VI. Professional Reading

Reviews by Peter Oleson

Pioneers of Irregular Warfare: Secrets of the Military Intelligence Research Department in the Second World War
Malcolm Atkin

At the outbreak of war in September 1939 Britain was ill prepared. By the Summer of 1940 it faced disaster—Belgium, Holland, and France had been overrun by the Nazi Blitzkrieg and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had been surrounded at Dunkirk. While many of the men were heroically evacuated, little of the army’s equipment was. There were legitimate fears in the British War Office and in the public of a German invasion of the British Isles. With little to fight with on the ground at home and with forces stretched thin in the Middle East, frontally opposing the Nazi war machine was impossible.

The British Military Intelligence Department, which had been abolished in 1922, was reestablished only in September 1939. Even before in 1938, however, a small “think tank” focused on irregular war was established. It became known as “Military Intelligence—Research,” or MI(R). Headed by an imaginative Lieutenant Colonel, Jo Holland, MI(R) in the two short years of its existence was the birthing ground for many of Britain’s innovations in opposing the Nazis—the creation of Auxiliary Units for home defense and of commando units; the establishment of Britain’s escape and evasion organization, M19; the Jedburgh concept used prior to the Normandy invasion; and sabotage equipment. Many of the officers who led irregular units during the war had interned in MI(R).

Although a military intelligence unit MI(R), due to stretched resources, it was ordered to conduct operations with its limited assets. MI(R) carried out many missions to recruit and support resistance movements in Poland, Norway, Armenia, Yugoslavia, the Belgian Congo, Ethiopia, Aden, Kenya, Libya, Central and South America, and China. Many of these were unsuccessful, such as the employment of Independent Companies, intended to be sabotage and irregular elements, as light infantry to oppose the Nazi advances into northern Norway.

Atkins describes both the cooperation and competition between MI(R) and Section D, the sabotage element of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6). Section D provided much of the funds for MI(R) that were independent of the War Office budget, but the two organizations held conflicting views of irregular operations. SIS was largely a civilian organization and recruited non-military agents for sabotage operations; MI(R) believed that irregular warfare was a military responsibility and eschewed the use of civilians, often anxious about Nazi reprisals against civilian populations.

Readers of Atkin’s history will learn that British planning in the early war years was naïve and often arrogant. Atkins writes that there was a “contemporary arrogance of the British military establishment in believing their inherent superiority in all forms of warfare” [195]. This attitude undermined more than one British mission to other countries seeking cooperation against both Germany and Italy. Competitive bureaucratic politics—between the War Office and the Foreign Office, between various War Office departments, and between individuals—also negatively affected British efforts.

Atkin’s approach to the history of MI(R) can be difficult to read. The detail he provides about individuals, many of which are tertiary at best to the history of MI(R), can bog down the reader. Knowing each person’s history of assignments before being part of MI(R) is of little interest. He also tends to give blow-by-blow descriptions of bureaucratic processes, including who received what paper and to whom they passed it on with comments. This has added little to the central theme of the book.

Atkin’s attempts to correct history concerning Jo Holland and Colin Gubbins. Gubbins was recruited by Holland to join MI(R), but the two held very different views. After MI(R) was disestablished in late 1940, its elements absorbed by other, newer organizations, Gubbins, ever the politician, went on to be the third director of SOE (Special Operations Executive), which became the main sabotage organization. After the war Gubbins publicly claimed credit for many of the innovations that originated in MI(R). Holland, who died in 1951 without leaving any memoirs of his own, was
not credited. Atkins describes Gubbins as self-serving and more interested in self-advancement than success of the operations he headed while in MI(R).

Clearly Jo Holland was one of those rare individuals whose imagination was not constrained by being in a structured organization and who contributed greatly to the field of irregular warfare.

*Spycraft for Thriller Writers – How to Write Spy Novels, TV Shows and Movies Accurately and Not Be Laughed at by Real-Life Spies*
Edward Mickolus
Wandering Woods Publishers, 2021, 112 pages with Spy-Fi Trivia Questions and Further Reading List

Former CIA officer and prolific author, Dr. Ed Mickolus, has a new book that can best be described as fun. Its thesis is encapsulated in the subtitle. He starts with a succinct description of Intelligence Community organizations with emphasis on the FBI and expanded description of CIA, the two organizations most often depicted in novels and on the screen.

Mickolus briefly describes how things get done in the IC, explains the intelligence cycle and how a recruited spy is spotted, assessed, vetted, pitched, and managed. He explains that it is a long and difficult process and unlike what is depicted on TV. He clarifies terminology: that the FBI has “special agents,” but the CIA has “operations officers.” For CIA “agents” are those who have been recruited to spy for the US. He corrects the popular notions of CIA officers being “super heroes” with “genius-level linguistic skills,” who engage in conspiracies, and save the world by themselves.

One section of the book depicts a visit to CIA Headquarters and shows many of the exhibits displayed including an A-12 Oxcart, MI-17 helicopter, a fragment from the Berlin Wall, and Usama Bin Laden’s personal AK-47. He also explains how analysts are tied together across the Agency and community by Intellipedia and Intelink.

Reviewers are supposed to point out mistakes in books. One jumped out: there are now 17 IC organizations (plus the ODNI) with the addition of Space Force (which obviously joined the IC after the book was written). This is a useful volume for intelligence neophytes, thriller writers, and should be provided to every journalist.

Speaking truth to power. This reviewer’s son is a Hollywood TV writer whose past credits include CBS’s CIA-set The Agency and NBC’s Pentagon-set E-Ring. Years ago, I was invited to talk in his Writers’ Room, and spent an afternoon debunking the then-popular Jason Bourne solo-operator concept, explaining what intelligence was (not instant CNN), the analytical process and how long it could take, the concept of a consumer, and the intelligence cycle. The writers were full of questions and seemed appreciative of getting “an insider’s view.” But afterward my son explained the cold truth – that network TV requires escalating conflict over the “acts” between commercial breaks (to sell shampoo and cars) – and that the hero(es) solving the mission by hour’s end brings back the audience for a new mission/new advertisements the following week…. So much for reality.

*Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community*
Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau and Craig Forcese (Editors)
University of Toronto Press, 2020. 317 pages with index

Much of the intelligence literature focuses on the United States or United Kingdom. But to our north, Canada is an internationally active nation and a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. In a series of essays, contributed by twenty experts, Top Secret Canada examines the various national organizations involved in intelligence and Canadian security.

Canadian security organizations have undergone extensive changes since 9/11 to deal with evolving threats, including internal threats of violence. Being a parliamentary democracy, various ministers oversee the various parts of its intelligence apparatus. Canada has no foreign intelligence organization focused on HUMINT collection, such as the CIA or the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6).

The first part of the book focuses on the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The Privy Council is a professional, career organization that supports both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. There is a small element that is involved with overseeing intelligence and security. It sets intelligence requirements and priorities for all of the intelligence-related Canadian elements. It also contains the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat.
that produces intelligence reports and assessments. The Prime Minister’s Office houses the political staff that reflects the needs of the Prime Minister. It uses intelligence in the formulation of national policies.

Canadian foreign intelligence activities are strictly limited. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is focused on threats to the security of Canada. It was established in 1984 after a scandal involving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) out of the national security focused elements of the RCMP. CSIS’s HUMINT activity is conducted only within Canada and under strict guidelines. It employs all sources including open sources, investigations, liaison, and cooperative sharing agreements with other countries, exercised via “security liaison officers.” Intrusive techniques require a warrant. Like the UK’s Security Service (MI5) CSIS has no arrest powers. It coordinates such matters with the RCMP. A stand-alone element within CSIS is the Integrated Terrorism Analysis Center (ITAC), an analog to the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

The Canadian Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada’s counterpart to the US’s National Security Agency (NSA). Established in 2011 the CSE collects foreign intelligence, protects Canada’s information infrastructure, and assists law enforcement. It leads inter-departmental efforts in cyber, engaging in both defensive and offensive actions. Like NSA’s cryptologic representatives, CSE embeds “client relations officers” in other organizations that employ SIGINT or cyber intelligence. The CSE director reports directly to the Minister of Defense.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s functions include law enforcement, crime prevention, and disruption of national security threats, including chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. Its security intelligence functions were transferred to the new CSIS. The RCMP is not only the national police force, under contract, it provides provincial and local policing as well.

The Canadian Border Service Agency (CSBA) combines several missions. Including border security, customs, immigration control, food security, visa applications, and refugee programs. It employs Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams in Canada’s major cities.

The Minister for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness heads the department colloquially known as “Public Safety Canada,” established in 2005. He has an extremely broad mandate overseeing the Canadian Border Services Agency, the RCMP, CSIS, the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC), and the Parole Board of Canada (PBC), as well as three oversight review bodies. Public Safety Canada coordinates counterterrorism efforts, fighting cyber-crime through the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC), counter-proliferation, and protection of critical infrastructure. Within the department is the Canadian Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, established in 2017, which seeks early prevention of violence through intervention and reintegration of perpetrators.

The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) is Canada’s version of the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Center (FINCEN). FINTRAC’s focus is on organized crime, money laundering, and risk assessment to Canada’s economy from illegal activities. It is an independent organization under the Minister of Finance.

The defense intelligence element of the Department of National Defense / Canadian Armed Forces collects HUMINT, SIGINT, and imagery, conducts geospatial analyses, and has a large analytical function, as well as counterintelligence functions. The deputy minister of defense and the chief of the defense staff oversee multiple organizations, including the Joint Imagery Centre, a national counterintelligence unit, the Mapping and Charting Establishment, the Joint Meteorological Centre, Joint Task Force X (HUMINT collection), and staffs for analysis, indications and warning, and long-term threat assessments.

Other chapters in the book address the former Department of External Affairs, known since 2015 by its new name “Global Affairs Canada” (GAC) and the Department of Justice (“Justice Canada”). GAC manages all liaison officers abroad in Canadian embassies, including CSIS liaison officers. Justice Canada provides centralized legal services for all elements of the government and maintains a legal services unit in other government agencies.

The Canadian government had a complex system of oversight and review of its intelligence and national security activities. The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), established at the same time as CSIS in 1984, monitored CSIS activities. Two separate commissions oversaw CSE and RCMP. In 2017 a new law combined the multiple oversight organizations into the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), which can review any activity or matter related to national security. It investigates complaints, and handles appeals related to the issuance of security clearances. It also advises on citizenship requests. It was not until 2017 that Parliament established its own review body – the National Security
and Intelligence Committee. It is a non-partisan committee of nine members, four members of Parliament from the ruling party and three from the opposition plus two senators. There is no limit to what the committee can investigate.

Top Secret Canada is the “first book to offer a complete study of the Canadian Intelligence Community.” It is interesting to compare the Canadian structure and system for national security to that of the US. One item to note is that both have an extensive lexicon of acronyms. The Prime Minister’s Office is akin to the White House staff. The Privy Council Office is like a combined National Security Council staff, Office of Management and Budget, and other supra-Cabinet elements. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliament is like a combined House and Senate Intelligence Committee as well as portions of other congressional committees. One interesting aspect of the book is a section on “The Consequences of Trumpism” [pp 210-11] that addresses the issue of the consequences of a more isolationist United States. The book is a useful reference to north of the border.

The Cold War: Wilderness of Mirrors.
Counterintelligence, and the U.S. and Soviet Military Liaison Missions 1947-1990
Aden C. Magee
Oxford: Casemate, 2021. 322 pages with appendices, glossary, bibliography and index

Germany – East and West – was at the center of Cold War conflict. In 1947 the four Allied powers (including France) that occupied zones in Germany established liaison arrangements between them. Each formed a Military Liaison Mission (MLM) that could travel throughout other’s occupation zones. The Soviet and American MLMs became major intelligence players in the years before the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic and the reunification of the divided nation.

Magee’s book is a detailed history of the MLMs, written by a counterintelligence expert. He describes the history of the USMLM; evolution of its practices; incidents, including the shooting death of Army Lt. Col. Arthur Nicholson in March 1985 at the hands of a Soviet sentry; and of the Soviet MLM (abbreviated as SMLM-F), located in Frankfurt.

The USMLM was a prodigious collector of operational intelligence on the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). Ironically, as later counterintelligence became available the Soviets had complete access to USMLM reporting through its spies in the US military in Germany. The Soviet SMLM-F never appeared as aggressive or even interested in touring areas of West Germany, leading to suspicions that it was more of a clandestine GRU facility.

As the author points out the functions and operations of the USMLM and SMLM-F were very different. His exploration of the political aspects of the MLM relationships, and the relationships between the US and West Germany and the Soviets and East Germany regarding the liaison missions is interesting. While the Soviets utilized the East German Stasi to surveil and harass the USMLM, the US excluded West German counterintelligence from any involvement in such matters.

One of the more interesting aspects of the book is its description of various spy cases. Magee ties together the many spy cases of the period that impacted both sides of the Iron Curtain: Heinz Felfé, George Blake, Michael Goleniewski, Anatoliy Golitsyn, Yuri Nosenko, Pyotr Popov, George Trofimoff, John Walker, Vitaly Yurchenko, Zoltan Szabo, Vladimir Vasíliev, Clyde Conrad and his ring, James Hall III, Ryszard Kukliński, Oleg Gordievsky, Vladimir Rezun (pen name Viktor Suvorov), Robert Hanssen, and Aldridge Ames.

Magee writes that after Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the KGB undertook covert active measures to undermine glasnost, which it viewed as threatening its own institutional power. [See also the review of Catherine Belton’s book, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West in The Intelligencer, Vol. 26, No. 1, Fall 2020, pp. 102-9, which details KGB actions over the years to preserve it powers.]

Magee’s book is focused on the USMLM and the SMLM-F and largely excludes the British MLM and the French, which is a weakness in the overall history of the MLMs. The book suffers from redundancies and repetitive arguments. The cliche “wilderness of mirrors” is rehashed too often and appears to have been inserted in the title and at places in the text to enhance sales.

Magee is clearly a believer in counterintelligence. He lambastes the US Army in Europe and the CIA for not paying closer attention to what intelligence activities the Soviets were conducting in the West. His opinion of James Jesus Angleton is unforgiving. But he describes how army counterintelligence matured,
in his opinion, in favorable contrast to both CIA and the FBI. He editorializes repeatedly criticizing the US’s failure to focus on counterintelligence over the years. Nonetheless, his book is an interesting history of a dangerous time and place.

**More Stories from Langley:**  
_A Another Glimpse Inside the CIA_  
Edward Mickolus (editor)  
Potomac Books (University of Nebraska Press), 2020. 335 pages with index and bibliography of books written by CIA alumni

Ed Mickolus, a prolific free-lance author, might as well be the chief recruiter for the Central Intelligence Agency. His More Stories is a collection of reflections by 25 former employees on their careers.

The editor has chosen reminiscences from those who worked in analytical jobs, covert operational positions, scientific and technical endeavors, and support functions. One take-away from the book is the vast variety of jobs at CIA. “Who knew the CIA needed librarians?” the back-cover asked. Two chapters reveal how important they are and how varied their duties are. It’s not your school’s library.

Change is a constant at CIA. The agency is better at adapting to a changed environment than many other US bureaucratic organizations. Employees move from job to job often, both as career advancing moves and as some search for more personally fulfilling work.

Some of the chapters reveal emotional and ethical issues sometimes encountered. One addresses the termination of a long-term asset. Things had changed and the asset’s information was no longer of value. But ending a long-term relationship is never easy.

Many of the contributors noted the impact of September 11, 2001. It fundamentally changed CIA and in a very rapid manner. What is clear from the authors is that they, and their compatriots, felt a deeply held conviction to support the president, his advisers, and the military as the nation responded to the terrorist attacks. The work ethic they described was phenomenal.

Several of the authors discussed CIA’s interactions with the rest of the Intelligence Community. Some accounts reflect the old CIA-FBI rivalries.

There are pearls of wisdom seeded throughout the various authors’ accounts of their careers. The importance of being able to write well and know foreign languages is well documented. Some recounted experiences that were unpleasant, including having a lousy boss. However, the bottom line for all 25 contributors is essentially the same: their jobs at CIA, whether for a lifetime or a far shorter period, were the highlights of their professional careers.

More Stories is easy to read. George Tenet, in a back cover review, writes the book could be “enticing” for those seeking jobs. If anyone knows of a young person contemplating working for the CIA, this reviewer’s advice is to gift them a copy of More Stories.

**Spies on the Mekong:**  
_CIA Clandestine Operations in Laos_  
Ken Conboy  
Philadelphia: Casemate, 2021. 246 pages with bibliography and index

Much has been written about CIA’s “secret war” in Laos and Vang Pao’s secret army of Hmong. Conboy’s book is different. It focuses on the activities of the Vientiane Station to collect intelligence on the ever-turbulent political situation in Laos and the efforts conducted against the Soviet, Polish, and other communist “diplomats” in the administrative capital of Vientiane and royal capital of Luang Prabang.

Conboy is a keen observer of Southeast Asia. He has written books on the wars in Cambodia, on the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong, the efforts against the Chinese in Tibet, on Indonesia’s intelligence agency, and on Al-Qaida terrorists in Asia. Much of his focus has been on Laos, resulting in several books. Spies on the Mekong is his latest.

For those interested, Conboy provides a succinct history of Laos and how it gained independence after France relinquished its colonial territory in Indochina. It is a history of political turmoil and individuals vying for power. Leaders, such as several-time prime minister Souvanna Phouma, were largely ineffectual. Coups and attempted coups occurred frequently in Vientiane, often by mid-level disgruntled military officers, such as Kong Le.

With the war in Vietnam, Laos became important as a buffer state. The book describes in considerable detail the activities of the Vientiane Station, how it worked to influence Laotian elections, counter the communist influence of the Pathet Lao, ensconced in the northeast of the country in Sam Neua, adjacent to North Vietnam. The titular head of the Pathet Lao was Souphanouvong, the half brother of Souvanna Phouma and Prince Boun Oum. The three represented...
the communists, neutralists, and royalists, respectively. Much of the politics of Laos was linked to one or another of these men.

The author places the extensive CIA paramilitary activities in Laos in context with the political situation. This is not a book that describes in detail what appears in other books about the support to the Hmong and other hill tribes.

Conboy details the histories of many of the Laotian and US personnel who were in Laos. His naming and details of US personnel, including CIA clandestine personnel, is surprising. He reveals the cover identities of many. He has clearly interviewed many in depth. He describes sources and methods in detail, such as the use of Thai-recruited surveillance personnel and audio collection operations to learn of internal Lao negotiations. He often praises CIA for its accomplishments, such as the project, codenamed HABRINK, in Indonesia that garnered for the US detailed technical data on front-line Soviet equipment, including the SA-2 surface-to-air missile, Whisky-class submarines, the Styx anti-ship missile, several naval ships, and the TU-16 Badger bomber. The SA-2 data was crucial for the US to develop electronic warfare countermeasures used over North Vietnam. Conboy also tells the sordid story of former CIA officer David Henry Barnett, who betrayed the details of HABRINK to the Soviets for money.

Conboy describes how part of the Vientiane Station focused on recruiting potential defectors from the USSR or other communist nations that had diplomatic facilities in Laos. The Poles maintained many personnel in Laos as members, along with India and Canada, of the International Control Commission, established in 1954 to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Accords concerning France’s withdrawal from Indochina. The story of the lengthy recruitment of the KGB deputy rezident Vladimir Mikhailovich Puguzov is a classic. Puguzov, known as GT/JOGGER, was one of the American sources betrayed by Aldridge Ames and executed by the Soviets.

Spies on the Mekong is well written and easy to read. It provides a broader perspective on US activities in Laos that what is contained in the many paramilitary-oriented accounts.

Spy Swap: The Humiliation of Russia’s Intelligence Services
Nigel West

Nigel West (actually, Rupert William Simon Allason) is a prolific British author of books about espionage cases, intelligence services, intelligence-related personalities, and history. Spy Swap is his latest.

The volume is interesting but also challenging to read in parts. The first part of the book reads like a compilation of case files of different espionage cases. Despite this hard to follow aspect the book is worth reading if one is interested in Soviet and later Russian espionage. It contains a rich history of espionage cases.

Russia’s employment of illegals – intelligence officers under deep cover and not associated with official government elements – began soon after the Bolshevik revolution. Illegals were first sent to the US in the early 1930s. West explains how the networks of illegals were organized and run parallel to the intelligence agencies’ rezidentura. He also details what illegals do – “surveying for dead drops, signal site and other operational locations,” photographing them and preparing descriptions for other officers, servicing dead drops, and being an “intermediary or ‘cut out’ so as to avoid contaminating” someone else. They can also “talent spot and cultivate potential sources without arousing the suspicion inevitably attached to someone working under diplomatic cover.” [77]

Illegals have been inserted in many countries, including Warsaw Pact nations as well as in the Third World. West states that the Russians strategic plan called for six illegal networks in the US. One of the KGB/SVR’s motivations appears to have been that illegals could act as replacements or back-ups in case of a break in diplomatic relations or conflict when the rezidentura would no longer be functional. But, as the author notes, another reason is the Kremlin’s “innate distrust” of anything published in the West and therefore had a preference to rely on spies.

West includes detailed coverage of well-known, and some obscure, espionage cases, including the defection of Vasili Mitrokin and the SVR archive he brought out of Russia. That archive, which took years for the British to translate revealed the Russian spy US Army colonel George Trofimoff and NSA’s Robert Lipka. A whole chapter is dedicated to KARAT, the SVR’s codename for FBI agent Robert Hanssen.
Hanssen, who provided over 6,000 documents to Russia, was revealed by the 2000 defection of Alexandr Shcherbakov, who was paid $7 million for his information. West notes that many Russian spies were identified by Russian defectors. One of the more obscure cases involved Herman Simm of Estonia, who was recruited in 1985 and arrested 23 years later. He provided over 3,000 NATO documents to Russia and was described as the “most damaging [spy] in Alliance history.”

The major focus of the book, of course, is the history of Operation GHOST STORIES, the FBI investigation of Russian illegals sent to the US to penetrate the policy levels of the US Government. It is a complex and fascinating tale of carefully orchestrated counterintelligence investigations, which started in the post-James Jesus Angleton period with the FBI’s recruitment of multiple Soviet intelligence officers in the KGB Washington rezidentura – Major Sergie Motorin, Colonel Valeri Martynov, and Gennadi Vasilenko. Chapter 1, “Recruitment,” recounts multiple FBI and CIA successes and also problems encountered, such as with Philip Agee’s identification of hundreds of CIA officers, the betrayals by Ron Pelton, Earl Pitts, Aldridge Ames, John Walker, Edward Lee Howard, Robert Hanssen, and others.

Each of the ten illegals in the network taken down in 2010 are profiled by West. Apparently, Anna Chapman was a one-woman “honey trap.” Chapman, and later Marina Butina, appear to represent a new technique of the SVR of using the attractiveness of women operating more openly in Western societies rather than under deep cover.

The roll up of the illegal network in late June 2010 had to be carefully planned so as to prevent some of the network being warned and for political purposes. Then Russian president Dimitry Medvedev was at the United Nations. The arrests began as soon as his plane exited US airspace. West tells how both Shcherbakov and Alexander Poteyev, sources who revealed the illegal network, had gotten out of Russia surreptitiously just before the arrests. Poteyev, a CIA recruitment since 1999, had been the deputy of Directorate S and compromised SVR illegals in many nations. Chapman, while known to be part of the illegal network from the time she first arrived in the US, had never been observed committing any offense that could be prosecuted. West describes how an ingenious FBI operation obtained her computer with a short-range communications capability and entrapped her.

The ten illegals arrested in late June were swapped within a month for four being held in Russian prisons. All ten pled guilty in order to be swapped, and SVR director Mikhail Fradkov admitted to CIA director, Leon Panetta, that all were, in fact, Russian spies. The negotiations succeeded with the Russians releasing Aleksandr Zaporozhsky, a KGB officer who volunteered to the CIA in 1989 and who was the only convicted CIA spy in Russian custody; Igor Sutyagin, accused of treason for working with a British journal that was a MI6 front; Sergei Skripal, a GRU colonel and MI6 double agent; and Gennady Vasilenko, a KGB officer in the Washington, DC rezidentura targeted for recruitment by the FBI in the late 1970s and betrayed by Aldridge Ames. The spy swap generated considerable press at the time.

West notes later arrests of Russian spies in Austria, the Netherlands, and of Jeffrey Delisle in Canada and provides details on subsequent Russian provocations in Western Europe, including the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the UK and of arms dealer Emilian Gebrev in Bulgaria.

West also reveals some intriguing details of investigations and counterintelligence tradecraft. He tells how the Russians could intercept coded, frequency-hopping FBI operational communications and determine, even without knowing the contents, whether their officers were under scrutiny by the FBI’s surveillance professionals.

The book has several helpful references, including a Dramatis Personae list that allows the reader keep track of the many names, an organizational chart of the SVR’s Directorate S that manages illegals, a chronology of when different members of the illegals network rolled up by the FBI came under investigation as one led to another, and a timeline from 1979 to 2019 of significant events related to the illegals network and Russian spying in general.

After reading this book one has to conclude that today’s SVR is a very sophisticated opponent. This reviewer, however, is skeptical of the book’s subtitle “The Humiliation of Russia’s Intelligence Services.” The subtitle is more a marketing come-on to boost book sales than a realistic assessment. There is little doubt that the SVR, and its companion services, the GRU and FSB, without much hesitation, will continue attempts at inserting illegals into other countries. As West notes there are multiple successes and failures by the intelligence services on both sides.

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This book is a page-turner. Toby Harnden tells the story of the eight members of Operational Detachment Alpha, also called Team Alpha, the second CIA paramilitary team inserted into Afghanistan after 9/11. The first team, called “Jawbreaker,” was inserted into the Panjshir Valley region with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance on 26 September 2001, just fifteen days after 9/11. Team Alpha was inserted behind enemy lines south of the major northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif on 17 October.

Team Alpha’s mission was to drive the Taliban out of the mountains of northern Afghanistan. It was to support Abdul Rashid Dostum, the major and controversial Uzbek warlord in the area and the other tribal elements aligned with him against the Taliban.

The mishmash of tribal differences in Afghanistan, differing languages, and the Sunni-Shia Islamic schism greatly complicated the CIA team’s mission. The Pashto-speaking Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group, who are Sunni, and overwhelmingly Taliban, occupied the region from the south of Afghanistan to the northwest of Pakistan. Tajiks speak Dari, are also Sunni, and occupy the Panjshir Valley of northeast Afghanistan, south of Tajikistan. The Hazaras, also Dari speaking, but Shia, in central Afghanistan were persecuted and often massacred by the Taliban, accused of being non-Muslim. Uzbeks of Turkic origin were a Sunni minority in northern Afghanistan with its own Uzbek language. Many were refugees from Uzbekistan during the period of the USSR. Turkmen, another Turkic group in northern Afghanistan, speaking a language similar to Turkish, are Sunni and aligned with the Uzbeks. While David Tyson, one of the eight members of Team Alpha, spoke various dialects of Uzbek as well as Russian, Turkish and Turkmen, and other languages, none of the others of the team were language proficient for Afghanistan. Four were CIA paramilitary officers.

The rivalries, Harnden explains, between Afghan warlords and tribal leaders was a major impediment to unified action against the Taliban. A history of treachery and changing sides due to bribery or avoidance of defeat pitted Dostum against others. Major players included Mohammed Noor Atta, a Tajik, who had been a deadly rival of Dostum but an ally of convenience; Mohammed Mohaqeq, the local Hazara leader and firm ally of Dostum; Amir Jan Naseri, a Pashtun who had fought with the Taliban but later switched sides; and Mullah Mohammed Fazl, the Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan.

The author explains the strategy to seize Mazar-i-Sharif and what Team Alpha had to do to focus the fight for northern Afghanistan. Taliban elements were defeated with the assistance of US airpower and Mazar-i-Sharif was captured on November 10. But Taliban treachery, agreeing to surrender as a ruse to re-seize Mazar-i-Sharif, led to an uprising at Fort Qala-i-Jangi. The “prisoners” at Qala-i-Jangi were Arabs, not Afghans, and members of Al-Qaida’s foreign brigade, not Taliban. While approximately 400 prisoners were assembled in the fort’s courtyard they jumped Team Alpha’s Mike Spann, who was interrogating selected prisoners, and killed him—the first casualty of the Afghan war. Hence the title of the book. The uprising was part of a double-dealing plan by Fazl to recapture Mazar-i-Sharif from Dostum and the Americans.

The author delves into the personal histories of the members of Team Alpha, which brings a human touch to the story. He also tells of the Green Berets inserted later and of the UK’s Special Boat Service (SBS) team that fought the Al-Qa’ida uprising. Spann’s wife, Shannon, also a CIA officer, did not know of Mike’s death for several days. Harnden’s portrait of Shannon Spann is sympathetic. His description of CIA’s reaction to Spann’s death and how fellow CIA officers came together to support her in its aftermath is inspiring.

It was at Qala-i-Jangi that John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban,” was captured. The author recounts Lindh’s actions and his California family’s reaction to his unrepentant adherence to Al-Qa’ida beliefs.

Harnden concludes the book with an examination of the evolution of US strategy from a CIA-led insurgency against the Taliban and hunt for Osama Bin Laden to a military-led “occupation” force. The author is not sympathetic to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who resented CIA’s initiative and flexibility, and his early focus on Iraq despite the lack of evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11. The Pentagon had no operational plan related to Afghanistan at the time of 9/11, but CIA did. The book was written just before the 2021 final withdrawal of US and Allied forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban take over.
First Casualty is a detailed accounting of events in the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan. It is well written and fills in many previously unknown details. CIA was cooperative with the author, allowing an unusual focus on the lives of the CIA officers involved. This is a book well worth reading. (AFIO president Jim Hughes has interviewed Toby Harnden about First Casualty. Go to www.afio.com.)

The Sailor’s Bookshelf: Fifty Books to Know the Sea
Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.)

This book about books is a gem. Adm. Stavridis, who is a prolific author, has shared his assessment of fifty books that he believes are the best that describe the oceans, sailing, and contending with what the oceans often confront sailors. Each review is short—two to five pages and intertwined with the author’s comments about his naval career at sea and shore. He was NATO’s first naval Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR).

He has divided the book into sections: The Ocean, Explorers, Sailors in Fiction, and Sailors in Non-fiction. Many of the books are well-known literary classics, such as Jules Verne’s 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, Patrick O’Brian’s Master and Commander, Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny, and Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea. Others are about geopolitics and history and how sea power affected the world’s evolution, e.g., The Battle of Salamantis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece—and Western Civilization; Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783; and Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time, which contributed to the dominance of England’s Royal Navy.

The stories of explorers are inspiring—Captain Cook, Thor Heyerdahl, Ernest Shackleton, and others. There are also books about disasters at sea (The Perfect Storm, In the Heart of the Sea: The Tragedy of the Whaleship Essex), survival (Life of Pi, Mutiny on the Bounty), and what sailors need to know (Watch Officer’s Guide, 16th Edition).

Anyone interested in the sea will find Adm. Stavridis’s book a wonderful guide.

Putin’s Playbook: Russia’s Secret Plan to Defeat America
Rebekah Koffler
Washington: Regnery Gateway, 2021, 410 pages with notes and index

Koffler, a former senior Russian intelligence analyst at DIA, who immigrated from the USSR, has written an “interesting” book. “Interesting” because it is an excellent examination of Putin’s intentions, the tools he uses, and his psychological manipulation to disarm the West. It is also a screed against US intelligence, DIA in particular, its failings to understand today’s Russia and its security bureaucracy and its opaque punishments of Russian-focused analysts in the IC.

Koffler warns “Russia is preparing for war with America, which Moscow believes in inevitable.” [304] Russia has a master plan “designed to keep America off-balance, or, if necessary, defeated militarily.” [3] “Humiliated by the collapse of the USSR, Russia is now ready for revenge.” [5]

“Labeling Putin irrational, reckless, or delusional may be satisfying intellectually for some... Calling him a ‘killer’ will not scare Russia’s master spy, helped in a fear-equals-respect culture.” Koffler concludes such labels help him maintain his image, “which is part of his attraction for Russians, who don’t think like Americans.” [300] One valuable aspect of the author’s book is how she dissects the differences in American and Russian thinking. Understanding the Russian mindset is crucial to understanding the Kremlin’s intentions toward the West. Russia, she states, has been at war for two-thirds of its existence, is paranoid about being attacked yet again, and is “hyper-focused on security.” Putin is focused on rebuilding the Russian “Derzhava,” (power) and empire. Seeing itself as the defender of the Orthodox faith, Putin’s Playbook is a reminder that the “Russian Wall” still exists.

The author concludes that Putin will be president for life and that “Moscow’s anti-American policy and strategy have been consistent for the last century, regardless of who sits at the top of the Russian government.” [xxiv-xxv] Putin is “ruthless with enemies, some of whom he has had killed... he jealously holds power, squashes dissent, and has amassed a huge fortune for himself and his friends.” [63]

In the chapter “Russia Organizes for War” Koffler writes that Russia has learned from experience that if a fight is unavoidable, it is best to strike first. She
analyzes Russian military doctrine inscribed in its own manuals. She criticizes Western descriptions of “hybrid warfare,” stating that “indirect warfare” that targets the adversary’s mind is the principal focus of Russian planning. The aim is to “destabilize American society through ideological subversion” over time. [88] Russian interference in the election of 2016 had the aim of “undermining public trust, inciting political protests, and discrediting democracy...” [89] She cites many examples.

Chapter 4, “Putin’s Star Wars: Lasers, Jammer, and Satellite Killers,” addresses Koffler’s conclusion that space will be the initial realm of any kinetic war with Russia. “American space superiority is also our Achilles heel,” which will be targeted by various means to deny the US its command and control, targeting, and communications capabilities. Chapter 5 addresses cyber weapons, which will be used for destroying networks and psychological attacks. She notes how in the 2020 American elections Russian intelligence, often via the “private” Internet Research Agency, pushed QAnon conspiracy theories. She states that Russian planners view cyber as a strategic weapon comparable to nuclear weapons. [141]

Koffler traces how the KGB, and its successors, used human agents as means to influence American policy, citing the case of FDR’s adviser, Harry Hopkins, and the ten illegals arrested by the FBI in 2010. She devotes a chapter to “active measures” and describes historical examples, such as the Trust, which during the 1920s seduced many anti-Bolsheviks to return to Russia to a dismal fate, and the New Economic Policy, which attracted Western technology and financing for the Russian economy devastated by its civil war. She reviews some of the principal murders, or attempts, (i.e., “wet affairs”) of the Kremlin’s opponents, including Trotsky, Pope John Paul, and others both within Russia and in the West, more recently.

She lists some of the modern weapons systems being developed by Russia to overcome American strategic defenses, including a new heavy ICBM, a hypersonic glide missile, and air-launched ballistic missile, a nuclear-powered and armed cruise missile, a nuclear-powered underwater drone, laser weapons, and electronic warfare.

The author repetitively excoriates her bureaucratic enemies within DIA, who lodged unknown accusations against her, and the security bureaucracy at both CIA and DIA that first blocked her selection as an assistant NIO for Cyber and later by pulling her security clearance ending her intelligence career. She cites other Russian analysts, who following the demise of the USSR, were either forced out of DIA or reassigned, eviscerating DIA’s Russia analysis capabilities. Her description of what happened to her suggests that one of the purposes of her book is to exact revenge on her former employer. She is candid about her politics. She equates the Democrats’ liberal views of government as “socialism” à la what she experienced growing up in the totalitarian USSR. She praises LTG Michael Flynn, who she claims was entrapped; criticizes President Obama as being naïve; claims President Biden is taking America down a socialist path; labels Congress’s impeachment trials as “feckless”; and believes US counterintelligence conducted “unfounded” probes into President Trump’s campaign and is generally weak. “Washington’s naïve and obtuse belief that liberal democracy is coveted by all has blinded our leaders, prompting them to reduce our intelligence and military resources targeting Russia,” she concludes. [97] Her polemic detracts from the central, and important, message of the book.

Various sections of the book have been redacted (indicated by opaque black lines). Putin’s Playbook joins several other books laying bare Putin’s intentions and hostile actions, including Catherine Belton’s excellent 2020 Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West and Fiona Hill’s 2015 Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Koffler brings to the literature the unique perspective of a native Russian.

Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I.
Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark

Even though so much of our recent focus has been on the Ukraine conflict and Chinese threats against Taiwan, South Asia remains one of the most dangerous spots on the globe.

Two nuclear-armed countries—India and Pakistan—remain at each other’s throats. They have fought four wars since the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947: the first Kashmir War of 1947-48 concerning Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India rather than Pakistan despite the fact that the vast majority (77%) of the population was Muslim; again over Kashmir in 1965; the evisceration of the Eastern and Western Pakistani state and creation of
Bangladesh in 1971; and the Kargil War in 1999, again in the Kashmir region. Since the last war, Pakistan's aggressive use of militants and disguised army troops to infiltrate Kashmir and incite an uprising have continued, resulting in many bloody incidents. India has retaliated in its own ways. Much of the continuing conflict is either carried out by or incited by the intelligence elements of both countries—Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).

Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark have been foreign correspondents for The Sunday Times and The Guardian. Their book, Spy Stories, was an attempt to understand and report the accounts of “rival officers and analysts [or the two opposing intelligence organizations] working to outwit and trap one another...” [xi].

RAW was established in 1968 as India’s foreign intelligence service. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) that existed since the 1947 partition was modeled as a police special branch and manned by colonial police officers and was largely ineffective against Pakistani aggression. Rather than being an independent agency, RAW is an adjunct of the prime minister’s office.

Pakistan’s ISI was established in 1948 and has been “shadowy and misunderstood.” As part of the Pakistan army it has resisted oversight from civilian governments and has a “legacy of barbarism,” lack of transparency, and history of “covert side deals.” [269]

The enmity between India and Pakistan is complex and often hard to understand. The authors shed light on many incidents, some of which could easily have been casus belli, and on important personages behind the scenes on both sides. They also describe many of the terrorists who have destabilized Pakistan and threaten to do the same in India.

There are multiple terrorist groups in Pakistan, including Jaish-e-Mohammed (J-e-M), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and others, some of whom are family-based criminal groups and zealot organizations. Some include within their ranks retired ISI officers and some rogue actors.

One of the more valuable aspects of Spy Stories is its descriptions and explanations of widely-reported events that are not well understood. These include the murder and beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter David Pearl in 2002. Levy and Scott-Clark tell how the wrong person, Omar Sheik, was convicted of his murder due to political pressure. It also includes the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 by a Pashtun teenager recruited as a suicide bomber. ISI apparently covered up the investigation for unknown reasons.

The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 was a tremendous shock to the nation. The authors trace the attack to the two Pakistani-based groups LeT and J-e-M. They also analyze the 2008 terrorist attack that held the city of Mumbai hostage for three days.

The book provides an historical look at events in Kashmir, both Pakistan’s almost constant attempts at infiltration and incitement of rebellion by its largely Muslim population and Indian suppressions of the population. The 2019 car-bomb attack on Indian troops at Pulwama was a deciding factor for the Indian government to severely crack down on Kashmir. The attack was sponsored by J-e-M which had the objective of starting another Indo-Pakistani war. The end result has been the abolishment of Kashmir’s semi-independent status and ingestion into India under BJP President Modi.

The authors tie the actions of the opposing intelligence services to the domestic and international politics of the countries. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf came close to a potential peace deal over Kashmir, only to be sabotaged by terrorists and domestic politics.

Many of the major players, and many of the anti-Pakistan government Pakistani terrorists are identified and described. Disturbingly, the authors identify a growing terrorist movement within India that targets Muslims and is aimed at creating a Hindu state. False flag incidents have been blamed on Pakistan. The access of the two journalists to many of these figures was both difficult and remarkable as to how much they obtained through interviews.

While Spy Stories sheds light on the two opposing intelligence organizations that are largely unknown to Western audiences and looks behind events that have prompted headlines around the world, the complexity of the politics and the many sparring parties and individuals can be hard to follow. It is impossible to know the veracity of some of the material included by the authors, who admit not everyone was open and honest with them. The authors also exhibit an anti-CIA bias, often blaming CIA’s policies, actions, and funding as exacerbating the animosity between the rival intelligence organizations. One conclusion is that Pakistan is a fragile country torn internally by tribal, ethnic, political, and personal differences that threaten the cohesion and future of the state.

For those interested in South Asia Spy Stories should be read in concert with three other relevant
Revolutionary Monsters: Five Men Who Turned Liberation into Tyranny

Donald T. Critchlow

Washington, DC: Regnery History, 2021. 206 pages with index and selected bibliography

Conservative author and professor at Arizona State University, Donald Critchlow has compiled an indictment against five 20th Century former revolutionaries who seized power and to maintain it transformed their nations into murderous tyrannies – the Soviet Union’s Vladimir Lenin, China’s Mao Zedong, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, and Iran’s Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini.

In each chapter dedicated to one of the tyrants the author traces their rise from youth through ideological transformation to revolutionary dedication to obsession with power and ruthless embrace of oppression, purges, and mass murder to retain supreme power and authority. In each case the tyrants’ failures required the finding of counterrevolutionaries, foreign agents, corrupt opponents, ideological or religious or social deviants, and others who could be blamed and removed from their positions, arrested, and often executed. The United States was always a target. The number of victims cited by the author is astounding. Four of the book’s subjects were anti-religious, believing in their own revolutionary theologies. Khomeini was the exception. He equated himself with the second Mohammed. [137] Opposing Khomeini was to oppose God.

As Critchlow writes: “The modern revolutionary mind is enraptured by... visions of a perfected society.” Revolutionaries become prophets, who believe that the existing corrupt world can only be improved through the “destruction of the existing world order.” They take on a “terrorist’s mentality” as violence is the only route to achieving their vision— and retaining power. The “lust for power is a consistent theme.” “An arrogance develops (or is revealed) in the revolutionary leader who posits that he embodies the revolution” that will fail without him. A “cult of personality” becomes important. The tyrant portrays himself as a “man of the people.” Narcissism and hubris are characteristics of such tyrants. Beneficial propaganda is essential to promoting the tyrant. Critchlow cites many examples of Western reporters, authors, and government officials who were at least initially sympathetic to one or more of the tyrants, succumbing to propaganda and manufactured lies.

Inevitably in each case the revolution turned into tyranny and then into a kleptocracy. Those closely aligned with the revolutionary leader profited immensely. However, anyone thus closely aligned often could come under (jealous) suspicion and end up being eliminated. Mao was supreme in purging real and imagined rivals.

Like those expecting US intelligence to be prescient the author includes negative comments about CIA, at one point claiming CIA’s leadership was pro-Castro and later that CIA did not understand Castro’s popular appeal. Critchlow’s ideological bent is quite clear, especially with his adjectives, but his basic facts and observations are historically accurate and that makes the book worth reading.

The Afghanistan Papers:
A Secret History of the War

Craig Whitlock


Fifty years ago the Pentagon Papers caused a major political scandal and revealed that the Johnson administration had “systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress.” Whitlock’s book reveals the same regarding the US’s 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

Like the Pentagon Papers, Whitlock’s book is based on official US Government sources – 2,000 pages of transcripts and notes from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR),

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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s notes (called “snowflakes”), US Army oral history interviews by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth and by the US Army Center of Military History, by the University of Virginia with senior members of the Bush administration, and by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training of diplomats. All of these sources are either unclassified or were declassified as a result of Freedom of Information Act lawsuits. The Washington Post interviewed many of those who were identified in these sources.

The Afghanistan Papers is a depressing, albeit important, book. It details American ignorance, repeated poor judgments, bureaucratic incompetence and working at cross purposes, coddling – even promotion – of corruption, turning a blind eye to criminals, and many more ills that undermined the war and eventually led to America’s failure to achieve its objectives.

America’s objectives morphed as time went on. Across four administrations from Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden the changing objectives prevented possible diplomatic and political solutions from being achieved. As many senior political leaders, military commanders, and unit level commanders admitted the goal of nation building was never achievable. Afghanistan, a largely rural, uneducated, tribal country had little sense of nationhood. Attempts to create a nation in a Western sense not only fell on deaf ears, it was seen as a threat to many in the existing hierarchical tribal social structure.

Not only were high level political decisions ill conceived, American practices worked against making any progress. The rapid rotation of army officers meant that those who had gained hard-won experience departed and their replacement had to start the learning process again. This was largely the result of army careerism policies – “punch a ticket to get promoted.” The same was true for civilians working on various programs – rural development, counter narcotics, and governmental development. Failed programs were often resurrected by newly assigned officials ignorant of the previous failures. Air strikes often alienated local populations. Collateral deaths of civilians were often covered up by the military.

While corruption in the Western sense has always been a part of Afghan society, the infusion of dollars after the American invasion exacerbated the problem. CIA paid corrupt warlords to support anti-Al-Qaida and anti-Taliban operations. Opium production, “taxes” on logistics coming in from Pakistan, and extortion provided the Taliban the funds it needed.

Corruption in the Afghan military, and especially the national police was a major problem never solved. Seniors in the national police skimmed salaries, and many police consequently reverted to extortion of civilians turning them against the Kabul government and into Taliban supporters.

Perhaps the most disturbing revelations in The Afghanistan Papers is the repeated false pronouncements from military leaders in Afghanistan – always positive remarks about progress when privately they knew events were not going well. False statements about collateral damage and deaths from aerial bombings. These were repeated up the chain of command to Kabul, to Central Command headquarters, to the Pentagon, and to Congress and the public. This occurred in every administration and has shades of Vietnam all over again.

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