




## VI. PROFESSIONAL READING

### REVIEWS BY PETER C. OLESON



***Decision Advantage:  
Intelligence in International Politics  
from the Spanish Armada to Cyberwar***


by Jennifer Sims

New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. 603 pages with appendices,  
notes, bibliography and index.

This is a fascinating and thought-provoking book. It consists of 8 very detailed historical chapters and 6 on lessons learned and forecasting future challenges.

Sims is an astute observer of the US Intelligence Community, having served on the House Intelligence Committee staff and as a senior official in the State Department's Bureaus of Intelligence and Research (INR) and of Management and as a professor and director of intelligence studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. Former Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal cites her as the "inventor" of the decision advantage concept for assessing the effectiveness of intelligence. In *Decision Advantage*, Sims—a political scientist—has "mined history for knowledge about intelligence..." [xi] However, as overwhelmingly demonstrated by the detail and insights in the 8 historical chapters of the book, she is a superb historian as well.

Sims defines intelligence not as what exists today in modern nation-states but rather as "competitive purposeful learning" undertaken by anyone for gaining advantage over others. Intelligence is "engineered." She redefines the traditional intelligence cycle to include five elements: "decision-makers, platforms (access providers), sensors (sniffers, tasters, readers, feelers), processors (sense-makers), and communicators (transmitters)." She posits that "the better these five pieces are, including their integration with the decision-maker, the better the intelligence for competition; and the better that intelligence is relative to an opponent, the more likely the win" [xiii].



Chapters 2 and 3 are an impressive history of Elizabethan England versus Catholic Spain in the 1500s. The author details the repeated plots supported by Philip II against Elizabeth I and how her minister Sir Francis Walsingham's counterintelligence frustrated them. Elizabeth I relied on knowledgeable individuals, including shipwrights who rebuilt the English ships to take advantage of the perceived vulnerabilities of Spanish galleons, and supported pirates that preyed on Spanish ships bring New World wealth to Spain, and diplomats, who understood Philip II, who, to his disadvantage, believed himself "divinely informed" [46]. Sims describes how Elizabeth I was a hands-on manager, controlling others who might take personal advantage of the international conflict with Spain, such as the pirate Sir Francis Drake. Her competitor, Philip II, lacked good strategic intelligence against England, which led to an "incoherent military strategy" [66]. His bureaucracy "had been filtering out intelligence incompatible with his perceived preferences" thereby adversely affecting his decision-making [80]. Sims observes that when the Armada sailed against England Philip II's hubris, certainty, and lack of intelligence invited surprise and defeat from English tactics, the weather, and lack of navigational knowledge of northern waters.

The author devotes two chapters to analyzing battlefield intelligence through examining the battles of First Manassas (Bull Run) and Chancellorsville. Her description of the evolutionary employment of the telegraph in 1860 and 1861 and how over time it expanded the battlefield is interesting. "The confused state of communications, intelligence, and decision-making would profoundly affect strategy and tactics during the first months of the war" [134]. It was the North's infrastructure that gave it strategic advantage [135]. Sims examines the aspects of cavalry reconnaissance, balloons, and the loyalties of local populations (citizen spies) as they affected intelligence. She notes that one-third of the population of Washington, DC, was loyal to the South as were large sections of the Maryland citizenry.

While the Confederacy had intelligence advantage in the battle of First Manassas, the Union did at Chancellorsville. Yet the Union army was defeated. Sims describes how the Union forces, using intelligence, outflanked the Confederates but at a crucial juncture the needed tactical intelligence on Confederate movements did not reach Union General Hooker due to a breakdown in communications, making the

intelligence useless [189-90]. Sims calls “communications [as] the pillar of superior intelligence” [201]. She also notes that Hooker’s excessive secrecy inhibited his intelligence system [213].

The author devotes an intriguing chapter to the hunt for John Wilkes Booth and how intelligence played in the complex environment at the end of the Civil War and whether Lincoln’s assassination was part of a Confederate plot to “rekindle” the war despite Lee’s surrender at Appomattox courthouse [249]. She notes how manhunts require a degree of perception management to gain public support, collection superiority—knowing one’s own side as well as the adversary, and raise ethical and legal challenges.

With her background in the State Department, Sims notes that “diplomatic operations include a combination of intelligence, communications, foreign policymaking and negotiation that vary according to the requirements of foreign policy” [252]. Her chapter on intelligence support to diplomacy addresses the differences with intelligence support to military operations. She takes a broad and long view of intelligence citing the effects of industrial and technological change in communications (including undersea cables spanning the globe) and in fields such as systems engineering. Electronic communications enabled a revolution in cryptology. Citing the Allies’ success with Ultra (the decryption of Nazi Germany’s Enigma-based communications), Sims notes Brigadier E. T. Williams’ 1945 comment that “...very few armies ever went to battle better informed of their enemy” [275].

The author contrasts the state and uses of intelligence in European countries in both pre-war periods of the early 20th Century. She devotes one chapter on “Gaining Diplomatic Advantages before World War I” and another on “Intelligence and Decision in 1938” within the context of an in-depth description of the international political situations from the late 1800s through the mid-1900s. She describes Austro-Hungarian intelligence before its decision to go to war with Serbia over the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as well as Germany’s hesitations to support Vienna in light of Germany’s assessment of the geopolitical situation in Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire’s leaders’ “decision to use force against Serbia rested on untested assumptions” that were flawed because “both the providers and withholders of intelligence were highly politicized; they shared only the intelligence that supported their views” [341]. The French were distracted by a domestic scandal and leaks compromised their cryptographic successes. And the British were seeming oblivious to events in Eastern

Europe. Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey vacillated about the July 1914 events in Eastern Europe [264-5]. Russia gained decision advantage, and prepared for war, due to Austro-Hungarian chief of counterintelligence Colonel Alfred Redl’s spying for Russia that provided St. Petersburg its enemy’s order of battle, military status, and war plans.

European leaders haunted “for years afterward [by] gaps in intelligence in 1914 inspired growth in national intelligence...” [360]. However, “the transition of national intelligence functions from diplomatic and military establishments to professional national intelligence organizations confused decision-making between 1900 and 1940” [316]. This was true in Britain that led to policy paralysis in 1938 and the lead-up to World War II.

With the decline of monarchies and the growth of popularly-selected governments and openly available news public opinion became an important factor. “Hitler was among the few who understood that intelligence on the masses mattered, and that it could be used to gain decision advantages even when the military balance was against him” [309]. He ran multiple intelligence efforts focused on domestic “threats” as well as foreign neighbors and employed extensive influence operations. However, established mindsets that existed in England and Germany did “worse than mislead.” They reduced the demand for good intelligence by government leaders [313]. And in Britain competing intelligence efforts – official and unofficial – came to different conclusions on Hitler’s intentions, paralyzing effective action by Prime Minister Chamberlain. Personal animosities also intervened. Sims notes that “[t]rust is crucial if intelligence is to influence decision, especially in conditions of uncertainty” [399].

In her final chapters Sims develops “A Theory of Intelligence in International Politics” and looks to the future. Intelligence is a “form of power,” she notes.

Besides brute strength, knowing when and how to fight, flee, rest, or cooperate with others has been key to longevity. Intelligence, which is the measurable capacity to learn despite being opposed by others, has always been the essential supplement to pure muscle – especially in international politics...” [405].

Sims cites four fundamental requirements for achieving intelligence advantage:

- Superior capacities to collect relevant information.

- Sufficient detachment of collection from current policy and known threats to enable the discovery of the unexpected.
- Superior transmission of intelligence and strategy among intelligence providers and decision-makers to create advantages over competitors.
- Superior capacities for selective secrecy. [Emphasis in original. 406.]

Sims posits that including “Analysis” as a separate requirement tends to “put it into a box” disconnected from the other elements. She emphasizes how “counterintelligence shapes what an opponent learns through information denial and influence operations, including deception” [409, 411]. She addresses “anticipatory intelligence” that goes beyond expressed policy requirements to provide warning of the unanticipated [423].

Sims “develops a general guide to building intelligence readiness, whether for war, diplomacy, or international manhunts” [Flap]. She notes “that a reliably superior intelligence service must be responsive to decision-makers’ requirements and yet, at the same time [original emphasis], capable of acting outside of those requirements to rescue those decision-makers from strategic surprise.” She also emphasizes the criticality of counterintelligence to “control or degrade” what adversaries or others can learn that serves their competitive interests [9]. “[I]ntelligence is dynamic and comparative... and cannot be analyzed apart from the opponent’s system” [22].

She is critical of decisions that have adversely impacted US intelligence capabilities: the reduction in diplomatic posts and personnel, the over-focus on military requirements, partisanship and the weakening of congressional oversight, budget constraints, and a slowness in responding to the technical requirements related to cyberwar [428-40].

Sim’s final chapter is entitled “The Twenty-First-Century Terrain of Uncertainty.” She addresses the cyber world; quantum technologies; new areas of potential conflict, such as the Arctic; Artificial Intelligence (AI); and the rise of authoritarian governments.

Sims concludes:

Sound intelligence is factually true as far as it goes, but it is also often incomplete and full of residual uncertainties. The ultimate purpose of intelligence is to gain decision-advantage – and win – despite uncertainty and the absence of ultimate truths [original emphasis. 445].

The chapter Notes are an unusually rich source of supplementary information and well worth reading. *Decision Advantage* is not an easy read. It is dense, detailed, thought-provoking, and readers should take their time to thoroughly absorb the insights that the author presents. It is one of the more consequential volumes about intelligence that have been published in a long time.




### ***Spies Who Changed History: The Greatest Spies & Agents of the 20th Century***

by Nigel West

Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2022. 221 pages with Notes and Index.

Nigel West (real name: Rupert William Simon Allason) is a prolific author of sixty-one prior intelligence-related books and known as “the expert’s expert.” *Spies Who Changed History* is his latest.



West has chosen 14 spies that he believes were “demonstrably important” in affecting international relations.

Walther Dewé ran a train watching spy ring in Belgium during World War I that alerted the British to German troop movements. “By 1916, it was estimated in London that up to 70 percent of... strategic intelligence was derived from Train watching” [4].

Christopher Draper, a British pilot, was a double agent against Nazi Germany’s Abwehr. He was a prototype for the subsequent British XX Committee that ran successful double agent and deception operations (“double cross system”) against the Nazis.

Olga Gray, working for MI-5 (Britain’s Security Service), discovered the cipher system used by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in the 1930s to communicate with Moscow, allowing its decipherment and MI-5’s conclusion the CPGB was an extension of the USSR’s NKVD intelligence service.

Arnold Deutsch was the NKVD illegal resident in the UK who recruited nineteen spies including Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, John Cairncross, and Anthony Blunt – the “Cambridge Five.”

Renato Levi, an Italian playboy, worked for the “French, German, and Italian intelligence agencies, as well as SIS” [59]. In Egypt he helped the British



hoodwink the Italians and Rommel's Afrika Korps, demonstrating the value of strategic deception.

Major Richard Wurmman, a captured "senior Abwehr officer" in Tunisia cooperated with his British captors and laid out the intricacies of the competing Nazi intelligence services – the Abwehr, Sicherheit-dienst, and the Gestapo, including their functions, sites throughout Europe, and individuals. He was key to subsequent Allied counterintelligence successes.

Al Sarant was a member of the Rosenberg spy ring and provided classified information on the B-29 bomber, high-resolution airborne radar, and other advanced technologies. Sarant escaped to Moscow and became instrumental in the Soviet integrated circuit and semiconductor industry. In this chapter West lays out in detail the extent of and damage done by the Rosenberg ring.

Engelbert Broda, an Austrian physicist, provided Moscow with many documents on American and British atomic research. He died in 1983. His identity and full role as an atomic spy was not discovered until 2009.

LTC William Whalen (USA) worked for the head of Army intelligence and on the Joint Staff. He provided Moscow from 1955 to 1961 "information pertaining to atomic weaponry, missiles, military plans for the defense of Europe, estimates... of military capabilities, ...intelligence reports and analyses" as well as plans of the Strategic Air Command [133].

CWO John Walker "compromised US Navy cryptographic systems and classified information from 1967 to 1985" [141]. Run by Oleg Kalugin, later the head of the KGB's foreign counterintelligence, Walker and those he recruited compromised the entire Fleet Broadcast System and was the "key source on US submarine missile forces" [144] providing "powerful war-winning capabilities" [146] to the Soviets.

Sergeant First Class Clyde Conrad (USA) from 1975 to 1985 provided the Hungarians (and therefore the Soviets) "NATO's complete defense plan" for Europe [155]. Recruiting others "the sheer scale of [his] spy-ring was breathtaking" [159].

Vladimir Kuzichkin was "singlehandedly responsible for scuppering the Kremlin's plans to organize a Communist coup in Iran" after the 1979 revolution [161]. Defecting to the British he also identified other Directorate S illegals in Canada and Switzerland.

Ashraf Marwan was the son-in-law of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and recruited by Israel's Mossad in 1969. He provided warning of Egypt's and Syria's planned 1973 Yom Kippur attack on Israel but was disbelieved. West states "[a]ny objective analysis

of what Marwan achieved rules out the possibility that the Israelis were misled by a double agent 'game'" [179].

Gennadi Vasilenko was a CIA mole within the KGB who was instrumental in exposing both Aldridge Ames and Robert Hanssen by providing CIA access to other Soviet intelligence officers. West's telling of how there were many involved in mole hunts and their uncovering, including in 2010 of the ten illegals in the US; the damage done by Hanssen; and the covert extraction of two valuable CIA spies from Russia is fascinating.

The book is interesting in the detail and quotations that West includes: an extract from Philby's confession [44-46], including West's analysis of his continued lies; a description of the individuals and the extensive nature and depth of the Rosenberg spy ring; then Director of Naval Intelligence RADM William Studeman's statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee on the damage wrought by John Walker and its implications; the revelation of Moscow's planned coup against Iran's mullah regime in 1981 and the resulting bloodbath of communists when the plot was revealed.

West puts a lot of emphasis on tradecraft and the methodologies of various spies. Of interest is his analysis of Gennadi Vasilenko's ties to both the Ames and Hanssen cases.

Although West concentrates on the 14 spies he picked his narrative ties them to many others, some well-known, others not, giving an impressive overview of many spy rings. *Spies Who Changed History* benefits from West's access to primary materials from MI-5. He includes many extracts from MI-5 reports. The book benefits from the author's extensive listing of abbreviations and a 13-page *dramatis personae*.

Why did West choose these fourteen? Although he mentions others in the narratives, he easily could have chosen other spies that fit his theme of changing history, such as William Weisband, Alfred Redl, Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Oleg Penkovsky, or Vitali Mitrokhin. West acknowledges this but instead chose to "focus on cases on which new light can be shed" [xxiv]. I guess we will have to await his sixty-third book.




***Wise Gals: The Spies Who Built the CIA and Changed the Future of Espionage***

by Nathalia Holt

New York: G. T. Putnam, 2022. 382 pages with notes and index.

This is a delightful book despite a few shortcomings. Its focus is on the early struggles of women in the CIA to achieve a semblance of equality in recognition, pay, and promotion with their male counterparts. It follows five pioneering women from the time of the OSS to the ends of their careers. One, Jane Burrell, was the first fatality of a CIA officer, but was never awarded a star on the wall in CIA's lobby. Nathalia Holt recounts the many indignities and disappointments these women endured, all the while as they were dedicated to their country and their agency.



Nathalia Holt

Part of the book's subtitle, "... and Changed the Future of Espionage," describes the impact these five, and others, had on the evolution of CIA operations. Liz Sudmeier, operated for many years in Iraq and remained the only HUMINT collector after the 1958 bloody coup d'état, blending into the society with her language skills and ability to engage others, especially Iraqi women. While the rest of the CIA station had been evacuated she stayed. Despite her accomplishments she was not deemed an operations officer, the most prestigious designation, but rather a reports officer, a perceived lesser role. Her recommendation for the CIA Intelligence Medal of Merit, strongly supported by her station chief, met with bureaucratic opposition at CIA headquarters due to her designation and grade.

The women in CIA were ahead of their time in relation to much of the federal government. In 1953, in response to being openly questioned by several CIA women employees, new CIA director Allen Dulles established the Committee on Professional Women. It soon was nicknamed the "Petticoat Panel." It worked long and hard, fighting the bureaucracy for the data that showed gender discrimination. While ultimately successful getting the data, its report was dismissed by an all-male panel of senior CIA administrators. It would be many years before the recommendations first contained in the Petticoat Panel report became reality.

A central figure in Holt's book is Eloise Page. She started as General Donovan's secretary in the OSS.

Despite many disappointments she rose in rank, was instrumental in establishing many successful espionage efforts of great value, experienced in counterintelligence, became the first woman chief of station in 1975 in a difficult situation. Her predecessor, Richard Welch, had been assassinated outside his home in Athens by the 17 November terrorist group. She became a leader within CIA and the wider Intelligence Community. Holt admiringly describes her career. (This reviewer knew Eloise Page. She once interviewed me to be her deputy; I declined. Later I lectured in her class "Counterterrorism Perspectives for Senior Managers" at the National Defense Intelligence College, now the National Intelligence University.)

Holt's book recounts several operations in which the women highlighted in her book were instrumental. One was the early days of CIA's U-2 operations in the Middle East and the Soviet Union. Despite intelligence warnings the US was caught by surprise in 1957 by the USSR's launch of Sputnik. CIA's involvement with anti-Soviet Ukrainian dissidents was problematic. Holt describes the cultural conflict within CIA between traditional espionage operations and the growing focus on covert actions, including the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs operation and the subsequent 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. (For a detailed accounting of how US intelligence functioned during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see the AFIO monograph by senior CIA S&T officer Reg Heitchue, *The Cuban Missile Crisis – Sixty Years Later: When Intelligence Made a Difference*, at [https://www.afio.com/publications/monographs/HEITCHUE\\_The\\_Cuban\\_Missile\\_Crisis\\_Monograph\\_2022.pdf](https://www.afio.com/publications/monographs/HEITCHUE_The_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_Monograph_2022.pdf).)

Some readers may be bothered by some of the inaccuracies in Holt's book, but they seem minor to this reviewer and do not adversely impact the main theme of the book. It did seem at times, however, that Holt ascribed to her women subjects an exaggerated role and influence on specific topics. Intelligence is a team sport and the focus of the book at times seemed to lose sight of this. Despite these criticisms Holt's book is well worth reading.

In the AFIO Now video series, AFIO president Jim Hughes interviewed Nathalia Holt. The interview, now released to the public, is well worth watching at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPQhMf42kG8>.




## ***Intelligence and the State: Analysts and Decision Makers***

by Jonathan M. House

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022. 232 pages with notes, bibliography and index.

This is a relatively short book (168 pages of text) that covers a lot of European and American intelligence history. As such, it is a good introductory overview of some of the problems that face intelligence analysts when providing unwanted information and conclusions to policy makers and commanders. House is a military historian at the US Army Command and General Staff College.



The author begins by discussing the issue of professionalism and the role and responsibilities of intelligence analysts to the state and its political leaders. He then addresses the intelligence cycle and how collection can involve ethical issues, especially when employed domestically. This is not just an American phenomenon,

it has been a European one as well. He addresses the challenge of confidence in assessments and the problems of “weasel words” and the impact of restrictive classifications.

One chapter delves into the interface between operators and analysts and the problems that can occur. He warns about the problem of operators controlling what information can be presented to customers. Often focused on examples of intelligence failures, such as the Iraqi WMD judgment, House examines how misperceptions can occur, including the insidious infection of politicization of intelligence judgments.

This reviewer found the chapter on European Precedents in the evolution of intelligence most interesting. The author overviews British, French, Hapsburg, German, and Russian intelligence and discusses why some were more effective than others. (The French and Hapsburgs were not.) He provides a good overview of how Russian intelligence evolved from Tsarist to modern days. Worth noting is that European states’ intelligence historically was mostly focused on preserving the existing state against domestic enemies. Foreign intelligence played a lesser role until the post-World War I period.

Much of the focus of the book is on American intelligence from its modest beginnings to today. His discussion of OSS is a good reminder of how inter-agency rivalries can inhibit intelligence activities. He

covers in detail the efforts of President Eisenhower to develop a strong intelligence community and collection and analytical capabilities to counter the Soviet Union. Especially interesting is the examination of presidential advisory panels and their influence on the president and the consolidation of fragmented (and often competing) organizations into national entities, such as the US Intelligence Board (USIB), DIA, NSA, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

House covers many of the significant issues related to intelligence – errant assessments related to Vietnam, domestic surveillance, the Church Committee, controversies related to covert actions, and the poor US record in counterintelligence, and others. He also covers many of the reform efforts up to the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence.

His final substantive chapter is on “The Paradox of Warning.” House posits that warning is the basic function of intelligence. He examines many warning failures, noting that the public rarely knows of warning successes – Operation Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, the invasion of South Korea and the Chinese intervention, missiles in Cuba, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The book is an overview and sometimes that lack of detailed addressal of a topic leaves the reader wanting. House also at times injects personal assessments of others’ motivations, which can be distracting. Nonetheless, *Intelligence and the State* is a good historical discussion and worth reading.



## ***China Vs Democracy: The Greatest Game, China Handbook***

by Robin Shepherd

Halifax International Security Forum, November 2021. 98 pages.  
([halifaxtheforum.org/china-handbook/en/](http://halifaxtheforum.org/china-handbook/en/)).

The International Halifax Security Forum in



November 2021 focused on China and its growing threat to democracies worldwide. The Forum interviewed more than 250 experts and has produced a handbook that details Beijing’s actions and behavior. The Forum has noted that “there was no common strategy among the world’s democracies

with regard to China.” This is urgently needed.



“[P]eople around the world, and their democratic governments, have, perhaps belatedly, woken up to the hard reality that Beijing is not our friend,” notes the Forum, declaring that “the Chinese Communist Party is, in fact, the virus that endangers the world.” “Democracies have acknowledged implicitly and explicitly that their approach to Beijing over the last three decades, and especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, [has] amounted to a foreign policy miscalculation of historic proportions.” The common assumption that with economic modernization China would liberalize and join in the international order has proven to be chimeric. Instead it has become the “most powerful authoritarian state in history.” “The only stakeholder that Beijing is interested in accommodating is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Democratic China is a mirage.”

“The key to understanding the nature of the China challenge is to recognize that Beijing’s worldview is guided, above all else, by the interests of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that is Leninist to the core.” Technologically supported domestic oppression is omnipresent. The CCP has embraced authoritarian regimes around the world, e.g., Venezuela. Beijing is undermining democracies with particular attention to Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the One Belt One Road initiative is far more than an economic initiative supported by Chinese companies, which are beholden to the CCP, such as Huawei. Beijing ignores international agreements and norms, as evidenced by its continuing subjugation of Hong Kong, rejection of the decision by the Permanent International Court of Arbitration over the Scarborough Shoals, use of its Coast Guard and maritime militia to harass other nations’ fishers in its rejected claims over the South China Sea, among other activities. Chinese espionage against others which possess desired military and economically important technologies is ubiquitous and has been very damaging to the US military and commercial industry. The Forum explicitly states “China intends to emerge as the dominant tech power in the twenty-first century.” “China and the world’s democracies are plainly now locked in an increasingly antagonistic standoff.”

The conundrum for others is that “[m]any of the greatest challenges that the people of this planet face... will require global solutions. Without China, they will be difficult or impossible to achieve.” Climate change is perhaps the greatest.

The *China Handbook* describes the nature of the CCP and its grip on China. It details what China is trying to achieve in the world and the elements that it

uses, including the Ministry of State Security, the Peoples Liberation Army, the United Work Front Department, the CCP’s propaganda arms, development investments in other countries, and other elements, including global Chinese companies, visiting Chinese “scholars” and Chinese “institutes” at universities, scientific delegations, and overseas ethnic Chinese who are seduced or coerced into helping the “motherland.” The *Handbook* also examines the strategic aspects of China’s actions and ambitions.

The Forum states bluntly that “[t]he standoff with Xi’s China is indeed a decisive moment in history, and the decisions democracies take over the course of the next decade will, to put it bluntly, determine whether they meet the challenge or whether they are overcome by it.” “The real China challenge for the world’s democracies is how to cooperate effectively with each other.” For the West will have to develop a common understanding and craft an approach to thwarting multilaterally Beijing’s actions and ambitions. The *Handbook* concludes with seven principles for defending democracies from China’s aggression.

This is a sobering, but important, volume.



### Russian Proverbs —

Laws are silent in time of war



A chatterbox is a treasure  
for a spy



Eternal peace lasts  
only until the next war

## Quick Peeks


The past year has seen many, many books published that relate to the intelligence field. While reviews in *The Intelligencer* are mostly for non-fiction there are still far more than any reviewer could read. Many of those by major publishing houses get reviewed in national newspapers, CIA's *Studies in Intelligence*, or other scholarly journals. This reviewer tries not to duplicate intentionally what other reviewers have done, but often finds that with *The Intelligencer* only appearing twice a year some duplication occurs nonetheless. Here are some quick peeks at three books that publishers have sent AFIO, which this reviewer has examined but not had the time to thoroughly dissect.



### ***Improving the Intelligence Community's Leveraging of the Full Science and Technology Ecosystem***

by National Academies

Washington, DC: National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, 2022. On-line at [www.nap.edu](http://www.nap.edu) or [www.nationalacademies.org](http://www.nationalacademies.org).



"The U.S. Intelligence Community depends on knowledge of cutting-edge science and technology to inform intelligence missions and compete with its adversaries." Commissioned by the Director of National Intelligence the NSF's report addresses improving aware-


ness of scientific research, technology discoveries, and engineering worldwide and recommends naming a Chief Technology and Innovation Officer (CTIO) for the IC. The report encourages increased outreach from the IC to other scientific communities within and outside of government, the use of rotational assignments, the establishment of talent pools, and emulate DoD's outreach to scientists and engineers. Improving open source exploitation of S&T data and international bilateral efforts are also recommended, including funding international cooperative activities.



### ***Cyberspace in Peace and War (Second Edition)***

by Martin Libicki


Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021, 495 pages with notes, bibliography, and index.



Libicki is a well-known cyber expert. *Cyberspace* is a lengthy book – five parts and 33 chapters. He provides a good introductory education on how hacks are executed, the various types of cyberattacks and their intents, and how cybersecurity is a system problem. He notes that most cyberattacks are transitory in their effects; however, he also addresses the long-lasting hack of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In Part II concerning cyber operations, the author addresses cyberwar and raises an interesting discussion on whether the Chinese would employ cyber operations in the same way the US might. In Part III on strategies, he discusses the US's advantages in the cyber domain and responding to an attack, including those that are sub rosa. He discusses why attribution of an attack is so difficult. His final Part is on establishing norms for cyberspace.

Of particular interest, Libicki describes in detail how the STUXNET worm worked against the Iranian centrifuges. He examines Russian cyber doctrine, which "reflects the importance of surprise" [93] and notes that Putin (pre-Ukraine war) "warned that damage from cyberattacks could be higher than that of conventional weapons" [135]. He devotes an entire chapter to "the enigma of Russian behavior in cyberspace."

*Cyberspace in Peace and War* is a complex read but very informative of the virtual world that impacts us all. It is unfortunate that the Naval Institute Press decided to use what appears to be a tiny (size 9?) font, which makes the lengthy and heavy volume somewhat difficult to read.



Martin C. Libicki, PhD





### ***CIA Paramilitary Operations in Tibet, 1957-1975***

by Ken Conboy


Warwick, England: Helion & Company Ltd. 2022. 72 pages with sources and bibliography.

Conboy has written several books and articles about special operations and CIA's operations in Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia. This heavily-illustrated monograph covers the history of CIA's involvement in supporting anti-Chinese rebels in Tibet. The author includes a lot of detail: the identities of CIA paramilitary officers; the training camps on the island of Saipan, Camp Hale in Colorado, The Farm, and other support facilities in India, Thailand, and Okinawa. He describes the air operations supporting the Tibetan rebels and the aircraft involved (C-119, C-130, C-34, helo courier, and others). He describes the Dali Lama's actions (or inactions) and the politics of his exile court.


The covert operation encountered many difficulties. Language and lack of literacy were problems. Communications by radio and overland were challenging. Political support in Washington was intermittent. India's acquiescence of support ran hot and cold depending whether it was fearful of antagonizing Beijing or not. In addition, CIA's Far East and Near East divisions were often at odds over the operation.

In the end support to Tibetan rebels was a failure. Many of the inserted volunteers were killed or captured by the PLA. The rebel's effect was minimal. The operation was doomed when President Nixon went to China and reoriented US-Chinese policy.


Conboy's book is part of the Asia at War series published by Helion & Company and distributed by Casemate.



cions about Soviet Missiles in Cuba” debunked the popular belief that it was U-2 photography that initially discovered the missiles. It was human observers. Reg Heitchue’s “The Cuban Missile Crisis” is the only scholarly piece this reviewer knows of that addresses the intricacies of how all disciplines of US intelligence worked during the crisis. (His extensive 208-page monograph is on-line at [https://www.afio.com/publications/monographs/HEITCHUE\\_The\\_Cuban\\_Missile\\_Crisis\\_Monograph\\_2022.pdf](https://www.afio.com/publications/monographs/HEITCHUE_The_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_Monograph_2022.pdf).)



Another book – *Abyss* by prolific British historian,



Max Hastings, may be of interest to AFIO readers. Hastings is an engaging storyteller and his latest book in fifteen chapters describes the overall crisis, the personalities involved, the tense discussions when the White House was considering an invasion of the island. The author describes how President Kennedy was pressured by “hawks” in his administration. He later commented to Kenneth Galbraith “Ken, you will never know how much bad advice I received.” Hastings writes that Kennedy’s “part in the Cuban Missile Crisis represents his best claim upon greatness...” [xxi]

This book has been published also under a different subtitle: “Nuclear Crisis Cuba 1962.”

### ***Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962***

by Sir Max Hastings

London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2022. 480 pages with Notes, Bibliography and Index.


So many books have been published coincident with the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 that this reviewer has been unable to read even a few of them. In the past edition of *The Intelligencer* AFIO published two unique articles on that crisis. Gary Keeley’s “HUMINT Reports Raised Suspi-

### ***Active Measures, A Graduate Research Journal on Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Information Operations***

Sebastian Smeureanu, Editor

Washington, DC: The Institute of World Politics

It is always interesting to run across a new source of information. This reviewer recently discovered *Active Measures*, Vol. 6, Spring 2022, which is a scholarly journal published by the graduate students at the



Institute of World Politics. “Its name refers to a set of influence operations and propaganda — disinformation and deception — used by the Soviet Union to persuade and to have a strategic impact.” An overview and listing of articles are available on-line at <https://www.iwp.edu/category/active-measures/>. Vol. 6 includes


three interesting articles: “In for a Penny, In for a Pound: Implications of Post-Cold War Changes in US Citizens’ Motivations for Espionage” by William Leigh; “Tiktok, Tinder, Zoomer, Spy: Motivation s for Espionage in Late Millenials and Gen Z” by Dan; and “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine” by Brian Rivas. Vol. 6 also includes a book review of Amy Zegart’s *Spies, Lies and Algorithms: the History and future of American Intelligence*.



### ***Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944-1949***

by Thomas Boghardt

Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 45-5, Cloth; CMH Pub 45-5-1, 2022, 546 pages, maps, illustrations, index. [https://history.army.mil/html/books/045/45-5/cmhPub\\_45-5.pdf](https://history.army.mil/html/books/045/45-5/cmhPub_45-5.pdf). 20 MB on-line.



US Army intelligence underwent a transformation starting in 1945. While focused on apprehending Nazi war criminals and officials, it soon had to turn its attention to an increasingly hostile USSR. As part of the Army Historical Series, Thomas Boghardt has compiled a history of Army intelligence operations from

when US forces first crossed into wartime Germany capturing Aachen, through the Battle of the Bulge, to the Nazi’s collapse and in occupied Germany. He examines the various US and allied intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, denazification efforts, the chaos that ensued with displaced persons and the black markets, plus Soviet espionage, defectors and informants and other topics.

This is a detailed history of a very complex topic that identifies many of the participants and what they did. It also covers the Target Intelligence Committee’s efforts to exploit German SIGINT successes, the

recruitment of German scientists (Operation Paperclip), and the Berlin blockade of 1948-9.


*Covert Legions*, based on declassified official records, is a rich source for World War II and intelligence historians.



### ***Terrorist Events Worldwide 2021***

by Edward Mickolus

Wandering Woods Publishers, 2022, 198 pagewith bibliography, and Terrorist Events Worldwide 2019-2020, Wandering Woods Publishers, 2021, 405 pages with bibliography.



The 2021 volume is the twentieth in a series documenting terrorism, which Mickolus defines as “the use or threat of use of violence by any individual or group for political purposes.” He overviews regional developments, the activities of key terrorist groups, and the fates of significant terror figures –

who was killed and who was captured. This precedes a chronology of terrorist events by continent, country, and date. Mickolus includes domestic terrorism events within the United States, including a lengthy section on the January 6th events at the Capitol.

*Terrorist Events Worldwide* is a good example of open source exploitation. The series is a good starting point for any research on terrorist events.



Peter C. Oleson is senior editor of *Intelligencer* and Editor of *The Guide to the Study of Intelligence*. He is a former associate professor of intelligence studies, University of Maryland University College. He has taught about intelligence extensively on the faculties of CIA University and the National Defense Intelligence College. Prior to his time teaching, he was assistant director of DIA, involved in policy, resource, and acquisition matters. He served as senior intelligence policy advisor to Under SecDef for Policy. Was one of eight charter members of Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service. After leaving government he worked in industry developing defense and intelligence systems.