


## VI. PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEWS BY  
PETER C. OLESON



### *Hunting Nukes: A Fifty-Year Pursuit of Atomic Bomb Builders and Mischief Makers*

by Richard Philip Lawless

Mountain Lake Press, 2023, 539 pages, no index, multiple visible redactions.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a little explored or written about aspect of intelligence operations. Lawless's book covers his years focused on proliferators and wannabe proliferators primarily in Asia. Richard Lawless spent 15 years in the Directorate of Operations (DO) as a Clandestine Service Officer focused on nuclear issues. He later served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as the Deputy Under Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.




Originally assigned to the CIA Station in Seoul, South Korea, Lawless was tipped to the nuclear desires of the autocratic president, Pak Chung-hee. Pak, despite the Republic of Korea being a party to the 1968 international Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, directed a clandestine weapons

program that had its root years before under President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960). Faced with a hostile regime in Pyongyang and wondering whether the American commitment to South Korea was solid, Pak desired a deterrent capability. In 1968 North Korea had sent a commando team into Seoul to assassinate Pak, captured the USS Pueblo 18 nautical miles off the coast in international waters, and in 1969 shot down the US Navy's EC-121 SIGINT plane over 90 nautical miles off the coast.

The French and Canadians were involved in selling South Korea nuclear processing capabilities. The US's uncovering of South Korea's clandestine aims caused significant diplomatic ripples with both countries.

The author explains how US politics affected the perceptions of other countries and their dealing with the issue of having a nuclear weapons program. President Carter's public discussion of the desired withdrawal of American forces from the Korean peninsula fed the paranoia of President Pak about the solidity of the American alliance. Apparently, Carter's policies also affected the thinking in Taiwan.

After Seoul, Lawless was assigned to an unacknowledged European city (a CIA required redaction) to work with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His explanation of the difficulties that the IAEA faces with its competing missions of promoting nuclear energy and guarding against the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs is enlightening.



One educational element of Lawless' book is how he links clandestine HUMINT collection to diplomatic efforts, both at the Station and national levels. He also describes in considerable detail, which are understandable to the lay reader, the technologies and processes necessary for constructing

an atomic weapon.

The author provides limited histories of other countries' nuclear programs, some well-known, others not, including North Korea, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, and Iran. He notes how the Chinese helped the Pakistanis develop their warheads and delivery missiles.

Notably missing from the author's overview of other nations' nuclear programs is Israel. It is apparent that any reference to Israel was redacted by the Department of Defense, continuing the "see no evil, hear no evil" policy of the US Government since President Nixon's decision not to acknowledge the clandestine Israel nuclear test in the South Atlantic on 22 September 1979. (Examining many of the blacked-out redactions in the text any informed reader with easily determine that the redactions often refer to Israel.) Lawless reveals a clandestine relationship between Israel and Beijing related to modernizing Chinese weapon systems with Western technologies (many including American that were transferred surreptitiously). He also recounts the history of how James Jesus Angleton, as head of the DO's counterintelligence, also controlled all aspects of intelligence relationships with Israel, alleged by some as including support to its nuclear program, a practice that appar-

ently continued long after Angleton was removed by DCI William Colby.

In a later assignment, Lawless focused on technology developments in Japan, including the potential for certain Japanese companies to be secretly involved in nuclear proliferation. He also recounts how the Station assisted the Japanese security elements resist the widespread diversion of advanced technologies to China and the Soviet Union via their espionage services.

Lawless was recruited by DCI Casey in October 1985 to set up a new organization to exploit the knowledge of senior business leaders whom Casey knew well from his career. The businessmen were often helpful, but the new element incurred the wrath of the leaders of the DO, who continually tried to undermine the new organization. The conflict led to vituperative exchanges with the Deputy Director for Operations and other DO seniors, who, according to the author, vowed career revenge on Lawless.

After leaving CIA employment for the private sector, the author was often called out for alleged misdeeds as his identity was leaked from the White House and elsewhere, which periodically fed a press frenzy.

The book has 97 redactions, all by the Department of Defense, which are being contested in court proceedings. One reaction this reviewer had was that the author has employed his book partially as a means of “correcting” the record of personal conflicts with others in CIA. A little salt is needed in reading these parts of the book.

*Hunting Nukes* provides considerable insight into what a Clandestine Service Officer does, how HUMINT flows through the various elements of the DO and CIA bureaucracy (it’s not smooth sailing), how inner-agency conflicts arise within the DO and with the DDI, with varying opinions on reported topics, and more. The book is an excellent overview of the non-proliferation problem that we have faced and still do.

### ***Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State***


by Michael Fredholm

Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, University of Copenhagen, Monograph Series no. 143, 2018. 472 pages with bibliography and index.

Sometimes one comes across an older book that is very insightful and remains relevant. Such is Swedish scholar Michael Fredholm’s volume on Afghanistan. While published five years ago, it is the best book available that provides detailed understanding of the history, politics, ethnicities, government, invasions, and dynamics of Afghanistan from the 1700s to today.

“The complex landscape of Afghanistan is in many ways much more difficult to understand than Afghanistan’s enemies,” such as insurgent groups, writes General Stanley McChrystal. A country of many ethnicities, historically at odds and war, is “seemingly forever stuck in the past.” Fredholm attempts to explain the root causes of Afghanistan’s repeated failures to develop as a modern nation.

Afghanistan is “at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.” Afghanistan “was shaped by great power politics.” It has been invaded many times – by Alexander the Great, Gondophares and his Iranic speaking Indo-Parthians, Abdur Rahman ibn Samura’s Arabs, Genghis Khan, the Turco-Mongols, and Babur’s Mughals. These were prior to the Great Game between the British and Russians in the 19th Century, each of which was looking for a buffer against the other. Both invaded Afghanistan during that period. The Russians tried to annex the Pamir area in 1891. The 20th Century was marked by internal civil conflicts, Soviet invasions of 1925, 1929, 1930 and 1979, and in this century by the US and allied invasion in 2001.



In 1880, Emir Abdur Rahman attempted to modernize the fragmented tribes of Afghanistan. His strategy involved providing security in order to allow modernization and institute economic reform, which was needed for raising funds to provide for an army to provide security. Each depended on the other. The British recognized after several military campaigns into Afghanistan (1839-42, 1878-80, and 1919) that it was not worth the cost of remaining and decided to support Abdur Raḥmān, who became dependent upon British largess. Thus, Afghanistan became a “rentier state” needing outside powers’ subsidies to function. The pattern has never changed. Abdur Rahman eventually failed in his endeavor, and his successors all failed too.

Mountain ranges largely divide Afghanistan into north and south. The north is “mainly populated by Persian – and Turkic-speaking groups” – the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens. The south is dominated by Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group) and other Persian-speaking groups. Tajiks and Hazaras are dominant in most of the main cities, including Kabul. There are 14 ethnic groups recognized in Afghanistan. Besides those mentioned above there are Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Almaq, Arab, Kyrgyz, Qizibash, Gujar, and Brahui. Also, there are Ismailis. As no census has been conducted in Afghanistan in many years, the numbers and locations of many ethnic tribes and clans are guesswork. “[W]hile most of Afghanistan’s population [is] concentrated in the largely Pashtun south, 60 percent of the country’s agricultural resources and 80 percent of its industrial, mineral, and natural gas wealth are found in the chiefly Uzbek and Tajik north.” Controlling this wealth has traditionally been a Pashtun goal. As Fredholm points out however, the Pashtuns are by no means united. Deep divisions exist between various Pashtun clans. This has been true since the early 1700s when Pashtun leaders changed through civil wars and assassinations. And Pashtun leaders’ relative poverty led them to raid wealthier neighboring countries. It was the lack of revenue that consistently underlay the failure of early Pashtun rulers.

Fredholm details the history of Afghanistan’s leaders’ attempts at state-building. He notes the challenges of a “state-imposed pashtunization ideology,” which alienated other ethnic groups, and the “contradictions between clericalism and secularization.” National leaders were often opposed by the clergy, who often “were all too eager to whip up opposition to any change that was perceived to threaten privileges they regarded as traditional and immutable.” Fredholm

quotes Abdur Rahman as saying “More wars and murders have been caused in this world by ignorant priests than by any other class of people.” Regional leaders (often incorrectly labeled as “warlords”) that had the loyalty of their tribes often opposed centralization under a national government and, in fact, the central governments were dependent upon regional leaders. Their militias provided the needed regional security as well as a deterrent to the central government’s control.

Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India (1898-



1905), wrote after visiting Afghanistan in 1894 that it had “the most turbulent peoples in the world by force alike of character and of arms, and by a relentless savagery...” Abdur Rahman initially succeeded in uniting large portions of

Afghanistan but only through force, coercion, and unrestrained violence.

The author details the international, domestic, and social history of Afghanistan. Feuds and uprisings were common. The Shinwari Pashtun rebellion of 1928 became a civil war, supported in part by the clergy. The Herat uprising of early 1979 and the subsequent civil war was what prompted the Soviet invasion of that December. He notes that American clandestine support was provided to opponents of the pro-Soviet government in the months prior to the Soviet invasion. Of interest is Fredholm’s analysis of Soviet Politburo debates about Afghanistan and its fears of Muslim extremists destabilizing the Central Asian Socialist Republics and its subsequent decision to invade once again to support a pro-Moscow president (who the Soviets then murdered to install a more favorable communist leader). The post-Soviet period gave rise to the Taliban, who came to power when the Najibullah government collapsed in another civil war. The Taliban dragged Najibullah from his UN refuge and castrated and killed him in 1996. The author details the history of the Taliban, its nominal leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, and the conflicts between Omar’s Quetta Shura



and its rival shura in Peshawar. Saudi financial support for the Taliban was essential for its early growth.

Fredholm also traces more modern mujahid-din factions and their leaders who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s and fostered turmoil in the 1990s. He clearly identifies Pakistani covert influence efforts, which have continued to today. The provision of safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is what allowed Taliban and other insurgent groups to survive and continue efforts against the Soviets and later the US and its allies. Fredholm notes that Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) tipped Bin Laden two to three days before the US cruise missile strike in August 1998 on Al-Qaida's training camps.

Fredholm critiques the various foreign interventions in Afghanistan. He divides the US strategy into various periods: the "checkbook campaign" with the Northern Alliance that lasted a short time before the fall of the Taliban; the "light footprint" approach of 2001-2005 was undermined by the war in Iraq after 2003 and by Taliban safe havens in Pakistan; the "surge" of 2009-11 was too small and ignored the "safe haven" problem; the 2011-14 period emphasized transition to Afghan forces. However, the Afghan government could not raise or sustain sufficient forces and the governance from Kabul was inconsistent, corrupt, and often incompetent. It could not maintain its forces or programs without continued foreign financial and technical support.

The author notes that the US and its allies often made the same mistakes the Soviets did in the 1980s. "Both the Soviets in the 1980s and the international

Coalition in the 2000s repeatedly failed to realize that the information provided by one Afghan group on another, portraying it as hostile to the intervention force, often was no more than a means to draw foreigners into local feuds by making them attack a local rival." Neither could organize effective Afghan security forces, which continually frayed from overwhelming desertions.

Afghanistan has suffered from many inadequacies: multiple language barriers; regional divisions; loyalties dependent upon patronage; high illiteracy; the "lack of institutional capacity to plan and manage industrial enterprises;" a large narcotics economy; lack of consistent security, especially in rural areas; widespread criminality; inconsistent government policies; rampant corruption of government at all levels, especially with Army and police commanders; inconsistent foreign aid programs; and "less-than gifted rulers." These are historical as well as modern day problems. Looking ahead (from 2018) Fredholm writes "The lack of a sustainable economic base remains the key problem for making a viable country out of Afghanistan." "The Taliban's extreme interpretation of Islamic law and the polarized vision of how to govern Afghanistan were [and are today] obstacles that undoubtedly would be the most crucial to overcome if Afghanistan is to build a strong, coherent government that is representative of its numerous ethnic and regional groups." Little has changed from the Taliban's initial period of governance including its view of women's rights and education. The author predicts "recurring civil wars."

The author also debunks common myths about Afghanistan. He labels the theory that Afghanistan is the “graveyard of empires” as a Cold War invention. In fact, Fredholm notes “historically, invasion forces had not been driven out but in time departed on their own terms” usually recognizing Afghanistan is not worth the price of occupation.

If one wants to understand the history, failures, tragedy, and futility of Afghanistan, Fredholm’s book is what one ought to read.

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## REVIEWER’S POSTSCRIPT

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Fredholm’s book was published in 2018. In 2023, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), who was “established in 2012 to monitor US spending and war progress,” issued his report “Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to its Demise,” which has been described as a “withering examination” of the failures of the US and the Afghan government.

“The decision by two U.S. presidents to withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan fundamentally altered every subsequent decision by U.S. government agencies, the Ghani administration, and the Taliban,” it states. “Actions taken by each ultimately accelerated the collapse of the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)] in August 2021. But the stage had been set for that collapse long before—by the failure of the U.S. and Afghan governments to create an independent and self-sustainable ANDSF, despite 20 years and \$90 billion of international support.” The SIGAR report “includes first-person accounts of the disintegration of the Afghan government and security forces as the Taliban closed in on Kabul, and the aftermath of the fall of the Ghani government.”

The President Ghani central government in 2021 “reshuffled most of his security officials, often replacing them with fellow ethnic Pashtuns, especially Ghilzai Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan. These leadership changes were part of a broader pattern of politicization and ethnicization (in favor of Pashtuns) of the security sector in the final years of the Ghani administration.”

“Ethnic competition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns (Tajiks, in particular)—enflamed by the Ghani-Abdullah rivalry—was likely the single biggest source of dysfunction” in the police and army. Also, there was “competition between the younger and

older generation of officers, between the jihadis and the professional officers, and between ethnicities. All these issues distracted from the fight...” “Ghani was more interested in the tactical daily engagements on small minor issues rather than the big strategic issues that the country was facing...” “According to a former Afghan general, in the week before Kabul fell, President Ghani replaced the new generation of young U.S.-trained Afghan officers with an old guard of Communist generals in almost all of the army corps. Ghani, that general said, was ‘changing commanders constantly [to] bring back some of the old-school Communist generals who [he] saw as loyal to him, instead of these American-trained young officers who he [mostly] feared.’” Corruption at all levels of the Afghan government was a major factor in the population’s disenchantment with the authorities.

“SIGAR found that the single most important factor in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) collapse in August 2021 was the decision by two U.S. presidents to withdraw U.S. military and contractors from Afghanistan, while Afghan forces remained unable to sustain themselves.”

In the post-9/11 era of American and allied engagement in Afghanistan little changed fundamentally. The new central Afghan governments under Karzai and later Ghani faced the same problems that Fredholm describes in *Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State*. The central government was opposed by regional and ethnic entities. Civil and ethnic conflict never abated. The central government was almost entirely dependent on foreign allies for technical assistance and funding. The objective of creating a modern state was not based on fertile ground. Recent reporting suggests that the Taliban are facing the same problems today that faced Ghani, and Karzai, and Rabbani, and Najibullah, and Karmal, and Amin, and others back to Abdur Rahman Khan in the late 1880s, and before.




For a detailed review of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction see Jeff Stein’s article “Afghan Treachery and Kabul’s Collapse” in *SpyTalk*, Feb. 27, 2023, at <https://www.spytalk.co/p/afghan-treachery-and-kabuls-collapse>. Quotes above are extracts from Stein’s article. The complete SIGAR report can be found at <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf>.

## Spy Ships: One Hundred Years of Intelligence Collection by Ships and Submarines

by Norman Polmar and Lee J. Mathers

Potomac Books, University of Nebraska Press, 2023. 305 pages with appendices, notes, bibliography and index. Well-illustrated.



Norman Polmar is a long-standing naval analyst and author of 57 naval – and intelligence-related books. Lee J. Mathers is a retired naval officer, co-author with Polmar, and researcher for the documentary film *Azorian* and the book of the same title.

*Spy Ships* details the operations of many intelligence collection ships including

those of the US, USSR (and Russia), the UK, the Netherlands, and multiple other nations. Both the Soviets and Americans began developing dedicated intelligence collection ships in the 1950s. In 1991, the Soviets operated about 60 AGIs (the moniker for intelligence collection ships). In addition, the Soviets operated the “world’s largest fleet of oceanographic/hydrographic research ships and Space Events Support Ships (SESS),” that were capable of signals collection, numbering some 200, and which were supplemented by some of the Soviet fishing trawlers that were suspected of cutting some ocean bottom cables. By 2020 the number of Russian AGIs was about a dozen. [78-81]

By contrast, the US during the Cold War operated about two dozen ships for intelligence collection purposes. [ix] The authors detail the operations of many of the US intelligence collectors, including before, during, and after the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), in the Barents and Sea of Japan near Soviet home ports, in the eastern Mediterranean, and along the coasts of

South America and Africa. They trace the evolution of US spy ships from the early conversion of surplus World War II vessels to today’s modern swath-hulled TAGOS ships



US Navy Military Sealift Command (MSC) ocean surveillance ship USNS Effective (T-AGOS 21) sits in dry dock at Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bryan Reckard.

towing the anti-submarine Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS).

Surprising is the number of undersea collisions that have occurred between US Navy and Soviet navy submarines. The authors detail several of these, but the total number remains unknown. There have been several disasters at sea. The Soviets were always quick to blame the US Navy for colliding with its stricken submarine. Polmar and Mathers write about the losses, and causes thereof, of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-219 in October 1986 and the nuclear-powered Oscar-class Kursk (K-141) in August 2000.



A port view of the Soviet Yankee class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine K-219 that was damaged by an internal liquid missile propellant explosion. Three days later the ship sank in 18,000 feet of water.



“Whiskey on the Rocks.” The grounding of the Soviet submarine S-363 on the Swedish coast, 27 October 1981.

In October 1981 a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine (S-363) ran aground near a major Swedish naval base. The incident, which was discovered by Swedish fishermen, became known as “Whiskey on the Rocks” and brought light to the incursions of Soviet submarines into other nations’ territorial waters. While the Swedes released S-363 after several days, a later interview with its captain was revealing:

In January 1993, [Soviet navy] Captain Gushchin stated in a Swedish television interview that he had orders to blow up the submarine if an attempt was made by the Swedes to seize the craft. Other Soviet officers confirmed the direc-

tive to destroy the submarine, and, if necessary, the crew. [Emphasis in the original].


S-363 was determined by the Swedes to be armed with nuclear torpedoes. One analysis concluded that during the 1980s between 17 to 36 submarines penetrated Swedish waters. [84-5]. Added to this are suspected Soviet penetrations along Norway's fjords.

The authors have mined both open source and declassified materials revealing previously unknown details about sea-based intelligence collection operations and, in the case of the US, who managed and operated spy ships and submarines. They identify the relationships of the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office (NURO) and the National Security Agency to the Navy-operated ships and submarines. Many bureaucratic battles were engaged between NSA and the Navy over national versus fleet collection requirements and therefore operations.

*Spy Ships* examines each of the many Soviet (later Russian) AGIs and their world-wide operations, including surveilling US ships off Vietnam and alerting the North Vietnamese of B-52 departures from Guam. The authors recount many instances of aggressive behavior by Soviet ships, including the collision between the HMS Ark Royal and the Soviet destroyer *Bravny* in the Mediterranean in 1970. "The day after that collision, the Soviet government accepted a long-standing invitation from the United States to hold bilateral talks 'on incidents at sea.'" [71. See also Bob Alden, "The Genesis of the Incident at Sea Agreement," *The Intelligencer*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter-Spring 2020.]

Polmar and Mathers recount the *Azorian* operation to recover the Soviet Golf-class submarine (K-129) that sank northwest of Hawaii in August 1968, including details of why the submarine sank and how it was located by the USS *Halibut* (SSN-587). They recount the story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* and detail that it recovered the forward 38 feet of K-129 to include nuclear torpedoes and documents (and what it didn't recover — the warhead of a SS-N-5 Serb ballistic missile). They also reveal that the *Glomar Explorer* was surveilled during its operation by Soviet navy ships, which did not comprehend the underwater operation underway until a press leak about the operation in the

US. [41-4, 122-5. See also, <https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/the-exposing-of-project-azorian/>.] The authors also recount *Halibut's* operations to tap Soviet underwater communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk starting in 1971 until Ron Pelton, a former NSA employee, disclosed the operations to the Soviets in 1980 for \$37,000. [44-8]




HMS Ark Royal in collision with Russian Kotlin guided missile destroyer. November 1970, on board HMS Ark Royal, off Crete, eastern Mediterranean when she collided with a shadowing Kotlin destroyer. Seven Russian sailors were thrown overboard as a result of the collision, five were recovered by Royal Naval boats and two were missing. Ark Royal was holed above the water line in the collision, but was able to continue in the joint Navy-RAF sea exercise 'Lime Jug'. © IWM

The authors examine in detail, devoting an entire chapter, to the attack on the USS *Liberty* (AGTR-5) by the Israelis during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. After examining detailed records they concluded that the attack was the result of a combination of poor Israeli Defense Force (IDF) communications and command and control between the Israeli Navy and Air Force, and the unprofessional "hyper-aggressive attitude" of an on-scene junior naval officer. The US Defense Attaché at the time concluded the attack was the "result of [the] eagerness of [the] IDF Navy to glean some portion of [the] great victory being won by the IDF Army and Air Force." [145] The authors also examine the poor assumptions made by the US in tasking *Liberty* and sending her into a hot war zone. They further convincingly debunk some of the conspiracy theories alleging that the attack was intentional.

Polmar and Mathers dedicate another full chapter to the seizure of the USS *Pueblo* (AGER 2) by North Korea on 23 January 1968. They detail the poor planning by the Navy and the erroneous assumptions that the

North Koreans would not attack a US Navy vessel, which resulted in significant losses in “national intelligence objectives and targets... priorities, and methods... lost were classified manuals and equipment for four cryptologic systems... [and] about 8,000 special intelligence messages.” [191] Due to lack of planning and training the crew had not destroyed all of the classified material on the ship.



A-12 landing at Groom Lake

One interesting side tale is Project Palladium in which the CIA and Air Force tried to determine the vulnerability of the A-12 (CIA version of the SR-71) to the Spoon Rest and Fan Song surface-to-air missile-associated radars provided Cuba by the USSR. Using spoofing signals and calibrated spheres launched from a submarine off Havana, analysts determined the radars could detect and track the A-12. [See also, S. Eugene Poteat, “A Memoir by an S&T Intelligence Officer,” AFIO’s *Guide to the Study of Intelligence*, pp. 142-3. On-line at <https://www.afio.com/publications/Guide/index.html?page=192>.]

*Spy Ships* is a book rich in detail, well-illustrated. The authors admit that compiling this volume was challenging as many countries do not acknowledge operating spy ships and much information remains classified. In the opinion of this reviewer, nonetheless, *Spy Ships* is interesting, well written, and the best book on this topic available.

Peter C. Oleson is senior editor of *Intelligencer* and Editor of *The Guide to the Study of Intelligence*. He is a former associate professor of intelligence studies, University of Maryland University College. He has taught about intelligence extensively on the faculties of CIA University and the National Defense Intelligence College. Prior to his time teaching, he was assistant director of DIA, involved in policy, resource, and acquisition matters. He served as senior intelligence policy advisor to Under SecDef for Policy. Was one of eight charter members of Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service. After leaving government he worked in industry developing defense and intelligence systems.

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## BLOGS, NEWSLETTERS, PODCASTS, WEBSITES WORTH EXPLORING

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### Island Intelligencer

All things espionage with a Hawaiian accent. Spy buffs, current and former intelligence officers, academics, and those who are just intellectually curious will find herein a comfortable nook in which to learn about, comment on, and discuss all things espionage.