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The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency

By

Hans Moses

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The
CLANDESTINE SERVICE
# of the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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About the Author

Hans Moses arrived here from his native Germany in 1939. After some years of daytime work and nighttime study, he volunteered for infantry service but, once in Germany, became an interrogator-investigator for Army intelligence. Rehired as a civilian, he transferred to the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal, but soon returned to intelligence work as a research analyst for the Air Force, first in Austria, then in the Pentagon. From 1953 to 1974, he worked in the CIA's Clandestine Service. After his retirement, he was frequently called back, mainly for analytical writing and lecturing. He now volunteers as an editor and researcher for AFIO.

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THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE
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FOREWORD

Since the early 1970's, the Central Intelligence Agency and especially its clandestine operations activity have been the subject of widespread public discussion and "exposés" in the American media. Much of the attention has been focused on specific events and alleged abuses, and the comment on them has more often than not been based on ignorance and misunderstanding of what had happened. Passion and prejudices have often substituted for knowledge and fairness where the CIA has been concerned.

To date, information on the CIA and its activities has been dominated by the negative critics of the Agency, a few of them former CIA employees who have become disillusioned or disaffected. But the preponderant volume of comment on the Agency has come from "outsiders": journalists who have made a career out of exposing the CIA, and others ideologically or intellectually opposed to the concept of U.S. secret activities.

Those relatively few persons who have been privileged to follow CIA activities and their importance to the national security of the United States have for the most part been restrained from writing about the Agency because of their respect for the secrecy obligations they agreed to observe and because of their ingrained habits of discretion. In effect, the U.S. public has been exposed to information and misinformation (and in some interesting cases **disinformation**) on the CIA and particularly on its clandestine service. Few voices have been raised to correct the record or to speak up for the necessity of a national U.S. intelligence agency, and the need in many instances to operate clandestinely **outside** the United States.

The Association of Former Intelligence Officers has been studying ways to make available to the public an accurate and informed understanding of the CIA's clandestine service and its methods of functioning on behalf of the policy-makers of our government, without violating the tenets and obligations of the intelligence profession represented by its members. We decided that our best approach would be to draw on our own AFIO resources -- the experience and recollections of former intelligence officers, supplemented by some background reading -- in order that the public may understand how the CIA's clandestine activities have been conducted in the past, and to explain the general guidelines and disciplines under which it necessarily still operates. We felt that we could accomplish our aim without becoming unduly specific and, while remaining clear of sensitive information, could make a more objective, basic contribution.

This paper is the result of our efforts. Among the published works we have used as background information we should like to acknowlege, in particular, The Night Watch by David A. Phillips (New York: Atheneum, 1977), Secrets, Spies and Scholars* by Ray S. Cline (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), and the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (Church Committee) with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, with special emphasis on Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). All of them are recommended for separate reading.

Responsibility for this paper rests with AFIO. The Central Intelligence Agency has of course reviewed the text and has found that it contains no classified information. We have neither asked for nor received the CIA's endorsement of its contents, nor can we be sure to what extent our paper reflects current conditions in the CIA. We have attempted to spell out a "real world" orientation for the reader who is interested in his country's intelligence services, including the principles and guide-lines under which the CIA's clandestine activities are generally carried out. It may seem almost an anomaly to carry on clandestine activities in an open society such as we have in the U.S. but, enormous though that challenge may be, it must continue if the leaders of our nation are to have eyes and ears on the rest of the world.

With due acknowledgment of the limitations of this paper, we hope that it will help in meeting a legitimate public need: to understand what really goes on in this segment of our government's intelligence activity.

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*See the Recommended Reading List, page 20; Cline, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan Bush & Casey.

INTRODUCTION

A somewhat dated edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defined "clandestine" as: "Conducted with secrecy by design, usually for an evil or illicit purpose." (A comparatively bland definition -- "held in or conducted with secrecy" -- was substituted in more recent editions.)

As in most other trades, professions, and specialties, the terminology used to describe intelligence functions has developed its own meanings and connotations, and conventional dictionaries are no reliable guides to its usage. In the CIA's own ranks, clandestine activity has been defined as the performance of a secret task accomplished often in the face of opposition. Clandestine activity is sponsored by a government or group against a hostile state or group, or in support of a friendly state or group. It is designed and executed so that the sponsorship of the activity or operation is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, and is planned so that if it is uncovered, the sponsor can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for it. Clandestine activity, the CIA has maintained, depends on two preconditions: the desire to do something and evidence that it cannot be done openly.

Yet there is something to be said for the formulation used in the older Webster's edition some years ago: it quite accurately captured the concept of stealth, surreptitious movement and deception which -- unlike Webster's current version -- reaches beyond the confines of mere secrecy, and which must be recognized as an essential element in the functioning of a clandestine intelligence organization. In the sense of operating abroad, it is also appropriate to speak of authorized activities as illicit, even though not as "evil," for our government, like all major governments, needs a clandestine arm to operate outside the rules and controls imposed by other powers and by different societies. While all established nations with foreign interests recognize this and are known to sponsor various forms of clandestine activity at all times, none have chosen a designation -- or at least a subtitle -- as close to the literal truth, warts and all, as has the United States. Although no more than symbolic, this is one of many indications that our Clandestine Service, despite all of its well-advertised departures from the accepted norms of our society, has throughout its history been a thoroughly American institution.

Leaving aside the question of which clandestine activities have been, are, and will be essential, reasonable, acceptable, unnecessary, ill-advised or intolerable, we should be clear about one thing: they are what must be carried out when other means fail to accomplish what is needed in the national interest. If our nation could get along without the product of stealth, surreptitious movement and deception, it would not be logical as a consequence to reform its clandestine service in conformance with societal ideals; it would be logical to abolish it. Conversely, if the nation must have the option of resorting to stealth, surreptitious movement and deception when nothing else will work, that option must be accepted, professionalized, protected, and supported. We can, indeed must, think in terms of scale, limitations and effectiveness, but we cannot afford ever to forget the distinction between what we need and what we like. The United States has, probably later than it should have, entered the clandestine intelligence field not because of a fascination with stealth and adventure, but because those in authority came to believe that it could not responsibly stay out. This, we submit, is the one fundamental point that must be understood at the outset of a discussion of the CIA's Clandestine Service.

The discussion itself will touch on the principles, mission, history, functions and organization of the CIA's Clandestine Service. We shall endeavor to provide as complete a picture as possible in this framework, but we must also remain conscious of the complexity and the sensitivity of our subject which inhibit extensive treatment of many specifics. The purpose of these pages is not to titillate or to entertain, but to explain the basics of our Clandestine Service to those seriously interested in understanding what it is, what it does, and how it came about.

PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES

When we step from the philosophical framework into the area of practical application, clandestine activity embodies two general pursuits that, for a variety of reasons, do not usually coincide, but sometimes do overlap:

1. Espionage (and counterespionage or counterintelligence) -- the **collection of information** by surreptitious means;

2. Special Activities or Covert Action* -- surreptitious **actions** in support of American policy objectives abroad.

The main distinction between the two pursuits is that espionage is used to **acquire**, and **make available** to others in our government, **knowledge** required for policy-making, analysis and protection; special activities are designed to **influence** people and events abroad. What they have in common is, principally, their reliance on unconventional methods and secrecy.

With these basic formulations -- really little more than labels -- in mind, we should take a look at the history of the Clandestine Service. The vagaries of changing conditions, policies, personalities and trial-and-error experimentation have had as much to do with the development process as any design, but the two principal categories of activity have remained the basic elements in both the orientation and the structure of the organization.

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*Note: What was known as "covert action" through most of the post-World War II period was renamed "special activities" a few years ago. In this paper, the terms are used interchangeably.

HISTORY

1. BACKGROUND

Although the U.S. has engaged in espionage from time to time since the days of George Washington, its systematic, extensive clandestine activity began during the Second World War with the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (1941) and then the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (1942). When the OSS was disbanded after the end of the war, its Secret Intelligence and Counterespionage Branches were placed in the War Department under the name of Strategic Services Unit (SSU) as a holding action until the postwar U.S. leadership could devise a permanent intelligence organization. SSU was eventually incorporated into the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), established by Presidential Directive in January 1946. CIG's successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was formed in September 1947 by the National Security Act, and the CIG became its nucleus. The so-called CIA Act followed in 1949.

The problem of whether the CIA would collect information on its own or solely collate and analyze departmentally acquired intelligence arose during the legislative discussions of the 1947 Act. The Act did not specify that the CIA would collect intelligence, but the President decided, with the approval of the Congressional leadership, that it should. The authority for this was inferred from that part of the 1947 Act which authorized the Agency "to perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

Finding a legal basis for intelligence activities has bothered many governments. The political problem always arises whether a nation can have amicable relations with another country while legally (hence openly) establishing and maintaining within its own government structure an organization committed to action which is illegal in that other country. Nations have usually finessed this problem by simply not admitting to an intelligence capability and refusing to comment on intelligence matters. The CIA, however, was legally constituted in both the 1947 and 1949 legislative acts. Hence, from the inception of its intelligence system, the U.S. accepted the paradox of having an organization undertaking operational activities the U.S. Government would prefer not to acknowledge while legally recognizing that the organization exists.

2. GROWTH

Presumably the Clandestine Service would have had a slow, careful growth in operations and personnel, had not a responsibility for Special Activities (starting with what was known as "psychological warfare" and termed "covert action") been assigned to the CIA in June 1948. Thinking about such covert activities had been going on for a while, at least since late 1946, when Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal suggested that this form of warfare be studied for future use. U.S. officials saw the Soviet Union, which was proceeding to extend its sphere of influence in Europe and was flexing its muscles elsewhere, as a global threat and felt that the

Soviet leadership intended to use the organizational weapon of the Communist Party system to subvert and ultimately dominate the world. Forrestal reasoned that the U.S. would not be able to thwart Soviet intentions without a clandestine political mechanism that could counter the Communist effort. But when then Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, asked his General Counsel if legislation allowed the CIA to be involved in such activities, Lawrence R. Houston said it did not. Pressed further on the issue, Mr. Houston told the Admiral that if the President, or the National Security Council, which the President headed, directed the CIA to carry out covert action, and if the Congress allotted funds to do it, then the CIA could indeed become involved. On 14 December 1947, upon the urging of Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the National Security Council gave the responsibility for covert "psychological operations" to the CIA. On 18 June 1948, this was followed by NSC Directive 10/2, giving the CIA the job of undertaking covert political warfare against the ostensible Soviet menace.

It was first thought that the clandestine collection mechanism and the covert action organization should be kept separate, and parallel offices were created to this end: clandestine collection was done by the Office of Special Operations (OSO); covert action by the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).

The covert political struggle against the Soviet Union was conceived to be a European affair. The U.S. policy planners wanted the political offensive in Europe to parallel the economic aid given under the Marshall Plan. They were interested in the stimulation of democracy through encouraging competing political party systems, and in defeating Communist efforts to take control of labor movements. (General MacArthur's unwillingness to have the OSS operate in his command in the Far East undoubtedly was a contributing factor in the initial concentration on Europe.)

The change in China to Communist control in 1949 and the subsequent Korean War altered the emphasis. The Agency's responsibility for covert action was widened to include paramilitary actions in the Far East to support military operations in Korea. A major paramilitary capability was thus established within the CIA and was maintained for many years.

3. CONSOLIDATION

By the early 1950's, almost everyone had become disenchanted with the "dual service" approach. In 1952, clandestine operations were unified, and the separate offices of OPC and OSO merged into one Clandestine Service (CS). During the brief period when the offices were separated, they fought each other for control of resources as well as for agents, a competition which some of the latter managed to exploit for their own profit. The 1952 unification stopped such duplication and competition, but it took some time for the Clandestine Service to establish a unified command structure.

The key to achieving actual unification was the establishment of the CIA Station Chief as the individual through whom all clandestine activity was funneled from abroad. He was held accountable if anything went wrong and received the credit when it went right. He reported directly to his Washington headquarters.

As time went on, the Clandestine Service was re-oriented and reorganized many times in order to meet changing international conditions and national requirements and to promote organizational efficiency. Throughout it all, the basic structure remained intact: a consolidated organization, whose key frontline units were the field stations, directed and supported by a headquarters in the United States.

The organization was staffed by personnel who, under a flexible rotation system, were generally available for alternating domestic service and foreign tours. Those became the prevailing procedures in which the Clandestine Service has functioned throughout its history.

CURRENT FUNCTIONS

1. GENERAL

The Clandestine Service (CS) is designed to serve the foreign intelligence requirements of many offices in the U.S. Government, very much including the CIA's own analytical staffs. The requirements arrive in many ways, both formal and informal, and originate on many levels, from policymakers who need factual evidence or other forms of support to analysts who need raw material to supplement or check information they have. Borrowing concepts as well as terminology from the commercial field, the Clandestine Service thinks of the other offices as "consumers," "customers" or "users" and of its contributions as "services." It is axiomatic -- and understood by the Clandestine Service, even though occasionally overlooked by a would-be customer -- that the service requested must be important enough to justify the clandestine effort needed to supply it, and that other suppliers cannot reasonably be expected to meet the need, for as a rule the clandestine route is more expensive, more difficult, and potentially more troublesome than others..

The requesters are, of course, normally in a better position than the Clandestine Service to judge the urgency of a request even though such judgments cannot always be free of parochial considerations. In turn, no one is in a better position than the Clandestine Service to know what clandestine facilities exist and can be mobilized for any given task, and to judge the feasibility, risk and expense of any "service." Particularly in the area of Special Activities, the Clandestine Service may have commitments, desires, and apprehensions that contribute to its own brand of parochialism. In practice, major tasks are customarily hammered out in discussions by the interested parties. Additionally, the Clandestine Service often tries, in the light of what it knows or thinks it can do, to anticipate and interpret the needs of the "marketplace," as much as to respond to requests by customers expressing their own particular needs.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

a. Reporting

We have noted the criteria under which it becomes appropriate for our government to attempt acquisition of information by clandestine rather than by conventional means. We should add that, as a rule, acquisition -- or collection -- means just that: analysis, research and intelligence estimates are not parts of it and are left to other offices. However, categorical assertions tend to oversimplify things, particularly in fields that have the complex dynamics of intelligence activities. The support, protection, testing and exploitation of collection assets, and the proper presentation of the information to its users, require various forms of research and evaluation by the collectors themselves.

On the other hand, analysts, as users of the information, make judgments that affect the collection process. Nevertheless, there is a dividing line between collectors and users of information, and we can best describe it in functional terms. Whatever research and evaluation are done in the Clandestine Service are keyed to the support of its operations and the authentication and refinement of its product; the users provide requirements for information, evaluate the extent to which the product meets them, try to fit the product into a larger framework and use it as a potential basis for their conclusions.

In effect, what the Clandestine Service obtains is a first-stage contribution to the intelligence process, a process which at its later stages includes analyses and estimates and, ideally, provides information on which policy recommendations and decisions are based. The first-echelon product of collection is called "raw intelligence" or "raw reports." The "raw" or "foreign intelligence report" (there are other designations which are equally acceptable) is, indeed, the standard vehicle by which CS information found worthy of someone's attention is conveyed to customers. The raw report customarily protects the identity of the source, but invariably gives the reader some idea of his access and reliability and may include comments to help the user assess the information. The comments are strictly separated from the information itself, and great emphasis is placed on unbiased presentation. The raw report can be issued in a variety of forms, bear different classifications and distribution restrictions, and be directed to one, some, or many users, depending on breadth and level of interest, perishability, urgency and sensitivity.

As a matter of common sense, it is doubtless easy to understand the first three criteria: breadth and level of interest, perishability and urgency. Cabinet-level officials, for instance, should not be burdened with reporting on small-scale military movements, but the same reporting may be of great value for an analysis of troop dispositions. A report indicating the imminent resignation of a foreign official may be less than earth-shaking, but if it is of interest to someone, it must be disseminated speedily, lest it be overtaken by the event. A warning of a major upheaval or imminent hostilities would warrant immediate transmittal to the White House and other high levels of government. But what about our fourth criterion -- sensitivity? What makes some reports more sensitive, and their dissemination more restricted, than others?

This leads us to the heart of clandestine collection: the operations the CS must run in order to acquire its information.

b. Collection Operations

The Clandestine Service's stock in trade is the collection of information from people -- "human sources," or HUMINT as it is called in the trade. Collectively, those sources represent the entire spectrum of human psychology, character, morality, motivation, position, origin, nationality and what have you. The Service has developed the application of personality factors to the recruitment and handling of its sources into something of a science. In categorizing its sources, however, the CS applies functional terms which help to illustrate both the criteria and the Service's actual experience with human sources. Sources who have been tested and have accepted a continuing relationship with the Service -- usually contractual and generally (though not always) with provisions for financial compensation -- are called "agents" (a term which the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in contrast, applies to its staff personnel rather than to its informants. This has evidently been a source of constant confusion among media observers, many of whom persist in calling CIA officers "agents.") Sources who have not attained agent status, even though they may be under consideration for it or aspire to it, are called "contacts." Those rarely reporting information are "occasional sources." Those whose data are obtained without advance planning, and usually on a one-time basis, are "casual contacts." "Witting" sources are those who knowingly cooperate with the Service; "unwitting" sources are individuals who provide information without realizing that it is going to the CIA, or even knowing that their information has been overheard or elicited from them. All sources are initially regarded as "untested" until they establish something of a reporting record. If they prove themselves as sources of good information, they can eventually be described in reports carrying their information as "tested" or "reliable."

A common requirement for all true Clandestine Service intelligence sources is their potential for providing foreign information of interest to the U.S. Government but concealed from it. The criterion of -- usually intentional -- concealment is essential here. As a rule, it distinguishes Clandestine Service information from that provided by the State Department and various other agencies which also report information of interest to the U.S. Government. Since the information, in order to be useful, must also meet appropriate standards of accuracy and timeliness, it follows that the selection and maintenance by the CS of the right sources are complex and challenging tasks.

Formidable as the problems have been, the CS has nevertheless managed in the great majority of cases to separate the wheat from the chaff, and has, over the years, acquired and maintained an impressive array of reliable sources. While many elements in an agent's existence cannot be controlled, an accurate analysis of his motivation and his physical and psychological needs, along with appropriate steps to support his confidence, security and willingness to help, can be brought to bear. Notwithstanding the many inevitable trial-and-error sequences, this approach has served the Clandestine Service well.

The case of each source of the CS is, of course, different. It is particularly important to correlate the value and potential of each CS operation with the cost and risk inherent in running it. An exposed source, depending on the circumstances, may lose his reputation, his livelihood, or even his life. An assessment of risk for the source and his importance, then, is the main determinant of the sensitivity of the information, and the care with which it must be treated by those who process it as well as those who read it.

In this connection, we should deflate the widespread impression, bolstered by popular spy fiction, that all agent relationships are governed by deceit, that agent loyalty must end in disillusionment, and that the burned-out agent must expect to be turned out into the cold or worse. That is an image to which a serious American intelligence organization cannot afford to lend substance lest it defeat its own purposes; for the truth about such treatment could not remain hidden from those it could some day affect. While for many reasons it is not normal practice to tell a source more than he needs to know, every agent handler learns that a commitment to an agent -- whether for the immediate or the distant future, whether written or unwritten and even if implied rather than explicit -- must be kept. When, for instance, some of the more sophisticated Clandestine Service agents have, understandably, come to express concern in recent years that the agreed-upon confidentiality of their intelligence relationship may no longer be secure, their worries have focused on the American political climate, not on the good faith of the Clandestine Service.

We should address another general impression about clandestine collection operations that is at variance with experience. For quite some time, great efforts have gone into advance planning designed to achieve and maintain a selection of sources in closest possible proportion to changing priority needs for information. Advance planning has been necessary for the direction and redirection of CS resources, and has been vital to the successful recruitment of certain individuals thought to meet predetermined criteria of susceptibility and access. But in the field of clandestine operations, even the best plans have limitations. First, experience has shown that worthwhile recruitments often depend on opportunity more than on design. In one place, one may not be able to secure the services of people with the right access and qualifications, especially on short notice; in another, excellent opportunities may arise which do not satisfy immediate demands but can be rejected only at the risk of neglecting a probable future need. Second, recruitments are not, on the whole, simple matters. The establishment of a human relationship and the testing, development, and orientation of a source are long and delicate processes, and the termination or redesign of an operation is often a risky and usually a major undertaking. The fact is that U.S. priorities and designs are apt to change more quickly and more easily than our clandestine assets, the best of whom cannot be expected to behave like puppets. Someone who, for instance, has developed military expertise and has taken pride in accurately reporting military data cannot necessarily transfer his interest, expertise, and access to economics, even if such change would fit our plans. This is not, of course, a matter of collective long-range inflexibility; but significant in-depth intelligence will not begin or cease to flow in response to sudden turns of a mechanical tap, and a productive and faithful source whose services have been found unnecessary may have no taste for a return engagement.

One of the most important tools the Clandestine Service has is a detailed data base on each prospective and actual source. Equally important is the distillation of collective experience and understanding into operating doctrine and methodology. But the backbone of the entire effort is a corps of trained personnel. They must have the proper personality, aptitude and dedication and must have demonstrated their ability to survive and succeed in an unusual environment. They must also be able to impart their expertise to newcomers who appear suitable for a career in this esoteric field but who require a lengthy adaptation process which, necessarily, cannot begin until they enter the service.

c. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is treated in these pages as another collection activity because, like the other pursuits previously described, it is designed to acquire knowledge. But its purposes, its needs, and its customers give it a status -- some have said, a world -- of its own, and it is often presented as a category of activities apart from information collection.

Whereas other CS collectors try to acquire and pass on worthwhile knowledge on foreign affairs, counterintelligence (CI) operators are interested specifically in foreign -- essentially adversary -- intelligence services: what they are, how they operate, how they are staffed, what their goals are, what they have actually been doing and are planning to do, and how they are attempting to learn about or counter our own intelligence operations. The central part of the CI task is undoubtedly the discovery and abortion of attempts by foreign services to penetrate our government institutions.

CI, with special emphasis, is a field for professionals, and largely one for specialists, not only in terms of those pursuing leads and collecting data, but also of those who need and use the information thus collected. The object of the CI exercise is the protection of our secrets, our institutions and our intelligence efforts, and not -- certainly not primarily -- the procurement of information for analysis and policy-making. The users of CI information are, accordingly, other intelligence and security organs, both civilian and military, and selected individuals or units in other organizations specifically charged with the protection of their establishments from foreign intelligence encroachments.

Counterintelligence work characteristically tends to be exceptionally sensitive, primarily because, under the searching eyes of experienced adversaries, even a slight lapse or a minor disclosure could thwart a major effort mounted at great pains. Knowledge of CI operations and substance thus has traditionally been protected with special care, and access to it has been severely restricted. As is inevitable when intelligence services duel with each other, camouflage and deception are ingredients of the daily experience; this, in turn, makes it specially important for our counterintelligence personnel to be thorough in gathering their facts, to be wary of first impressions, and to wear skepticism and suspicion as parts of their professional armor.

Actually, counterintelligence principles and consciousness cannot be, and in practice are not, completely divorced from general operational activity. It is a matter of elementary defensive understanding: whatever one does in the clandestine field may run into counterefforts by opposing services. Thus a fair measure of counterintelligence methodology is included in the training of all operational personnel and remains an integral part of operational thinking.

Outside of the distinguishing features mentioned above, the operating principles and practices in counterintelligence work are pretty much the same as in other clandestine operations.

3. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

a. Policy Framework

Special Activities, we may recall, are designed not to acquire knowledge, but to influence people and events, and all to one end: to support U.S. policy abroad. U.S. policy, in this context, is defined by the President and implemented by members of his official family in the Executive Branch. Special Activities are, simply put, merely one of the many tools at the President's disposal.

The instruments of American policy overseas are primarily the Department of State, its Foreign Service and other overt agencies of the government. Special Activities by the CS, while far more extensive in times past than at present, have never been more than a small proportion of America's overseas effort, and have been brought into play when overt diplomacy was not thought to suffice. The United States has been intent on countering covert efforts by adversary powers against U.S. interests throughout the world. In addition, the United States has often found it necessary to oppose the efforts of political leaders hostile to the U.S., not necessarily because they were dependent on Communist influence, but sometimes when they were using Communist or other national parties to gain control of neutral or pro-American nations. Moreover, in many countries terrorism has given increasing cause for U.S. counteraction. Terrorism can be a feature of national policy (as at this writing in Libya), an organized group effort such as various Palestine Liberation Organization groups in the Middle East, or an expression of modern anarchist action such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany.

b. Essence of Special Activities

We earlier defined Special Activities as "surreptitious activity in support of American policy objectives abroad." Just what is surreptitious about such programs? The most basic answer is that the role of the United States Government must not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. The reason is simple: Whenever the Government's hand in an international move can be revealed or acknowledged, open or diplomatic channels are appropriate and much to be preferred.

Unfortunately, we cannot always afford to go that overt route. Here are three examples, all hypothetical:

In the first case, we find a political leader — perhaps the head of a government, a party or a labor union — confronted with a conspiratorial move by anti-democratic elements not representing a popular majority but obviously well financed and organized, which threatens to oust him. He cannot, on his own, marshal enough effective support, spot the troublemakers behind the scene, or muster the expertise and resources needed to anticipate and counter the conspirators' moves. The U.S. Government considers it a matter of self-interest and is in a position to help him out. He is eager to accept — but only if the arrangement is not exposed to the public.

Another example: It is assumed that a pro-Western group in a non-Western state is in danger of being overwhelmed by the regime's domestic apparatus but clings to the hope of support from the outside. Our Government feels in a position to provide that support to good effect, and believes that the group's continuing vitality is important to us. We could not openly provide such aid, however, without a break in diplomatic relations.

Our third example: A foreign capital is being subjected to a flood of anti-American propaganda, sponsored by individuals whom we suspect — although we cannot openly prove — to be agents of another foreign power. One of our local friends would be willing to do his bit to counter this but can do it only if he gets help -- and if the help does not bear an American label.

In such situations, and in an infinite number of others, variants of which have arisen many times in the past, our Government retains the option of using its Special Activity capabilities. This may happen whenever there is need for a middle ground between a formal national commitment -- in extreme cases, at the risk of open warfare — and the passive acceptance of damaging developments. Historically, Special Activities were also thought appropriate when there were opportunities to advance our national interest at a much lower risk, if any, and with a great deal more flexibility than open or diplomatic intercession would offer.

c. Types of Special Activity

Different kinds of Special Activity have been mentioned earlier in our sections on the development of the Clandestine Service. We can turn to history for further illustrations.

Political action has traditionally been the most widely used, and the most important, form of Special Activity. Essentially, it has meant the use of political means to achieve political ends, i.e. steps taken to promote the presentation of pro-American views -- and attack anti-American positions -- in political controversies; and to influence political events in our favor. The latter could include the exertion of political influence for or against certain foreign groups or individuals, in order either to preserve the status quo or to change it. An example of political action was the multi-year program of covert subsidies for two radio outlets, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, whose broadcasts were aimed at the Soviet Bloc. CIA support of students and student groups expressing anti-Communist sentiments at international meetings, which was eventually exposed in the press and ended in 1967, clearly lay in the political action sphere. The now celebrated support for political opponents of leftist Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens in the 1970's was in that category. So, also, was the placement of news stories in the foreign press, criticized inter alia in 1976 by the U.S. Senate's Church Committee Report. (We should point out that, while such news stories could be notional, the CS has always understood, as most advertisers do, that the truth is often the most powerful argument.) There are many other varieties of political action, and whereas our examples, for purposes of better illustration, represent major programs or events, the bulk of the CIA's political action operations over the years consisted of minor individual steps, designed for a short distance and leaving only small footprints in the international sand.

Paramilitary operations, in many ways an entirely separate form of Special Activities, have, as indicated, played a major role in the growth of the Clandestine Service. They do not fit the usual pattern of clandestinity, because little about them can be concealed. They are covert only in the sense that the true national sponsorship is not officially admitted, and it has in the past often remained unacknowledged by tacit agreement of both sides. Such operations require their own information-gathering infrastructure, communications control, personnel and weapons support and substantial funding. They have been by far the most expensive covert operations undertaken by the CIA.

Examples of paramilitary operations have been given and are not hard to come by in the open annals of past CIA activity. An instance of a successful operation was the campaign, largely even though not entirely paramilitary, to unseat President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. For an unsuccessful paramilitary undertaking, we need to look no further than the landing at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in 1961. The unacknowledged presence of North Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam throughout much of the war was one of many paramilitary campaigns launched by foreign countries.

Other Special Activities have, more often than not, been derivations, combinations, or variants of those described. Among them have been escape, evasion, and rescue operations both during and after wars, infiltration operations for sabotage purposes, and protective training programs for high-level foreign personalities.

d. Scope

The prevailing assumption in the Executive and Legislative branches of government remains that, generically speaking, the United States should not deprive itself of the Special Activities option. At the same time, in response to complaints about the range, latitude, control and side-effects of past Special Activities, legislation has been enacted and new directives issued which closely define and limit such activities in the future, and new procedures have been established for the approval and review of each activity, and for the determination of its legality. The President, the National Security Council and the Congress are taking part in this process. The Attorney General is playing a new and significant role as a guardian of the law in deliberations over intelligence policy.

It should be emphasized here that Special Activities, since their inception in our governmental framework, have had to meet, at a minimum, the test of relevance to national foreign policy, with the President, then as now, seen as the chief policymaker. In the past the test procedurally could be quite informal: an indication of what the President wanted or, in minor matters, the existence of sufficient precedent. But in the main, covert activities required approval by designated Security Council committees and, for a number of years, policy coordination with the appropriate State Department offices.

In the future, Special Activities must meet additional criteria, the most important of them being that of importance -- rather than merely relevance -- to national defense or foreign policy. Policy consideration, notification of Executive and Congressional offices, approval and review will all be highly structured, with emphasis on maintaining sufficient safeguards and maximum accountability.

In the Cold War era, there was a time when Special Activities took the lion's share of the budget of the Clandestine Service. In recent years, however, they have shrunk to a small percentage. We might note that of the nine "duties and responsibilities" assigned to the CIA under Executive Order 12333 of December 4. 1981, only one pertains to Special Activities as "approved by the President." While this does not in itself indicate the future proportion of Special Activities to other pursuits, and only assassinations are specifically prohibited, the trend is clear. In the foreseeable future, it is safe to predict, the main U.S. clandestine effort will be directed towards the procurement of information rather than towards Special Activities.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

1. ORGANIZATION

a. General

The organization of the Clandestine Service reflects its orientation and needs: concentration on foreign affairs, directed and supported by a domestic headquarters. The key units are the field stations, practically all of which operate in foreign countries. (The only field units operating in the United States are those charged with developing and maintaining foreign operations and personnel ("assets") on American soil and briefing and debriefing certain Americans willing to share information with CIA which they acquired during their foreign travels.)

b. Field Organization

Our discussion of clandestine operations will have given some indication of the variety and unpredictability of the conditions under which the organization must function. In the Clandestine Service's field activities, little can be taken for granted other than a continuing need for reassessment and change. Thus the organization must be flexible rather than static. Short of going into specific areas and programs, which will not be attempted here, we can only provide an account of what is normal or typical, with the understanding that the service treats special situations in special ways.

The field stations may vary in size, from large establishments staffed with individuals of diverse qualifications down to one-person units. Personnel invariably are under some form of cover of varying depth, depending on need and circumstances. The Station Chief is still, as he has been throughout the existence of the Clandestine Service, responsible to his Washington headquarters for all clandestine activities in his area. If there is liaison with foreign intelligence services, it is maintained by him or his delegates. He also represents the CIA — not merely the Clandestine Service — in the local American establishment, both civilian and military.

Each station has a number of missions to perform. Charters are drawn up and are regularly reviewed in the CIA's Washington headquarters.

c. Headquarters Organization

The Clandestine Service, formally called the Directorate of Operations (until early in 1973 it was called the Directorate of Plans), is one of the major components of the Central Intelligence Agency under the command of the Director (and Deputy Director) of Central Intelligence. Its organization chart resembles that of a military command, with functions divided between line and staff units. The major line units — parallels of the combat units in a military organization -- are called "divisions"; they represent command authority and are the Directorate's instruments for managing field activities. The staffs perform research and provide facilities for field and headquarters activities, work that usually goes beyond the needs and responsibilities of any one division but that may, if necessary, be marshalled in support of any division, effort, or purpose.

The common denominator of most divisions is their fundamentally geographic orientation. A division (sometimes called "area division") is usually responsible for a major geographic area; and depending on what kind of an area it is, the division's organizational breakdown may or may not be highly complex. The staffs have, if anything, even greater organizational variety than the line units but their charters are invariably functional rather than geographic. (Smaller units within a staff may, of course, be called upon to focus on certain geographic areas, just as some divisions have functional units under their jurisdiction.)

Three things should be said about CS headquarters. Those who feel that the organization looks complicated must be advised that in real life it is more complicated still. We have not listed specific functions. Even if we tried, it would be hard -- and probably useless -- to distinguish permanent from transitory and essential from limited-purpose institutions. Nor can we overlook the fact that each of the key line units, the area divisions, has staffs of its own which largely parallel those on the higher level but are nevertheless essential to its existence. Conversely, some of the staffs are at some points propelled directly into operations and assume the character of line units. While all this is doubtless confusing to outsiders looking for a clear organizational pattern, it is as natural as breathing for members of an organization that has learned to extract pragmatic solutions to real-life problems from the structure that exists on paper.

The second point is related to the first. Neither the work of the Clandestine Service nor its structure has remained static. As conditions or judgments changed over the years, so did the table of organization, and staffs as well as divisions were created, abolished or redesigned in the process. In situations that required special efforts but were thought to be of limited duration, it was found appropriate to establish temporary task forces rather than to make outright organizational changes. Such approaches are not limited to the Clandestine Service and will undoubtedly continue to be used as needed.

Thirdly, the Clandestine Service depends in a number of ways on the apparatus of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole, rather than merely on its own. Administration, security, training, personnel, scientific and technical research, budget and finance, for instance, are primarily designed to support all of the CIA although of course they are represented at various levels within the Clandestine Service framework. In major ways, it pays to remember, the Clandestine Service is an integrated part of a central organization, the CIA, which, in turn, is an integrated part of the national government.

2. PERSONNEL

a. General

It has often been said, and more often intimated, that Clandestine Service personnel are, or must be, a special breed. Advocates of clandestine activities have stressed intelligence, discipline and dedication as essential characteristics; critics have charged deviousness, moral blindness, and over-aggressiveness.

Actually, Clandestine Service employees are no less varied in background and personality than those in most other large organizations in and out of government; nor, as a matter of experience, are the criteria for success fundamentally different. What distinguishing features there are pertain not to ability or character, but to orientation. Clandestine Service personnel must be, or become, intensely interested in foreign affairs. Beyond that, they must be able to adapt themselves to certain environmental conditions if they are to have a chance for a satisfactory career. They must accept the fact that much of what they do, see, and hear cannot be freely discussed with outsiders, nor necessarily with all their own colleagues. As a rule, they must be willing to work for distinction within the organization and forego the satisfaction of potential public acclaim. They, and their families, must be ready to live with the inhibitions to social life and public utterance that flow from the acceptance of secrecy and relative anonymity. Depending on personality and outlook, this kind of existence can be natural, easy, difficult, or impossible for an individual. Those who find it too difficult or impossible are, of course, not suitable for a Clandestine Service career and, if they nevertheless accept the required restrictions, are apt to become frustrated and to create problems for the service and for themselves. For those who can make the adjustment, however, the work can be highly rewarding.

b. Operations Officers

The "operations officers" or "case officers" (erroneously called "agents" by the media) are the mainstay of the Clandestine Service. They are, in other words, the people most directly responsible for the spadework of the Clandestine Service, as described above under "Collection Operations" and "Types of (Special) Activity."

Operations officers get extensive training and guidelines and follow certain basic procedures ("tradecraft"). While some of the elements of their professional activity have parallels in other investigative, technical, and adminstrative work as well as in news gathering and salesmanship, the combination represented by their profession is unique. An operations officer must, of course, be able and willing to live and travel abroad, he must know something about the language and the culture of his area, and he must be effective in person-to-person contact. He must be able to achieve a thorough understanding of others without losing his independence of judgment. And he must maintain discretion as well as integrity.

It should be noted that few case officers are equally adept at all phases of operational activity. One, for instance, may have great success at recruiting agents while another may show special strength in exploiting a recruited source over the long haul. Also, notwithstanding all common doctrine, no two operations officers ever appear to get results in exactly the same way, nor do different agents necessarily react the same way to any one operations officer. Finally, even though an operations officer often gets into situations where he must depend on his own ingenuity, he knows that there are other people -- superiors as well as specialists and other potential supporters -- on the same team. Thus, certain facets of any operation are liable to become matters of shared participation and responsibility. This is particularly likely when an operation requires knowledge or resources beyond the capacity of an individual officer.

c. Specialists

For reasons not hard to grasp, operations officers have sometimes been called "generalists." That term distinguishes them from the many others -- in effect, the "specialists" -- whose services are either necessary or helpful in the operational framework. The range of such services is wide. There is room for linguists, area experts, engineers, technicians, researchers, reports and requirements officers, communications officers, and many more. The Clandestine Service has all of them within its ranks and, of course, all types of clerical personnel as well. Beyond that, it will be remembered, its efforts are supported, as the occasion demands, by personnel in other Central Intelligence Agency offices, especially those with facilities for research and analysis.

PROJECTION

In the foregoing pages, we have tried, in rudimentary form, to explain the Clandestine Service and to put its work in perspective. In the course of this undertaking, it will have become apparent to what extent the service has been tied to the national environment and its climate. What our policymakers required in years past, and Congress expected and supported, could be achieved only through an organization that was, in effect, a closed society with well-protected secrets and a range of missions and programs that were unique by design. Work in the Clandestine Service offered to its practitioners an inseparable mixture of self-denial and distinction, of limitation and security, and of insulation and assurance. The appeal was essentially that of patriotism, trust, predictability and belonging. Basic standards and priorities were clear and their acceptance and protection rarely questioned.

This form of existence began to change in the early 1970's -- even though the structural trappings remained generally intact -- with a spate of printed and spoken charges against the CIA, and with the widespread abandonment of traditional inhibitions against public discussion of intelligence matters. It is not our purpose here to discuss this change in terms of morality or justification; we are solely concerned with its effect. Suddenly, the society was less than closed, its secrets were no longer inviolate, its standards and priorities placed in doubt, and predictability replaced by uncertainty. Psychologically and philosophically, the change in the U.S. was not merely profound; it was traumatic for most of those affected, especially those in the CS.

Some of the negative impact of the disclosures have been mitigated with time and as wide segments of the American public have begun to realize the damage caused by the exposure of many clandestine activities, methods and procedures. The public is also slowly realizing the potential damage to our clandestine operations, facilities, and modus operandi if secrets are inadequately protected and if clandestine activities suffer from undue restrictions. The precise amount of residual harm done to the Clandestine Service over the past decade is not known, but it surely has been considerable.

It is difficult to project the future of the Clandestine Service from the outside, and harder still to think of suggestions for it that could have real meaning. Here are a few general thoughts, however:

As we indicated at the outset, some kind of balance must be established after the massive wave of Congressional and media assaults against the CIA that marked much of the past decade. But to say that the public and its spokesmen have, on the whole, begun to rise above the level of one-sided condemnation of U.S. clandestine activities abroad is not the same as assuming a complete return to the national consensus of the past. The door to the CS's secrets cannot remain wide open, but neither can it be as securely locked as it once was. It cannot remain permissible or fashionable to say or write in public anything on clandestine intelligence regardless of the consequences on human life or national welfare, but neither ought there to be unquestioned acceptance of every secrecy label. The Clandestine Service must not be held to standards of saintliness, but neither should it expect public and official tolerance of any clear abuse of privilege.

Executive and legislative approaches have given some indication where the lines are expected to be drawn. Beyond that, there are many imponderables: new scientific discoveries, future foreign alignments, alliances, conflicts and clashes, as well as the evolution of our domestic political climate and the requirements of future administrations -- all will surely contribute to a continuing examination of national needs and priorities which, in turn, will vitally affect the character and mission of the Clandestine Service.

We have little doubt, however, that the Clandestine Service will need to adjust itself to a departure from the past to an existence that is at once more controlled and less predictable. We see no reason why the Clandestine Service, and those who define its mission, should not be equal to that challenge.

SEMINAR OUTLINE

There are certain major questions which should be answered concerning any clandestine service (The authors named in the following paragraphs are those given in the Recommended Reading list which follows this section.):

- There is a major difference between clandestine intelligence collection and covert military, political and economic actions. Cline, Kent and Kirkpatrick address this issue from organizational and substantive points of view. Once the difference between the two is understood, Phillips, Roosevelt and Wyden give excellent descriptions of covert actions while Hood, Masterman, Persico, and again Phillips give excellent descriptions of clandestine collection.

- Once the differences between types of operations are understood, and the seminar group has a feel for how such operations serve or fail to serve national security policy, the group should then address the issue of propriety. It will be easy to justify the Double Cross system (Masterman); not so the Bay of Pigs (Wyden). Developing an agent in place as described by Hood serves clandestine intelligence collection, as do many of the operations described by Phillips, and they can be more easily justified than can the covert action to overthrow Mossadegh, as described by Roosevelt. However, if it becomes a matter of national policy that the Shah of Iran must return to power in order to protect a strategic resource, then Operation AJAX is a better way to implement national policy than is a military incursion. Should a president in a democracy have a weapon which is beyond diplomacy but short of war?

- An interesting exercise for a seminar group member with an interest in law, government and history would be to trace the authority to carry out orders for clandestine and covert operations back to the Constitution.

- A comparison of clandestine services could be developed from the description given in Hans Moses' essay and Barron's authoritative discussion of the KGB.

- A discussion of current events and applicability of clandestine operations in support of national security policy would allow seminar members to assess just how valuable a tool such operations might be.

There are a number of ways to approach these major issues. They could be assigned to individuals, or groups, for presentation to the seminar as a whole. Once basic definitions are understood, a debate as to the utility or propriety of clandestine operations would be instructive.

Recommended Reading

BARRON, John. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974. Introduction by Robert Conquest. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 462p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1974).

An excellent, authoritative and well-written account of many major cases in which the KGB has been involved around the world. Also included are some valuable details of the organization of the KGB. This is the best current book on the subject, although the section on the GRU is somewhat weak.

CLINE, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan Bush & Casey. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1981. Charts. Bibl. notes. 351p. (Further updated pap. ed., under title of The CIA: Reality vs. Myth scheduled for publication by Acropolis Books, Jan. 1983).

This is an update of the author's Secrets, Spies and Scholars, published in 1976. Dr. Cline recounts his career as an intelligence analyst in the OSS and CIA. In the latter organization, he rose to the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence (1962-66). From 1969-73, Dr. Cline headed the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This is an important book by an official the major portion of whose career was spent in intelligence production and analysis and who writes of these matters with authority and understanding.

COLBY, William E. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 493p.

This book describes Colby's intelligence career, commencing with his assignments in OSS in World War II when he parachuted behind the lines on hazardous missions in France and Norway. He then details his CIA career in which he rose from case officer and other assignments to become Director of Central Intelligence during its most troubled and controversial times -- the aftermath of Watergate, and the Congressional hearings into alleged misdeeds by CIA and the intelligence community. He also discusses his role as an Ambassador in Vietnam and the pacification and Phoenix programs there.

CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1979. 122p. (pap.).

Two chapters in this book are particularly important to the study of the Clandestine Service. Chapter Four, "Clandestine Collection," by Samuel Halpern and Chapter Six, "Covert Action," by Hugh Tovar, will do much to differentiate between these two activities so confused in the minds of many unfamiliar with national intelligence. Both authors are experts in their field. Two additional volumes of this series are of value; Vol. four: Covert Action. 1981, and Vol. five: Clandestine Collection, 1982. While some of the papers are uneven, many of them represent experienced presentations.

DULLES, Allen W. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Bibl. 277p. (pap. N.Y.: Signet Book, 1965)

A former Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961), after touching on some of the early history of intelligence, examines many aspects of intelligence requirements, collection, and production, describes the Communist intelligence services, and explores the uses of intelligence. With the authority of his own experience, he expounds the role of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community in the U.S. Government, up until the time he left office. The paperback edition has a little added material, particularly as to specific cases.

HOOD, William. Mole. New York: Norton, 1982. 317p.

The story of CIA's first recruit within the Soviet Intelligence service -- a military intelligence (GRU) officer named Major Pyotr Popov -- who, says Hood, a former CIA man, provided the U.S. with so much valuable information that it saved the U.S. "...half a billion dollars in military research."

This is a virtual manual for the case officer. While Mr. Hood indicates in the introduction that his knowledge is dated, it is unlikely that the recruiting and handling of agents by the Clandestine Service is much different now than as described in Mole.

KENT, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949. 226p. (pap. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

A foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production. The book lays down many of the principles which have subsequently been established in practice. The paperback edition contains a new 5000 word preface by Dr. Kent, reflecting his many years of experience as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates at CIA.

There is little in this fine basic text about clandestine intelligence, but what is there is essential to understanding how the clandestine service of any nation fits into the total intelligence structure. It does much to place clandestine operations in perspective. Those short sections of this text which discuss definitions and use of clandestine intelligence are essential.

KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., Jr. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973. Bibl. 212p. (pap. N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1975).

A description of the roles, functions and organization of the U.S. intelligence community, prior to Professor Kirkpatrick's retirement from CIA in 1955. The book is the best available for that period, but does not reflect the many changes in the intelligence community since that date. However, his discussion of clandestine and covert activities and how they interrelate and sometimes clash, is still applicable and worth the reading.

MASTERMAN, Sir John C. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972. Foreword by Norman Holmes Pearson. 203p. (pap. N.Y.: Avon Books, 1972; N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The late Sir John Masterman was Chairman of the British Double-Cross (XX) Committee during World War II. At the end of that war, he wrote this text as an official classified history. Slightly sanitized, this text was authorized for publication by the British authorities in 1971. The book describes the highly complex and successful efforts of British intelligence to neutralize and, in many cases, to utilize the services of every German agent in Great Britain during the war. A major text on counterintelligence and deception, the book is a classic treatise on this type of activity and the meticulous coordination which such activity requires. For the purposes of this monograph, The Double-Cross System shows the vulnerability of clandestine intelligence activities to detection and play-back of enemy agents and the seriousness of the results for those who can achieve such a coup.

MEYER, Cord. Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Bibl. notes. 433p.

This autobiography, starting with the author's undergraduate days and his World War II career as a Marine officer in the South Pacific, where he was badly wounded, describes his search for world peace in the establishment of the United World Federalists. In 1951, Meyer joined the CIA, where he served for more than 25 years. His principal assignment was as head of CIA's International Organizations Division which was charged, through covert action and other means, to counter the Soviet political and propaganda offensive against the Free World. Meyer's chapters on the Cold War and on the U.S.-controlled Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are particularly illuminating, as are his chapters on the Soviet Union and its KGB. This is an important and carefully written book.

PERSICO, Joseph E. Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II. New York: Viking Press, 1979. Bibl. 376p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 1979).

Persico, for more than a decade, was chief speechwriter for Governor (and later Vice President) Nelson Rockefeller. When the latter retired from political office, Persico determined to write this book on the penetration of Nazi Germany (and Austria) by agents of the OSS. He was able to obtain several hundred previously classified documents from CIA's OSS archives and to reach over one hundred of the participants in wartime operations against Germany: agents, staff and case officers, and support personnel. A few of these operations had strategic merit. Most of them were tactical in nature, supplying important order-of-battle and targeting information from behind the German lines facing the Allies' advancing armies in Europe. Piercing the Reich is the first real effort at considering these operations on Germany soil in their entirely.

PHILLIPS, David Atlee. The Night Watch. New York: Atheneum, 1977. 309p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The author's relations with CIA began on a contractual basis in South America in 1950. After some years in this status, Phillips became a staff officer in CIA's Clandestine Services. He served in three Latin American countries as Chief of Station and later became the chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. In 1975, he retired from CIA in order to speak out publicly in defense of the need for a strong American intelligence community and in the same year he founded the Association of Former Intelligence Officers for this purpose. His book is a well-written, anecdotal and philosophic account of his intelligence career with obvious emphasis on his region of specialty, Latin America.

POWERS, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 393p. (pap. New York: Pocket Books, 1981).

This book by a well-known journalist is, on the one hand, the most comprehensive book on the CIA to date. On the other, it is seriously flawed with errors, some of them major, of fact and concept. One of the book's most important shortcomings is Powers' failure to recognize the world as it was after 1947, the fact that there was (and still is) a serious Soviet threat, and his failure to weave the actual world situation into his CIA narrative. The author's study of the mass of material he obtained (including many interviews with former CIA officials) led him to change his mind on several of his original hostile misconceptions of his topic. Unfortunately, Powers still tries to make himself the moral judge of U.S. policies which the CIA supported, although he denies that CIA was the "...rogue elephant..." that others have charged. The subtitle of his book is misleading. It is not the story of Richard Helms who serves more as a thread winding through the book because of Helms' lengthy career in intelligence. The author does not understand Helms and is sometimes very unfair to him. This is a book which should be approached by the reader with a full recognition of its many errors as well as its interesting exposition of U.S. intelligence.

ROOSEVELT, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979. 217p. (pap. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981).

Roosevelt, a veteran OSS and CIA officer, was the principal case officer for Operation AJAX, the jointly-planned Anglo-American operation for the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and the restoration of the Shah of Iran to his throne. Because Mossadegh had ordered virtually all British citizens out of Iran, the principal burden of this successful operation fell on the Americans. In the crucial days before AJAX, Kermit Roosevelt entered Iran clandestinely to take charge of the operation and maintain personal liaison with the Shah and a few other senior Iranians. This book is his description of Operation AJAX, its planning and approval at the highest levels of the British and American governments, and its execution.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Final Report and Hearings, Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence and Military Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975-76.

These Reports and Hearings comprise the most thorough investigation of United States intelligence activities, foreign and domestic, ever undertaken by Congress. Book IV is the most important part of this series to the subject of the Clandestine Service. It contains the "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," expanded and revised from a shorter version in Book I. The full version of the "History" in Book IV, by Anne Karalekas of the Committee Staff, was published commercially in 1977 by the Aegean Park Press, P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, California 92653. While somewhat uneven in some areas, particularly on the role of clandestine collection and covert action, this "History" is probably the best text publicly available on the history of CIA.

WYDEN, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Bibl. notes. 352p.

The views in this book are as varied as the opinions of those who have commented on it or who participated in one way or the other in the Bay of Pigs operation. The author's views that the CIA was "...acting out of control..." and "...routinely, daily, committing unconstitutional acts..." are debatable, and the book is flawed by errors. Nevertheless there are those who consider this the best book on the subject. It is written in an easy, chatty style, reflecting the author's journalistic background. He has interviewed many of the participants and spent several hours with Castro discussing the operation. Those who read it, however, should approach this volume with circumspection.