Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Period

— Part I —
The Changed Environment

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The role of intelligence has undergone fundamental shifts since the end of the Cold War. Intelligence is no longer the purview of a few high-level decision makers. It is now everybody’s business. Within conflict zones intelligence is collected, analyzed and used at lower and lower levels of command. Within the tranquility of domestic life local law enforcement and even ordinary citizens have become producers and consumers of intelligence. Publics expect their security and intelligence agencies to be more proactive and collaborative at home and abroad to preempt security threats. At the same time they expect their governments to uphold their civil liberties.

This article explores the causes and nature of these shifts. The approach is more thematic than chronological. Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by the nature of the threats that it must confront and the environment within which it operates. The collapse of the Soviet Empire led to a proliferation of new states and left power gaps that others were quick to fill. New threats emerged from sub-state actors. It also removed the largest impediment to global capitalism. As great power conflict became a distant memory, economic espionage increased, the criminal underworld feasted on the rewards of a deregulated global economy, and intelligence agencies increasingly turned to a burgeoning commercial sector for help.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the East German secret police, the “Stasi”, collapsed.¹ The CIA managed to obtain copies of the Stasi’s foreign files, which revealed that almost all the CIA’s agents in the GDR in 1988-1989 had been controlled by the Stasi.² The files were used to prosecute Americans and West German citizens for treason.³ Motivated to gain membership in NATO and the European Union (EU), the services of other Eastern European states were quick to purge their ranks of agents who had ties to serious corruption, organized crime or previous human rights abuses.⁴ A similar transition to democratically accountable intelligence soon occurred in South Africa when apartheid collapsed in 1994.⁵ Nearly two decades later repressive security services in the Middle East would implode following the popular revolts of the Arab Spring.⁶

Like the Communist Party and the USSR itself, the KGB became a major casualty of the failed 1991 coup to oust Mikhail Gorbachev.⁷ Almost all of the leadership were implicated. The KGB was broken up into five services,⁸ but, in contrast to East Germany, only a limited effort was made to open the KGB archives.⁹ Although thousands of former KGB pro-

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¹ Civil activists occupied offices of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security) and revealed a vast network of informants that had spied on neighbors, friends and family. With 91,015 staff and 189,000 informants or “Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter” (unofficial employees), 1 in 50 of the population had ties to the Stasi. Thomas Wegener Fris, Kristie Macrakis and Helmut Mueller-Enbergs (Eds.), East German Foreign Intelligence. Myth, Reality and Controversy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 3.
⁷ Todd and Bloch, Global Intelligence, Chapter 5, “From KGB to FSB and Back Again?”
⁸ The five agencies are the SVR (foreign intelligence), FSB (internal security), FAPSI (communications), FSO (federal protection), and GUSP (special programs). Military intelligence, the GRU, was left largely untouched. Robert W. Pringle, “The Intelligence Services of Russia,” in Loch Johnson (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See also Robert Pringle’s article “Guide to Soviet and Russian Intelligence Services” in the Winter/Spring 2011 edition of Intelligencer.
⁹ It was not until the defection of KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to Great Britain in 1992 that many of the Cold War secrets
professionals left the services in the 1990s, some of the most effective Russian assets remained in place. In 1995, the CIA discovered that Aldrich Ames had been spying for the Russians for 10 years. A few years later Robert Hanssen, an FBI agent, was arrested, having spied for the Russians for 20 years. By the first decade of the 21st century Russian espionage efforts against the US were back at “Cold War levels” and the FSB was demonstrating the ruthlessness of its predecessor. This resurgence reflected the priorities of President Putin, a former KGB officer, who took over from Yeltsin in 1999, and brought former members of the KGB, dubbed “siloviki,” into government and industry.

Western intelligence agencies were downsized after the Cold War. The Dutch foreign intelligence service was for a short time actually abolished and some suggested there was no longer need for the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). But cooler heads prevailed. Across the board, human intelligence took the largest hit. In the US a peace dividend of around 30% was implemented by the end of the 1990s and the CIA’s budget was slashed by 23%. One important outgrowth of security sector reform and downsizing was the rise of private corporations offering security and intelligence services. These found a market in developing countries whose fragile regimes could no longer count on the support of the superpowers, and in the developed world, where the hiring freezes of the 1990s, the expanding global economy, and the increased tempo after 9/11 combined to turn them into major players in the world of intelligence.

**THE EMERGENCE OF NEW THREATS**

During the Cold War the core intelligence task of western agencies was to monitor the USSR’s strategic and military posture. When the Soviet Empire collapsed this task assumed a much lower priority. Economics became the new battleground. But it was not long before new security challenges emerged. Iraq invaded Kuwait and “low intensity conflicts” broke out in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. The reordering of the system following the end of the Cold War altered cost-benefit calculations and led to increased contestations for power in many parts of the world, requiring a dramatic increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations.
At the same time, criminals took advantage of deregulation and globalization.24 In Russia the failure to provide a regulatory framework for business encouraged organized crime to become a surrogate for government.25 As the number of weakly governed areas around the globe increased, crime went global.26 The spread of liberal economic reforms, the emergence of instantaneous forms of communication and the growth of émigré communities were major drivers.27 The market for trafficked counterfeit goods, narcotics, weapons, and humans grew as high as 20% of world GDP, according to some estimates.28

Although leftist terrorism receded as communism collapsed, the 1990s saw an increased frequency of terrorist attacks around the world, in Bombay, Cuttack, New York, Khobar, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.29 While these events garnered increased attention,30 it was the sarin gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, and especially the use of fuel-filled jets as missiles in the US on September 11, 2001, that revealed the power of religiously motivated terrorism in the post-Cold War world.31 The conventional wisdom that terrorists “want a lot of people watching” but “not a lot of people dead”32 no longer held. Powerful non-state actors were now capable of wreaking havoc on a global scale and posing a tier 1 threat to international security without the direction of states.33

The possibility that weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of terrorist groups now haunted the security establishments of western powers. Globalization was making it easier for countries to set up quasi-governmental organizations and front companies to buy and sell dual-use nuclear technologies.34 Having stolen nuclear secrets while working in the Netherlands, A.Q. Khan succeeded in fathering the bomb in Pakistan, and reoriented his purchasing network into the world’s first nuclear supermarket.35 To add to the post-9/11 angst, the anthrax attacks of October 2001 fueled fear of a mass biological attack.

The post-Cold War security environment was a far cry from the “perpetual peace” predicted by advocates of the “End of History” thesis.36 The long-term decline of the Westphalian state articulated by Robert Kaplan


24. The term ‘globalization’ was barely used before 1989 but has since been deployed to explain the notion that boundaries are being rendered increasingly porous – almost meaningless – by the sheer volume of cross-border activity. Michael Cox, “From the cold war to the world economic crisis,” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a more anecdotal account see Thomas L. Friedman’s highly readable Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) and its sequel The World is Flat (New York: Picador, 2007).


28. The Big Five organized criminal groups from China, Columbia, Italy, Japan and Russia - the Chinese Triads, the Columbian Cartels, the Italian Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Russian Mob - expanded their overseas operations, while new criminal activity emerged in places such as Albania, Nigeria, Mexico, and the Gulf of Aden. Mandel, 15-18, and Chapter 4, “Major Transnational Criminal Organizations.”


35. Khan found willing customers in Iran, Iraq, North Korea (the “axis of evil”) and Libya. See, for example, Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

in his vision of the “Coming Anarchy”37 was creating a new era in which authority was dispersed and a medieval power structure was emerging.38 Clinton’s DCI, James Woolsey, captured the nature of the new threats well when he warned that a “garden of snakes had replaced the single dragon.”39

The new threats forced intelligence agencies to adapt. In contrast to the large, slow-moving, clearly bounded, observable targets of the Cold War, the new targets were small, agile, amorphous and hidden.40 In the Cold War enemies were easy to find and observe, but difficult to neutralize. Now the opposite was true. The new enemies were relatively easy to neutralize once found. Finding and observing them was the problem.41 Obscurity was their greatest asset. They exhibited small “signatures,” low “signal-to-noise” ratios and indicators that lacked the uniqueness needed for effective warning intelligence.42

In the Cold War most intelligence consumers were located at the apex of national-security decision-making.43 Now the number of consumers was mushrooming to include state and local officials, managers of infrastructure, and even private individuals. An airport security officer or a public health doctor might now have a more urgent “need to know” about a threat than the US president because he or she might be in a more immediate position to thwart it.44 Similarly, intelligence in conventional wars was typically collected by upper echelon intelligence sections and passed to subordinate units to facilitate action. Now western militaries were fighting counterinsurgencies in which platoons and companies were both collecting and acting upon intelligence. Intelligence flows were becoming more bottoms-up than top-down.45

These changed realities demanded a new approach to information. For half a century intelligence agencies had developed a labyrinth of classifications and compartments to minimize the threat of Soviet espionage.46 But this system was now preventing the information sharing needed to address new dispersed enemies with no respect for boundaries. Intelligence agencies now had to balance their traditional need for exclusion with the new need to form horizontal knowledge networks.47 Instead of a linear problem-solving approach the time-sensitive and fragmented nature of the new targets demanded a continuous, recursive dialogue amongst collectors, analysts, and consumers.48

Intelligence agencies around the world adapted with varying speeds to these non-state threats. Unconstrained regimes in the Middle East were swift to clamp down. Egypt’s Mukhabarat, for example, dismantled much of the al-Jihad terrorist group in the early 1990s.49 The repressive practices of Middle Eastern security agencies would drive Islamist extremists abroad and cause them to shift their focus from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy.”50

For liberal democracies the struggle would be long and protracted. The small, highly secretive British and Ulster intelligence agencies learned, with some exceptions,51 to use force against the Provisional Irish

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40. Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapter 2, “The Changed Target.”
43. Treverton, “The Changed Target.”
44. Ibid.
45. Christopher C.E. McGarry, Inverting the Army Intelligence Pyramid (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and Staff College, 2011).
51. These included collaboration with loyalist paramilitaries and turning a blind eye to human rights abuses by their most
Republican Army (PIRA) in a constrained and legitimate manner.\textsuperscript{52} They also learned the importance of inter-agency collaboration,\textsuperscript{53} so that by 1994 the M15, Special Branch, and regional police forces throughout the UK were frustrating 3 out of every 4 attempted terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{54} This experience would serve the British well when confronting the growing threat of Islamist militants in the following decade.

The huge US intelligence community, “flawed by design” according to Amy Zegart,\textsuperscript{55} was the slowest to adapt. In the 1990s the IC resisted the recommendations of several commissions to revamp its information practices.\textsuperscript{56} After 9/11, Congress passed legislation that helped to remove the “wall” between law enforcement and foreign civilian intelligence.\textsuperscript{57} While remaining “allergic” to the prospect of a stand-alone domestic intelligence agency,\textsuperscript{58} Congress did accept commitments from the FBI to transform itself into an “agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes.”\textsuperscript{59} It responded to the perennial urge to “fix the machine”\textsuperscript{60} by creating a new Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and a new position of Director of National Intelligence in 2004.\textsuperscript{61}

US military intelligence was quicker to adapt. The concept of joint intelligence was already firmly established,\textsuperscript{62} so it was not a huge leap for the Department of Defense (DOD) to work with national agencies to form National Intelligence Support Teams in the 1990s and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers in the new century.\textsuperscript{63} To prosecute fleeting targets, intelligence and air operations became increasingly coordinated,\textsuperscript{64} and special forces honed the process of “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze” (F3EA) down to a science.\textsuperscript{65}

US paramilitary forces came into their own after 9/11, in contrast to the struggle they had finding their footing in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{66} CIA covert teams worked together with special operations and indigenous forces in the winter of 2001 to overthrow the Taliban in a matter of weeks.\textsuperscript{67} By 2004 US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) had become the lead command in “global operations against terrorist networks.”\textsuperscript{68} Thousands of raids later, in May 2011, of Change.”


66. CIA covert action in the 1990s was marked by a half-hearted campaign to work with opposition groups in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein, but Saddam’s intelligence apparatus proved too adept at uncovering assassination plots and executing conspirators. In Guatemala, the CIA’s contribution to fighting the “war on drugs” was colored by accusations of human rights abuse. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002); John Prados, Soft for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 597-612.


68. Its role was outlined in the classified “Unified Command Plan.” After the ouster of the Taliban, Donald Rumsfeld fought...
the takedown of Osama bin Laden showed that the Pentagon’s covert capabilities had come a long way since the ill-fated 1980 mission to rescue the American hostages in the embassy in Teheran.69

The “exploit” part of the new F3EA cycle was the key to launching follow-on operations and creating a spiral of success.70 Some raids conducted in the post-9/11 counterinsurgency campaigns netted a treasure trove of intelligence from “site exploitation.”71 But the bulk of intelligence came from detainees. In sharp contrast to the Cold War, when the most useful intelligence was willingly revealed by defectors, the challenge now was extracting timely intelligence from detainees unwilling to talk.72 The exposure of mass detentions at Guantanamo Bay, “harsh interrogations” at Abu Ghraib, the practice of “extraordinary rendition,” and the existence of secret CIA prisons generated huge anti-US sentiment around the world.73 It also led to considerable soul-searching and debate within the US,74 as Europe largely stood by in dismay.75

The “find” part of the F3EA cycle was also dependent upon human intelligence. But HUMINT from spy runners recruited at Oxford or Yale and taught to frequent the embassy cocktail circuit was of little use in tracking down terrorists.76 In contrast to the need for a few highly placed agents inside the closed systems of the Cold War, the emphasis was now on a plethora of access agents who could lead the agency to clandestine terrorist cells.77 Security agencies built huge networks of informants to preempt the threat of terrorism.78 In the decade after 9/11, with a handful of exceptions, the high-profile domestic terror plots in

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74. After 9/11, early positions taken by the US government by the Office of Legal Counsel that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to captured Al Qaeda or Taliban operatives were overturned by the US Supreme Court, which ruled in summer of 2006 in “Hamdan v Rumsfeld” that unlawful combatant detainees of the US military held in DoD custody must be afforded the protections of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. The McCain Amendment, which became law in Dec. 2005 as part of the Detainee Treatment Act, and applies also to US intelligence agencies, forbids US personnel in US facilities from using coercive interrogation techniques not set forth in the US army interrogation manual. Frederick P. Hitz, Why Spy? Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 56, 164.
75. Most countries in Europe had already grappled with these issues and had incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into their domestic laws in the 1990s. Even in the UK, despite the special relationship, there was political and intellectual consensus that torture remained anathema. Britain had learned from the Troubles that “inhuman and degrading treatment” was largely counter-productive in the long-term. Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity or Crisis and Transformation?” Intelligence and National Security, 24:1, 2009.
78. In Israel one estimate from June 2003 suggested that as many as 80% of potential terrorist attacks were being foiled through intelligence from informants. In the US an estimate from October 2011 put the number of FBI informants at around 15,000. The DEA had their own network of 5,000 registered informants and 10,000 sub-sources. Steve Hewitt, Snit: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer (London: Continuum International, 2010), 127; Trevor Aaronson, “The Informants,” Mother Jones, October 2011. Robert K. Ackerman, “Intelligence Key to Counterdrug Efforts,” Signal Magazine, October 2010.
the US were thwarted by the FBI through informants and sting operations. A critical ingredient was cooperation with state and local law enforcement through Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

It was another story abroad. One of the most salient features of intelligence in the post-Cold War period has been the explosive growth in foreign intelligence liaison, especially with domestic security services. To preempt terrorist plots being hatched in the remote camps of Pakistan or the apartments of proved invaluable. They knew their country, and their services. To preempt terrorist plots being hatched in intelligence liaison, especially with domestic security periods has been the explosive growth in foreign the early 1990s, spiritual advisers and couriers led to the king-pins of the Cali Cartel in all – was a result of foreign intelligence services' work alongside the agency. Just as money launderers and accountants led to the king-pins of the Cali Cartel in the early 1990s, spiritual advisers and couriers led intelligence agencies to senior Al-Qaeda leaders after 9/11. Attempts to recruit ideologically motivated insiders proved to be less successful and highly risky.

Intelligence liaison also became important in multilateral peacekeeping missions and in dismantling transnational proliferation networks. In 1998 cooperation between British and American intelligence revealed A.Q. Khan's plans to assist Libya in building nuclear weapons. The CIA then recruited informers within Khan's network who tipped them off in 2003 to a shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya. The October interception of the German-owned ship BBC China by Italy delivered enough evidence both to convince Qaddafi to renounce his WMD programs and to persuade President Musharraf to shut down the Khan network in an unprecedented series of intelligence-led negotiations.

Intelligence liaison, however, had its risks. The inflated judgments about Iraq's WMD programs in the infamous 2002 NIE used to justify the invasion of Iraq were based in part on intelligence from foreign agencies that turned out to be fabricated. This included the testimony of an Iraqi chemical engineer codenamed “Curveball” who was feeding falsities to his German handlers, and a forged document passed along by Italian intelligence purporting to

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83. After 9/11, the FBI and even the NYPD increased the number of counterterrorism liaison officers abroad, while the CIA set up Counterterrorism Intelligence Centers modeled on its counter-narcotics centers in Latin America and Asia. Adam Swendsen, “The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:1, August 13, 2008; Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account for Bulk of Agency’s Post-9/11 Successes,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005.

84. Aldrich, “Beyond the Vigilant State.”

85. Ibid.

86. Ron Choepeekiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe.


88. As demonstrated by the tragic deaths of seven CIA officers at Forward Operating Base Chapman in December 2009, who were killed in a suicide attack by extremist Humam al-Balawi, whom they believed had been “turned” by Jordanian intelligence. Joby Warrick, The Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2011).

89. A review of UN peace operations in 2000 known as the Brahimi Report convinced the organization that its long-standing aversion to intelligence was no longer tenable. It concluded that UN peacekeepers needed “field intelligence and other capabilities” in order to “mount a defense against violent challengers.” The UN also needed intelligence to monitor ceasefires and agreements on the decommissioning of weapons, and to investigate war crimes. Simon Chesterman, “Does the UN have intelligence?” Survival, 48:3, August 3, 2006; Richard J. Aldrich, “Intelligence and International Security,” International Studies Encyclopedia, Danemark, Blackwell Publishing, 2010; Hugh Smith, “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping,” Survival, 36:3, Autumn 1994.


show Iraqi purchases of yellowcake in Niger. The US IC responded to these failures by requiring that information concerning the reliability of sources be included in all future analytic products.

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**RECOMMENDED READINGS**

**Conferences.** A series of conferences organized by the University of Wales over the past decade help explain the changing nature of intelligence. See special editions of *Intelligence and National Security*, 19:2, Summer 2004; 21:5, October 2006; and 24:1, February 2009. In 2002 a conference was organized by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association in The Hague resulting in a collection by Ben de Jon, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele, *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (Oakton, VA: OSS International Press, 2003). In 2003, CIA and RAND teamed up on a series of workshops and published findings in *Making Sense of Transnational Threats* (Kent Center Occasional Paper, 3:1, 2004). One of the paper’s authors, Gregory Treverton, used these findings as the basis for his excellent *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009).


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