avrokotos operating in utter disregard for the rules.

Charlie Wilson himself ended up overseeing much of this eccentric weapons program for Pakistan out of his own congressional office, and it turned out to be a wild and remarkable success story. The Spanish mortar, for example, was designed to make it possible for the mujahideen to communicate directly with American navigation satellites to deliver repeated rounds within inches of their designated targets. The weapon’s name was purposefully misleading, chosen to conceal the fact that major portions of this “Spanish mortar” were being

built by the Israelis. Milt Bearden, the station chief who would dominate the war's later years, actually came to rely on the steady stream of crazy new weapons that kept coming on-line from this offbeat program. His strategy called for introducing a new weapon into the battle every three months or so, in order to bluff the Red Army into thinking their enemy was better armed and supported than it was.

"When the weapon was first used it wiped out an entire Spetsnaz outpost



George Crile

with a volley of perfect strikes. And as soon as Bearden learned from the CIA's intercepts that the commander of the 40th Army had helicoptered to the scene, he knew that from

that day on, the Soviets would have to factor in the possibility that the mujahideen had acquired some deadly targeting capability. For that reason alone, the weapon was a success even if never




Charlie Wilson [in front]

fired again. Bearden became so intoxicated with this kind of psychological warfare that he later developed plans to have a group of mujahideen shoot dead Russian soldiers with crossbows. To him, the vision of men who might kill you with a bow and arrow one day or with a satellite-guided mortar the next would be unnerving to any army." (P-393). This is a best-seller. (Jonkers/unread, based on reviews by Jeffrey Howard and by Shaheen Sehbai, // http://www.satribune.com/archives/jul20_26_03/P1_charlie.htm)

TERRORISM, AFGHANISTAN, AND AMERICA'S NEW WAY OF WAR

by Norman Friedman
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Md.

July 2003, ISBN 1-59114-290-3
with Notes, Bibliography, Index.



After setting the stage, Dr. Friedman, a noted naval strategist and author, takes a chapter to sketch the beginning - the Russian war in Afghanistan. It tore up the country's political system, in which tribal chiefs and religious men ruled, and social cohesion was ensured by precedence. The chiefs met in the loya dirga to determine national policy. In wartime, however, leadership devolved on capability in battle, which fed tribal ambitions and made it difficult to agree on a national government. Moreover, the Soviets discovered that many of the Afghan leaders could be rented, though not bought (as both the Taliban and the US did later).

The Taliban were seen in the US at the time as conservative but honest. Americans might not find their social customs appealing, but they were seen as adapted to a conservative Muslim country. The Taliban badly needed reliable troops. Al Qaeda offered a solution. Osama's Arabs could be counted on to fight, not only the Russians, but Ahmed Shah Mahsood. They formed the 055 brigade, which became the only effective force in the Taliban army, and the only one capable of night fighting. In the end, with all neighboring countries and others (US, Saudi Arabia etc.) intruding on the war, the Soviets lost, but Afghanistan's infrastructure was destroyed. Grazing country was ruined by landmines. Only the poppy remained as a cash crop, and the country became a major source of heroin for Europe (Later the Taliban received a large subsidy from the US to block

poppy cultivation; today, poppy's have regained their importance and exports are in full swing). Aside from military support, bin Laden provided the Taliban with much of the cash it needed, and thus Afghanistan became the center of bin-Laden's pan-Islamic movement.

Dr Friedman's book is a rich source on the complex interplay of history, policy and technology. While bin Laden was forming his terror international, the US military was engaged in developing a new kind of war fighting, described as the "Revolution in Military Affairs" or 'Network-Centric Warfare'. Friedman examines its impact in Afghanistan to destroy the terrorist home base. He posits that the 9/11 attacks were intended to inspire a wider movement in the Muslim world that would lead to a pan-Muslim empire, and argues that it failed because of determined US action. This is a wide-ranging, broadly argued, informative book -- with the only regret that it was completed before the recent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It would have made a good fit. (Jonkers)

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS:

(1) **CHINA** - The Canadian Security Intelligence Service published an article on "Weapons Proliferation and the Military-Industrial Complex of the People's Republic of China" in the latest issue of its publication, 'Commentary.' Check <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/com84.html>

(2) **NETHERLANDS** - The Defense Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) of the Netherlands has recently published an English edition of its 2002 Annual Report. The report offers a Dutch perspective on terrorism, conflict in the Middle East, and other topics of international interest. See (in MS Word format): <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/mivd2002.doc> (Secrecy News 9/5/03) ❄

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Check the NDIA Website www.ndia.org for more information about NDIA. There is a membership application on the Website. You must add: "I am an AFIO member and wish to receive a free six-month membership in NDIA."

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QUIZ

by Dwayne S. Anderson
dsanders@newsGuy.com



ANSWERS TO THE LAST QUIZ

1. What was the Central Bureau?

Answer: This was the SIGINT unit that supported General MacArthur's campaigns in the South Pacific. It was a joint operation with Australian, British, and US air and personnel looking at Japanese air and ground communications. The organization was initially unsuccessful at breaking into Japanese Army ciphers. But after finding some buried Japanese code books and reconstructing others from partially burned material, the Bureau was able to read Japanese, high level, Army communications, though not always lower level comms between Japanese field units.

2. What was LCDR Charles S. Root role in intelligence?

Answer: LCDR Root was a one man intelligence office of the US Coast Guard prior to passage of the Prohibition Bill. He was soon overwhelmed by the new flood of data and responsibilities that came with Prohibition and asked for and got help—initially four more bodies, including the famous cryptanalyst, Elizebeth Friedman. The office continued its expansion throughout Prohibition with extensive field activities consolidated under LCDR (later CDR and finally CAPT) Root's direction. He died on active duty before it reached its peak.

3. Here's an "opinion" question without, perhaps,

any clear or absolute answer. Did General MacArthur make maximum use of the intelligence available to him?

Answer: Army historian Drea, if my memory serves, said MacArthur used it well on occasion and ignored it when it didn't suit his plans. The "good use" led to significant successes in his New Guinea Campaign, but ignoring solid information on enemy forces and intentions in later campaigns led to a couple near disasters and to greater than necessary casualties. Drea struck me as a very competent student of these operations, and I completely buy his assessment of MacArthur's use of intelligence (which I suspect would get a grade around C-).

4. This question also involves MacArthur and the notoriously successful spy, Kim Philby.

According to the article in the *Military History*, June 2001 issue, "Kim Philby had a remarkably long career with British Intelligence—spying for the other side" by Richard K. Munro, Philby played an important, and for the US and its allies, very nasty role. Munro notes that MacArthur wrote that his strategic movements were being leaked to the enemy and that General James M. Gavin said, "I have no doubt that the Chinese were well informed by the British foreign office." Munro then states, "One can only guess how many American, South Korean, and United Nations units were cut to pieces by the wily and well informed (through Philby's and cohorts spying) Peng Dehuai between November 1950 and January 1951."

My question to our readers is: Were MacArthur and Gavin right? Did we take considerable losses because of Philby and his cohorts?

Answer: I am not aware of any definitive study on this, but personally, I am inclined to believe that any information on MacArthur's strategic military plans that filtered through to the British Foreign office were probably so general, as well as somewhat delayed, that they would not have been

of any great value to the Chinese in the essentially tactical situation (during those months) on the Korean Peninsula. I wonder if Chinese Sigint was not far more useful to them in this conflict, particularly since US forces have long had a reputation for poor communications security.

5. Here's one I don't think even our sagacious Hawaiian correspondent will get. What did the codeword Cloche refer to?

I barely remember it myself and, to ensure that it wasn't well known, checked in my 1990 copy of Leo Carl's intelligence dictionary and it wasn't there. Should I give a hint? Naw! Since some of my readers tell me my questions are too easy, I won't go soft.

Answer: I'm relying solely on a sometimes faulty memory here. I recall Cloche from field reporting from the Far East on or about 1957. I believe it was from an US Army office in Hong Kong. The reports were an eclectic mixture of economic, political, social, and occasionally military items, generally of little value, from local sources. The material was little seen and little used and was sometimes thought to have originated in a "Paper Mill."

NEW QUESTIONS

Q1 Who was Wellington's head of intelligence during the Waterloo campaign?

Q2 When was the world's first combat reconnaissance flight (with heavier than air aircraft)?

Q3 Some time back, I posed the question: "What was the spy capital of the world in WW-II?" There were several candidates but most readers agreed with me that it probably was Lisbon. Today's question is "What was the spy capital of the Far East during WW-II?"


Q4 What does the term "trolling" refer to—in intelligence that is, not fishing or looking for dates in singles bars? ❄

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