AFIO Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the U.S. Intelligence Community

Thirty years ago David Atlee Phillips, a CIA officer concerned over the stinging Pike and Church Committee hearings which condemned intelligence operations—operations conducted at the behest of U.S. Presidents—took early retirement and formed the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers. His mission: to explain to Congress, the Press, and the American people, the important role cautiously weighed and sourced intelligence collection and analysis plays in a nation's security. Two years later, the Association was renamed the Association of Former Intelligence Officers when its headquarters moved to Whittier Ave in McLean, VA where it remains today.

One of the first goals of the Association was to educate Congress, and it did so through testimony at hearings and in personal visits with various committees. In 2005, however, much has changed. Congress and their staffs are knowledgeable, but the American public, in an understandable mood to place blame for...
Chairman’s Message

Peter Earnest
Chairman

I want to take this opportunity to thank all those Life Members for the large number of replies, donations, and thoughtful comments we received to my Life Member Appeal. While Life Membership is no longer offered in lieu of annual dues (to better enable the Association to grow), these members were the original seed that sustained the Association during its early years, and continue to be a vital part of its activities and historical underpinning.

As expressed in my note, your sustained commitment to the Association and its mission is valuable to us, and you showed it with that impression response. We thank you!

Like the Intelligence Community it serves, the composition of AFIO membership has greatly changed, as the chart on page 14 reveals. We now have the majority of our members currently working in active intelligence roles, either in their first career assignments, or back on long-term contracts. The painting of it as a well-planned withdrawal. Is that to be how the world sees us leave Baghdad? How easy is it to predict, this late in the game, with so much at stake to depart gracefully?

What is certain while in the heat of the moment, or even years later in recall, often can still be clouded by the “fog of war.” Much of human experience faces this clouding, and historical accounts vehemently differ as a result.

After several important lead articles by Poteat, Harrison, Anderson, Wheeler and Le Gallo, we present a collection of fascinating first-hand accounts on precisely those moments in Saigon—thirty years ago on April 29—when many of the same decisions had to be made. CIA Chief of Station (Vietnam) Tom Polgar tells of the increasing sense of doom and the inability by some to accept the situation, the urgency required and the difficulty conveying it to a government unwilling to embrace the facts until it was nearly too late to depart. An account by U.S. Marines guarding the embassy, followed by a totally different recall of the situation by Henry Kissinger, shows how fear, embarrassment and distance impacts the assessment of fast-breaking, emotionally charged life-changing events. Richard Hale gives a view from a different perch, followed by three haunting accounts presented in The Guardian (UK) from others who were present.

Enjoy these articles and the large collection of book reviews of professional titles.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PARALYSIS

S. Eugene Poteat
poteat@afio.com

Self-flagellation: A practice that Shia Muslims and Americans have in common; the Shia engage in it for religious reasons, affirming their faith and demonstrating their piety, the Americans engage in it for social reasons, affirming their innocence and demonstrating their victimization.

We now have U.S. media wringing their hands over the personnel shuffles at CIA in a manner that caters to America’s appetite for the follies and foibles of actors, athletes and other celebrities. No other nation dares push its intelligence services through the public sieve as do we.

The current congressional and public outcry stems from purported CIA and FBI intelligence failures to foresee the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the intelligence analysis that got right Iraq’s know-how and capability to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), but then got wrong the conclusion—in-country boasts to the contrary—that ergo propter hoc there must be large stockpiles of WMDs secretly stashed. This major intelligence failure, according to Silberman-Robb WMD Commission, was due to the Intelligence Community’s inability to collect the hard evidence the analysts needed to get it right.

Analysts are often in the position of having to make do without the hard evidence (intelligence collection) which is needed to turn out perfect, on-target analy-

sis; so, they do what they can with what they have—make the best possible estimate. Their institutional estimate for top officials is called a National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, which is nothing more than a thoughtful, cautiously delineated, best judgment based on their intelligence tempered by their expertise. The word “Estimate” says it all. Yet, even the realm of estimates contains pitfalls; the primary one is the trap of mirror-imaging...of assessing situations from the particular perspective of an American, far from the values, views, beliefs, and objectives of the targets of interest.

No other nation’s intelligence services are so preoccupied with analysis from internal sources and personal assessments—other countries focus on collecting their adversary’s secrets directly. Stalin, for example, didn’t bother with analysis. He told his intelligence people to just get the secrets in the Americas’ safes—no analysis was necessary. He valued raw, first-hand intelligence. There is no question that Soviet agents’ collection was successful and Stalin’s conclusions were correct.

The Soviets stole America’s greatest secret of WWII—the atomic bomb—with the result that Stalin knew of the bomb before Truman did. Earlier, Soviet agents had completely infiltrated the Roosevelt administration. Their NKVD and GRU agents were in the White House, the Congress, State Department, Treasury, Justice Department, OSS and the U.S.’s code-breaking operation; they had our secrets in their pockets. By many estimates, their intelligence collection successes in many fields—economic, political, military, technological—kept the flawed Soviet system alive 30 years beyond what otherwise would have been a swifter death from the unreality and untenability of their economy. The CIA did not have a single case officer inside the Soviet Union until well after Francis Gary Power’s U-2 wasdowned in 1960. The reason for this negligence was that the U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Llewellyn Thompson, was afraid that the “dirty business” of spying could jeopardize his sensitive diplomatic mission. The paucity of collection contributed to the poverty of the analysis.

How did we get into this situation? The story begins during WWI. When British intelligence broke the German diplomatic code and revealed the contents of the infamous Zimmermann Telegram to the U.S., and then lured the U.S. into the war on its side, the U.S. had no intelligence capabilities. President Woodrow Wilson said that if the U.S. needed intelligence, we would simply get it from our allies, the British and French. With the Armistice in 1918, Wilson found himself prepared to enter the Paris Peace negotiations. He had no idea what the Europeans were likely to want out of the peace negotiations.

One of Wilson’s advisors suggested he create a group of experts who knew something about Europeans, their aspirations, and especially their desires in negotiations. The group, called the Inquiry, a hastily assembled group of scholars and investigative reporters, was this country’s first attempt at providing strategic or national intelligence to policy makers, in this case to support President Wilson and his entourage at the Paris Peace Conference. Although the Inquiry’s scholars, mostly historians, put together in short order a notable effort, it was ignored by Wilson’s policy makers from the State Department, who saw no need for an independent intelligence assessment, i.e., research and analysis from anyone other than the State Department, with the result that Wilson was far out of his depth with the Europeans in the peace negotiations. Although Wilson never understood the value intelligence had for policy making, he finally came to realize that intelligence was needed not only to plan and win wars, but also to insure peace. Nevertheless, subsequent administrations continued to lack an understanding of the value of intelligence and to disdain its methods.

An egregious and notorious, later example of this naiveté was Congress’s passage of the Communications Act of 1934, possibly under the influence of the State Department, which made it illegal to listen in to others’ communications, including those of the enemy. Notwithstanding this legislative prohibition, the Office of Naval Intelligence proceeded to break the law by continuing to master the art of code breaking and to read the Japanese codes—just in time to save the day in WWII. Walter Lippmann had been a member of the Inquiry, and his later writings in the New York Times reflected these early concepts of strategic intelligence analysis to support policy making. Wilson, Lippmann and the Inquiry were the beginning of the eastern...
liberal establishment’s foothold in strategic intelligence.

The idea of independent intelligence research was resuscitated during WWII in the Office of Strategic Services’s Research and Analysis Branch. One of the analysts in the OSS was Sherman Kent, an academic. Kent knew of America’s earliest involvement in analysis at the end of WWI, and he was familiar with Lippmann’s thought and work. Kent, one of the founding fathers of the CIA in 1947, carried over Lippmann’s concept of intelligence analysis, institutionalizing it in the CIA’s Office of National Estimates—eventually becoming its chief. Thus, America’s overdependence on analysis goes back to the beginning of the CIA in 1947. By 1949, Kent was the accepted national authority on intelligence research and analysis and the guardian of its producers’ relationships with its consumers, i.e., the President and the country’s other top policy and decision makers, such as those in the Department of Defense. Kent codified his understanding of this esoteric subject in 1949 in his seminal book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.

Depicting strategic intelligence as something produced independently by a permanent bureaucratic group of scholars and experts, Kent proposed that they would deliver volumes of encyclopedic expertise about the external world that could be drawn upon by the policy makers when needed. In his Strategic Intelligence, he characterized the relationship between “producers and consumers of intelligence” as “one of utmost delicacy” and “wished above all else to have its findings prove useful in making of decisions.” Kent often used the words “objective scholarship” regarding his analysis unit to emphasize—and also to remind practitioners of analysis—that getting too close to the consumer of intelligence might cause the analysts to slant or color their analyses to accommodate the consumer’s wishes—avoidable only by keeping a wide gap between the two—a practice that supposedly continues to this day. To insure the analysts’ products had value to their consumers, Kent argued that analysts should “bend every effort to obtain guidance from their customer.” To obtain that guidance, Kent advocated that, “Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and not so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment.” To resolve this difficulty, Kent urged analysts to, “...keep trying every known device to make the users familiar with the producers’ organizations, and the producers with the user's organization.” He concluded his work with the admonition to policy makers not to turn their backs “on the two instruments by which Western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizon of knowledge—the instruments of reason and the scientific method.”

Kent’s tome remains widely accepted as the “bible” of strategic intelligence analysis by those in the intelligence analysis business. But then, a small voice was heard that not only challenged the precepts of Kent’s bible, but turned out to be prophetic. Willmoore Kendall, writing in World Politics in July 1949, challenged Kent’s shibboleths and charged that Kent had missed the boat—entirely. Kendall essentially cried out that the emperor had no clothes. A Rhodes Scholar, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois, a tenured professor at Yale, and a life-long student of politics, Kendall wrote that Kent’s doctrine of strategic intelligence was born out of wartime expediency and was absolutely unsuited for a peacetime world wherein the United States found itself in competition with the Soviet Union. “Since it is American policy on which the future of the free world seems to depend, it is high time for the public debate to commence.” Kendall said that Kent’s approach to strategic intelligence was wrongly preoccupied—as appealing as airy conjecture might be—with predicting the future, rather than being responsive to urgent, present needs.

Although Kendall had early leftist leanings and might have been a Trotskyite, he became staunchly anti-Communist after a stint in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. He turned conservative in the 1940s. This was a common conversion among many intellectuals of that era—the honest ones seeing through the sophistry of Communist ideology and the smoke of Soviet propaganda. This background led Kendall, who clearly understood the Soviet threat, to think in terms of America’s need for intelligence on which to act—including intelligence to sustain “the big job—the carving out of United States' destiny in the world as a whole.” Kendall harshly criticized Kent for a “crassly empirical conception of the research process.” Kendall, in contrast, expressed the view that “an intelligence operation built upon a conception of the process in the social sciences that assigns due weight to ‘theory’ as it is understood in economics and sociology, and increasingly one hopes, in politics...” would result therefore in a more accurate and valuable intelligence picture. Here we have the essence of Kendall’s views of intelligence analysis, i.e., that intelligence research should be steeped in knowledge of the social sciences, the foundation for understanding the “otherness” of adversaries. Kendall, in essence, was simply reminding Kent of Sun Tzu’s words 2500 years ago, “know your enemy.”

Kendall was a difficult person, a man who had little tolerance for mortals of lesser intelligence and for bureaucracies—obviously, not one to fit into the CIA establishment. When Kent’s NIEs, in 1962 on Soviet intentions to place offensive missiles in Cuba, in 1975 on Soviet strategic missile forces, and in 1979 on the fall of the Shah of Iran, seriously missed the mark again and again, it became clear that the Kent model for strategic intelligence was not up to the job—as seemed to have been predicted by Kendall. Much has been said and written about the Kent-Kendall debate,
but the poor showing after the debate by the Office of National Estimates seemed to have tipped the scales in favor of Kendall. Though Kendall often shot from the hip, he displayed a deadly accuracy. The past and current failures of analysis underscore the validity of Kendall’s model for intelligence analysis, a methodology based on knowing one’s enemy, how he thinks and what he wants, a model that is even still applicable in today’s war against terrorists.

...intelligence research should be steeped in knowledge of the social sciences, the foundation for understanding the “otherness” of adversaries.

But Kendall’s admonition to get under the skin and into the mind of one’s adversaries was not adopted. The Kent model of intelligence analysis prevailed and underpinned other critical errors of analytical judgment, e.g., the 1950s bomber and missile gap, a contention dispelled by the U-2’s flights which showed that there was no gap. While analysts, in 1973, were struggling at their desks with the technical issues of whether the Soviets could covertly convert their SA-5 anti-aircraft missile into an anti-ballistic missile to skirt the ABM Treaty or whether they would simply cheat on the treaty, the CIA’s technologists went into the field and intercepted the SA-5’s radar signals that confirmed that the Soviets were cheating on the treaty by testing their SA-5 in an ABM mode. Better collection—not better analysis—solved the problem. When Henry Kissinger during treaty negotiations confronted the Soviets over their behavior, they ceased their cheating. Unfortunately, the analytical failures continue, the most recent and notorious of which are the failure to anticipate 9/11 and the assertion that the Iraqis had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction.

What is not so well known, and does not get into the news, is that intelligence analysts have many successes to their credit. There is a clear correlation between good intelligence collection and good intelligence analysis. When analysts have good information provided by the CIA’s clandestine collectors in its Directorate of Operations and technical collection assets—and open sources—the analysis can be based on rock solid evidence. Intelligence analysis is, perforce, based on the inputs it receives from various sources, including the secrets the DO is able to pilfer from reliable and clean-hands sources, and the additional research and judgments of the analysts. Every computer geek knows GIGO (garbage in, garbage out)—good intelligence operates under the same law: good collection in, good analysis out.

The fundamental problem is the DO’s inability to collect urgently needed intelligence from a new type of enemy, transnational and ubiquitous, but one whose whereabouts are unknown and whose communications are undetectable. Mission impossible? Seemingly so. This vacuum of raw material has hampered intelligence analysts, leaving them (and the nation) open to policy mistakes and misstatements. How and why did the Directorate of Operations get into a position where in its reduced size and capabilities do not and can not produce the needed intelligence? Start with waves of Executive branch investigations and Congressional attacks beginning four decades ago. The Church and Pike Committees led to constraints on what the DO could do, whom it could recruit, and how quickly it could respond to national threats, and shackled the slightest initiative.

The CIA was not the only organization attacked by the Church and Pike Committees. The FBI’s counterintelligence budget was cut by twenty-five percent and their CI agents were transferred to pursue crimes that had already been committed rather than remaining assigned to prevent espionage and terrorism, thereby leaving Soviet spies more operating room. The Defense Department’s human intelligence collectors suffered the same fate. These two committees seemed to make the work of the KGB and the GRU easier. The Soviet KGB exacerbated the self-inflicted damage to U.S. intelligence by waging a deception campaign that helped to poison the minds of Americans and friendly foreigners against the CIA and its DO by planting false stories about it around the globe.

Buying into one of these old propa- ganda lies, Oliver Stone’s movie JFK, using Jim Garrison’s absurd interpretation of the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, were both based on an off-cited KGB false story planted in an Italian Communist magazine that implicated the Agency in the Kennedy assassination. Later, the KGB circulated a falsehood that the CIA was in cahoots with the kidnappers of babies in South America to obtain their organs for transplants to people in the U.S. For good measure, the KGB propagandists threw in additional piffle that CIA was pushing drugs in Watts, Los Angeles. One has to hand it to the Soviet writers—stirring the pot with all the right ingredients for a naïve U.S. audience was their specialty. U.S. newspapers were filled with outrage, which spilled into Congress, demanding that all CIA activities be investigated and reinved.

The constraints on the DO began further limiting its ability to provide analysts with needed data. The DO’s inputs to the analysts declined further when Jimmy Carter—the first President to politicize the DCI’s position—displayed his discomfiture with CIA and the “dirty business of spying,” with a number of appointments that echoed the view that “gentlemen don’t read other gentlemen’s mail.” Carter bought into the idea that the unpleasant necessities of human spying could be avoided...that technology could do it all, and leave one with clean hands: no more recruitment of and disreputable intercourse with shady, unsavory, disaffected, and disloyal foreigners—diplomats, soldiers, and unspeakable spies—to supply stacks of stolen and suspect secrets. Carter appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence with the specific charge to turn the Agency away from the dirty “agent” side of the business and to focus on technical means of collection. Turner’s belief in techno-wizardry was rock solid. Although he knew that it was no panacea for intelligence collection, yet he went along with Turner’s view since collection by technical means could, and did, have some positive benefits. The problem with technical collection, by such means as satellites, is that their capabilities are not a secret, and so they are vulnerable to countermeasures and deception. Carter’s anti-HUMINT
bias resulted in the emasculation of agent recruitment by the Agency’s DO.

This over-reliance on technology and the inability to understand the need for the patient development of human sources, including unsavory and infamous persons, gained further unfortunate footing with Clinton’s selection of John Deutch as DCI. Deutch, responding to the demands of Congress, the White House, and the public, wiped out the DO’s ability to collect the secrets that the analysts needed, restricting its clandestine collectors from dealing with “unsavory” characters—sending out new requirements that only “nice people” who had secrets to sell be recruited. When valuable raw intelligence vanished because there were not enough “nice” people who were unhappy with unstable and or dangerous countries, had access to these countries’ secrets, and were willing to take the risks of passing their information to the U.S., American intelligence analysts were left to their own local resources, mostly open sources, in composing critical NIE’s. No wonder they missed the boat on 9/11, or as others have put it, didn’t have enough dots to connect. One of the old-line DO operatives from the days before the Congress tied CIA’s hands put it another way, “Estimating is what you do when you don’t know and can’t find out.”

The complex difficulty of fixing the collection-analysis problem is apparent daily as newspapers report with surprise at the departures of some senior CIA officials. Are we making things worse with these rapid and sweeping changes? The loyalty of insiders clouds the issue. Many unhappy voices are merely stating solidarity with colleagues whose careers are cut short by the sweeping changes. Anxiety over their own security compounds the din. Many are wary of the forced Congressional solution to reorganize intelligence, particularly because reorganization as the sole solution was sold to the public with great fanfare through an impressive public relations campaign before its content was released and without being subjected to any study and debate.

Others recognize that the current DirCIA, Porter Goss, may be making necessary, yet painful, changes to fix a system that increasingly produces feckless, flawed, or flimsy analyses. Few appreciate what Goss is doing since he isn’t performing in public and has chosen not to appear on the TV news talk shows to explain why he seems to be focusing on changes in the Directorate of Operations. The close and essential connection between collectors and analysts seems to be too arcane for pundits and the public to comprehend. After all, if analysts got it wrong, why are collectors the ones being asked to take retirement? Many claim that this is throwing out the baby with the bathwater, but there is historical precedence. President Roosevelt did the same after Pearl Harbor, skipping over top generals and admirals to put younger ones in charge. And he won the war.

The intelligence analysis process demands the best of raw intelligence inputs from both technical and human sources. The orders for the cutbacks in human sources that are essential to good analysis came from the same Congressional panels and policy makers who now are demanding that the intelligence problem be fixed by doing better, more objective analysis. To rescue American intelligence, the DO—the very foundation of the intelligence structure—needs to be rebuilt; hence, the need for a number of replacements. Goss, with his wealth of experience as a DO clandestine case officer and as Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, knows what has to be done, and he has moved quickly to reinvigorate the DO. He expects to see the pay-off in terms of better analysis from the Directorate of Intelligence; analysis that lives up to the standards that William Moore Kendall urged decades ago—solid, reliable assessments based on the knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of the foreign targets’ interests, not on the mindset of desk-bound Americans believing that their open-source material and personal view points have it right. Certainly, there are those within the DO ranks who know terrorism and know how to work against terrorists. Goss’s challenge is to articulate and communicate his mission and objectives to these mid-ranking officers, to remove restrictions on their work, and to increase their reliance on deep, non-official cover rather than rely on liaison services.

The recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions, other than signaling the public that attention has been drawn to the problem, are unlikely to result in better collection and analysis. Nor will the Congressional and administration mandated changes in management superstructure, reshuffled budget authorities, and who briefs the President address the problem. Not only are these changes—that are at best marginally related to the problem—unlikely to improve intelligence collection and analysis, they have the potential for making matters worse. For example, further restricting the dialogue between the President and the DCI—the only one in the chain of command with first-hand, inside knowledge of clandestine operations and the responsibility for improving intelligence collection and analysis—could deny the President the benefits that come only from face-to-face exchanges between policy and intelligence. While the resolution of who in the Intelligence Community will do what in information sharing, analysis, and reporting is needed, only better intelligence collection from reinvigorated clandestine sources and technical services can provide the basis for improved analysis. How successful Goss will be in restoring collection inputs into intelligence analysis depends on whether the Congress, White House, and especially the public—all informed and understanding—demand that changes be made that support rather than destroy the possibility of improvement. Indeed no intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism or law enforcement organization will ever be effective at eliminating the threats to our way of life without the trust and support from a well informed and educated public—which is AFIO’s mission.

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The writer is a retired CIA intelligence officer, and serves as President of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

"Nations get on with one another, not by telling the truth, but by lying gracefully.” —H.L. Mencken
The danger in today's intense focus on improving information sharing in homeland security protection is that the term will be taken too literally. The number of organizations engaged and the volume of information generated is so great that providing more data to more people, in the interest of better “information sharing,” will not resolve underlying sharing issues, and is likely to make them worse. Compounding the volume problem is the largely vertical orientation of homeland security components, each guided by its own chain-of-command, established missions, and interest-driven imperatives. The seams between them are the proverbial cracks into which observed anomalies can fall enroute to becoming intelligence failures. They are also barriers to the constant and focused interaction needed to prevent those cracks from defining the intelligence process.

It is much too simplistic to ascribe our information sharing weaknesses to failures of dissemination: that if only a report available to Person or Organization A had gotten in time to Person or Organization B action could have been taken to avoid catastrophe. Often, perhaps more often, the indicative information was available to key people who were not able to recognize its portent, chose to discount it, or simply never got to it. To a significant extent, their lapses reflect the limitations imposed, often unconsciously, by the operational contexts in which they work, where competing priorities, objectives, and expectations will unavoidably color evaluation of information received and the situation at hand.

What makes effective intelligence analysis and support so difficult is that available hard data is rarely sufficient to permit high confidence determination as to what's going to happen (if anything), who's going to do it, where and when. In the good old Cold War days, we could watch the massive Soviet military establishment with our national technical means, and know when something might be afoot. In the current era, we are dealing with single or small numbers of individuals skulking around the world using the weave of our social and economic fabric for cover. The upshot is that it is much harder to tell whether or not a piece of information obtained by one or another intelligence or enforcement organization is significant enough to warrant sharing and with whom to share it. Automatic sharing of everything with everybody is clearly not the answer; that would simply make the haystack much larger, without making the needles more apparent, particularly when there is often no universal agreement as to what the needles look like.

The combination of fragmentary, ambiguous information and the noise introduced by an enormous intelligence-enforcement infrastructure that processes and reacts to it creates a perfect storm. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to believe that we will one day be able to completely eliminate either of these problems. Homeland security will always involve large numbers of diverse organizations generating and sifting enormous volumes of data, very little of which of is of agreed significance and indisputably actionable. What we can do, however, is to mitigate the storm’s
centrifugal forces that make cooperation more difficult.

A mission-centric approach to structuring the operating relationships among intelligence support and law enforcement components offers a promising way to transcend organizational stovepipes. Implementation would occur in the virtual environment of secure digital networks and state-of-the-art information technology that now exist or are already under development in the national homeland security infrastructure.

Information sharing communities would be structured to reflect operational targets or missions rather than participating organizations. The targets/missions, large and small, permanent and transitory, would mirror the operational responsibilities and concerns of the homeland security community. One community might focus, for example, on security of the Mexican border, another on container shipments into East Coast ports, a third on narcotics trafficking into the Detroit area.

- A mission-centric information sharing community would comprise those people, across the spectrum of participating organizations, whose expertise, duties, and insights could contribute to effective performance of the designated mission. Relationships would extend beyond the Federal arena to encompass appropriate state and local organizations.

- Each active community would be coordinated by the organization(s) bearing statutory or operational responsibility for the target or mission it covers. Participating organizations would assign to it their sub-elements and personnel most appropriate to that coverage and to its own responsibilities. Every community would have direct participation by both enforcement and intelligence support agencies.

- Mission-centric communities would be realized as distinct virtual entities supported by an array of collaborative interaction tools that would enable members to exchange information and views, in a variety of media, on a one-to-one or one-to-many basis. Participating individuals, identified by name, would be assigned to their communities on a long term basis to foster active working relationships among analysts, law enforcement officers, and management decisionmakers across organizational boundaries.

Pooling analytical resources across organizational boundaries should yield important synergistic benefits. No organization disseminates all of the information it collects, partly because of time and expense, but mostly because the information’s significance (if any) and operational value are not apparent or cannot be determined. Much of it, therefore, is known only to people within the organization that acquired it. Providing convenient and secure facilities for those individuals to share insights and information, as well as to collectively address observed anomalies, can yield more useful analysis of situational ambiguities and potential developments. Including in the community both intelligence analysts and operational managers should provide the latter better support in determining the nature and timing of action to be taken.

There are two concerns likely to be raised in connection with mission-centric information sharing communities. The first has to do with the potential for management failure, improper actions, or plain confusion caused by the apparent blurring of organizational boundaries and chains-of-command, particularly where operating authorities and intelligence support personnel are interacting in the same context. An obvious deterrent to such occurrences would be a strict regulation precluding use of an information sharing medium for transmission, by anybody, of operational taskings or assignments. In endorsing the concept, the leaders of the Homeland Security and Intelligence Communities would have to decide that the benefits of mission-centric information sharing substantially outweigh its potential pitfalls. Their continuing support would be needed to prevent the gradual imposition of restrictions that could ultimately render the communities useless.

The second major area of concern will be security: the protection of ongoing investigative and enforcement operations and of intelligence sources and methods. The communities’ transverse membership structure and information flow patterns will raise flags, particularly given the proposed inclusion of state and local agencies. In fact, however, security protection features incorporated in the proposed virtual community architecture would be at least equal to those currently operative in comparable DoD Intelligence Community, and Homeland Security networked systems. They would provide for centralized administration of internetwork accesses, personal authentication of individual users, monitoring and recording of member online activity. The services facility that supported these functions would also provide for the maintenance of data bases relevant to a community’s interests and serve as a secure portal for its interaction with outside entities and sources of new information.

Mission-centric virtual communities are not new, either in concept or implementation. The National Counter Terrorist Center, itself a mission-centric community, has created an on-line adjunct. The Department of Defense, in prosecuting and supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, makes remarkable use of such communities in tactical command and control, surveillance and intelligence operations. Several years ago, two junior Army officers created civilian Internet websites called Companycommand.com and Platoonleader.org. They are successful, mission-centric communities, their mission being to provide a forum in which young officers can help one another be better company commanders and platoon leaders.

These examples reflect operating models that differ in specifics from one another, and from the concept discussed in this article, because their missions and underlying contexts vary. What they have in common is that they make their users and participants more effective by enabling them to work together in an environment driven by common missions and objectives rather than by a rigid organizational system.

FREDERICK HARRISON has had an extensive Intelligence Community career, devoted principally to multi-agency information sharing initiatives. He holds ONI’s Neilsen Award, NSA’s Rowlett Trophy, CIA’s Career Medal, the Vice President’s Hammer Award, and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement.
Symposium—continued from page 1

cells already within our borders, hidden or using the cloak of religious tolerance and freedom, are counting on America’s openness and diversity to blind us to their intentions to seek the annihilation of all “infidels” or nonbelievers, while publicly downplaying these ideas to the trusting American public, hesitant to speak ill of religious-appearing groups with political agendas.

AFIO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYMPOSIUM AND CONVENTION 2005

The NEW Federal Bureau of Investigation—Its new National Security Service, Intelligence Directorate and Counterterrorism Division

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2005

1015 – 1200 – Chapter Workshop – restricted to current and prospective Chapter representatives, conducted by AFIO VP for Chapters Emerson Cooper. No cost, but must register.


1145-1300 – Luncheon with Paul Sperry, “Islamic Extremists, ‘Muslim Terrorists’ and Political Correctness in America” [invited]

1300 - 1450 – Intelligence Books Panel – Paul Sperry, Judith Pearson, Stephen Budiansky, Ann Blackman, Nigel West [confirmed]

1420 – 1520 – David W. Stady, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, FBI – “New Counterintelligence Techniques for the Expanded Bureau Roles”

1540 – 1610 – John Pistole, Deputy Director, FBI – “In Summary - Counterterrorism / Counterintelligence at the FBI - Overview of Many New Directions”

All Day – FBI Recreation Association Store will have satellite outlet at the meeting

All Day – World Trade Center Private Exhibit - just opened; unavailable to the general public

Optional Evening Reception....

Departure for International Spy Museum - Zola Restaurant [for those who have selected the Spy Museum Reception]

1645 – 1930 – Chairman’s Reception at the International Spy Museum. AFIO Chairman [Spy Museum Executive Director] Peter Earnest host.

International Spy Museum Reception includes hors d’oeuvres in private reception room of Zola’s Restaurant. Museum’s large gift shop will remain open the first hour. Will NOT include tour of Museum.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2005

Conférence Center, Sheraton-Premiere Hotel

0830 - 1000 General Membership Meeting - President, Sr. VP & Executive Director

1015 - 1200 – Chapter Workshop – restricted to current and prospective Chapter representatives, conducted by AFIO VP for Chapters Emerson Cooper. No cost, but must register.

END OF SYMPOSIUM and CONVENTION
Prelude: These are interesting times for those that follow the twists and turns of our intelligence policies. Every day brings new developments. Yesterday, for example the Negropointe/Hayden nominations were approved, with Hayden giving some insights on what went wrong on the Iraq estimate. Also yesterday, the President’s Commission on Intelligence criticized the CIA and FBI plans to retool and improve their organizations. What will tomorrow bring? Interesting but hard on the poor columnist, like myself, who finds that anything he writes, becomes quickly dated unless it is written five minutes before publication.

One question that occurs to me is: if all current and projected changes to the intelligence community had been in place before the Iraq Estimate, would that estimate have been more accurate? Unlike, in my view. Creating more superstructure doesn’t necessarily create better analysis and new sounder information.

IC Market Report: Just read an item called “Cold Cases,” by Dennis Drabele in the book review section of the Sunday 6 March 2005, Washington Post in which he wrote

The reputation of polar explorers is so variable that it may help to think of them as stocks. Judging by a pair of new books, Scott is up, Peary has fallen to a new low, and Cook, once thought of as all but worthless, is rallying.

It struck me that may be a good way to look at the US intelligence community (IC). One might say that it is a bull market for the agencies, especially for growth, and we have two major mergers afoot. CIA, DIA, FBI and NSA might equate to big board stocks (NYSE) and the others to NASDAQ equities.

The Agency: CIA had a good, though much shrouded public image in its early years, then reached a low point later, perhaps bottoming out at the time of the Church Committee. It climbed back gradually and then with a rush in the 1990s as it endorsed openness and had good roles in TV series and movies. Subsequently, it dropped a few points with the Ames case but was helped by the popularity of cigar smoking, good guy, Director Tenet, soared to new heights during the Afghan campaign, and maintained a good level until deep into the Iraq operations when it slowly became apparently the Saddam did not have big stocks of nerve agents, biological weapons, or any kind of a viable nuclear weapons program.

Although the Iraq estimate was an IC judgement, CIA took the image hits for the unhappy estimate. It more lost ground when Tenet’s “Slam Dunk” statement was widely publicized, and dropped more points with the publication of the September 11 Committee report. At the moment, it doesn’t look like a good investment as various newspaper columnists point out the morale is low, and that Director Goss has politicized the Agency by bringing over a batch of politically oriented personnel from Congress and putting them in senior positions while ousting many of the old time professionals. Also, the new Director of National Intelligence is said to be eating CIA lunch by taking over the daily briefing of the President, taking over estimates, and reportedly, is about to hire a couple thousand analysts. With Defense apparently getting into clandestine operations in a bigger way, and the FBI moving into overseas operations. CIA may be at a market low.

But not all the news is bad for the Agency, and it may hold it market value at a steady though lower level. It is doing well budget wise and has been ordered to hire more analysts and operations officers. Only time will tell how it works out, and it may do quite well as Director Goss, an experienced intelligence hand, now relieved of many of the onerous daily duties, can concentrate, especially, on strengthening clandestine operations. Market Advice: Reduce holdings.

The Bureau: FBI (until recently, primarily a law enforcement agency) has certainly had its ups and downs too. Glorified in its early years by bringing down famous gangsters and by adroit public affairs) its stock set a new high right from the start. Recent years were less kind as the Hanson case, the failure of a costly computer
system, and the failure to prevent the 11 September attacks have lowered the stock value. It too has expanded its asset base and has diversified. Market Advice: Hold.

Defense Intelligence: DIA has, wisely in my view, largely managed to stay out of the limelight from its inception, a policy inaugurated by its first Director, LTG Carroll. It had to tread lightly at first as it was created over objections and resistance from the Services. Avoiding criticism and building it asset base with its large, fairly new headquarters, improved communications and computerization, and better training it has shown, up until now, a solid, steady growth—a good dividend issue. Gradually, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense increasingly got into the intelligence business, moving sideways into the game through C3 (Command, Control, Communication) and then more directly as it established intelligence offices and currently ending up with an Undersecretary for Intelligence with, of course, a substantial staff. Moreover, it was announced yesterday that the Pentagon wants to consolidate all eight of its intelligence agencies under one four star general—a Super Defense Intelligence Organization (this was sort of what was intended for DIA in the first place). What with the new DNI, a Defense Undersecretary for Intelligence, plus a Deputy Undersecretary, and possibly a four star Chief of Defense Intelligence, DIA's stock appears to be slipping. Market Advice: Sell!

No Such Agency: NSA managed to get by with virtually no public image at all until recent years. Now we have Glavnost big time at the Agency. Deep into retooling to cope with burgeoning communications traffic, one might consider it a growth stock, but there some questions. First off, its CEO is leaving after doing a credible job, and moving to become number two at the Office of National Intelligence (or whatever it will be called). Having an expert on NSA matters at the right hand of the DNI might be good, but perhaps, not so good for NSA's in house ability to make and carry out its own decisions. More critical, is the extremely difficult job of trying to monitor the world's communication without getting buried under by the massive increases in traffic—not to mention all the wide band fibre optic cables, which to this writer, appear to pose formidable problems. Market Advice: Limited buy.

I’ll leave the NASDAQ agencies for another time although they all appear capable of some upward movement.

New Offering: One IPO is coming up—the Office of the Director for National Intelligence. This organization will face enormous turf battles, budget battles, and infighting. It will need strong White House and Congressional support to function well. Despite these problems, there is a strong possibility of upward movement here. This looks like a solid investment as a growth stock. Market Advice: Buy!

Disclaimer: This market analysis was written on 23 March. Stocks might rise or fall further depending on developments that transpire between now and the publication date.

Predicting: The Intelligence reorganization bill requires CIA to build several checks into its analysis procedures—to avoid forecasts such as the one on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Now (mid-December 2004) there are some Congressional pressures to extend these requirements to the entire Intelligence Community. Several of these measures may be useful, however, some of the procedures were already established since 9-11, such as Red Team analyses. Others, such as a quality control office, might be superfluous or even a step backward. Too many checks, balances, and rechecks, could slow down the process of evaluating intelligence, refining it, and getting it out to consumers.

Determining the current situation is difficult enough, given a secretive and security-minded target, but predicting the future, as estimates must do, will always be chancy business and 100 percent accuracies rarely can be achieved. Consider that, in the 1970s, climatologists who had enormous quantities of solid data available to them, were worried about global cooling. For thirty years, these data showed that world temperatures had slowly but steadily dropped and scientists were saying that something must be done or we would enter another ice age. Their predictions, according to many and perhaps most present climatologists, were 180 degrees off course and global warming, not cooling, is the dire threat (On 23 December 2004, shortly after I wrote the above, George Will discussed those global cooling predictions at some length. He also mentioned that, contrary to the other evidence of a warming trend, glaciers in Iceland are growing).

Classification: I note that DCI Porter Goss once voiced his concern over classification, namely (I don't remember his exact words) that it was badly done, and over done. I believe that almost everyone in the intelligence community has long ago come to the same conclusion. I mention “almost” everyone because I recall one guardian of compartment documents who firmly believed that no one, even cleared personnel should have access to this material. If no one saw, it read it, handled it, it was secure. The fact that it was then useless, despite having been gathered at great cost, made no impression on him. Security was the first, foremost and sole objective. Doubtless there were or are others of the same persuasion.

Otherwise, it is generally agreed that too much is classified and too much is classified at higher levels than is warranted. During my years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there were many times I and my colleagues did not use compartmented intelligence because an answer was needed “now” and getting the special documents with, perhaps, useful data, would take far too long. It would arrive far too late. Time and inconvenience greatly limited its use. To a lesser degree, this was also true of all classified information. On occasion, under time pressure, I added sections to the Secretary's briefing books from open sources, even though Secret or Top Secret material on these sections were available—somewhere if one had the time to find it—and likely were more extensive or more detailed. I've had to do this even with such items as a foreign country's order of battle (on two occasions for the Vice President's books). One of the issues here was that, even though action officers in OSD were cleared for the special material, our safes were not and thus the material had to be picked up each day and returned each evening. Not handy at all when one was gyrating at top speed.

One basic problem affecting over classification is a system whereby an analyst, case officer, or desk officer is never reprimanded for over classifying a report but could be in hot water from under classifying one. So, when even the slightest doubt exists, use the higher classification.

The over classification problem can
never be completely resolved, but there are some measures that can be taken to reduce it. First and foremost, security officers should to be charged with, not just overseeing the security of various information but also briefing on, charged with, and graded on fitness reports on ensuring that unclassified information is not uncritically and automatically stamped with various classifications, and if stamped, it is not done at a higher level than necessary. After all, the less classified matter there is in circulation, the better it is likely to be protected.

The second measure is that new compartments of classified data should be extremely limited and previously compartmented information put into regular channels whenever feasible. Thus, Top Secret Codeword would become Top Secret and more available to users.

**Special Forces and the AR:** First off, I had best establish that I really don't know whether Special Forces should be considered part of the intelligence framework. In fact I stopped trying to define intelligence long ago. I do know that some fifteen agencies make up the formal intelligence community and various and sundry mavens in this field name up to twenty-one agencies that belong under this rubric. Maybe the Library of Congress should be number twenty two. Anyhow, US Special Forces do carry out many activities that are best defined as covert action. Because of the nature of these actions, the rifle/carbine has become a more important part of their armament than it generally is with regular forces where artillery, mortars, missiles, and rockets, cause many enemy casualties. In any case, the venerable M-16/AR-15 has greatly improved over the years (remember when we heard of how it broke down, misfired, jammed and other horror stories during the Vietnam War, and how some of our troops preferred to use captured AK-47s) becoming a highly reliable weapon. Recently is has been improved even more and now comes in a variety of calibers including heavier 5.56 caliber bullets and the newer 6.5 Grendal, .68 SPC, .448 SOCOM, and .50 Beowulf (someone in the ammunition business must have been impressed by their freshman English Literature course). So the Special Forces have a wide selection. The last two, I understand, are powerful (334-grain bullets for the .50), shorter range cartridges primarily for use in carbines. Needless to say, there are many new optical and other attachments that make the AR even more effective. There are two articles in the March 05 Guns&Ammo magazine for those interested in learning more about AR developments.

While on the subject of weapons, here's one more note for our many readers who are interested in arming the case officer. Kahr Arms, a firm that has specialized in small lightweight, concealed carry pistol, is producing a new polymer .45 (the KP4543) that weighs 17 oz. and has a match grade barrel and a six round magazine. Sounds like a good weapon for anyone desiring a lightweight weapon in a heavy caliber. One caution, because of the low weight, it might be a tad difficult to control when loosing off several rounds. I have looked at other Kahr models (never fired one) and they seem to me to be well made. ☏

A tyrant...is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader. — Plato

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**AFIO National 2005**
**Special Events and Speaker Programs IN BRIEF**

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**AFIO at Tanglewood 13 August 05**

In the beautiful Berkshire Hills of Western Massachusetts, the Boston Symphony Orchestra held their well-known annual concert which included an All-Mozart Program and an evening of All That Jazz conducted by Keith Lockhart. Family, friends and AFIO colleagues of Boston-based AFIO Board Director Albano Ponte arrived from New England and New York to celebrate this purely social engagement.

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**Summer Luncheon - 28 July 05**
**Mike Scheuer and Steve Coll**

"Between Iraq and a Hard Place — the CIA, Islamic Militants, and the problematic Middle East" was the theme of the well-subscribed summer luncheon. The turnout, in fact, was so large—almost 300—that it required the hotel to move another group to other quarters, to allow us to have three contiguous large rooms – and even those were crowded.

Speaking first, in a spirited ‘take-no-prisoners’ presentation, was former CIA officer and now un-"anonymous" Michael F. Scheuer, former head of CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit until 1999 and author of IMPERIAL HUBRIS: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. He provided a needed eye-opening examination of what
is wrong in the way we are approaching
the al Qaeda/Taliban issues—and how the
funding and tasking was— and might still
be done—in the community.

Following lunch, Steve Coll - Pulitzer
prize winning author, associate editor of
the Washington Post - spoke on his years
of tours, activities and research for his
prize-winning book: GHOST WARS: The
Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan,
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion
to September 10, 2001 which won a 2005
Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction. The
book used numerous interviews with Mike
Scheuer, Gary Schroen, and other Agency
officers who worked on Afghanistan and/
or Iraq operations.

For the first time, AFIO released
streaming audio of the program online
for all members to enjoy. It can be found
at: http://www.afio.com/sections/event_sched-
ule/05_july_28_luncheon_audio.htm

AFIO AT THE POPS
11 JUNE 2005 - THIRD ANNUAL
AFIO/BOSTON POPS EVENING
“RED, WHITE AND BLUE”

On Saturday June 11th Boston-area
AFIO members and friends gathered again
at Boston’s Symphony Hall to hear the
Boston Pops Orchestra perform a medley
of patriotic songs under the direction of
Keith Lockhart. AFIO Board Member Al
Ponte, and teammate Gary Wass arranged and hosted
the event for local Boston
and New England members able to attend
this upbeat, spirited outing. Thank you Al
and Gary!

Charles S. Robb’s talk. Robb, Co-Chair-
man, WMD Commission [Silberman-Robb
Commission] also explained why the
report devotes little time on what intelli-
gence did right, and focused on 9/11 as an
“intelligence failure” rather than a failure
of policy to accept and act on numerous
warnings given to it by several agencies. I.
C. Smith, former Special-Agent-In-Charge,
FBI, discussed material from his new book:
Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling Inside
the FBI. Thaddeus Holt, lawyer and former
Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, spoke
on Military Deception in WWII. His book,
The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the
Second World War, received unusually strong
praise by U.K. and U.S. reviewers.

WINTER LUNCHEON
14 JANUARY 2005
PHILIP ZELIKOW
AND GEORGE FRIEDMAN

“The Political Tug-
of-War over
Money and
Power - The
Intelligence
Community
Restructure
Battle” was
the theme
of Philip D.
Zelikow’s
(Executive
Director, 9/11
Commission
- National
Commission
on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States) talk to a
standing-room-only crowd. He laid out the
myriad problems the Commission faces
with adoption of its findings and what he
foresees in a restructuring of the intel-
gen community. Earlier that morning,
Dr. George Friedman, Founder/Chairman
of Stratfor, Strategic Forecasting, Inc.,
author of the riveting America’s Secret War:
The Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between
the United States and Its Enemies discussed
“Islamic Terrorist Extremism - Abroad
and Within - Europe’s Late Awakening.”
He displayed an unusual clarity in picking
out the salient sources that have given his
reports uncanny accuracy and coinage in
Washington circles.

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g/11, has joined the chant that this was an “intelligence failure.” A mantra many repeat with conviction but little understanding of its falsehood.

As Dave Phillips said of similar claims in 1975, and as AFIO says today, it was not an “intelligence failure.” g/11 was a failure of intelligence “policy”—a policy set by Congress, by courts, and various Administrations. The decades of such policies brought layer upon layer of legislative restrictions, hand-tying limitations, inappropriate political or economic correctness, and odd skittishness over offending those blatantly intending to do us harm. Examples of this came out in post-g/11 hearings—from the protection of Saudi co-conspirators, letting them slip quietly out of the country, to the inability to examine the laptop of terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, to the insistence that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda despite no evidence. These policies effectively suffocate risk-taking, creativity, and imagination...traits that became risky career breakers in the 1980s and ’90s, yet expected by the post-g/11 committees.

The USA PATRIOT Act and new Visa and Passport requirements, and – let’s hope – serious protection of our borders, give hope that some of these policies will be reversed to counter growing dangers we face. AFIO’s role remains the advising and encouragement of young students anticipating careers in this field, and in the explaining of current and historical intelligence issues told from the rare viewpoint of the actual intelligence practitioner. Through publications, seminars, career advice, internships, and referrals, the Association continues its role where the needs are greatest...as a beacon and conduit for the intelligence officers of tomorrow, meeting the career officials of today. We welcome those who join to learn, to educate, and to encourage others who wish to serve the country in this crucial but frequently misunderstood field.
AFIO chapters are autonomous local groups granted permission to use the AFIO name, who form and thrive often based on the efforts and enthusiasms of a few dedicated, energetic local members. While all members of chapters must be current members of the National association in Virginia, the local chapters set their own dues and conduct their own programs. To remain certified, chapters must hold three or more meetings a year, elect officers annually, and every January supply to the National Headquarters a list of current chapter officers and members.

If no chapter is listed below for your area, and you possess the drive to start one, our Vice President for National Chapters, Emerson Cooper, can guide you through the assessment and formation process. He can be reached at sinon@worldnet.att.net. Chapters need 15 to 20 seed members to begin the process. Many areas have that number or more [the National Office will search membership records by zip-codes], but lack that individual willing to undertake the formation and maintenance duties. Those who have done so, however, will tell you that it is satisfying to see a chapter grow, and witness the favorable educational impact it can have on the local community curious to learn more about intelligence, counterterrorism, and homeland security.

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Chapters Activities in Recent Months

The Rocky Mountain Chapter met on July 21st at the Officers Club's Falcon Room, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Co. to hear Col. Stewart Pike, Special Forces Commander in the Horn of Africa for several years.

On September 29th, the Rocky Mountain Chapter met at the USAF Academy's Officers Club's to hear Captain (Ret) Bill Fernow, USN who served as CO on a nuclear submarine. Contact Richard Durham, phone number 719-488-2884, or e-mail at: riverweary3@aol.com if you wish to join the chapter or hear more about their upcoming programs.

The new acting President of the Rocky Mountain Chapter is John W. McMichael at nrg8@aol.com. We welcome him to the new post. A profile appears in this issue of a former Rocky Mountain President, Dr. Derrin Smith.

The Florida Ted Shackley Miami Chapter had a Thursday, April 28th dinner in Coral Gables at Casa Bacardi / Olga-Carlos Saladrigas Hall, Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami in conjunction with The Institute. The event feted Don Bohning, on his new book, “The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965.” Bohning graduated from the Dakota Wesleyan University in 1955. He spent two years in the United States Army before attending University in 1955. He spent two years in

The Florida Satellite Chapter regularly hosts luncheons at Eau Gallie Yacht Club, Indian Harbour Beach, FL. Speakers vary. If you are in the area, please join them for the social hour and luncheon. To register, contact Barbara E. Keith, President, at bobbie6769@juno.com.

The Florida Suncoast Chapter is scheduling new events. To hear more about their activities in the Tampa Bay area, contact H. Patrick Wheeler, CIA (Ret), the chapter President, at lobhigh@tampabay.rr.com.

The Northern Florida Chapter out of Jacksonville always welcomes new members. For details on joining this chapter or to hear of their upcoming events, contact Quiel Begonia at begonia@coj.net.

The Jim Quesada San Francisco Bay Chapter hosted cocktails and luncheon on June 16th at the United Irish Cultural Center. The featured speaker was Dr. Barton Bernstein, Professor of History, Stanford University, on “Intelligence, the Atomic Bomb & the End of WWII.” Dr. Barton Bernstein is an expert on Oppenheimer and the Manhattan Project and focused on the creation of the Atomic Bomb, the A bomb's role in ending WWII, and the role intelligence played in ending WWII. Relying heavily on declassified materials, Bernstein analyzed selected aspects of the WWII experience, including information little known or unknown in the United States.

by Augusto Pinochet in Chile, the 1978 Jonestown Massacre in Guyana and the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1979. Bohning has also written extensively about the Bay of Pigs and the attempts to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. A welcome was delivered by Jaime Suchlicki, Director of the Institute, and the Presenter was Juan Tamayo, senior correspondent, Miami Herald.

The Florida Palm Beach Chapter will soon be reactivating and holding more events. If you are visiting or now live in the area and haven’t joined, now might be the time to contact: F. W. Rustmann, Jr., President, at 561.655.3111 or at fwr@ctctntl.com.

The Florida Suncoast Chapter is regularly hosting luncheons at Eau Gallie Yacht Club, Indian Harbour Beach, FL. Speakers vary. If you are in the area, please join them for the social hour and luncheon.

The new acting President of the Rocky Mountain Chapter is John W. McMichael at nrg8@aol.com. We welcome him to the new post. A profile appears in this issue of a former Rocky Mountain President, Dr. Derrin Smith.

Levchenko was born in Moscow in 1941. Graduated special elite school with intense learning of English. In 1964 graduated Moscow State University with degree in Japanese language and Japanese history. Several years worked in the Soviet Peace Committee and Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Both organizations were active hands of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CC CPSU. Its functions were: ideological control over Soviet foreign policy, coordination of actions of the foreign Communist parties, secret contacts and full support of foreign “national liberation movements”, invitation its leaders to the Soviet Union for consultations on armed struggle against “colonial” regimes mainly in countries in American sphere of influence. The most active subversive actions were conducted in the Middle East. The International department had close ties with practically every Palestinian organization, providing them with arms and money. In this respect International Department was even more

of Germany’s surrender to the Allies and last month, August 2005, was the anniversary of Japan’s surrender to the Allies. Security rules during WWII blocked the flow of information, often appropriately, but sometimes not. Looking back after 60-65 years permitted the reexamination of WWII’s past and to consider, among other issues, how the war and the enemy were understood in 1941-1945 and how US policy was predicated on that sometimes flawed wartime understanding. Dr. Bernstein earned his PhD at Harvard University and has been at Stanford since 1965. He has written six books, 135 essays, and has given over 800 lectures. He is an expert on 20th Century History, especially WWII, the Atomic Bombings, early Cold War, Nuclear History and crises in International Relations, the Korean War, the Cuban Crisis and modern US Presidency. He is now working on: Nuclear History and the End of WWII, and his next work: Crisis in US Foreign Policy.

On September 13th the Jim Quesada Chapter hosted former KGB Officer Stanislav Levchenko at a Luncheon at the Basque Cultural Center. The topic was: Soviet Politburo Machinery, which worked against United States; “Active measures” against United States in Japan; Former enemy’s secret political war against United States.

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The most active channel was Socialist Party of Japan, deeply penetrated by KGB. Being disgusted by the Soviet Politburo policy, in 1979 Levchenko defected to United States. Author of two books. For information on joining this chapter or to hear about their future programs, contact Rich Hanson, 1255 California St., #405, San Francisco, CA 94109, or call 415-776-3739.

The Illinois Midwest Chapter held its 13th consecutive 2-day Fall Symposium at the Great Lakes Naval Base on 15-18 September, with briefings and presentations. Quarters were again at the Great Lakes Naval Lodge. All meetings and meals were at the Port O'Call, the old Officer's Club. For more information on joining this chapter or to hear about their upcoming programs, contact COL Angelo M. Di Liberti, President, at airborneop@aol.com.

The Northern Ohio Chapter out of Cleveland held a picnic on September 11th in Madison, OH at the home of Chuck and Gretchen Reed. To learn more about the chapter contact Howard or Veronica Flint at 440-338-4720, or write Capt. John R. Lengel, USA(Ret)/CIC at silverfox1929@aol.com.

The Nevada Las Vegas Chapter holds many meetings. One was on June 7th at Clark County Library Conference Room and featured Roger E. McCarthy, former Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer, Author, and fellow Chapter member. McCarthy spoke on his book, Our Republic in Peril, and his previous book, Tears of the Lotus. Our Republic in Peril details the inadequacies of the mainstream media in chronicling and covering news over the last 50 years and the damage it has done to the country. To quote a five-star review on Amazon.com, “A worldview from one who’s been there, this is not your usual conservative book. McCarthy speaks with experience and authority on world affairs in an engaging style and is sure to make waves. I’ve no idea how he got permission from CIA legal beagles to tell all, but I’m
Profiles section.

Lindberg’s heretofore secret undercover at (732) 255-8021. Also, read the profile of efforts? To join this chapter or to learn helping or hurting our counterterrorism the actions of Porter Goss at CIA – is it

Gene Poteat spoke on “what’s behind the circumstances of his death. The meeting took place in Hank’s Room at the Kennebunk Free Library in downtown Kennebunk. New members are always welcome.

On September 17th, the Maine Chapter heard speaker Henry Precht, retired Foreign Service Officer, talk on “Iran - Getting It Wrong, Getting It Right.” The event took place at the Kennebunk Free Library in Kennebunk, ME. A graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Precht joined the Foreign Service in 1961, serving mainly in the Middle East. During the Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis he was Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs at the State Department. A recipient of numerous awards, Precht also taught international affairs at Case Western Reserve. Copies of Precht’s book, “A Diplomat’s Progress” were available for signing. For questions or information to join this new chapter, contact Barbara Storer, 9 Spiller Drive, Kennebunk, ME 04043, tel. 207-985-2392.

On October 15th the Maine Chapter will present “Protecting Our Borders” with a representative from U.S. Border Patrol. Royal Canadian Mounted Police are also invited to present a view from both sides of the border. The event starts at 2 p.m., at the Kennebunk Free Library, Kennebunk, ME. Further details available from Barbara Storer at the number above.

The New York Metropolitan Chapter met on March 11th at the Society of Illustrators Building, to hear Andrew McCarthy, the Federal Prosecutor for the Southern District of New York (1986–2003) who led the successful prosecution against the jihad organization of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and is an attorney in private practice in New York City. McCarthy, the recipient of numerous awards, including the Justice Department’s highest honors, spoke to a packed room of attendees. Irene Halligan, Former Chief of Protocol for the City of New York under Mayor Rudy Giuliani, led the Pledge of Allegiance; S. Gene Poteat, AFIO’s President, spoke on “The Current State of American Intelligence and Counterintelligence”; and Julie Anderson, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, CUNY, AFIO Award Winner, and then Acting [now official] AFIO New York Metropolitan Chapter VP/Treasurer, briefly commented on her ground-breaking Ph.D. dissertation on the Russian Intelligence Services.

The New York Metropolitan Chapter held an evening meeting on “Corporate Espionage: Who is Stealing America’s Secrets - Why and How They are Doing It” on Friday, 16 September 05. The speaker was David Hunt, retired senior officer of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, where he served for 32 years. Hunt was posted to many stations, and has particular expertise in Soviet operations, European affairs and counterintelligence. He was COS in New York City and Mogadishu, and holds the Donovan Award for Excellence as well as the Agency’s Distinguished Intelligence Medal. The location for the meeting was again the beautiful Society of Illustrators Building. Brief introductions were provided by Gene Poteat, AFIO National President; and Elizabeth Bancroft, AFIO National Executive Director. For more information on the many activities by this new chapter, contact Chapter President Jerry Goodwin, AFIO - New York Metropolitan Chapter, 530 Park Ave 15B, New York, NY 10021. or call him at 212-308-1450 or email afiometro@yahoo.com.

Huh?}

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[Anonymous or restricted members — of which there are many — are never listed!]

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AFIO has a very small staff. The organization runs and thrives on the efforts of many volunteers who give of their time to keep our events running smoothly, our programs filled with the latest speakers, our office & finances in order, and our information channels, agencies, corporate and Congressional connections strong. We thank...

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and all the spouses, partners, friends, children and ‘grands’ of the above, who lost hours of time with these special people, while they worked on AFIO projects to help the country, and to guide intelligence officers of tomorrow.

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The Association thanks the hundreds of donors who contributed in this range, usually as part of their dues renewals. For too many to list here in Periscope, but each one of them noted and appreciated. Your gifts will be used wisely to advance AFIO programs and publications. We thank you.

AFIO MEMBERS

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To replace Maj. Gen. Edward J. Heinz who is remaining on the Board but stepping down as Vice Chairman, is Dr. James H. Babcock. Babcock was elected to the Board in 2004. From early 2003 to present, Babcock is responsible for concept definition and planning for a variety of technical systems in the CIA/DST/System Engineering and Analysis Office (SEAO). From 2001 to 2003 he was Vice President and Chief Scientist at Aegis Research Corporation. He was responsible for technical leadership and the generation of secrecy strategies for a number of programs in the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense. From 1994 to 2001 Babcock was a MITRE Fellow in The MITRE Corporation. He was president of Integrated Concepts, Inc., from 1992 to 1994—dedicated to addressing difficult integration problems for the intelligence and C3 communities. Dr. Babcock established and managed the Washington intelligence division of the MITRE Corporation from 1987 to 1992. His work grew from 65 people to several hundred, supporting every major Intelligence Community organization.

He managed MITRE technical activities located at every major US foreign command (CINCs), and NRO, CIA, DIA, NSA, and elements of what is now NGA. He served in Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1975 to 1981 as Staff Specialist, Satellite Communications; Assistant Director, Systems; Director, National Intelligence Systems, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence. He was personally responsible for OSD for the FLTSAT, AFSAT, DSCS, and LES-8/9 satellite systems. He was employed by the CIA from 1958 to 1975. The majority of his assignments were in the Office of Communications. He holds the Ph.D. from Stanford University, the MS in MIT, and a BSEE from the University of Iowa. He is a life member of AFIO and plays many active roles in its programs and governance.

Carla B. Fai

FBI, CIA TURN TO COLLEGES TO BOOST RANKS

Judging by the name, Carla B. Fai could be just about anyone, the cantankerous 89-year-old woman obsessed about the neighborhood cats or a vibrant pig-tailed girl waiting for her dad to come home from work.

But about 20 Stetson University students learned she’s the acronym for the list of character traits FBI recruiters screen for new applicants: character, associates, reputation, loyalty, ability, bias, finances, alcohol abuse and illegal drug use.

Changes in the Bureau forced by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks were also part of the afternoon lecture conducted by Ron Rothwell, a special agent from the Orlando office.

The FBI and CIA are two of more than 20 companies hunting for future employees through seminars on campus this semester, said Ann Marie Cooper, director of Stetson’s career management office. Other companies grant on-campus job interviews at career fairs.

Bank robbery and white-collar crime investigations, once among the FBI’s top priorities, have taken a back seat to preventing terrorist attacks in the United States.

“We can’t do everything. We can’t do what we did before,” said Rothwell, adding resource shifts have drawn agents from across the country into the squads dedicated to fighting terrorism.

For college students, the good news is the changes have increased demand for people with advanced language and computer skills, but that doesn’t mean it’s any easier to join the FBI.

Students learned the challenges they would face just to get hired at the national law enforcement agency.

Due to graduate in December with an MBA and fluent in three languages, Ahmad Yakzan, 24, isn’t a likely candidate. Born in Lebanon, Yakzan isn’t an American citizen. He hoped to work part-time as a translator for the FBI’s Tampa office while attending law school next year. “I can’t, although I have a lot of assets they want,” Yakzan said.

To get hired at Bureau, there’s a short application, then a long application followed by background checks beginning with elementary school years. Candidates need a bachelor’s degree and three years’ work experience, although some master’s degrees can count toward work experience. The process, including 17 weeks of training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Va., where scores of less than 85 percent are not acceptable, can take up to two years, Rothwell said.

Braden Curran, 22, said he’s already applied for a job at the National Security Agency. It was the FBI’s demand for three years of work experience that Curran found most daunting. It would prevent him from starting in his chosen field after graduation.

He’s determined to find a job in the intelligence-gathering field eventually. “I’m not really a military type of guy, but it’s my way to be patriotic and give back to the country,” said Curran, who graduates this year with a bachelor of arts degree.

— from West Volusia News-Journal. by Christine Girardin, Staff Writer

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Lingering World War II Mystery
The Leslie Howard Story

Douglas L. Wheeler

“I shall be back…We shall all be back.”
- Leslie Howard’s final words in the anti-Nazi film, Pimpernel Smith (1941), in which he portrays a secret rescuer.

A curious reference to an intelligence briefing in a book about the loss of a passenger plane may help solve the last great air mystery of World War II.

The mystery: Why did eight Luftwaffe planes shoot down Flight 777A, an unarmed, unescorted, well-marked, scheduled civil airliner as it flew from neutral Portugal to Britain on June 1, 1943? As far as is known, nothing of the plane or its 13 passengers and 4 Dutch crew was ever found. On board were:

- Leslie Howard, a matinée idol, one of the most celebrated stage and film stars of his day and a leading anti-Nazi filmmaker who had become a personal symbol of resistance to Nazi tyranny.
- Wilfrid Israel, who had visited Portugal to help rescue Jewish orphans.
- At least three other persons of extraordinary interest to the Nazis for their war-related work: Iwan Sharp, Britain’s top tungsten ore expert; T. Michael Shervington of Shell Oil in Portugal, an intelligence agent; and G. Maclean, an inspector-general of embassies, who was misidentified by the Germans as a military general due possibly to a mistranslation of Maclean’s title from the purloined passenger list.

The disputed history of the circumstances of this tragedy is not a new story but an important and compelling one which now has been illuminated by intriguing new evidence. This fresh information, recently collected from retired officers who shared Communications intelligence training experiences, has revised hope that at last lingering questions long asked by the victims’ families may now be answered.

The new evidence helps to confirm at least the greater likelihood of what was long alleged, often in garbled form in scattered printed sources since 1957: that the ULTRA secret, one of the top Allied secrets of the war, was somehow involved in the loss of Flight 777A. “ULTRA” was the Allied codename for the secret intelligence derived from decrypts of German radio messages, which were generated by ENIGMA, the German enciphering and deciphering machine. ULTRA was an important weapon in that war and its very existence remained an official secret until 1974.

My research shows that for at least fifteen years after the shoot-down of Flight 777A, several generations of American, Australian and British intelligence officers were taught variations of the following story about the flight: the British had intercepted a secret German radio message before the flight which contained the passenger list, and this suggested that the airliner would be a target for attack. In order to prevent the Germans from learning that the British had ULTRA and to protect the life of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was visiting North Africa at the time and had to make a dangerous return flight, the British did not warn, cancel or divert Flight 777A but let it take off to its doom.

The point of the lesson was that code-cipher security in war is of vital importance and that sacrifices may have to be made to preserve such secrets. According to the recollections of several former Intelligence officers and staff, the lesson was taught to various persons in American intelligence services including the Atomic Energy Commission (Arnold Kramish), Naval Intelligence (Charles Weisbur) and the CIA (Garrett Cochran, Virginia Cori and Scott Breckinridge).

This explanation of what happened was not found in previous public accounts that implied that the plane may have been shot down because of a case of mistaken identity. This explanation was encouraged by rumors after the event and the story contained in Churchill’s published memoirs in 1951. According to this version, as passengers boarded the airliner at Lisbon a German agent mistook a passenger named Alfred Chennells, Howard’s accountant, for Churchill. An order was then dispatched to shoot down the airliner after it left Portugal. The origins of this “Churchill look-alike” story are obscure but no more obscure than the ULTRA training story’s original source.

For more than two generations, the Howard family, the Sharp family and the families of the other victims of Flight 777A have been unable to get access to the relevant government records. Ronald Howard, Leslie Howard’s son, spent years before he died trying to discover why and how his father’s plane was destroyed; he remained frustrated that he could not get access to the relevant ULTRA records.

With the new Freedom of Information law in Britain, and now the evidence I have discovered which helps to confirm that intelligence services for 15 years taught new officers that the ULTRA secret was involved in the loss of Flight 777A, it is time to set the historical record straight.

Douglas L. Wheeler, a former St. Louisan who graduated from St. Louis Country Day School, is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of New Hampshire, where he taught a course called Espionage and History. He has been a consultant on Portugal course called Espionage and History.
The American War in Vietnam is a long and complicated story. Enough books were written about it to fill our library. The best of them, in my view, is Vietnam for Dummies. I am not mentioned in it.

**Alone, the Fall of Saigon is long and complicated. Today I write this article mostly about my last day there, the longest and most traumatic of my life.**

What made it so traumatic? Because just two year earlier we believed we had won. The President of the United States wrote to congratulate me personally for helping to achieve the honorable peace we fought for.

We had a victory parade in Saigon. President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam led the show with his Chief of Staff, General Cao Van Vien. Both were invited to meet at the alternate White House in San Clemente, California with President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Also invited to the meeting were the 79-year old American Ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker, his designated replacement Ambassador Graham Martin, Minister Counselor of Embassy Charles Cooper and myself.

I did not yet know about the darkening cloud of the Watergate scandal. I was at the top of my world.

Then two years later...

At 4 a.m., Tuesday, April 29, 1975 in Saigon, I woke to the sound of explosions. Here we go again, I thought. The airport was bombed yesterday, rockets hit downtown Saigon on Sunday. Intelligence showed North Vietnamese heavy artillery in range of Saigon. I called the duty officer at the Embassy. We always had two over-night. He reported the airport was under sustained cannon fire, but had no damage assessment.

Clearly, a dramatic turn of events. With this much noise, there was bound to be heavy damage. If the runways became unusable, the evacuation process that had been going on for several weeks would be halted. There were thousands of people at the airport ready to board planes. Big decisions would have to be made and quickly. I knew my place was at the Embassy.

The weather was hot and muggy, typical for Saigon. I put on slacks and a blue shirt, without suspecting that I would wear this casual outfit on national television and for a week.

Leaving my bedroom, guided by some sixth sense, I stuck my passport into a pocket and took a flight bag with my camera, prescription medicines and check book. It would be a rough day, but I had no idea that I would never again see my elegant French villa, my possessions or my family photos, among them the pictures I took in 1938 in Paris and on the Royal Mail Ship Queen Mary on my way to the United States.

Downstairs, the dining room was set for a meal. The two servants also heard the explosions. They assumed I would go to the office. They were ready to serve breakfast, dressed in the traditional wear of high class Vietnamese house servants: White pajama pants, with high collar white tunics. I was not hungry, but asked to talk about their future. Suppose this was the end for the
Americans in Saigon. What did they want to do? The older lady, in her sixties, weighing about 90 pounds, said she wanted to stay. Surely the communists would not harm an old woman? Who would consider her a threat? She had relatives in Saigon, she would move in with them. The younger woman, in her mid-twenties, speaking fair English, said her boyfriend was a soldier. They wanted out of Vietnam. Could I help them? Could she take off right now to find her boyfriend?

Yes and Yes. I gave the old lady all the money I had in the house and asked her to stay near the phone. I was off to the Embassy.

My faithful driver, ethnic Chinese Ut, was ready, the six-year old Chevrolet polished to high gloss, as usual. At 5 a.m., the streets were empty. A 24-hour curfew was in effect. Another terrible decision by a helpless government. On the way to the Embassy I asked Ut what he wanted to do?

He wanted to leave Vietnam, but only with his family. His extended family. How many? One wife, seven children, his parents, her parents, his brothers, their children. How many? He counted thirty-seven. Can you get them to the Embassy? Only by collecting them in person. Okay, after you drop me off, take my car, go get your family. Ut was dubious. This could be a difficult day. Surely I would need him? As it turned out, he did not leave the Embassy and I needed him, indeed, and he performed magnificently. Much later I learned that he had independent plans for his family, in true Chinese style. This is a good place to note that my experiences with Vietnamese at a personal level were altogether positive. I hated to hear what American say about the slopes or the gooks.

At the Embassy, information was fragmentary, but from the roof we could see the fires. Telephone reports from military and CIA people at the airport pointed to an inescapable conclusion. There would be enough damage to make operations by fixed wing aircraft questionable, to put it mildly. Two C-130’s — heavy transport aircraft — were undamaged on the ground. Two marines were killed.

Other bad news: Seven helicopters of Air America — CIA’s own airline — were destroyed. The loss of the choppers would reduce our capability to make rooftop pick-ups, an important ingredient of the Embassy’s evacuation planning.

I told the duty officer to activate the calling system to put our people on emergency duty and to get ready to distribute travel envelopes, each containing 1,500 dollars — worth a lot more at that time — to be given to all of our people on the assumption that they might have to make their own way back to the United States from some corner of East Asia.

Then I called the Ambassador, Graham Martin, 63, a habitual night person and in bad health. He had emphysema and a bad case of bronchitis that morning. I summarized the news. He would come to the Embassy immediately. When he arrived, it was obvious he was not well. An untiring and selfless person, he drove himself even harder than he did the people around him. I remember a call from him one day, around 1 a.m. “Is there anything I should know before I go to sleep?” he asked me.

On the morning of the 29th he was mentally alert as ever, but he could hardly talk. I listened to his whispers and relayed his remarks to the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and to Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief in the Pacific.

The substance: evacuation of non-essential personnel should be pushed to the utmost, but in the morning hours of the 29th there was no word from Washington, or in Saigon, that the American Embassy would cease to function later that day.

In the meanwhile American and local employees were arriving in a steady stream. By 7 a.m. most were in their offices, putting their papers in order and waiting for instructions.

Around 8 a.m., the Country Team — the top officers of the Embassy — met with the Ambassador. The two main topics: the condition of the runways and North Vietnamese intentions regarding a continuing American presence in Saigon. We lacked clear information on the latter, but the Ambassador would go to the airport to inspect the runways. A good place to note that Ambassador Martin was also a retired colonel of the Air Force.

While the top brass was meeting, two important processes got underway and gathered momentum: the Americans were using all possible means to advise their Vietnamese contacts that they and their families should come to the Embassy or go to designated pick-up points. Meanwhile, on their own, thousands, including foreign diplomats, Vietnamese dignitaries and just plain people came in through the Embassy gates, into the grounds, but not into the building. The marines kept discipline. No one could enter the building, unless there was authorization to admit them.
The atmosphere was tense, but orderly till about noon.

We had cause for a quick chuckle. The chief of staff of the Hungarian military delegation came to my office to ask that we rescue his comrades stranded at the airport. They did not know the attack was coming, wanted to get to town, but the South Vietnamese stole all their vehicles. It was not all that often that a communist official would come to CIA for help. I asked a deputy to organize a convoy and the Hungarians were brought to town.

Around 9:30 a.m. the Ambassador told me that President Ford ordered a reduction of embassy staffing from 600 to a hard core of 150, with the CIA to fill 50 positions. I was to work out a staffing pattern. The problem was not simple: we had to find a proper mixture of operations officers, linguists, analysts, communicators and secretaries — there were no word processors then, or e-mail. We also had to consider the candidates’ health, emotional stability, sense of discipline, family situation and — indeed — courage, for activities in what would be an unfriendly environment.

Frankly, I thought this exercise made no sense. I could not see the North Vietnamese permitting a large American Embassy with a large CIA station in Saigon. Still, the Ambassador had his instructions from the President and I had mine. We would work on it.

As events turned out, it would have been better to use this time and the attention of senior officers for refining the evacuation process.

Throughout the morning I was with the Ambassador or at my desk, getting reports, making decisions, a steady flow of visitors and a barrage of telephone calls. To our surprise, the telephones worked to the end, but all the news was bad. The South Vietnamese military were in dissolution. The National Police disappeared. Conditions bordering on anarchy were developing. Looting was reported. Gangs were breaking into abandoned residences. I authorized special deals with groups of friendly officers who formed themselves into commando units, willing to work their way out under our guidance. Our biggest risk: armed, individual soldiers who might interfere with the evacuation.

Around mid-morning I had word from South Vietnam’s new president, General “Big” Minh. He wanted all American military, note ‘military,’ out of Vietnam within 24 hours. As a last favor to him, would we evacuate his daughter and son-in-law? We agreed.

At this juncture, operations at the American Embassy were not a 3-ring circus, but a 33-ring circus, without a ringmaster. The Embassy was not organized to handle control and communications in the type of chaos that was descending on us. Improvisations became the order of the day.

The courage, initiative and resourcefulness of the individual officers — military, Foreign Service, CIA — saved the lives of many thousands of Vietnamese, but we had a multitude of spectacular solo performances, not an orchestrated effort.

Personnel not involved with moving Vietnamese were engaged in destruction of files and other sensitive property, including supervised burning of money. In the streets, conditions were still relatively orderly. Some staff were taking advantage of the lull to return to their homes, pack a bag, pay off servants and to dispose of their pets. The Navy made it clear they would not accept dogs or cats on board. The wiser people sent their pets out of country weeks ago, but we still had lots of American pets in Saigon. One of my deputies felt he had no choice: He went back to his residence and shot his two beloved boxers, a deed easier on the dogs than on their master.

Shortly before noon we got word that President Ford ordered the Embassy closed and all Americans out of Saigon by nightfall. With the runways at the airport unusable; Operation Frequent Wind was commenced, the largest helicopter movement of people in history.

As the word came, we were still working on the 50-man station. Scrap all that. Now only one task remained: Get hold of Vietnamese associates and insert them into the evacuation channel. Easier said than done. Saigon was a huge city — over four million people. Many Vietnamese had no telephones, the frequent curfews changed peoples’ living habits, many moved in with
relatives and last, but not least, word that the Americans were leaving spread like wildfire. The last fragments of military discipline disappeared, armed soldiers—many of them deserters—spread fear and confusion, crowds clogged the streets, overran suspected helicopter landing points and the Embassy was surrounded by an impenetrable wall of people.

My office remained functional. Situation reports were sent to Washington. Telephones were working but all the news was bad. Key people, important contacts, could not make their way to pick-up points. Designated landing areas were overrun by mobs at the sound of approaching choppers. By 3 p.m. it was impossible to get in or out of the Embassy, except through a secret door, installed for just such a purpose, from our parking lot into the garden of the French Embassy. The Ambassador used it to return to his residence, to pick up his ailing wife and his servants, and bring them into the Embassy. The pressure of the crowds against the gates was such that the Marines did not dare to open them, for fear that they would be overwhelmed by onrushing hordes.

I did not dare to leave my office. I called home. I asked the older servant to take care of my dog and my parrot. I told her to take anything in the house she wanted. I told her it would be better if she left the house before the North Vietnamese arrived.

She informed me that a lot of people were assembled in my residence. Some came because they thought it was a good place from which to get on a helicopter. It was not. The landing zone across the street, in a CIA logistics compound, was looted and overrun by mobs. Others remembered earlier, nonspecific suggestions, that in case of trouble they should come to my home. Others simply had faith in the transcendental power of the CIA. Among the people there: a deputy prime minister, himself a three star general; the Chief of Vietnamese communications intelligence, trained in the United States; the chief of protocol; senior military and police officers with their families; the wife of a top general—he committed suicide later that day; Vietnamese employees of the Embassy; my maid and her boyfriend; my dentist and her family; two children of a dead general whose mother was in Europe, etc, etc. I felt a great responsibility for those people, but what to do? I could not leave the Embassy. I consulted with Ut, my driver. He suggested that he would climb over the walls, get to the house and with the use of the other car I had there, help guide the people to the Embassy.

The adventures of these people as they wandered from one location to another, through the streets of Saigon over five hours, makes a separate story. One of them carried a large Samsonite suitcase, containing underwear and socks, sent to me by the maid. All of them made it to safety, the last after being lifted over the Embassy wall, or from the roof of an apartment house, as seen in one of the most memorable pictures of the evacuation [see below]. All, but for the hero of the day, driver Ut. He was last seen near the Embassy wall. We could have lifted him over, like so many others, but he would not leave without his family. In due course, he became one of the boat people who reached Taiwan, whence he contacted CIA. We gave him an annuity for life.

At the Embassy, people were venting their frustrations. One secretary hammered away at the revolving cylinders of electric typewriters. She did not want the communists to use them. Others broke glass and were trampling on pictures of Kissinger and President Nixon.

The execute order on the evacuation was given at 11:38 Saigon time. The first chopper arrived three hours later. The fleet was only 80 miles away. What happened? In an inexplicable oversight, Admiral Donald Whitmire, commander of the Navy’s evacuation task force, was not alerted that a decision to evacuate the Embassy was
pending. When he got word, the planes and pilots were not ready, and the marines for a ground security force were on different ships than the helicopters. It took time to shuttle people around. Fortunately, the weather was perfect, but the three hour delay cost us dearly. Lots of papers were written over the causes for the delay.

I skip the flight operations, handled with great skill, but on our last day we still had Americans dying, crashing into the sea.

As the evening turned into night, the bitter truth emerged:
— The North Vietnamese did not interfere with the evacuation, but it would be impossible to take out all the people who wanted to go;
— The pilots had been awake and flying for many hours. There were limits to their endurance.
— Roof-top landings by the Air America choppers, hazardous at best, were beyond acceptable risk in darkness.
— Washington feared the possibility that the North Vietnamese would reach downtown Saigon and capture the remaining Americans.

As load after load took off from the Embassy, from the parking lot, and from the roof, there was little left for me to do. We made sure all sensitive material was destroyed. I wandered the halls, saying good-bye to people. I called my house for the last time. The old servant was still there. I repeated she should take anything she wanted and to leave before daylight.

In the early hours on Wednesday, April 30, I supervised the destruction of our communications equipment. Just before we blew up our last machine, I composed the most painful message I ever sent: “Must advise this will be final message from Saigon Station...” The flash of our explosive charge was widely reported as a mortar hitting the Embassy. The misreporting of events in Vietnam continued to the very end.

We still had communications with the White House and Defense Department through an Airborne Command Post. Washington was insisting that the evacuation be terminated immediately, bringing out only Americans. Ambassador Martin kept fighting for time. As long as he remained, his top staff would remain. The evacuation could not be completed. The longer it went on, the more Vietnamese could be taken out. He talked himself past several presidential deadlines, but the intervals between helicopters kept getting longer. There were to be 20 more flights, we were told, then 14, with the Ambassador begging for more, a dozen more, six more.

Around 4 a.m. Saigon time, Secretary Kissinger told a press conference that the evacuation would be terminated at 5 a.m. Shortly before then we lost communications with the fleet, but the Airborne Command Post sent the decisive message to aircraft in the area:

“The following is from the President of the United States and should be passed by the first helicopter in contact with Ambassador Martin. Only 21 lifts remain. Americans only will be transported. Ambassador Martin will board the first available helicopter which, when it is airborne, will broadcast ‘TIGER, TIGER, TIGER’ in the clear.” The order was passed to the Ambassador by Marine Corps Captain Jerry Berry, pilot of Navy CH46 Lady Ace 09.

On receipt of that order, the Ambassador got up and without a word moved toward the door. The rest of us, perhaps

Executive Order 12333

No eavesdrop on foreigners, no eavesdrop on US citizens, no eavesdrop on US foreign policy discussions.

CIA Director Bill Colby’s final cable to COS Polgar, as the evacuation began and Saigon fell
a dozen, followed. As we stepped up the narrow metal stairs leading to the helicopter pad on the roof, we knew we were leaving behind thousands of people in the Embassy’s logistics compound. We were silent during the brief flight to the USS Blue Ridge. We all knew how we felt, leaders of a defeated cause.

From the ship we could send messages to our families. Mine was simple: “Left Saigon by helicopter. Now safe onboard American warship. See you soon.”

At 7 a.m. on April 30 I found my assigned bunk and prepared to go to sleep. My longest and saddest day had ended. My tour in Saigon was finished. So was the American presence, after 30 years of U.S. involvement in the affairs of Vietnam.

A little footnote: Many years later I saw Lady Ace 09 Pilot Jerry Berry again. By that time he was a retired Colonel living in Orlando. He had another chance at transporting high level passengers. When Mrs. Elizabeth Dole came to Orlando during the 1996 presidential campaign, the driver of her car was Colonel Berry. In retirement he also ran college preparatory classes at Orlando Navy Base and I spoke to his group. I also met him at the Longwood Rotary Club. Small world department.

Born in Budapest, Hungary in 1922. Academic gymnasium in Budapest, Gaines College for Business Administration in New York City, Yale University international studies (while in U.S. Army). On active duty U.S. Army January 1943-May 1946. 2d Lieutenant Military Intelligence. Assigned to OSS, (World War Two predecessor of CIA) in 1944. Accepted civilian intelligence employment with interim agency Strategic Services Unit on discharge from Army and entered on duty with CIA when it was formed in 1947. Career intelligence officer for next 34 years, holding staff and command positions with steadily increasing responsibilities in Europe, Latin America, Vietnam and CIA Headquarters. Noteworthy assignments included Chief of Base Frankfurt, Chief of Base Hamburg, Deputy Chief of Station Vienna, Austria; Chief of Station in Argentina, Mexico, Vietnam and Germany. In CIA Headquarters served as Chief Intelligence Collection Staff Eastern Europe and for Latin America. Chief of Personnel Management, Operations Directorate. Held ‘supergrade’ rank for 18 years, including GS 18 and Executive Level Four for ten years. Decorations include two Distinguished Service Medals—Intelligence Star and Department of State Award for Valor. Retired from CIA in December 1981. Subsequently served as consultant to Defense Intelligence Agency 1982-1985 and on staff of U.S. Senate Select Committee on Iran/Contra. Consultant to private business in United States and in Germany, but never in areas related to defense or intelligence. Lectured on intelligence topics at Tufts University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Smithsonian Institute’s Campus on the Mall and Central Florida University. Author of numerous articles on intelligence and international affairs published in such papers as Miami Herald, Washington Post, Orlando Sentinel, Boston Globe, American Legion Magazine, International Journal of Intelligence and German ‘Welt am Sonnta’ (Sunday World).

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America will never be destroyed from the outside.
If we falter, and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed ourselves.
—Abraham Lincoln

The Fall of Saigon
The Marine Perspective and Bibliography

Colonel Steve Hasty, USMC
for the “Fall of Saigon Marine Association”

Historian’s Note: As illustrated in the great Japanese movie director Kurosawa’s 1950 classic film Rashômon, different people witnessing the same event from different perspectives can produce wildly different versions of the same story, and all true from their standpoint. The challenge of historians, much like that of detectives interviewing witnesses to reconstruct a crime scene, is to evaluate and incorporate the individuals’ stories into a coherent whole. The list of books below dealing with the fall of Saigon is a partial one, concentrating primarily on the events leading up to the evacuations, and the circumstances immediately surrounding them. Many of these are memoirs by eyewitnesses to different portions of the event; others are compilations done after the fact, often using the memoirs as a basis for the book. The eyewitness accounts of what an observer directly saw tend to be of most value; second- or third-hand accounts need to be evaluated against primary sources.

There are other works dealing with the aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam that are not included here, but are worth pursuing for a greater understanding of the conflict, just as there are many other works and memoirs dealing with the conflict as a whole. Not generally included in our list here are works in which the fall of South Vietnam is but a portion of the book (e.g. the memoirs of Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford, among others). The memoirs below are those of bit players, caught in the riptide of history. To many, especially the younger generation born long after the events of 1975, the Vietnam War is as remote to them as the Peloponnesian Wars of Ancient Greece. For those in Vietnam who personally experienced the events of the spring of 1975, the memories may sometimes be repressed, but even 30 years
later, are never wholly forgotten.

Perhaps the best overarching account of those days is the volume U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End 1973-1975, by George R. Dunham and David A. Quinlan (1990: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington DC). Part of the Marine Corps Operational Histories Series dealing with Vietnam, it is a well-researched volume drawing on contemporary sources and provides an excellent overview in which to place the other books below. The books are listed alphabetically by author, and particularly noteworthy or recommended ones are annotated with an asterisk (*). Some of these works are no longer published, but for those interested there are many book search services (e.g. ABE.com; Amazon.com, etc.) from which out-of-print books may be located and purchased. (BSH)

The Fall of Saigon by David Butler (1985; Simon and Schuster: New York)


How We Won The War by Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung (1976: RECON Publications; Philadelphia, PA)

Goodnight Saigon by Charles Henderson (2005: A Berkley-Caliber Book; Berkley Publishing Group, NY)


* Escape With Honor: My Last Hours In Vietnam by Francis Terry McNamara with Adrian Hill (1997: Brassey's, Inc.; Herndon, VA)

Decent Interval by Frank Snepp (1977: Random House, NY)


Gia Phong! The Fall and Liberation of Saigon by Tiziano Terzani (1976: St. Martin’s Press; NY)

OFFICE OF HENRY KISSINGER

Dear Master Sergeant Broussard:

Dr. Kissinger has written the enclosed piece about the Fall of Saigon and about his activities and thoughts on that tragic day. He was glad to do it for you and the Fall of Saigon Marine Association.

I apologize for the delay in getting it to you. As you can imagine, recent events have occupied a good deal of his time. I know that his thoughts have often been turned to Vietnam, much as I am sure yours have been. With the Marines once again on the front lines, we here join Dr. Kissinger in hoping for their safe return, and indeed for all our armed forces.

Sincerely,

Suzanne S. McFarland
Executive Assistant.

Dr. Henry Kissinger’s activities and thoughts about the Fall of Saigon

THE LAST DAY

The Pentagon's plan for implementing the final evacuation were far from precise. There was a glitch in communications between the helicopters on aircraft carriers and the tactical air cover for them based in Thailand, leading to a disagreement among various commands about when the operation should start, whether it was Greenwich Mean Time or local time.

A new schedule had to be established, and the operation started in earnest with a few hours delay.

As Americans were being lifted from the roof of the American Embassy during the morning of April 29 (Washington time), President Ford, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and I briefed the congressional leadership. After that, all was silence. I sat alone in the National Security Advisor’s corner office in the West Wing of the White House, enveloped by the eerie silence that sometimes attends momentous events. The White House National Security Council office was the Washington command center for the evacuation of Vietnam even though the actual airlift was being conducted by the Pentagon. Neither Ford nor I could influence the outcome any longer; we had become spectators of the final act. So we sat in our offices, freed of other duties yet unable to affect the ongoing tragedy, suspended between a pain we could not still and a future we were not in a position to shape.

Ours was, in fact, a command post with essentially nothing to do. My Deputy, Brent Scowcroft, kept track of the myriad details with selfless dedication and efficiency. Robert C. “Bud” McFarland, later President Reagan’s National Security Advisor, was in charge of the administration of my office. He had served in Vietnam as a Marine and now, with tears in his eyes, had to tend to the mechanics of the collapse. Many of his fellow Marines had died to keep this tragedy from happening. Bud was deeply moved, though he made a valiant and nearly successful effort to try not to burden the rest of us with his sorrow. There was an almost mystical stillness.

By now it was early afternoon in Washington, well after midnight in Saigon. Despite his original inclination to end the airlift at dusk in Vietnam, Ford had ordered it to continue all night so that the largest number of Vietnamese might be rescued—especially those still inside the embassy compound. Around 2:00 p.m., I learned that there were still 760 people there and that, for whatever reason, only one helicopter had landed in the previous two hours. I called Schlesinger to discuss how we could evacuate this group completely. For it was clear that the North Vietnamese would occupy Saigon at daybreak. We computed that thirteen helicopters would do the trick. But for
safety, we agreed on a total of nineteen. U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin was to be on the last helicopter.

At 3:48 p.m. Washington time (4:58 the next morning in Saigon) Martin left with nineteen on the last helicopter—or what we thought was the last. He had done an extraordinary job. Over a two-week period, he had orchestrated the evacuation of over fifty thousand South Vietnamese and six thousand Americans with only four casualties. And he had kept the situation sufficiently calm to allow another eighty thousand refugees to get out on their own.

As soon as I thought the last helicopter had left, I crossed the passageway between the White House and the Old Executive Office Building to brief the press. But on returning to my office, I found that Vietnam still would not let go easily. While Graham Martin and the remnants of the embassy staff had indeed departed a 4:58 a.m. Saigon time, elements of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade which protected the evacuation—comprising 129 Marines—had been left behind for some inexplicable reason. Huge credibility gaps had been manufactured from far less than this, but those of us in the White House Situation Room had no time to worry about public relations. The helicopter lift was resumed. It was 7:53 p.m. Washington time (and already daylight in Saigon) when the helicopter carrying the last Marines left on the embassy roof.

Two hours later, North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon.

For the sake of our long-term peace of mind, we must some day undertake an assessment of why good men on all sides found no way to avoid this disaster and why our domestic drama first paralyzed and then overwhelmed us. But, on the day the last helicopter left the roof of the embassy, only a feeling of emptiness remained. Those of us who had fought the battles to avoid the final disaster were too close to the tragedy to review the history of twenty years of American involvement.

And now it was too late to alter the course of events.

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A CIA Officer in Saigon

The CIA Struggled to Keep Its Operation in Vietnam Going Until the Very Fall of Saigon.

Richard W. Hale
jandihale@aol.com

Richard W. Hale spent 30 years as an Operations Officer with the CIA, half that time stationed in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. His last overseas tour was in Saigon, from June 1973 until April 1975. He is retired and living in Florida.

I have never quite decided whether I should consider myself a Vietnam veteran or not. On those occasions when I dress up, I proudly wear a miniature Combat Infantry Badge in my lapel. I did spend 22 months in Vietnam, but the two are not related. It was nearly 30 years earlier, in Burma, that I earned the badge, as a machine gunner with the 475th Infantry Regiment of the Mars Task Force. In Vietnam I was a CIA officer stationed in Saigon after the war was officially over.

To begin at the beginning, in early 1973 I had been with the agency for 23 years, more than half of that overseas in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In 1971 I gave up a branch chief job to attend the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. The class consisted of 100 senior Navy officers and 100 Army, Air Force and Marine officers, along with a dozen civilian intelligence officers from the State Department, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

When I came back to Langley, I was killing time as a special assistant, waiting impatiently for an appropriate opening in Africa, when I was offered a job in Saigon. I had followed events in Vietnam, but had never considered volunteering. My wife and two children had always accompanied me on previous tours, and I discussed it with them. Unlike the standard military tour of one year in Vietnam, the usual overseas posting for the Foreign Service, the CIA and several other agencies was two years, without any home leave. Vietnam during the war was an exception for civilians: The tour was still two years, but families could not accompany the men, who were at least in theory given a couple of weeks’ leave every six months.

That policy now had been modified. The leave policy for men stayed the same, but wives could accompany their husbands, whereas children could not. Even if the wife accompanied him, the husband was still permitted to visit his children periodically but the wife could not, at least not at government expense. I had assumed that my wife would stay with the children, but she considered that out of the question. The kids were miffed, but agreed to share an apartment. We had to promise they could visit, even though it would be at our expense.

My wife and I arrived in Saigon on June 16, 1973. The agency had its own transient facility in Saigon, the Duc Hotel. It had a dining room and a small swimming pool on the roof. A few single people lived there full time, but the primary function was temporary housing for arriving and departing employees, and for employees from the outlying bases coming in for consultation or a bit of R&R and shopping.

Anxious to get out of our tiny room over a busy street, we first accepted a two-bedroom apartment on the third floor of a six-unit building. Unfortunately, the building was located at the intersection of two major thoroughfares, and from 6 a.m. until curfew at midnight the traffic noise was overwhelming. After a couple of months we moved to a house that was smaller than the apartment and in bad condition, but was located on a cul de sac with a high wall around it. My wife supervised a crew of Vietnamese workmen in the restoration process.

The CIA head office in Vietnam was the “station,” in the embassy building. There were five subordinate “bases” in the appropriate military regions (MRs), now called administrative regions: Da Nang for MR I, Nha Trang for MR II, Bien Hoa for MR III, Can Tho for MR IV and the Saigon
U.S. troops at a hidden camp in the Delta, of the more absurd claims of Communist we had already identified as a member of an argument with a Hungarian major, whom I had a heated gathering place for the ICCS officers. On one occasion at the pool I had a heated conversation with our targets was on Sundays to brief the officers there. For some reason our reach considerably. I also visited the base, station and State Department officers and enlisted men. It seemed like an excellent opportunity to recruit some defectors in place, and in fact refused more than one.

I had five full-time case officers, and we began collecting biographic data immediately. We also began briefing other base, station and State Department officers to act as “spotters” for us, thus expanding our reach considerably. I also visited the bases at Nha Trang, Da Nang and Bien Hoa to brief the officers there. For some reason I never did get to Can Tho.

I got no answer except sputters, but the general in charge of the Hungarian delegation complained to Tom Polgar, the chief of station (COS), about me. When Tom mentioned it, I told him the story with no apologies. He agreed that the Hungarian deserved it, and we dropped the matter.

Which brings me to a point I should have made earlier. Why would the Hungarians complain to Tom Polgar, who probably everyone in Vietnam knew was the senior CIA man in the country? They just assumed I worked for Polgar, since our cover was paper thin. Oddly enough, no one ever came out and accused us of being CIA. I guess that was the quid pro quo for not pointing out the AVH officers we had identified.

I can sum up my one year in that job by saying that those of us not previously exposed to the Poles discovered how lightly the mantle of communism rested on their shoulders. We had so many volunteers that we had to turn some away and could afford to be selective. The Hungarians were a different matter. We eventually did have some limited success, but I have to say those boys were for the most part dedicated Communists. I have often wondered how they are fitting into the new post-Soviet reality.

All of my previous overseas experience had been as a COB, COS or deputy chief of station (DCOS) — and in each case the office was small, with a couple of case officers and a secretary — so the sheer size of our presence in Vietnam, the largest in the world, took some getting used to. Bases were usually run by a COB, a deputy COB and a chief of operations. With the Saigon base, the third man on the totem pole was the executive officer (XO). At the end of my first year, the man holding that position completed his tour, and Bill J. asked me to take over as XO.

Once the last of our POWs were released in March 1973 and all but 50 U.S. military attachés had been withdrawn, Vietnam became old news. Americans seemed oblivious to the fact that the ARVN lost an average of 1,000 troops per month in skirmishes with the VC in 1973 and 1974. We would occasionally have dinner on the roof of the Caravelle Hotel. From there, you could watch the artillery duels going on out in the countryside.

When our son visited in the summer of 1974, we flew to Nha Trang to go snorkeling. Just as we drove up to the consulate guest house, a half-dozen VC B-40 rockets landed in the town. One of them came down in the street about 50 yards away, leaving a hole a foot deep and 2 feet across. Our son commented mildly that he thought the war was supposed to be over. A friend was stationed at one of the subbases in the Central Highlands, together with a young case officer. One morning the young man went out to fuel up their jeep. The jerrycan he picked up had been booby-trapped with a grenade. There were frequent incidents of that sort.

In December 1974, the NVA made their first serious probe, invading Phuoc Loc province from Cambodia, and by January 7, 1975, they had captured the provincial capital of Phuoc Binh, 100 miles from Saigon. Everyone on our side protested, but nothing else happened.

At about the same time, something occurred that astonished us completely. The embassy had been guarded by a platoon of Marines, under a captain. Now that guard force was reduced to a squad, under a gunnery sergeant.

Next to go, on March 10, was Ban Me Tho, the capital of Darlac province, in the middle of MR II. The NVA were thus in a position to cut the South in two. Now the NVA tanks came surging down Highway 1, heading for Hue. The 1st Infantry Division, South Vietnam’s best, was well dug in around Hue. President Nguyen Van Thieu panicked and ordered it to retreat to Da Nang. Before the ARVN troops got there, Thieu changed his mind and ordered them back to Hue, but it was too late. They were caught in the open and torn to pieces.

Thieu next ordered a withdrawal from the key Central Highlands city of Pleiku, the headquarters of MR II. The commander was General Pham Van Phu,
an incompetent, corrupt and cowardly man who held his position because of his support of President Thieu. Phu withdrew, all right. He loaded his family, even his household furniture, onto helicopters and took off for Nha Trang.

His senior subordinates followed suit. The now-leaderless troops fled in panic down bad roads toward the coast, submerged in a flood of refugees, and were cut to pieces by NVA artillery. There were half a million troops and refugees on this route, and only one in four made it to the coast. General Phu then decamped for Saigon. Just before the fall of the country, he committed suicide.

Since this is my story, I will interrupt this sad tale to explain what I was doing. I was having a really bad feeling about the situation. It seemed to me that the top brass in the embassy were far too sanguine about it. I started to arrange early departure orders for my wife, using the excuse that she wished to rejoin our children in northern Virginia.

Hue fell on March 25, and Da Nang, Vietnam's second-largest city, fell on April 2. The South Vietnamese who escaped there claimed they could have held out if the United States had provided them with more equipment. I have a copy of Stars and Stripes dated April 1, 1975, that lists the equipment abandoned just at Hue and Da Nang: 60 M-48 tanks, 255 armored personnel carriers, 150 105mm howitzers, 60 155mm howitzers, 600 trucks and hundreds of M-16s, machine guns and sub-machine guns. The total cost of equipment abandoned in MR I and MR II was put at $1 billion and included half the Northrop F-5s, other aircraft and helicopters available to South Vietnam.

In the meantime, my wife’s travel orders had been approved, but by then the embassy was encouraging dependents to leave and was issuing tickets on the spot. She left, protesting, on a Pan American Airways flight on April 3. That evening I received a telephone query: The Air Force was providing a Lockheed C-5A to evacuate many Vietnamese orphans as possible, and would my wife be willing to act as one of the escorts? Fortunately, she was gone already.

The C-5A took off the next day loaded with 230 orphans plus three dozen American women, mostly Defense Attaché Office secretaries and embassy dependents. Over the South China Sea the rear cargo doors blew open at 23,000 feet, damaging the rear control surfaces. The pilot headed back for Tan Son Nhut, but had to crash-land before he got there. The plane bellied into a rice paddy, then skipped over a river before coming to a stop. The rescue operation was not helped when ARVN troops, who got there first, spent more time looting than assisting. The death toll was put at 206, including the four American secretaries from the Defense Attaché Office next door to the Saigon base. I knew all four of them well.

The next bit of excitement happened on Tuesday, April 8, when a VNAF F-5E fighter-bomber blasted down the street outside our office and dropped two 500-pound bombs in front of the nearby presidential palace. Realizing he had missed, the pilot came around again, which gave me time to get outside for a cautious look at what was going on. He came boring down the street at about 50 feet and dropped his last two 500-pound bombs through the roof of the palace. The pilot’s objective was to kill President Thieu, but his early miss gave Thieu time to reach a bomb shelter.

For 25 years I was under the impression that the pilot was simply fed up with the incompetence of President Thieu. I recently learned that Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Trung was in fact a North Vietnamese mole who had trained at Kessler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Miss. His orders from the VC were to drop the first two bombs on the palace and the next two on our embassy. The embassy building was pretty sturdy, but the front building of the Saigon base was a prefab, with the structural integrity of a matchbox. At the time we did not know how lucky we were. Trung subsequently led the April 28 raid on Tan Son Nhut by five captured Cessna A-37 Dragonflies (jet trainers converted to light bombers). As of this writing, Trung is a senior pilot with Vietnamese National Airways.

Old hands used to joke about the time General William Westmoreland issued an unclassified order that civilians were not to carry weapons. They felt as if Westy had painted a bull’s-eye on their backs, and the order was pretty widely ignored. During my time in Saigon, most of us did not carry pistols, though I tucked my .38-caliber snub-nosed Smith & Wesson into a belt holster under my bush shirt when I had an agent meeting in some place like Cholon.

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was always hovering in the back of our minds, reinforced by Radio Hanoi referring to a “popular uprising.” As the NVA surged south, we thought about the possibility of a repeat performance. After my wife left, I started carrying the .38 and extra ammo all the time. I had a .45 in my car, an M-2 carbine at home, and more pistols and submachine guns in a safe drawer in the office. Feeling a little embarrassed about this, on the first morning I walked into Bill J.’s office and lifted my shirttail to display the gun. Bill laughed and stood up, pulling a 9mm Browning Hi-Power from his pocket.

Even stranger: I was the main point of contact with the half-dozen Army, Navy and Air Force attachés who worked out of the office across the courtyard from us. The Army attaché came to see me and asked if I could arrange for them to obtain some .45s. They were moving all over the Saigon–Gia Din district to keep on top of the situation, and were uncomfortable without some personal protection. I found it hard to believe, but their main office out at Tan Son Nhut had no weapons to give them. I passed the request up to the COS, who got the ambassador’s permission. Then I took the attachés down the hall to our office of security, where they signed for the required number of .45s and plenty of ammo.

The last two weeks I was there were a bit of a blur, so I will not attempt to put exact dates on what took place. The only battle the ARVN won in the whole wretched affair was 40 miles up the road from Saigon at Xuan Loc. It was a hollow and short-lived victory, as the troops would have been better employed in defending the outskirts of Saigon. They held off the NVA and VC for 10 days, and then the NVA simply bypassed them. Cut off, the ARVN 18th Division plus 3,000 rangers and paratroopers — one-half the strategic reserve for Saigon — were slowly destroyed.

Back at the base, with the approval of the COB, I put out an order that all files were to be either destroyed (shredded and burned) or immediately shipped out to Langley. Every case officer could keep one file folder no more than 1 inch thick for the most essential documents he needed to keep doing his job. There were howls of protest, but I knew most case officers
were pack rats, and there were a couple of instances of African stations or bases being overrun during civil wars and the safes left full of classified material. Back in the 1950s, we had thermite grenades on hand in case of such an emergency, but that seemed to have gone out of style. I was determined that if the NVA overrun Saigon, they would not find any Saigon base files.

Most of the case officers complied, but on Sunday, April 13, one of them squealed on another one. The guilty party was a police intelligence liaison officer. I opened his safe, and the entire top drawer was full. His files were as well organized as any I had ever seen, but they had to go. I got the man on the phone and told him that if he had not destroyed or shipped them by the next morning I would burn them myself. He did.

When the time came to leave, the Saigon base was swept clean. Unfortu-

ately, the same was not true of other repositories, particularly the embassy. The ambassador would not let his staff clean out their safes, since he was still living in a dream world, hoping that some accommodation could be reached with the Communists. Even more important, the South Vietnamese government’s police and intelligence files were abandoned for the North Vietnamese to find. But that’s another story.

The Saigon base had more than 50 people, and in early April we began to thin out the ranks. Every evening, Bill J., his deputy Monty L. and I would have a meet-

ing and decide who should be sent home next. It was then my job to call them into my office the next day and tell them it was time to go. Of course, most of the secretar-

ties were among the first.

I had a problem with some of the case officers, who came up with all sorts of excuses as to why they could not leave right away. My answer was always pretty much the same: I said I had no faith in the embassy evacuation plan, which called for civilian chartered airplanes out of Tan Son Nhut. I had been at Tan Son Nhut the day an NVA missile shot down a VNAF Douglas AC-47 gunship minutes after it took off, so it seemed to me likely that we

would be going out in helicopters, and I did not want one of the case officers to be sitting in my seat. Very few of them could argue with that reasoning, since they felt

the same way. They went.

At about the same time, all base and station personnel living in outlying areas were asked to move closer to the embassy. There were a number of small apartments now available that had previously been occupied by secretaries. Another officer and I moved into a two-bedroom, one-bath unit directly across the street from the back gate of the embassy.

I drove my car across the street the next morning and was greeted at the gate by a Marine clad in fatigues and toting an M-16. He stopped me, came to port arms and asked, very formally, “Sir, are you carrying any photographic or recording equipment, or any firearms?” He looked about 15 years old, and I thought if I men-
tioned my mini-arsenal he might flip out, so I lied. I then asked where he had come from, since I knew all the regulars, at least by sight. It turned out that a full platoon of Marines had flown in the night before from Okinawa. Better late than never.

At this time a lot of the CIA people who had evacuated Da Nang, Nha Trang and other points to the north were gathered in Saigon, and I knew that many of them were carrying M-16s, Swedish K 9mm submachine guns, etc. As soon as I parked, I hotfooted it to our office of security and told them what had happened to me at the gate. The security officer swore, then ran out to find the embassy security officer and get the Marines to stand down.

Finally, on the evening of April 21, the Saigon base was down to 15 people. Bill J. looked at me and said: “OK, Dick, it’s your turn. We have too many chiefs and not enough Indians. You leave tomorrow.”

I almost objected, then laughed instead. In response to Bill and Monty’s raised eyebrows, I reminded them of the objections I had been getting for two weeks, and that I had been on the verge of doing the same thing. I said OK, wished them luck and went home to pack my one small suitcase.

So, despite my harping on the possibility of helicopter evacuation, the next morning one of the last remaining secretaries, a case officer and I were driven out to Tan Son Nhut by the secretary’s husband. We carried our .45 in a brown paper bag, just in case. When we got to the airport we handed the bag to our chauffeur and wished him luck. The three of us then caught the last China Airlines flight out of Tan Son Nhut. The secretary was beside herself with worry about her husband, but he came out safely on one of the helicopters.

I spent two days in Hong Kong, bring-

ing friends at the consulate general up to date, then flew on to Honolulu, where our son was enrolled in college. I waited there on the remote chance that the situation in Vietnam would indeed stabilize, in which case I intended to turn around and fly back. When Saigon fell, I sadly continued my journey to Washington.

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Overheard

He and Gendron reserve much of their annoyance for the federal government, which they say spends billions of dollars on homeland security even as the southern and northern borders remain sieves. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, estimates that 8 million illegal immigrants live in the United States; about 465,000 are fleeing deportation orders.) “I just find it hard to believe that we spend billions of dollars on high-tech security stuff and then we let 8 million people come across our border illegally and say nothing,” Gendron said. “My son is with the Army in Iraq, and he says the biggest challenge is to tighten the border. Why is it any different here?”

—W. Garrett Chamberlain, the Police Chief of New Ipswich, New Hampshire, quoted in The Washington Post Friday 10 June 05 in “New Tack Against Illegal Immigrants: Trespassing Charges” by Michael Powell, who says Chamberlain and other New England police chiefs are frustrated that federal officials have declined to detain illegal immigrants.
Weekly Intelligence Notes

We were playing God, kicking people back

Suzanne Goldenberg
28 April 2005

The gates were thronged with desperate, pleading people. The ambassador was locked in his office, ripping up secret documents. Meanwhile, no one knew exactly how many rescue helicopters were coming... This past April 29 marks 30 years since the scrambled, humiliating evacuation of the US embassy in Saigon that marked the end of the Vietnam war. Suzanne Goldenberg talks to some of those who were there.

The Ngo family ascribe their presence in the Virginia suburbs of Washington DC to divine intervention. On the afternoon of April 29 1975, in those dreadful last hours before the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese army, Toai Vuong Ngo, his wife Nghiem Lan Ngo, and 18-year-old sister Tuyet Lan Ngo, found themselves in the desperate crush outside a side entrance to the US embassy, wedged between the crowds and the locked arms of the marine guards at the gate.

They had been there for more than three hours, Toai frantically trying to catch the attention of the marine guards to show them his documents authorising his family’s departure on the US airlift. He began to despair. “I told my wife: ‘I want to go home, and look for a car.’ My wife said, ‘No - either you get in alone, or we wait here till the last minute’.”

Suddenly two jeeps pulled up carrying a two-star general in the South Vietnamese army and a key liaison officer to the CIA. The gates, which had been sealed shut for more than three hours, opened a crack. Tuyet was shoved into the gate with so much force she could barely breathe; a photograph of her anguished face at the gates would appear on the cover of Newsweek magazine two weeks later. “I flew inside, I didn’t walk,” she says. “I was crying, and when I opened my eyes, I saw I was already inside the gate. I call it a miracle.”

In a way, it was. A friend of Toai’s had been clutching at his belt when the gates opened, but he did not make it inside. He spent seven years in a re-education camp. Toai believes he could easily have faced the same fate. A student activist, his stomach still bears the scar from a bullet wound inflicted by a communist rival in 1967, and his job at the South Vietnamese ministry of information made him a target.

His wife Nghiem had no illusions about what was happening. At the Saigon Credit Bank where she worked, wealthy customers were withdrawing large sums of money. “I was nervous. I told my husband, and he said: ‘Oh, no, they [the US] cannot let us lose!’”

Even so, Nghiem bought a small suitcase as a precaution, and the couple were relieved when they received a call from the US embassy. “They promised that when it was the right time they would call us and tell us where to get together.” But no call ever came, and by the morning of April 29, the Ngos decided to take fate into their own hands. (The original evacuation plan, which, in the chaos, was never implemented, was to broadcast coded messages over the American radio service. A weather report would announce a temperature for Saigon of “105 degrees and rising”, which would be followed by the first 30 seconds of “I’m Dreaming of a White Christmas.”)

They bundled into Toai’s green Datsun - with their friends, there were nine people inside - and raced through the streets of Saigon to the embassy (‘We dodged checkpoints like it was a racing car,” Toai says).

Inside, the embassy was almost as crowded as outside, with the area around the pool teeming with people. Within minutes, an embassy official handed Toai a megaphone and asked him to calm the crowd. He was asked to count off a group of 60 Vietnamese, who were to be loaded into buses for transport to the port of Saigon.
and out of the country. When Toai was almost finished, shortly before 4pm, the official appeared again. “He told me: ‘OK, you get in,’” Toai says. “So we were the last to get in, and the first to get out.”

As their bus sped towards the river, they were followed by a cavalcade of cars and motorcycles, driven by Vietnamese. They were to spend several days marooned on that barge, hungry and terrified, but they were safe. After stops in the Philippines and Guam, they arrived at a refugee camp in Arkansas.

The family did not stay there long, relocating to Washington DC within the month. Toai’s early years were a struggle - a succession of low-paid jobs - but he now has a home in the Virginia suburbs with a small American flag tacked on the front door. His three grown children are thoroughly American. Toai would like them to visit Vietnam. Now 58, he’s not interested in recrimination. “Everybody had a fault in it. Anyone who was in power should take some of the blame. Either they were not clever enough, or their ambition was too great,” he says. “But Vietnam after the war deserves to have a better life.”

Frank Snepp had seen the end coming. Since the beginning of April, he had tried repeatedly to convince the ambassador, Graham Martin, that it was time to make an exit plan. The intelligence arriving from one of the CIA’s best agents in the north did not vary: there was no chance of a negotiated settlement.

Late on the night of April 28, when the troops of the North Vietnamese army had fanned out in a crescent on the edges of Saigon, the 28-year-old CIA analyst made one last attempt to get his message through to the ambassador: there was not going to be a peaceful resolution to this war.

That was not a message Martin could accept. In Snepp’s eyes, the ambassador was an ageing cold warrior - “the next best thing to a B-52”. Martin had been sent to Saigon after the ceasefire with the task of convincing the South Vietnamese that the war was winnable. He also had deeply personal reasons for refusing to accept defeat in Vietnam, having lost a son to the war. “He said: ‘I don’t believe you. I have better intelligence.’ He cut off all military briefings. He refused to receive anything that contradicted his wishful thinking,” Snepp recalls.

The consequence of Martin’s refusal was chaos. That afternoon of April 29 saw the ambassador closeted in his third floor office, ripping up sensitive material to avoid its capture by the North Vietnamese. Upstairs, marine guards used thermite grenades to set fire to the communications room, and the CIA frantically shredded classified material, sending classified confetti wafting down into the makeshift helicopter pad in the compound.

Snepp spent the day hauling people up over the walls of the embassy. “Because no planning had been done in any coherent way, there was no prioritisation of any evacuees,” he says. “[We] were playing God, kicking people back, separating children from their parents.”

CIA personnel were ordered out at 9.30pm or 10pm. As his helicopter rose above the embassy roof, Snepp saw countless headlights moving towards the city from the north. The helicopter began taking groundfire, and rose steeply to avoid being shot down before making, like the other helicopters, for one of the US navy vessels off the Vietnamese coast.

In 1977, Snepp was sued by the government for writing a scathing book about America’s role in Vietnam. Although he had left the CIA, and the book contained no classified material, the court ordered him to forfeit his royalties and imposed a lifetime ban on any writing without prior authorisation. He now works as a television producer in California.

“The big message in the collapse of Vietnam is this: a lot of Americans went to Vietnam with all the answers and we came away with nothing but questions, and we haven’t answered them. How do you deal with insurgency? How do you deal with a chaotic situation in which you have civilians mingling with fighters? Should we even be there? For me, the collapse of Vietnam was a real watershed of the last century, and we have been left with the consequences because we have never been able to understand the questions that it bequeathed us.”

Alan Carter, the director of the US Information Service in Saigon, had no idea on the morning of April 29 that it was to be his last day in Vietnam. He had been woken at 4am by the thud of distant explosions. At 11am he was summoned from his offices at the American information centre to the separate embassy compound for a meeting of diplomatic staff. “I walked in and realised it wasn’t a meeting, it was an evacuation. Safes were being blown, papers were being shredded.” Carter was told he would be on the first helicopter out, leaving at about 1.30pm that afternoon.

But Carter, having seen four or five collegaues on to the 1.30pm helicopter, turned back, hoping to arrange the evacuation of about 200 Vietnamese: local staff, journalists and employees of the Ministry of Information who were counting on Carter for a way out.

He had already given up on the idea of bussing them into the embassy; no vehicle could get through the throng at the gates. As he waited for his colleagues to depart, he telephoned through to the information centre, advising people to try to reach his villa by foot; it was closer to the embassy - perhaps something could be arranged from there.

“I know after the fact they did get to my villa, but that is the last I know. The awful piece of knowledge I picked up later was that they called over to the embassy and talked to a marine guard, who said: ‘Carter and the others had taken off by helicopter.’ So when I came back from the embassy roof, no one was answering the phone at the US Information Service, or at my villa. That turned out for me to be enormously difficult - for them to think that I had just taken off.” He spent much of the day, until he finally left at midnight, trying to trace them. He never did find any of the people who had been relying on him.

After Saigon, Carter headed a Vietnamese refugee camp in Pennsylvania. He retired in 1980 and now lives in Vermont. Like others who served in the US mission at Saigon, he sees echoes in the war in Iraq. “I’ve long been convinced that we have an almost missionary instinct to remake other countries in the world in our own image.” In both cases, he argues, America
entered into war for the wrong reasons, and pursued those wars in the wrong way. And in both cases, “from my perspective we got out badly. We haven’t been able to get out of Iraq, and in the case of Vietnam we got out as badly as we got into it.”

EVACUATED 5AM APRIL 30

There were some in the US embassy in the spring of 1975 who openly said the end was inevitable, and that it was time to extricate American personnel and the tens of thousands of local people compromised by their association with the government of the south. The US ambassador Graham Martin and Wolfgang Lehmann, deputy chief of the mission to the embassy, were not among them. It wasn’t blindness, Lehmann maintains, but steely common sense. “All along we had to make sure things were done on time, but not before time,” he says. “If things were done too early, it would create a panic and everything would go to hell.”

But by the morning of April 29 it was clear that E-Day had arrived. Martin, already feeling the effects of the emblycer that would eventually kill him, effectively left all decision-making to Lehmann.

In Lehmann’s memory, there were no mob scenes, no panic-maddened Vietnamese surrounding the walls of the embassy. “It was generally very orderly except for a few cases where some of the Vietnamese wanted to take heavy bags,” he says. “Even at the end when it became clear that we had to leave these people behind, well, there was weeping, but it was still orderly.”

At around 3am on April 30 he learned there would be only 13 more helicopter sorties in and out of the embassy. Together with the ambassador, Lehmann entered the control room to tap out a last cable, advising Washington that the embassy would be shut down by 4.30am. “Due to the necessity of destroying communications gear this will be the last message from the US embassy in Saigon,” it said.

Both men climbed up the outdoor ladder leading from the embassy’s sixth floor to the helicopter pad. Martin climbed aboard and Lehmann went to follow him, but the pilot put up his hand - halt! - before closing the door and taking off. Soon after 5am, another helicopter touched down for Lehmann and six of his staff.

“That ride out, nobody said a word. There was absolute silence. The only thing you could hear was the sound of engines. It was a mix of sadness and anger. I was angry at our own system because it created a situation that basically amounted to a betrayal - a betrayal of the Vietnamese people and basically of the 58,000 Americans killed in the Indochina commitment.”

In Lehmann’s view, America’s project in south-east Asia, and the government in South Vietnam, remained viable as late as the summer of 1974 when impeachment proceedings began against then president Richard Nixon. By the time Nixon resigned on August 9, the anti-Vietnam lobby - “useful idiots”, he calls them - were a formidable force, and the US Congress was in no mood to vote for more funds for the government in Saigon. “What Congress did at the time was to give Hanoi a green light to go ahead, and opt for an all-out military option,” he says.

Thirty years later, at the age of 83, Lehmann still finds it a shameful decision. “It was a situation that could have easily been prevented had we mounted the national will to do so. It was a case of self-imposed impotence whose consequences followed us for years.”

EVACUATED 5.30AM APRIL 30

By the time Captain Stuart Herrington, who worked in the defence attache’s office at the embassy, arrived there on the morning of April 29, it was clear the day was not going according to plan. His understanding had been that a limited number of helicopters would alight on the roof of the embassy to evacuate key staff. Others, including Vietnamese whose names appeared on official evacuation lists, would be loaded on five or six buses and driven out to the airbase.

That tidy scenario was soon scrapped; the embassy was teeming with people, 3,000 in all. “Hordes of people, all of them with suitcases. They had all descended on the embassy based on the gut feeling that this was a safe place to be. We puzzled for years as to how they got in there, and it just seems very clear in hindsight that Vietnamese employees of the embassy, nice sympathetic US Marines, American staffers - I think there was a giant conspiracy to help these people.”

In the melee, it was impossible to say how many in the crowd were official evacuees, and how many had just seized their chances. Herrington just focused on trying to maintain calm as the hours dragged on. Almost all of the available helicopters were being used to evacuate people from the airbase outside town. On the embassy rooftop, only one or two touched down an hour.

“It got dark and it rained. We would get a helicopter every now and then, and people would start to panic that they would be left behind. We spent our time walking among them, saying: ‘Dung lo’ - ‘Don’t worry, nobody is going to be left behind.’ The crowds were close to panicking; pushing and shoving and using their suitcases as battering rams.”

The crowds did not ease until late in the day when the marines hacked down a giant tamarind tree in the embassy compound to make way for a second helicopter pad. At midnight, the first of the heavy lifters came in, landing in the embassy grounds. The bigger Sea Stallion helicopters, which could take up to 90 people, but only if they dumped all their belongings, were guided into the grounds by the head-lights of official sedan cars arranged in a circle around a makeshift helicopter pad.

There were about 420 Vietnamese left when Herrington’s commanding officer arrived to tell him there would be one more helicopter at the most, and that the captain would have to be on it. The order, he was told, came directly from President Gerald Ford. “It was a really, really stinking situation and Americans, particularly embassy people and people like me, were just suffering a terrible fit of conscience for what we knew we were doing. All the people left behind, and all the promises we made, all the grief and bloodshed, and all the years and years of promising these people that we would not allow Saigon to be overrun at the point of a gun. And here we were presiding over the very event we promised them time and time again we would never allow to happen.”

Herrington stayed at the heli-pad in the grounds for a few minutes more, assuring the remaining Vietnamese their chopper would come. He then quietly crept into the bushes, entering the embassy by a side
one block from the Gallery Place/China Town Metrorail Station

—Washington, D.C.—

kicks off...

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Kean had long since lost his belief in America’s mission in Vietnam by then. “It seems like there was mistake after mistake and it couldn’t be undone.” The outbreak of the war in Iraq reinforced many of his convictions. “I told my wife: ‘Holy hell, here we go.’ It’s utterly amazing to me how we can get committed to things like this,” he says. “There has got to be a better way than killing our young.”

Released Thursday, April 28, 2005

door. To his enduring distress, things were so chaotic that when his helicopter rose from the roof above the deserted streets of Saigon at 5:30am, there were just four people aboard.

He stayed on in the military, rising to the rank of a full colonel before retirement, and has advised the Pentagon at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. But that early-morning flight stands out in his memory. “It was the only time in my 30-year career and three different wars that I ever felt ashamed.”

But Herrington’s helicopter would not prove to be the last to leave the embassy. Somehow, 11 marines had been left behind on the roof, among them Major James Kean and Sergeant John Valdez. A few hours earlier, the last ambassador to Saigon, Graham Martin, had made his departure, with the stars and stripes folded under his arm. The code word “Tiger” went out over the radio to the US navy ships waiting off the coast, and in Washington Henry Kissinger went on national television to announce that the evacuation was complete.

“Given the nature of the war in Vietnam, 11 guys probably wouldn’t have made much difference,” says Kean, now 63. “It would have been one more thing in a long list of screw-ups. Most of us associate April 30 1975 with retreat and defeat.” It would take more than two hours to send a helicopter sortie back to get them.

Valdez was the senior non-commissioned officer in charge of the marine security detachment at the embassy in Saigon. Kean was in overall command of the marine guards at 23 US embassies across Asia. Officially, their duties were to protect classified material, but by the late afternoon of April 29 nobody was paying much attention to official job descriptions.

At the embassy gates, marines were struggling to bring in a handful of Vietnamese who were eligible for evacuation without letting in more crowds. Inside the compound, the air was thick with ash from incinerated classified material and from US banknotes - more than $4m went up in smoke that day - and the swimming pool was full of confiscated weapons from the fleeing South Vietnamese. The activity had ended abruptly at around 4am when Kean learned that Washington had halted the evacuation. “I got on the phone, and I said: ‘General, there are still more than 400 people sitting down here on their luggage waiting for a line, the general said: ‘The president directs ...’” The marines had their orders.

Valdez had then told his men to form a semicircle and walk slowly backwards to the main embassy building, keeping their eyes on the crowd. He had then placed himself in the last batch - which would eventually dwindle to the forgotten 11. “As we were getting closer to the embassy, the Vietnamese put two and two together, and realised we were leaving,” he says. “We had to pretty much fight our way into the embassy.”

Once inside, they slammed a huge log against the embassy’s heavy teak gates, cut the electricity to the building’s lifts, and locked the fire doors on each stairwell as they climbed the six flights to the roof. They had reached the fourth floor when someone rammed a water truck through the heavy teak doors. The 400 abandoned Vietnamese were soon in hot pursuit.

On the top floor of the building, the last few marines built a makeshift barricade with fire extinguishers and metal wall lockers. From the compound below, they could hear the comissary being looted, and the embassy’s fleet of white sedans. By the time the rescue party appeared on the horizon, the North Vietnamese were thrusting deep into the capital. About an hour after the last marines were airlifted from the embassy roof, a North Vietnamese tank crashed through the gates of the presidential palace. Saigon had fallen.

Kean had long since lost his belief in America’s mission in Vietnam by then. “It seems like there was mistake after mistake and it couldn’t be undone.” The outbreak of the war in Iraq reinforced many of his convictions. “I told my wife: ‘Holy hell, here we go.’ It’s utterly amazing to me how we can get committed to things like this,” he says. “There has got to be a better way than killing our young.”

Released Thursday, April 28, 2005
COVERT ACTION
A VITAL OPTION
IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Andre Le Gallo

Andre Le Gallo, a retired senior Central Intelligence Agency officer, ran clandestine operations (including covert action) in South-East Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America for three decades. He was the senior intelligence manager in four countries. He also served as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism in 1988-89. He was a vice president in an international energy company for five years and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution for two years. He is now the President of the San Francisco chapter of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers and is a consultant to government and business.

At this time of high-risk international changes, the United States must use all of our capabilities and to dust off the instruments of Covert Action (CA). CA can advance U.S. interests in the war on terrorism, in dealing with opposition to U.S. policies overseas, and serve as a positive force in facilitating democratization.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is defined by its clandestine arm, the Directorate of Operation (DO). The DO, the tip of the spear, has three basic portfolios: Foreign Intelligence (FI), Counter Intelligence (CI), and Covert Action. FI refers to the task of collecting (i.e. “stealing secrets”), and producing otherwise unobtainable intelligence; CI focuses on preventing others from stealing secrets, and CA is defined in U.S. law as activity meant “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

But, the news media normally uses the term “covert action” to mean just about any government activity that is outside of diplomatic channels. Even the more initiated use the term to refer to clandestine operation in general. As rightly noted in Foreign Affairs, the word “clandestine” refers to the operation itself. When Louis XVI provided resources to the incipient American forces early in the Revolutionary War, that was covert action. But, when George Washington was running his Culper ring of spies, the first organized intelligence organization in the United States, against the British military target in New York, those were clandestine operations.

Benjamin Franklin, an early and avid propagandist, was also a pioneer in the use of CA. For example, he was successful in decreasing the number of Hessian mercenaries under arms by “leaking” a letter from an imaginary German Count to the commander of the Hessian troops fighting for Britain. Since the German Count was paid a bounty for each Hessian killed in action, but not for the wounded, Franklin had the German author recommend that Hessians, if wounded in battle, would be better off dead than crippled. As a result, a large percentage of the Hessian mercenaries defected.

CA has had a controversial history since the National Security Act of 1947 placed responsibility for covert action with the CIA, newly created by the same Act. Over the years, various administrations have directed the CIA to use this tool when diplomacy was too weak or military action too strong. CA first showed its value immediately after WW II when it denied power to the Communist Part of Italy (CPI). More recently, in what was probably the largest CA program ever, the CIA led a coalition of countries in a covert program that evicted Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. These were major programs intended to have strategic impact. There have also been many smaller CA operations aimed at influencing local opinion in support of various U.S. policies. They principally used clandestine access to the local media, or made use of “agents of influence.” Perhaps the best-known example of an agent of influence operation by a hostile power was Harry Hopkins, described by former KGB London Rezident Oleg Gordievsky as “the most important of all Soviet wartime agents in the United States.”

CA can use shotgun or rifle methodology. That is, it can try to manipulate policies by influencing popular thinking about an issue or it can focus on a single key official, or on a few key individuals. Election operations tend to focus on the voters, that is helping the supported candidate run an effective campaign, either through more ample resources or better ideas or both. Where elections are unknown, or controlled by the government already in power, trying to get close to individuals with leverage makes more sense. Where the decision maker has only one “Rasputin-like” key adviser, that is the person on whom to target. CA cannot by itself create a tide of public emotions to reverse national beliefs. Italy’s Christian Democrats in the late 1940s would have run their electoral campaigns anyway. But CA assistance empowered them to beat the communist party at the polls. The Afghans would have fought the Soviets even without CIA assistance. But the CIA provided the Mujahidin with the resources to be successful - so successful that the CIA’s original goal, to make the Soviets pay for their aggression, changed to kicking the Soviets out of Afghanistan, a goal reached in 1989 when the last Soviet tanks crossed the Amu Darya River. In each case, a popular but impotent, base already existed.

THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL ISLAM

CA in Italy and Afghanistan was within the West’s policy of containing Soviet Communism. Today, a new “ism” must be faced. The United States and the West have been attacked by Islamic Radicalism struggling to impose its will primarily against what it considers apostate rulers in areas formerly controlled by the Muslim institution of the Caliphate, from Andalusia to Aceh. This adversary has been unsuccessful on its home turf so it has decided to take his rage on the road, attacking the home base of what it perceives to be the global source of a cultural cancer, the United States. The U.S. is in the crossfire between Muslim extremism and a passive Muslim mainstream. Like other weak movements led by true believers, this one is attempting to force societal changes through fear and destruction, through...
terrorism. What has been called “the War on Terrorism” is a polite euphemism. The contemporary adversary is not terrorism; it is Radical Islam, obtaining its ideology from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements and using terrorism as its weapon of choice.

This enemy’s fanaticism is based on a medieval dogma, preaching the reinvigoration of Islam to its previous geopolitical importance. But its weapons are as modern as the Internet. The movement hides behind religion, but the goal is to gain power. Its leadership is wealthy, but the foot soldiers are recruited using their own personal needs for validation and hope. It has been at war for years but the U.S. – and the world – noticed only on 11 September 2001 (9/11).

Washington’s response to 9/11 has been quick and effective, in the short run. But, a better balance between the tactical and the strategic is necessary. Terror attacks certainly need to be prevented. Tactically, that can be done only through intelligence and special military operations, with an emphasis on the offense. CA’s larger potential is on the strategic side. Can any person or country turn the dial to change the beliefs of an Usama bin Ladin? Probably not, but an effort should be made to separate the al Qa’ida leadership from its recruiting pool. The U.S. simply cannot continue to allow Islamists to spot, recruit and train terrorists unopposed. An attempt must be made to change the conditions that drive the foot soldiers into al Qa’ida’s dead-end street, and to change the perceptions of the U.S. and the West. And here seemingly paradoxical priorities must be worked out since the Iraq war has undoubtedly added to bin Ladin’s pool of recruits. But success in Iraq would go a long way to deny foot soldiers for the wannabee caliphs. The Iraqi conflict has attracted fighters from other countries like flies to flypaper. The argument has been made that, if they weren’t in Iraq, they might be in New York or San Francisco blowing up non-combatants. But two wars must be fought. In the longer term, if the U.S. and its allies fail to deal with “root causes” and focus their efforts only against today’s shooters, we are destined to fight forever while new terrorists are being spawned at a faster rate than we can lock them up or kill them. The requirement is for a longer-range weapon. Covert Action is ideally suited to this task.

DEVISING A STRATEGY

The challenge is at several levels. One, the U.S. must convince its allies that they are also at risk and gain their full cooperation on a less than grudging level. And the appeal of Radical Islam in the Developing World must be addressed. This part of the issue has religious, political and economic facets. The Islamists are at war with Western culture in more than they are at war with countries per se. Radical Islam is out to change a Western culture that is offensive to its fundamental tenets. The Fundamentalist disgust of western culture was famously expressed by Sayd Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, following an educational stay in the United States: “All these Westerners are the same: a rotten conscience, a false civilization. How I hate these Westerners, how I despise all of them without exception.” Usama bin Ladin’s early mentors included Muhammad Qutb, Sayd’s brother, and Abdullah Azzam, both members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Theirs is truly a war “sans frontières.”

CA is effective only if it supports policy, and our policy seems to be lagging behind events. Difficult choices must be made. Professor Bernard Lewis, who has written extensively on Islam and the Arabs, identifies two schools of thought among Muslims: one believes that they must revive Islam as it was a thousand years ago, and the other that Islam is capable of modernizing itself to fit into the current century.7 Politically, a large part of the Arab street’s feelings about the United States is based on U.S. support to the dictatorial regimes that govern those same streets. The street wants change while its government is hanging on to the status quo, backed by other status quo countries such as France, as French writer Pascal Bruckuer characterizes that country. And economically, the U.S. must emphasize the priority of political institutions and the rule of law prior to showering any country with more millions or billions of dollars it cannot handle. This means changing failed command economies in failed dictatorships. It means reversing beliefs apparently accepted by mostly young, underemployed populations that their problems are of “foreign”, mostly American and capitalist (dating back to Cold War propaganda), origins and by an allegedly continuing Christian crusade against Islam. This is a much greater problem than CA alone can take on. However, when the Western message is dead on arrival because of its U.S. origin, then CA has a major role to play. The CIA, and other Western intelligence agencies need to identify or create mechanisms to support moderate Islamic elements.

One key area that needs to improve is education. The religious schools teaching the Qu’ran and hatred of the West are manufacturing tomorrow’s suicide bombers. While shutting them down would be counterproductive, making sure there is a viable alternative to the Madrasas is possible. As a precedent, American universities have experience in setting up and running educational programs overseas. But the U.S. shouldn’t rely on American universities alone. Any institution, American or not but preferably local, willing to teach useful topics like the three R’s, in a frame work emphasizing the personal freedoms and free enterprise, should be included. The U.S. government should make resources available, as should the international institutions, as should non-government organizations (NGOs). And where overt U.S. or Western sponsorship would negate the effectiveness of the program, then covert action resources should be made available.

Similarly, many moderate Muslims believe that a non-violent Islam fitting into the modern world. But they have been too timid, or without resources, to make themselves heard. Covertly sponsoring private media outlets to reflect the voice of moderate, mainstream Islam should not be out of the question. Admittedly, some government radios and TV stations (Al-Hurra and Sawa) are broadcasting to the Middle East. Being U.S. government-sponsored, their music is more welcome than their message. Since known government sponsorship negates the message, CA needs to step in.

Do people in the Middle East really hate the United States as much as the media and the polls allege? Are the anti-U.S. demonstrations really aimed at the America, or are they “faute de mieux” safety valves. Most Middle East governments, which have done little or nothing to improve the quality of their citizens’ lives
censure criticism, unless it is directed at outside, typically toward the United States, the default setting. The “Arab street” takes its lead from two sources: its own government and populist voices, often beyond their borders. These two groups are both the West’s competition and its target audience. A positive, and early, resolution to the Iraq war holds great potential to affect the conditions responsible for the so-called “root causes.”

**TAKING THE LONG VIEW**

The solution to the problems foisted on the U.S. by a Radical Islam trying to fit into the 11th century rather than the 21st reaches beyond a military-only effort. Soldiers, together with the intelligence officers, can give America time by shutting down the immediate threats. The longer view requires more complex solutions. The Marshall Plan worked after WW II. But, to stem a global war without front lines, against enemies with no addresses, motivated by religious/political motives, and hijacking the causes largely spawned by bad governance, Washington and its allies must wake up to the size and complexity of the challenge. Guns can give us a short-term reprieve.

This time must be used by the West to structure and implement long-term solutions. Translated into resource allocation, policy makers need to look beyond the needs of the military and focus also on facilitating the transition of developing countries into the modern world. Some changes will happen with or without us. The process can’t be fully controlled. But, over time, the West can try to manage and guide that transition toward systems that will be accountable to the people of the countries where the changes are taking place. Eventually, democratization in local variations is the inevitable outcome. An attempt must be mitigate the unavoidable and concomitant destabilization.

The task is monumental. In the short run, the intelligence and the military tools can create time. In the long run, Covert Action, in coordination with the overt instruments of policy, can give the West a significant level of control on the levers to change in the Middle East. The alternative is endless terrorism.

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**END NOTES**

2. Ibid., p.104

**Bad Guys Love to Work Under Cover of Darkness**

We All Must Report to Police/Security
- Attempts to Enter Off-Limits areas
- Suspicious Requests for Information
- People Stalking Documents from Trash
- Unattended Packages in Crowded Public Places
- Suspicious Surveillance of Houses or Public Areas
- Anything Else That Seems “Suspicious”

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**MEMBER SPOTLIGHT: LOOKING AT FORMER ROCKY MOUNTAIN CHAPTER PRESIDENT DERRIN R. SMITH, PH.D.**

D r. Derrin R. Smith, GSIS professor, received an Academic Fellowship to participate in the Academic Fellows Program of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Tel Aviv, Israel. The overseas program was May 28, 2005 and included programs on counter-terrorism and intelligence issues in the Middle East. Currently teaching graduate courses in Terrorism (INTS-4907), Emerging Security Threats (INTS-4710), and Country Team Operations: Theory and Training (INTS-4312/4313), Dr. Smith is well known for his conflict-zone field research in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and this Fellowship complements his on-going research activities in country team operations and counter-terrorism. The fellowship award was announced on April 5, 2005 by Ms. Gina Grandinetti, Senior Manager at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

This latest academic fellowship award will contribute to an already busy Spring for professor Smith, who also was featured as Keynote speaker at the NATO Studies Center counter-terrorism conference in Bucharest, Romania on April 18, as well as participating in the Black Sea regional security conference convened during the period April 19-22 2005.

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**University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies Professor Receives Academic Fellowship Award**

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Smith was the Keynote Speaker for the Black Sea Regional Security Conference on Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence. He had two addresses to the Plenary session plus hosted and moderated the Black Sea Narco-Terror Exercise. His presentation “Homeland Security Against Emerging Threats” included high technology pilot-program architectures and related information and Smith concluded with an assessment addressing Return on Security Investment. Event attendance included approximately 150 senior officials from twelve nations, including First and Second Secretaries, deputy-ministers, military attachés and representatives of various security organizations for the Black Sea countries.

For further information on Derrin Smith’s courses and activities, visit his web page at HTTP://WWW.DU.EDU/GSIS/FACULTY/SMITH _ D.HTML or contact him at DERRIN.SMITH@ATT.NET.

Derrin Smith is a life member of AFIO, a member of our Academic Exchange Program, and is former President of the AFIO Rocky Mountain Chapter.

Smith began his career in intelligence and international affairs over 25 years ago, beginning in the US Marine Corps with military occupational specialties in Tactical Intelligence (mos-0231) and Strategic Intelligence (mos-0241). He is a graduate of the strategic intelligence program at Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific, Air Force Air Intelligence Training Command and other military and civilian schools. He was certified in Remote Sensor Employment for Reconnaissance and STA Personnel, and also became a subject matter expert on Devolution of Nuclear Command and Control in the People’s Republic of China while working for a US national laboratory. He has guest lectured at the National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, Hunan Province, China and at the Institute of Opto-Electronic Technique Research in Tianjin. He spent five years as a civilian member of a Rapid Emergency Response team before teaching at the Graduate School of International Studies.

In addition to courses in International Terrorism and Emerging Security Threats, Dr. Smith has created curriculum in Country Team Operations—Theory and Practice under the auspices of the Country Team—Studies and Operations Center, a non-profit entity that he directs. He continues to travel widely for both public and private sponsors, and returned to central Asia and the Balkans this past June.
By all accounts, Art Lindberg was a quiet and modest man. He had been in the military for nearly 20 years, since graduating with a geology degree from UNM. It was 1977 and Lindberg now retired from a senior management position with Jersey Central Power & Light Company—was a US Navy lieutenant commander, serving as procurement director at the Naval Air Engineering Center in Lakehurst, New Jersey.

At 41, Lindberg was becoming bored with his duty assignment. Retirement was still two years off. The procurement department was functioning well. He had been successful in incorporating the use of computers into the procurement process. Still, he longed for more excitement.

On June 27, 1977, Lindberg’s desire became reality. After a series of meetings with Terry Tate of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Lindberg accepted a potentially deadly, top-secret assignment, subsequently dubbed “Operation Lemonade.” His life would change forever.

Spy Saga
Not Your Ordinary Glass of Lemonade

Steve Carr
From Mirage
University of New Mexico Alumni Magazine

MEMBER SPOTLIGHT:
Looking at AFIO New England Chapter
President Art Lindberg

Central to an FBI sting operation, Art Lindberg, ‘58 BA, went undercover to help identify and capture three Soviet spies in Operation Lemonade...

As procurement director, Lindberg had assumed the meetings initiated by Tate in April were for contractual investigations. “No need for alarm,” he thought. “I was confident of my operation and knew things were going well. I had no idea that Tate had ‘ulterior motives.”

In May, Tate asked Lindberg if he would consider an extremely dangerous and sensitive assignment for his country.

“All I knew was that there would be no monetary reward. Because the operation was classified “Top Secret,” it could never be shared with friends, associates, or family. And it could involve danger and travel to strange destinations,” says Lindberg. “Specifics of the assignment would not be revealed until after I had agreed to accept the challenge.”

Lindberg later learned what the FBI already knew: the Soviets were using their United Nations mission in New York City as an espionage base, and the New York-New Jersey area was perfect spy territory. The FBI suspected a connection between the Soviet Merchant Marine and the KGB, using a vacation cruise ship as a floating center for spies. The FBI had been looking for someone to serve as a go-between, offering to sell American classified information to the KGB, and eventually trapping the Russians. Lindberg fit the bill.

The plan was put into motion. Suddenly Lindberg was living three lives, each “separated from the others by impenetrable walls,” he recalls. Not, only was he a dutiful US Naval officer, he was also a husband and father actively involved in family activities, including picnics, scouting, swim club, PTA, homework, church, and Sunday school.

His third life was just beginning—that of a clandestine agent. Meetings with special agents from the FBI became mutual evaluation sessions. The secretive nature of the mission was reiterated as was the mantra: “no benefits, no money, possible travel, no sharing with anyone—not even your wife—no one.”

The official offer was made to Lindberg minutes before he began a one-week vacation with his in-laws on the eastern shore of Virginia. The FBI gave him that week to make up his mind. He cycled the same questions over and over again in his head: “What am I accepting? Why should I take on something new? What impact will it have on my family? What will it do to my life? Is there any benefit to me personally? Why should I do it?”

Late in the week, Lindberg came to the realization that just maybe he was being called upon by a higher entity to serve his country.

“The Sunday before we left, I went to a small Methodist church where about 40 people were in attendance,” Lindberg says. “The only thing I heard throughout the service was the preacher saying, ‘Seize opportunities to serve God and your country.’”

“It became a very critical element of the entire operation,” says Lindberg. “I relied on it for strength. Once I heard it, the decision to take the assignment was very simple.”

Lindberg never imagined nor could he have dreamed what the results of his simple “yes” would be. At the time, he knew nothing about five men—a Baptist, three Jews, and a Ukrainian nationalist—suffering the extreme hardships of captivity in the Soviet Union’s gulag system with no hope of release for at least 10 years.

Reading the Recipe

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SECRET INGREDIENT

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Stirring the Pot

In late July, after the FBI was satisfied with his background and potential, Lindberg bought a ticket at the New York
office of the Soviet-run March Shipping Line and boarded the MS Kazakhstan for a cruise to Bermuda. The plan was to entice the Russians into an espionage trap.

“It was a very lonely cruise,” recalls Lindberg. “I didn’t get to interact with anyone. I was assigned my own cabin and sat for meals with three ladies—an older woman and her two daughters. They tolerated me and I tolerated them.

“The crew was aloof, standoffish, and didn’t interact. The main reason was because they were afraid someone would see them talking to a non-Soviet and non-Communist. They were on a short leash and very controlled. There was KGB on board, which is what we were trying to find out.”

Following the weeklong, uneventful cruise, Lindberg handed a note he had written the night before to the last officer on board before disembarking. In it he said he was an American naval officer interested in making some additional money before retirement, and that he could provide information of interest.

BITING THE BAIT: A surveillance camera captured this photo of Soviet spy Valdik Enger in 1978 as he pockets information left for him by Art Lindberg to the Soviets. The note contained a telephone number, and a time and day to call. Lindberg signed it, “Ed.”

A week later, he received the second phone call with more instructions from the Soviets. They told him to drive to a Sears store in nearby Asbury Park.

Thirty minutes later he arrived and the phone rang. He was instructed to reach under the shelf where he found a note inside a magnetic key case.

The note was extensive, containing instructions about their next point of contact and a series of more than 30 questions designed to size up Lindberg and his abilities. Did he have access to classified information such as the Trident missile launched by submarine? Was he willing to deliver materials to the Soviets? Could he take classified materials home from work? Lindberg answered, convincingly.

Over the next several months, the meetings and details became more involved as the stakes grew higher. The camouflage for the notes ranged from crushed Marlboro cigarette packs to Coca-Cola cans to Tropicana orange juice containers—stuff no one would bother to pick up or give a thought to. Inside each container were messages and thousands of dollars in $20 bills.

“I would disguise the containers with glued-on dirt, making them look like trash,” says Lindberg. “During this period I got $20,000 from the Soviets, all of which was turned over to the FBI. I saw later where they evaluated the information to be worth $30 million. The information I passed was all Navy classified documents that had been declassified for this operation, except for the final documents.”

GLASSMATES

On October 15, 1977, Lindberg delivered classified information regarding anti-submarine warfare and left it at a specified drop point inside New Jersey’s Garden State Parkway. With his life on the line, Lindberg had a keen sense of his surroundings, and was keeping an eye out for any information at the drop-off points that might help identify the Russians.

“Without being obvious, I was looking for plate numbers and descriptions of cars,” says Lindberg. “I would turn that information over to the Bureau.”

Lindberg likened the undertaking to a James Bond operation: “I could press a button giving me a flat tire in case I needed to cause a delay. I used miniature cameras mounted in my car grille and taillights to take pictures of cars. The FBI anticipated communication spots so that we could record phone calls. This thing got to be kind of neat, in retrospect.”

After the October 15 drop-off, Lindberg told NIS and FBI agents about a dark blue car with New York plates reading “XLT.” It turned out to be registered to Rudolf Chernyayev, a Soviet employed by the United Nations as a personnel officer, and one of the key players.

By April 1978, NIS and FBI agents had identified two other Soviets: Valclik Enger, on staff at the UN Secretariat, and Vladimir Zinyakin, the Third Secretary of the Soviet mission to the UN.

FIRST SIP

On August 30, Lindberg pulled his Ford Maverick into the parking lot of a diner in central New Jersey with the designated outside pay phone. He was a few minutes early and didn’t know if the Soviets would take the bait. At 11:45 a.m., the call came.

“Hello, Ed,” said an accented voice. “My name is Jim. We got your message and would very much like to meet with you. I’ll call you again—same time, same number—a week from today.”

Operation Lemonade was on. Entrenched in carrying it out successfully, Lindberg headed back to the base at Lakehurst.

SWEETENING

BIG GULP

On Saturday, May 20, 1978, the time arrived to catch the Soviets with information that would lead to their arrest—information that could convict them of conspiracy to steal military secrets. They needed to be caught red-handed.

The back of Lindberg’s car was gutted and replaced with peat-moss containers filled with Styrofoam. Two FBI agents were hidden in the trunk of his car. Teams of agents on the ground were instructed by one of the agents in the trunk where the
drop would transpire.

Lindberg made the drop at the appointed time and spot, near a clearing on a seldom-used service road. There he placed an orange juice carton with five, seemingly plastic, 35 mm film containers. Because spies are known to carry acid with them in order to destroy evidence, the film containers were actually made of titanium, with reverse threads, sealed with epoxy.

After making the drop, Lindberg walked back to his car, got in, and drove off. Shortly after leaving the site, Lindberg heard one of the agents in his trunk scream into his walkie-talkie. "They got them!"

"They got them!"

The FBI had arrested Chernyayev, Enger, and Zinyakin. Chernyayev and Enger were charged with conspiring to buy military secrets. They were convicted and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. Zinyakin, with diplomatic immunity, was deported.

Nearly a year after their arrest and months after their conviction, Chernyayev and Enger were taken to Kennedy Airport in New York and led to the front of a Russian Aeroflot while five Soviet dissidents—a Baptist, three Jews, and a Ukrainian nationalist—were led out the rear.

"It broke the logjam on emigration from the Soviet Union," says Lindberg. "It became easier for people to leave.

I am extremely proud of having played a part in it."

"Lemonade opened a whole new area of interest to me," says Lindberg, who is currently president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, northeast region. "It has given me a much greater appreciation of being an American and of all the freedoms America stands for. Tied in with that is a thankfulness for all that so many have done and continue to do defending our freedoms."

LIFE-CHANGING EXPERIENCE: Almost three decades since he played a pivotal role in capturing Soviet spies, Art Lindberg has found new interests in the Association of Former Intelligence Officers where he serves as President of AFIO's large David Atlee Phillips New England Chapter. He can be reached at (732) 255-8021.

Undercover Washington: Where Famous Spies Lived, Worked and Loved by Pamela Kessler. (Capital Books, paperback, 176 pp. $15.95)

Kessler, a former Washington Post reporter, knows the regional espionage landscape and takes the reader on a guided tour of drops, safehouses, graveyards, mansions, museums, secure government offices and restaurants used for rendezvous in the Washington area. If you want to find the mailbox used by traitor Aldrich Ames to signal he had something for the KGB, Kessler tells where to go. Ditto the Georgetown mansion where Wild Bill Donovan held secret meetings during World War II. Also the grotty Georgetown restaurant, Au Pied de Cochon, from which Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko walked out on his minders and strolled further up Wisconsin Avenue to the Soviet embassy to re-defect.

Accompanying this greatly updated text which quickly sold out the last time it appeared [warning] are more than 60 photographs of secret operatives and the hangouts where they lived, worked, loved and sometimes died gruesome deaths. If you will be visiting Washington Metro area for the AFIO Symposium, or for other business events, or for pleasure, or know people who will, this is an ideal gift or personal reference manual. AFIO Chairman Peter Earnest says about the book, "Fact-filled, rich in illustrations, and penned in her breezy style, Pam Kessler’s tour of the spy capital is a fun and engaging way to delve into real spies and their skullduggery." —review by Derk Kinnane Roelofse, editor, AFIO WINs
English for the first time. In the first letter, dated December 31, 1940, Hitler admitted what could not easily be concealed from Soviet air reconnaissance and long-range patrols: that indeed seventy German divisions and supporting aircraft were deployed in what he called the “Government General,” the term for the portion of Poland seized after the infamous 1939 pact. He claimed he wished to keep them safe from British bombers until the time came to invade England. Any talk of a German strike against the USSR were the result of rumors and “fabricated documents.”

In any event, the letters apparently convinced Stalin to ignore literally scores of invasion warnings. (Murphy requires three full pages to list each of them.) Not untypical was a report on June 17, 1941, from Pavel Fitin, the chief of NKGB foreign intelligence (predecessor of the latter-day KGB). The source was sound: an intelligence officer in Herman Goring’s Air Ministry. Further, the estimate was about as direct as an intelligence report can be: “all preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union have been completed, and the blow can be expected at any time.”

With an angry scrawl in the margin, Stalin returned the report to Fitin's chief: “Comrade Merkulov, you can send your ‘source’ from the headquarters of German aviation to his [expletive deleted] mother. This is not a ‘source’ but a dezinformator.”

Five days later, German armor clanked into the USSR, followed by more than 100 divisions of infantry, covered by planes that smashed much of the Soviet air force on the ground. Thus began a war that would result in the deaths of at least 20 million Soviet citizens.

Historians have long since established Stalin’s unwillingness to accept hard intelligence of the imminent German invasion. Previous books, both first-rate, include Joseph Barros and Richard Gregor, Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler and the Invasion of Russia, by Joseph Barros and Richard Gregor (1995); and Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (1973).

Murphy was able to go a significant step further by obtaining access to previously top-secret Soviet archives. Murphy is a man uniquely qualified to tell the story. He spent a distinguished CIA career on Soviet operations, first as chief of station in Berlin and then as head of Soviet operations at Langley.

One must admit to a twinge of sympathy for the men and women who risked their lives to gather information on the looming war, only to have their cowed intelligence superiors refuse to pass the information to Stalin. The famed Rote Kappelle, or Red Orchestra, which lost dozens of Soviet agents to Nazi torture chambers, had the full story; it was ignored. But most striking, perhaps, was the plight of Richard Sorge, famed in books and films as a...
Soviet agent who posed as a journalist to penetrate the German embassy in Tokyo. Sorge’s accurate reporting on German intentions began in 1940 and continued through June 20, 1941, when he reported that the German ambassador had told him that “war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable.” Stalin accused Sorge of being “a little [expletive deleted] who has set himself up with some small factories and brothels in Japan.” Another report was returned with the notation, “I ask you not to send me any more of this German disinformation.”

When Sorge sat in prison awaiting execution, Tokyo offered to swap him for a Japanese military officer. Stalin replied, “Richard Sorge? I do not know a person of that name.” Sorge went to the gallows. As a sort of consolation prize, in the post-Stalin 1950s he was depicted on a Soviet postage stamp as a “hero.”

That Joseph Stalin was a paranoid reclusive, unwilling to trust even his intimates, has been well established by biographers. David Murphy tells vividly the price the Soviet people paid for having their country run by someone who truly qualifies as a madman. A first-rate read from a man who knows the intelligence business.

Shackley also learned the dark and dirty side of his profession. Intelligence literature is replete with tales of KGB utilizing forgeries to discredit U.S. officials. Shackley gave the communists tit-for-tat when he ran operations against Czechoslovakia. He and colleague Warren Frank decided to ruffle the feathers of a “senior communist official” who was a hard-liner for the Soviets. He had been arrested by the Germany Gestapo in 1941. CIA’s Technical Services Division (TSD) fabricated two letters: one from a Gestapo chief to headquarters stating that the man had volunteered to serve as an informant in the Soviet underground; the other accepting his services. TSD used papers, inks and “all the cachets, formats and bureaucratic language” from the period. The package was given to the Vienna newspaper Wochenpost, ostensibly by a Slovak patriot who found the letters in post-war turmoil. “I don’t believe that this operation was the sole cause of our victim’s eventual fall from grace,” Shackley writes, “but I do think it was one more dab of grease that helped set the skids for him.”

Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11

A few weeks back, I heard former CIA case officer Melissa Boyle Mahle speak to a group of some 220 persons, chiefly Old Boys from or friendly to CIA. The topic was her book, Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11, Nation Books, 403 pages, $26, a sharply critical view of how the Agency became “anorexic” because of inept leadership and political correctness. Among other things, her scorn extended the odd-ball environmental requirements imposed on CIA during the Clinton-Gore years; as one point, she said in effect, “I will risk my life to fight terrorists, but I will not die for a rain forest.”

So how did the CIA-friendly crowd react? Seven persons sat at my table; six of them went to the lobby and bought her book. (I was the seventh; I already had a review copy). To me, the lesson was clear: discontent with the intelligence community runs dangerously deep.

If your eyes flickered over a crowd, Mahle—a slender and rather pretty blonde...
Much of Mahle’s work, understandably, was directed against terrorism. One episode, among many, reflects her frustration. In 1995 a “tidbit” of information located Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in Qatar. He was wanted for masterminding a Philippines-based operation aimed at seizing dozens of airliners. Mahle argued for a “snatch operation,” to lure Muhammad out of Qatar and capture him as he traveled. But the FBI insisted on making a formal request to the Qatar government; during the dithering that followed, the man disappeared. He was finally caught in Pakistan in 2003 and handed over to the U.S.—years after a plot similar to the one he planned resulted in 9/11.

Sadly, at the very time the Agency needed Arabic-speaking street operatives, Mahle was forced out. Because of secrecy requirements, all she can say is that she made “an unauthorized contact” that was “not reported in a timely manner.” Despite determined snooping, I could find no details. But one of her former colleagues told me, “For a male, this would have been a parking ticket, not a capital case.” She and her husband and daughter now live in Fairfax, where she works as a consultant on Middle East affairs.

**DECEIVING THE DECEIVERS**

Consider, for a moment, a staggering thesis that runs counter to conventional wisdom concerning the so-called “Cambridge Three”—the Englishmen Harold “Kim” Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, three of the most notorious spy figures of the 20th Century. The British government long maintained that their services on behalf of the USSR were not detected until 1951, just before the latter two fled to Moscow. Philby followed in 1963.

Now we have an intriguing counter-argument in S. J. Hamrick, *Deceiving the Deceivers* (Yale, $29.95, 297 pages). Mr. Hamrick is a longtime Foreign Service officer, now resident in Rappahannock County, Va., who wrote seven superb novels under the name W. T. Tyler. He argues that British intelligence realized the three were traitors long before their exposure, and that they were left in place so that (a) Philby could be played back against the Soviets; and (b) the other two were shielded for political purposes involving US-British relations.

When word of Mr. Hamrick’s book first circulated some weeks ago, many Old Boys, men long conversant with the Cambridge Three case, scoffed, calling his theory daft and improbable. Perhaps. But let’s see what the man offers, in a summary that of necessity must be terse.

The Philby matter is the most intriguing. Mr. Hamrick postulates that suspicion fell on him in 1946 when a Soviet diplomat in Ankara tried to defect to the British embassy. He was urged to stay-in-place as long as he could (accepted tradecraft) or at least until a ranking MI-6 officer could interview him. This turned out to be Philby, but by the time he arrived in Turkey, the Soviet had been hauled to the airport on a stretcher, his face showing signs of a savage beating. He was never heard of again. This episode alone was not enough to finger Philby as a Soviet spy. But in ensuing years, more information dribbled out, chiefly through the so-called VENONA intercepts of cables from the KGB resident in Washington to Moscow.

But why leave a suspected agent in place? Here is where the Hamrick thesis makes a reader scratch his head and think, “You know, this fellow just might be onto something.” And here is why. During the period 1945-1950 the Western deterrent to Soviet expansion rested upon a supposed American nuclear monopoly—if the USSR started trouble, Moscow would be obliterated with atomic bombs.

But the truth is that the “nuclear deterrent” was non-existent. In early 1947, when David Lilienthal was named chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, he went to Los Alamos to inspect the “arsenal.” As Lilienthal told the Cold War historian Greg Harkin, he was shown a chicken wire enclosure that contained the entire stock of atomic weaponry: one bomb. “One of the saddest days” of his life, Lilienthal lamented. The remaining bombs had been disassembled after V-J Day. Putting them back together would require days. Further, the U.S. had no means of delivering the bombs on Soviet targets even had they existed.

Thus commenced one of the grander scams of the Cold War. The U.S. and Britain decided to mount a black deception operation to peddle the nuclear-superiority myth to Moscow. Doing so, Mr. Hamrick writes, “required a suspected or known Soviet agent of proven credibility whose long loyalty to Moscow and unique access to official secrets amounted to verification. Was one available? Evidently he was”—Philby, of course.

Mr. Hamrick maintains that the Philby deception was solely a British operation, and that documentary proof of his thesis will never be revealed, even if it exists. Such is the nature of deception. The only “verification” came in an off-hand remark by Gen. Edwin Sibert, longtime military intelligence officer, in an interview with the British writer Anthony Cave Brown. But the chronology that Brown gave for what Sibert said had many inconsistencies, Mr. Hamrick states.

The decision to conceal that Maclean and Burgess were spies was political. Briefly, Great Britain was trying to work out a deal with Washington to share nuclear secrets. London knew that revealing that two officials in its Washington embassy were Soviet agents would squelch any deal. Hence the silence until the 1950 identification of Klaus Fuchs as a Russian spy, which made continued protection of Maclean and Burgess moot.

Mr. Hamrick devotes considerable space to a convincing debunking of the
media portrayal of Philby as a “master spy” who managed to deceive the all-powerful Central Intelligence Agency. He correctly notes that the CIA in those years — 1947-49 — was a tissue-paper tiger, ill-organized, staffed by pass-along military officers unwanted by their own services, an ineffectual laughing stock in the national security establishment. He maintains that the “Philby myth” was created in by journalists and others who delighted in tweaking CIA’s nose. And even if CIA was witting of how Philby had been used against the Soviets, tradecraft demanded that the secret be kept.

Now, be forewarned that “Deceiving the Deceivers” is not an easy read, even for someone familiar with the Cambridge Three case. But Mr. Hamrick should not be ignored.

A SPY AT THE HEART OF THE COLD WAR

One missing element in much non-fiction espionage literature is an answer to the question, “Just what information did this agent actually obtain? And was it of any value?” For obvious reasons, neither the spy’s masters nor his targets care to reveal his “take.” Now we have a notable exception the story of Fritz Kolbe, ably told in Lucas Delattre, A Spy at the Heart of the Cold War (Grove/Atlantic, $24, 206 pages, illus.).

The bare outlines of Kolbe’s remarkable story have been told in biographies of Allen Dulles, the OSS officer to whom he reported in Switzerland during World War II. Mr. Delattre, a French journalist, goes further, using Kolbe’s and OSS documents in the National Archives.

Kolbe, a Foreign Ministry official, developed a keen hatred of the Nazis, so much so that he risked his life to sneak across the frontier to talk with Dulles and give him pilfered documents. His information was sweeping, from the Wehrmacht order of battle and morale to sketches of the location of Hitler’s bombproof underground hideout, and the railroad sidings where Himmler and Goering set up quarters. One of dozens of political reports enabled the U.S. to bring pressure on Ireland to stop helping the Germans. No wonder that the late Richard Helms called Kolbe’s information “the very best produced by any allied agent in World War II.”

I offer one quibble. In his prologue, Mr. Delattre writes that “the Germans had an informer in the entourage of . . . Vice President Henry Wallace.” He offered nothing further. Curious, I queried Mr. Delattre by e-mail. He replied that he had no source other than a single document in the National Archives, and a reference in an unclassified 1966 edition of the CIA’s in-house journal, “Studies in Intelligence.” Given that the latter is unavailable to most laymen, I suggest that Mr. Delattre should have printed what he had or otherwise ignored Wallace. Nonetheless, a good read.

LEGENDS: A NOVEL OF DISSIMULATION

Any reader with more than a cursory knowledge of intelligence has two choices with Robert Littell’s new novel, Legend, Overlook Press, $25.95: Toss it across the room into the discard box for the next library sale, or, if you prefer, push reality away for a few hours and enjoy an interesting if very fantastical read. I suggest the American language needs a new word to describe such books, and so I just made one up. Call Littell’s novel “spy-fi.”

Littell’s story involves a CIA operative who might or might not be named Martin Odum, who we meet in retirement (perhaps) working as a private detective in Brooklyn. In his agency career, Odum was also known as Dante Pippen, a bomb maker for the Irish Republican Army; and Lincoln Dittman, a Civil War expert. Each of these guises required a carefully crafted “legend” — that is real spookspeak for a cover story to mask an assumed identity.

And here is where I jump ship on Mr. Littell. In his telling, the mere assumption of a “legend” enables a CIA case officer to live and work in a variety of foreign environments with very dangerous people. Persons in the business suggest that field life ain’t that simple, to say the least. In any event, Littell does put his multi-personality character into a series of perilous situations, and you are required to do some mental scrambling when you face the possibility that the Civil War expert actually lived — or thinks he did, anyway — during that period and got to know such persons as Walt Whitman.

But another bit of fantasy almost caused me to abandon my duty station in mid-read. Odum’s own CIA, in the person of the head of the Clandestine Services, is trying to have him killed to prevent him from revealing that the Agency master-minded the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Here Littell hints at some reality that has yet to be fully explored, and had he stopped there, without once again using the shop-worn device of turning CIA into a Murder, Inc., to borrow words from the late President Johnson, he would have had a more plausible story.

Now I used these pages a year or so ago to heap praise on Littell’s last book, The Company, and I find my words as a cover blurb on Legends, to wit: “…the Cold War might be over, but it still can produce good yarns” Intelligence remains a field where what really [italics] happens can seldom be matched by even a novelist of the talents of Robert Littell.

DIRECT ACTION

That said, one means of producing good spy fiction is to graft a novel onto actual happenings in the world of intelligence. Such is the unique skill possessed by John Weisman, who gives us his third novel in three years that keenly tracks some things that have been happening out at Langley. It is Direct Action, William Morrow, 355 pages, $24.95.

Weisman is painful reading because much of what he describes actually happened in recent years at CIA commencing (more or less) with the regime of John
Deutch as director of central intelligence during the Clinton years. Weisman describes how Deutch and his executive director, a woman named Nora Slatkin, essentially dismantled the CIA’s Clandestine Services, driving away “more than 240 experienced case officers – 40 percent of those with more than 15 years of field experience.” The few who remained found themselves forbidden to have contacts with anyone who had been engaged in any type of criminal or terrorist activity. Guess what happened? CIA was caught blindfolded on 9/11.

Weisman’s story is how a former case officer, now working for a private contractor, sets out to find and...ahem, neutralize...a bombmaker who is planning simultaneous attacks against the US and other Western countries. Suffice to say that this operative is not bound by Deutch-era strictures.

As in his previous works – he has written more than a dozen novels, including the Rogue Warrior series of best-sellers – Weisman has the knack of producing as-it-really-is prose. In effect, he is writing an in-progress history of the modern CIA that goes a long ways towards explaining why it is now so dysfunctional.

THE LAST SENTRY: THE TRUE STORY THAT INSPIRED THE HUNT FOR RED OCTOBER

I must use a shoehorn to fit this book into a piece about spy fiction, but do bear with me for a moment. In 1975-6, reports circulated among Western military attaches assigned to Moscow about a Soviet naval officer who commandeered a destroyer, the Storozhnev, and tried to flee to another country. A massive fleet and air mobilization was required to track him down in the Baltic. The officer, Valery Sablyn, was executed. The Soviets, understandably, did their best to suppress the story of the mutiny.

In 1981, an American naval officer named Gregory D. Young decided to piece the story together while a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. Drawing upon emigre reports and scattered news accounts, he wrote a thesis, “Mutiny on the Storozhnev: A Case Study of Dissent in the Soviet Navy.” The paper found its way to the Naval Academy Library in Annapolis.

Now, the connect: In 1982, a young insurance salesman in Southern Maryland named Tom Clancy was seeking a way to make a living. He chanced upon Young’s paper, they corresponded, Clancy did some work on his own, and he published The Hunt for Red October, a much-fictionalized account of the mutiny that was the first of his many bestsellers.

Now the true story is told by Young and Nate Braden in The Last Sentry: The True Story That Inspired The Hunt for Red October, Naval Institute Press, 250 pages, $28.95.

In real life, Sablyn sought to flee to protest what he felt was an endangering of the Communist system by Premier Leonid Brezhnev and his circle. Clancy shifted the action to a submarine rather than a destroyer and had the skipper defecting to the West, rather than protesting betrayal of red ideology.

Young and Braden did commendable detective work in finding and interviewing members of Sablyn’s family who explained the depth of his discontent. They also obtained Soviet documents pertaining to his trial and execution, as well as a lengthy KGB report on the episode. Not a novel, to be sure, but a well-told account of what happened during the Soviet military during the period when the Evil Empire was headed for a crack up.

SPY HANDLER

Chadwick’s is a smokey neighborhood saloon tucked in under the Whitehurst Freeway at the foot of Wisconsin Avenue, the sort of place where everyone seems to know everyone else. The front window table provides a splendid view of a much-potholed stretch of K Street NW (which dead-ends within a few yards) and a shabby fence enclosing a parking lot. In Espionage 101, Chadwick’s would rank high among places NOT to have a first meeting with someone from a rival intelligence service who is offering to sell information. Too public, no easy egress – its limitations are many.

Nonetheless, that exposed table is where CIA renegade Aldrich Ames launched his secret career of treason. He did so at a 1985 meeting with Victor Cherkashin, the head of KGB counterintelligence in Washington. The story of how Cherkashin served as the handler for Ames and another traitor, Robert Hansen of the FBI, is ably told in Spy Handler, written with Gregory Feifer, Basic Books, 338 pages, $26, black-and-white photographs.

Both treacheries been the subject of perhaps a dozen books. Now we hear the story from the KGB side.

At Chadwick’s, Ames professed to be a patriotic American, but one who felt that CIA “was putting one over on Congress and the American people” by overestimating Soviet strengths. But his decision was a business one: he needed money. He asked only that his identity be concealed from CIA sources within the KGB. Name them, a surprised Cherkashin demanded. Whereupon Ames pulled out a notepad and wrote a list of names.

“That piece of paper,” Cherkashin marveled, “contained more information about CIA espionage than had ever before been presented in a single communication.” He also handed Cherkashin a plastic bag that “contained intelligence reports disclosing even more about CIA operations.

Six months later, Cherkashin scored another big recruitment: that of Hansen.

Aside from the fresh details about Ames and Hansen, Cherkashin’s book is a primer on KGB tradecraft – for instance, how he managed to elude omnipresent FBI surveillance teams when he wished to meet an agent in Washington. He also has somewhat gossipy accounts of bureaucratic infighting in Moscow.

Now that the Cold War is no more, Cherkashin enjoys professional friendships with many of the Americans with whom he once jousted. (A photo shows him in a boat in Russia with Milton Bearden, who ran anti-Soviet operations for CIA.) Which does not mean that Cherkashin has shared
all his secrets. He teases that CIA and the FBI have yet to find yet another mole as valuable as Ames and Hanssen. Deliberate disinformation? Who knows?

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FIRST IN: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF HOW THE CIA SPEARHEADED THE WAR ON TERROR IN AFGHANISTAN

Given the abuse heaped on CIA in recent months — some but surely not all of it deserved — it is a pleasant diversion to read an account of an operation that actually worked. Veteran case officer Gary C. Schroen led a team that went into Afghanistan in the days after 9/11 to prepare for the U.S. Invasion that ousted the Taliban from power. He gives us a true-life adventure story in *First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Ballantine Books, 379 pages, B&W photos, $25.95).

Schroen, 59, was eleven days deep into CIA’s 90-day Retirement Transition Program, winding down a 35-year career in the Clandestine Services, at the time of the attacks. He was immediately tasked with assembling a team to go into Afghanistan and establish contact with the Northern Alliance (NA), one of the main resistance groups opposing the Taliban. Schroen had spent years with the NA and other groups, so he eagerly took on what proved to be the most dangerous and challenging assignment of his career.

First In is a superb case study of how efficiently the CIA works when things go right: the ability to find and equip the needed experts (in communications, weaponry, even medicine) and zip them halfway around the world on short notice. Need outdoors gear for the coming Afghanistan winter? Give each member of the seven-man team – codenamed JAWBREAKER – $1,500 cash, and proceed to an outdoor-equipment store near Agency headquarters in Northern Virginia. Buy dried foods (Power Bars, Tabasco sauce to spice up freeze-dry foods, saltines, cheese spreads) at the local supermarket. And then clamber into transport planes crammed with computers, communications gear – and three cardboard boxes containing $3 million in hundred dollar bills (“all used and none in sequence... packaged in bundles of $10,000...”) to be used to secure the support of and buy arms for the resistance fighters.

The first part of the operation went smoothly. Working with NA officers he knew from previous tours, Schroen set up observation posts overlooking Taliban positions. Coordinates of the main resistance points were plotted and sent to the officials planning air attacks.

But things suddenly dipped downhill. To the dismay of Schroen and the NA, the Pentagon chose not to attack what they considered to be most important targets – the artillery directly to the front – but concentrated on areas far to the rear. Here politics seemed to be involved. The planners of the war did not wish to permit the NA to seize power by conquering Kabul and other cities before American troops were on the ground. Hence support of the NA was sparing.

Despite the many frustrations, JAWBREAKER succeeded. Massive air strikes, followed by a flood of Special Forces troops and other ground soldiers, blasted the Taliban out of existence. But Schroen rightly concludes that much more is needed — including a decision to obliterate terrorist strongholds on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Otherwise, he fears, what is happening in Iraq is a mere sideshow.

A good and fast read that details CIA’s seldom-discussed paramilitary capabilities. A serious book, to be sure, but one that also can be enjoyed as beach reading.

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THE CASTRO OBSESSION

For decades a thick haze of hagiography has shrouded the reputation of the Kennedy brothers, with friendly biographers such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., unwilling to address darker sides of the administration. A striking example is Cuba. For years I heard veteran CIA officers decry being assigned blame for assorted schemes to depose dictator Fidel Castro, ranging from
organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion to an on-going campaign of sabotage and propaganda intended to destabilize his regime. To be truthful, I believed these people, for many were close friends who had no particular reason to dissemble. But what was lacking was the documentary proof essential to a writer. Samuel Halpern, who had a long and distinguished career in CIA’s Clandestine Services (he died a year ago), once lamented to me, “You are not going to find the ‘smoking gun’ piece of paper about Kennedy involvement. They were pretty lousy at the game of intelligence, both of them, but they did recognize the need for deniability,” that is, to put nothing on paper that could lead back to them, instead issuing cryptic orders through friends of demonstrated discretion.

Now the Kennedy veil on Cuba has been pierced, by the longtime Miami Herald reporter and editor Don Bohning, in The Castro Obsession. Potomac Books, Inc. 307 pages. $29.95, a work that is sure to infuriate the remaining Kennedy true-believers still among us. Forget everything else you might have read about Cuba and the Kennedys: Bohning has done the seminal book on the subject, drawing heavily on CIA documents – declassified, ironically, as part of the revelation of government files pertaining to the JFK assassination. (I suspect that CIA cheerfully tossed in the manifesto intended to destabilize his regime.

The very day after the Bay of Pigs failure – a disaster caused in large part by the President’s withdrawal of promised air support – Bob Kennedy wrote a memo to JFK urging a new campaign to deal with Castro. The national security apparatus moved quickly, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “develop a plan for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of US military might.” Distrustful of CIA, the White House put the operation under the tutelage of Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, who had run counter-insurgency operations in the Philippines and Vietnam. The cryptonym chosen was Operation MONGOOSE (although CIA officer Richard Helms would comment wryly that MONGOOSE never quite lived up to its dictionary definition as “an agile mammal”).

Sam Halpern was assigned as deputy director of CIA’s Caribbean Desk in late 1961, just as Lansdale was gearing up. Thus he had an insider’s view of what drove the administration. In one of many damning indictments related by Bohning – and which make his book a wicked delight to read – Halpern years later questioned what made the President and his brother “so full of hysteria, paranoia and obsession about Cuba....It seems to me to be something more to this other....than they got bloody noses at the Bay of Pigs....I mean, to make Cuba the number-one priority of the agency, at the expense of everything else, then to put Bobby in charge of the operations – and this – this boy, really, this hot-tempered boy – to try and run it and do the personal bidding of his brother. Unbelievable.” At one early meeting, Bob Kennedy declared that Cuba “carries the top priority in no uncertain terms in the United States Government – all else is secondary – no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared.”

What appalled veterans such as Halpern, Helms, and officers such as Ted Shackley, who eventually ran CIA’s vast Miami station, JM-WAVE, was that Lansdale insisted on planning covert operations without first doing the essential first step of gathering intelligence on what could likely be done inside Cuba. Consequently, writes Bohning, although some of the schemes were “creative, others [were] obviously unrealistic, unachievable, and even idiotic.” In the latter category certainly fell an idea. Another screwball scheme coming from the Pentagon called for “airdropping [into Cuba] valid Pan American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas, etc....” This supposedly would create “unrest and dissension” among the Cuban people. Oh, perhaps. What must be kept in mind as one reads this Marx-brothers scenarios is that the media have widely blamed them on CIA, and not the Pentagon. Bohning sets the record straight. With an estimated annual budget of $50 million (in 1960s dollars) Shackley ran the largest CIA facility outside of headquarters at Langley, with 300 to 400 officers assigned to Miami alone. The main office was a secluded building on the University of Miami campus, under the cover of “Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc.” Other properties, according to Bohning, included “marinas, hunting camps, merchant shipping, airlines, a motel, leasing and transportation firms, exile-operated publishing outfits,” JM-WAVE “ran the third largest navy in the Caribbean, after the United States and Cuba.” Shackley estimated that up to 15,000 Cuban exiles worked for the agency, to one degree or another.

Looming over this mammoth enterprise was the hot-tempered Bob Kennedy, who seemed to delight in savaging career Agency officers. What frustrated field men were his contradictions. On the one hand, he berated them for not being more aggressive in pushing his pet sabotage schemes. But when the Agency succeeded in one operation – the blowing up of a culvert or transformer, “a minor thing,” according to Halpern, Kennedy was livid about the ensuing publicity. He rang Bill Havey, a Miami operative. According to Halpern, “Bill gets chewed out by Bobby Kennedy on the phone. Harvey tells the attorney general that people are going to talk about it, it’s going to be on the radio, it’s going to be on television....” Intelligence gathering can be done quietly. But “boom and bang means publicity, and you better be ready for it.”

That such a massive campaign could be kept secret was laughable on its face. MONGOOSE relied heavily on Cuban exiles in the Miami area, dedicated patriots, to be sure, but congenitally unable to keep anything secret. Even more cruelly, the campaign gave Castro public justification for making Cuba an even more repressive state. And Latin Americans who could have been reflexively anti-Castro jeered at the United States’ failure to rid the
A Job of Cutting

Sue Huck, Ph.D.

The reviews above were released first to The Washington Times on several different dates in May, June, and July 2005 and are reprinted here with permission.

Joe Goulden had the great pleasure of finishing galleys on The Money Lawyers, due from Truman Talley Books/St. Martin’s Press in January 2006. Goulden is now writing a book on Cold War intelligence. His e-mail is josephG894@aol.com.

The Killers Speak

Jean Hatzfeld is a French journalist whose other works are unavailable in English. They include Dans le nu de la vie, interviews with Tutsi survivors, translated by Linda Coverdale.

Hatzfeld introduces us to a dozen Hutu men in their twenties and thirties who had engaged in an orgy of murder, then imprisoned. We see them grinning into the camera. Most, we learn, were released in May of 2003 to perform “community service.”

Hatzfeld begin with the assumption that the reader has two or more facts to rub together about Rwanda. Let’s just say that geographically, it is one of the pleasant African countries — a hilly green plateau high enough to have a cooler climate, yet warm enough for the staple crop of bananas. Despite its dense rural population, Rwanda’s independent small farmers lived well enough by local standards.

The population is—or was—an equal mixture of Hutus and Tutsis. The small number of Twa avoid them both. From pre-colonial times and into colonial days, when Belgium ruled Ruanda-Urundi, the Tutsis were the dominant tribe. Hutus frankly state that they resent the Tutsis for being taller, better-looking, more intelligent, and keepers of cattle. Members of both tribes easily recognized each other. Intermarriage was rare, and led to tense and often fatal situations.

In 1959, when the last Tutsi king died, the Hutus rampaged. The early 1960s brought independence, democracy, and majority (Hutu) rule, with further massacres in 1963. By military coup, Hutu leader Juvenal Habyarimana took power in 1973, an event accompanied by more killings. In 1990, Tutsi resistance led to the organization, by the Habyarimana clan, of interahamwe militias. (There is the merest hint, in Hatzfeld’s pages, of French influence in the creation of a political “cell” structure and in the training of militia. That is outside the scope of the book.)

Government radio broadcasts ceaselessly fed a Hutu sense of grievance and hostility. Soon came hints of impending violence. Some months before April, party cadres were checking on the supply and condition of machetes — ordinary farm tools. Days before the massacres, U.N. forces were hastily evacuating whites from rural areas.

On the evening of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s aircraft was shot down over Kigali, and within a few hours, the slaughter began. (The timing is incredibly tight. Surely the President did not intend his own death to be “the signal”? A mystery.)

Hatzfeld concentrates on events in a specific rural area, where the order to kill all Tutsis did not arrive until April 11. The cultural veneer of Catholicism vanished with blinding speed. Five thousand were killed in the church, five thousand more at the hospital. After that, the Tutsis hid in the swamps. Oddly unexplained was the apparently total lack of either individual or collective Tutsi resistance.

In the Nyamata region, some 50,000 of the 59,000 local Tutsis were killed within a month, when the Hutus of Nyamata began to flee to the Congo.

What Were They Thinking?

Hatzfeld, an experienced journalist, was already familiar with what had happened. He found his dozen interview subjects locked up and idle, and sat them down individually, repeatedly, in relatively pleasant surroundings. He could easily dismiss excuses, evasions, and other nonsense, and the men soon spoke frankly. It was not as if they were ashamed of themselves!
Intelligence Bookshelf


Retiring Florida Senator Bob Graham served on the Select Committee on Intelligence for ten years, including eighteen months as Chairman. During his service he co-chaired—with then Rep. Porter Goss—the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the intelligence community performance prior to 9/11, the results of which were published in July 2003. Intelligence Matters, is a summary of his role in the joint investigation, his views on the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his recommendations for reform of the intelligence community.

The book is divided into two parts. The first goes over events leading up to the September 11 attacks and includes a very “brief history of U.S. intelligence,” (p. xi), before following the trail of two of the hijackers—Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar—as they prepared for 9/11. In this mix Sen. Graham critiques the performance of the intelligence community players with equal severity, while acknowledging that budget cuts in 2001 forced the CIA “to reduce its HUMINT staff by approximately 20 percent” (p. 69) with foreseeable consequences in performance. His subsequent disagreement when he learned from DCI Tenet that it would take at least 5 years to train junior replacements reveals his grasp of the professional realities involved.

The second part of the book deals with the political and intelligence aftermath of 9/11. The political topics include the difficulties getting administration support for the Joint Committee, the role of the Saudis in 9/11, the problems associated with creating a National Homeland Security Agency, and the November 2002 elections. The intelligence aspects cover the Committee hearings, the Congressional leaks of NSA testimony, and the discovery of FBI files in San Diego that showed, among other things, that one of the hijackers lived “in the home of an FBI asset” (p. 160). Then there are comments on the now familiar WMD issue that led to the “slam dunk” assessment in the run up to the Iraq war, and the battles of declassification of CIA data, all sprinkled with candid anecdotes about dealings with the heads of the intelligence agencies.

There will be considerable debate over the last three chapters in the book. In his conclusions, Sen. Graham lists 11 bipartisan “reasons” that the present administration is not serving the country’s intelligence interests well. Typical, though not documented, are charges of presidential laxity and cover-up. Then an Appendix called, Lessons Learned, discusses “five of the major problems and challenges for American intelligence” (p. 237). With one exception, they lack specificity and are open to interpretation and significance. For example, the first charges that “we have failed to adapt to a changing adversary and global environment.” The fourth, on the other hand, is somewhat hypocritical when it criticizes the “intelligence community” for not implementing “the policies necessary to recruit human intelligence staff, to train them, diversify them, reward or sanction them, or maintain their skills.” The final chapter contains the 19 recommendations of the Joint Inquiry. Most are in the “should aggressively address the possibility...” category and are not helpful. But, the first one recommends that the Community be reorganized and reformed to include a “Director of National Intelligence with appropriate staff” (p. 255); a cabinet level appointment. There is no discussion or hint of awareness that the existing DCI, given adequate support and authority, could perform this function.

While Sen. Graham has shared some interesting insights on how things work in Washington, but he also leaves some doubt as to whether he really understands how much intelligence matters.


After the fall of France to Hitler in 1940, the British formed the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a clandestine paramilitary organization to operate behind enemy lines and aid partisan resistance groups. Occupied France was particularly important since it was clear to all it would have to be invaded before the war could be won—coordinated resistance was essential. SOE sent agents to arrange support to French resistance groups, but they were in many cases unable to assess the partisans military capabilities. British men on the ground were needed, said SOE, and in December 1942 a proposal for 3 man liaison teams—to include Americans and Frenchmen—was approved. The Americans were to come from the recently created Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Special Operations Branch. The teams were called Jedburghs.

Steel From The Sky is the first book about the Jedburghs. Before telling the stories of many of the teams in the field, author Roger Ford describes how they evolved organizationally, the seemingly endless—even in wartime—bureaucratic struggles for power within SOE, the interallied battles with the French and OSS over responsibilities, and the team training and equipment that had to be developed from scratch. He also discusses the recent misconceptions surrounding team composition, and the origins of the name Jedburgh—next on a list of codewords—not from a Scottish town as some authors have suggested. Unfortunately, he does not provide source notes, but he does mention some sources in the narrative that check out well, and he includes a useful appendix with all the Jedburgh teams listed by code-name and member names.

Ford leaves no doubt that SOE was as anxious not to share responsibility as OSS Director Donovan was adamant that they should do so. This conflict along with other problems, resulted in the bureaucratic decision not to deploy any Jedburgh teams before the invasion. Ford considers this decision
a serious operational flaw since it was not possible to replace injured members or equipment in time and in some cases the delay limited the operational missions that could be executed. The major post-invasion complication came when the French demanded that command be turned over to the French team members, a situation for which no plans had been made and which caused considerable confusion.

In the end, more than 90 Jedburgh teams—four with 2 members only—were inserted in to France, Belgium, and Holland. Events moved so fast that those in the latter two countries were not needed for their original purpose. Most of the book is devoted to telling the team stories in eight chapters or parts corresponding to regions of France where they operated. Logistical and communication problems were a justifiable complaint of each team. Nearly all the operations are mentioned though the amount of detail is limited by the records available. Three examples are included to illustrate the missions involved.

The first Jedburgh team—designated Hugh—was inserted on 6 June 1944. It had a dual mission of liaising with the resistance and assisting a British Special Air Service (SAS) unit already in Western France. Hugh’s commander viewed SAS—which he called Sad Athletic Sacks—as a support and tactical liability. Thus, he concentrated on the partisan mission, though it also included dealing with a power struggle between two French resistance groups. In the end they were modestly successful in channeling German troops by destroying bridges and railroads.

The Judex mission turned to catastrophe after finding the right DZ. The alert message noting 40 friends were on the way was misinterpreted to mean 40 aircraft, not people, and the DZ was a busy place. The chaos increased when the demolition ammunition exploded on impact. The partisans were not well trained, and the American 7th Army was expecting help as it advanced up the Rhone Valley.

Team Bruce is an example of diminished operational effectiveness because it wasn’t inserted until the night of 14 August. To make matters worse, it missed the DZ by 30 kms. Comprised of Maj. William Colby, a French Lt., and a French senior enlisted radio operator, it eventually linked up with the Donkeyman resistance network that was reluctant to conduct operations.

The reason became clear later when it was learned the network was then headed by a German double agent. As the course of the war in France became evident, the resistance role diminished and Bruce ended up gathering intelligence rather than fighting Germans. The double agent prudently decided to revise his loyalties.

While Ford stops short of concluding the Jedburgh Programme made a significant difference to the war effort, he leaves no doubt that the Jedburghs themselves were dissatisfied with the quality of support in the field, his final assessment of the program is that “for an endeavor essentially experimental in nature... it was a considerable success” (p. 256).

Whether or not the reader agrees, Ford has provide a thorough assessment of the program.

In 1926 he entered Dartmouth College, a classmate of Nelson Rockefeller—to whom he sometimes lent money—graduating in 1931. During the next ten years George married, joined the Army reserve, and worked at various engineering jobs in New York. He spent most of the war in Alaska where he was involved with the Russian lend lease program and David Chavchavadze—later to serve with him in the CIA—was his top sergeant. In 1944 George was transferred to military intelligence at Camp Ritchie, MD where he worked on Soviet intelligence projects. In March 1946, because he was also fluent in German, he was sent to Fort Hunt, VA, to interview Reinhard Gehlen about his knowledge of Soviet intelligence before being discharged. After a few years working in an enterprise harvesting alfalfa, a childhood friend suggested he come work for the CIA and in 1951, George became a branch chief, GS-14, in the Soviet Division, assigned to operations in the Far East. It was on his return from a trip to the Hong Kong in 1953 that he became involved in one of the most famous CIA cases.

The story of Pyotr Popov has been told elsewhere, but Kisevalter’s version adds some new detail. Popov, a GRU Major, was a walk-in to the Vienna station and his successful handling required someone with the ability to speak peasant Russian and develop his confidence—George was just the man. The case lasted nearly six years before ending in Moscow where Popov was imprisoned, tried and executed. Ashley draws on the firsthand accounts of other CIA officers involved to show the value of Popov’s contributions and tell how the case reached its end.

The next major case in George’s career involved another GRU walk-in, this time a Colonel named Oleg Penkovsky, who was handled jointly with the British SIS. Considered one of the most important Soviet agents ever recruited, Penkovsky’s intelligence played an important role in
the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The pressures of the case created problems for George but he played his part through the final meeting with Penkovsky in Paris. Kisevalter followed the final days of the case from Headquarters and much later filling in the events for Ashley that led to Penkovsky’s arrest, trial and execution.

George had one more albeit oblique contact with the Penkovsky case. Only one participant, Greville Wynne, tried to enhance his personal status in the affair when he wrote a book claiming, among other exaggerations, that Penkovsky had been flown overnight to the United States to meet President Kennedy. British author Nigel West called Wynne a liar and was sued for his trouble. West asked George to testify on his behalf. While this was not possible, George knew West was right; and he gave a deposition to that effect. The case ended with Wynne’s death before it came to trial.

The years between the Penkovsky case and his retirement in 1970 saw George involved in a number of recruitments in various parts of the world which Ashley describes. The most important, and by far the most controversial, concerned two KGB walk-ins. Anatoli Golitsyn would precipitate a CIA molehunt for a KGB penetration and claim that the second, Yuri Nosenko, was a fake defector. Ashley reviews the cases in detail based on his conversations with George and Nosenko. He concludes that “George never accepted the case for a mole in the CIA or the argument that Nosenko was planted by the KGB” (p. 283), though he acknowledges that he did not volunteer his opinion even after he learned of Nosenko’s incarceration under very harsh conditions. After the case was officially resolved, George and Nosenko became friends.

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George’s final assignment was to the CIA officer training facility for new CIA officers. Few will forget his formal lectures or his informal conversations in the club. By this time he promoted to super grade (the GS16), the first case officer to achieve that rank without being made a manager, and he had received the Agency’s highest award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. There was one more honor to come his way. In 1997, when the CIA celebrated its 50th anniversary, George was designated one of fifty Trailblazers for his many contributions to the profession, the only case officer so recognized. Less than two months later he was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery.

CIA SpyMaster is a sympathetic biography of a unique CIA intelligence officer who served his adopted country with honor and dedication.

Among the various encyclopedias of espionage, this one is the most up to date, and with the corrections made in this edition, the most accurate, despite the fact that it persists on including the oxymoron defector-in-place. The more than 3500 intelligence related entries—cases, personalities, terminology, organizations—are arranged alphabetically and contain brief cross references to related items in the book. In general the material is not sourced, although there are occasional references to specific books. A number of errors remain uncorrected and one should be cautious if detail is important to one's task. A few examples make the point: the date of Yuri Nosenko’s first contact with the CIA (1962 not 1963), calling Nosenko a double agent, and the statement on page 430 that The Penkovsky Papers were black propaganda. In the latter case, while the source of the papers was disguised, their content was accurate and thus they fail the black propaganda test. The entry on Philby also has many errors: he was not recruited at Cambridge as alleged (nor were any of the other four member of the Cambridge ring), Philby was not “the third man in the Cambridge spy ring” (he was the first), several details of his Vienna days are wrong, his second wife never worked at Bletchley Park, KGB officer Konstantin Volkov was not a defector, and Jim Angleton was not the head of CIA’s Office of Strategic Operations, nor was he the one who convinced the DCI that Philby was a Soviet agent.

As with most reference works of its kind, the thematic emphasis is on the conflict between the Soviet Union/Russia and the Western nations and their intelligence services, though there are a relatively long entries on China and Japan, and a short new entry on terrorist intelligence. Similarly, there is no mention of information warfare or the problems that email and the world-wide-web have created for counterintelligence. Recent cases added include: Robert Hanssen, Katrina Leung (Parlor Maid), and the Cuban agent in DIA, Ana Belen Montez.

In spite of the deficiencies noted, in the absence of a documented casebook on intelligence, Polmar and Allen have provided the next best thing and it should be of value to students, professors and the general reader.

See also a review by D. Cameron Watt, Intelligence and National Security, V16/1, pp. 348-9, that is not critical of the errors, but does enumerate at some length the omission of many British sources and European espionage cases. For reviews that do list some of the errors not mentioned here see J. Ransom Clark in the International Journal Of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 11, #2, pp. 239-42.

Polmar and Allen provide a chronology of wars and events mentioned in the book that spans the period 1800BC to the present.


In his impressive book, 1000 Days For Revenge, that deals with the intelligence failures prior to 9/11, author Peter Lance suggested in passant that the explosion of TWA 800 could have been a terrorist act, not the result of frayed wiring. In Cover Up he argues that “terror mastermind Ramzi Yousef ordered the bombing of TWA800” (p. 5) from his Supermax cell in order to induce a mistrial in his own case. It gets worse: Lance also charges that he warned the FBI and DoJ about the TWA800 bombing and they did nothing—cover
up. The FBI DoJ reaction may not seem so unusual when it becomes clear that Lance’s source was a Supermax inmate colleague of Yousef, connected to organized crime and also an FBI informant. Finally, Lance is also furious because he provided the 9/11 Commission with questions and his supporting materials and they ignored them all. At the end of the book he is far afield criticizing the commission for the “catastrophic mistake” of invading Baghdad and the consequent al Qaeda threat. (p. 254)

Who is right here? The secondary sources aren’t much help. Neither are the uncorroborated interviews. Cover Up is speculation mixed with sour grapes until real evidence is produced.

The Secrets of Rue St Roch: Intelligence Operations Behind Enemy Lines in the First World War by JANET MORGAN. (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 408 pp., endnotes, appendix, photos, index.

The 7th Baron Balfour of Burleigh died in 1967, but it was not until 1995 that his son John (the 8th Baron) and his wife finally opened the sealed Wellington Chest that contained the story of his father’s intelligence activities during WWI. The records were impressive: agent names, photos, codes, case files, even the story of an agent dispatched behind enemy lines in a balloon. John had seen the contents briefly years before and his father mentioned them on occasion. But it wasn’t until he was prodded by his wife that the discovery was finally made. How had the Lord Balfour, or Captain George Bruce, as he was in 1917, become involved in espionage? Who had he worked with, what had they done? Where had they done it? John and his wife, Janet Morgan, decided find the answers. They began by extracting all the names and addresses in Lord Balfour’s records and then locating and interviewing surviving participants or family members.

After nearly ten years and many travels, they pieced together the story of what came to be called the Luxembourg network and Ms. Morgan reveals them all in The Secrets of Rue St Roch.

During WWI, an age when espionage networks were standard tradecraft, British military intelligence ran some 6000 agents in Europe all tasked with finding out what Germany was doing militarily and economically. On the counterintelligence side, a series of Permit Offices were established in cooperation with the French security service, to interview persons who had managed to cross the German border and enter France, to determine whether they were innocent travelers or potential spies. One of these offices, staffed by only 4 officers and an administrative assistant—the multilingual Miss Dorothy Done—was located in a “narrow five-storey building... guarded by an orderly” (p. 9) at No. 41 Rue St Roch. It was from here that Captain Bruce would create and operate a very successful troop and train monitoring network working out of Luxembourg.

Two of the most successful “No. 41” agents were difficult recruitments for different reasons. Madame Lise Rischard was visiting her daughter in Paris from different reasons. Madame Lise Rischard opened the sealed Luxembourg network. She was a Belgian NCO who volunteered his services to Bruce through the mail. After a series of adventures, he eventually joined Captain Bruce in Luxembourg, traveling clandestinely by balloon. Perhaps the first agent insertion by that method.

Ms. Morgan tells the story of how these amateur spies, successfully established a train monitoring network, many members of whom were recruited by the once reluctant Madame Rischard. Bruce and his colleagues also developed their own agent codes and subsidized a Luxembourg newspaper—Der Landwirt—that was routinely sent to Paris, that ran coded messages and served as one communication channel. At other times face to face meetings were arrange in Switzerland. In those days, agents had to learn on the job and they earned high marks.

In the telling of this unusual espionage story, Ms. Morgan provides historical context about the war and the Luxembourg network’s role in it. She also describes the often complicated arrangements with the other British and French intelligence services whose cooperation was essential—Captain Mansfield Cumming, the first “C” crosses her stage from time to time. But more than all that, she delivers a fascinating narrative of a time when case officer and agent problems were much the same as today, but the pace of life was much slower. As Sir Colin McCall writes in the Preface, Janet Morgan “highlights some important truths... the vital need for trust between the players, and, as part and parcel of this, the constant need for the human touch in addressing people’s problems and anxieties.”

The Secrets of Rue St Roch is a story of classic military intelligence delightfully told by an author with an unusual sensitivity for the subject—intelligence history at its best.

No Backup: My Life as a Female Special FBI Agent by ROSEMARY DEW with PAT POPE. (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 302 pp., endnotes, index.

When government employees with exemplary records experience persistent industrial grade sexual harassment on the job, they may seek recourse through channels, become a whistle-blower, or resign. By 1990, FBI Special Agent Rosemary Dew had tried the first option without success, decided against the second, and so reluctantly after nearly 13 years as an FBI Special Agent, she resigned. It would be another 13 years before she wrote of her experiences. Why did she wait so long?

No Backup has two parts, both well documented. The first covers the author’s Bureau career that began in 1977, when, as a recently divorced mother of two, she entered the FBI Academy at Quantico, VA., one of the first four females to become special agents. After graduation she was assigned to law enforcement duties in the San Francisco bay area where she surveilled members of the Weather Underground, was stalked by a lunatic who thought he was being followed by the CIA and NSA,
The book describes several constants in her relatively brief but promising career. The positive ones include rapid promotion, awards and commendations. The major negative aspect, which becomes a central sub-theme of the entire book, was the pervasive and persistent sexual harassment from a few male special agents that began with the training at Quantico and continued at every stop along the way. It just such an incident that she relates in very embarrassing detail (pp. 191-20) during her final assignment, that precipitated her abrupt resignation. And, as she makes it brutally clear, citing specific incidents, she did not endure this treatment alone.

In part two of the book, Ms. Dew discusses what she learned about the FBI from its creation to the present. She reviews the Hoover legacy with its emphasis on law enforcement and the consequences that has had for counterintelligence. In the process she examines the effect of the Bureau reluctance to cooperate with other intelligence agencies, the impact of several discomforting recent espionage and terrorist cases including Richard Miller, Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Katrina Leung (PARLOR MAID), and failures associated with 9/11, to name a few. Since she was not involved, she merely gives views based on her experience. In a chapter titled, Scared of Change, Ms. Dew makes a series of specific recommendations aimed at long range FBI improvement. While she acknowledges steps by the current FBI Director intended to implement some of her suggestions, she leaves room for doubt that major change will occur in the near term.

So why did see write the book now? Because she realized as she observed the FBI since 1990, that others were still experiencing the same problems—too little had changed. And, further, in a time of great need, she hoped her voice might help others see the need for reform itself.

After leaving the Bureau, Ms. Dew became a nurse, worked as a defense consultant, developed antisubmarine software programs, served on a Presidential advisory committee on information technology and national security, and became a chemical weapons inspector. And, this talented lady has written a very interesting book.


The ideas and principles discussed in the first edition of this book, published before 9/11, have not changed. The new 43 page introduction to this edition addresses the post 9/11 questions: “What really did change, and what did not? And what are the opportunities and the pitfalls of the surge of interest in counterterrorism?” (p. viii) One presumable change, suggests Pillar, is the argument of some analysts “that terrorism was not a significant threat to the United States and that its costs were low and manageable.” (p. xi)

This despite the statement to Congress of then DCI George Tenet, in February 2001 where he “placed international terrorism and specifically al-Qaida at the top of the list of dangers.” (p. xxxviii) Thus 9/11 did not cause a change in the intelligence community awareness the terrorist threat, Pillar suggests, but rather the change was in the public awareness of the threat.

Other topics covered in this edition include the reaction to 9/11 in Congress and the investigations by the Congressional Committees. Pillar also stresses the importance of the “cell-by-cell, terrorist-by-terrorist disruption of terrorist infrastructures,” the substantial disruption of “al-Qaida since 9/11... an organization markedly less capable than it was two years ago—although still capable enough....” (p. xiii), and the costs of terrorism as shaped by the U.S. response to the threat. While he acknowledges that no compromises can be made with these extreme terrorists, he suggests there made be some avenues worth approaching with other countries.

Pillar argues that the concept of a war on terrorism is less like world war two in style and more akin to the war on drugs or the war on poverty—amorphous and hard to pin down. A principal theme of the book addresses this point: minimizing terrorism against U.S. interests depends on the health and wisdom of overall foreign policy” as well as a strong military. In this regard he advocates getting foreign partners involved. Overall, this book presents a temperate and discerning analysis with practical insights aimed at dealing with a problem that is part of our daily life and yet persistently resists attempts to stamp it out.

**Codename TRICYCLE: The True Story of the Second World War’s Most Extraordinary Double Agent by Russell Miller. (London: Secker & Warburg, 2004), 290 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.**

The WWII British double-agent operation first made public in John Masterman’s book, The Double Cross System was one of the most successful undertakings of its kind for two principle reasons. First the agent-handling tradecraft was excellent. Second, the British had broken the Abwehr codes used to send instructions and comments to their “agents” so the Brits had nearly perfect feedback, a genuine basis for trusting the more than 20 doubles. One of the early recruits, Dusko Popov, was a multi-lingual Yugoslav lawyer solicited in mid 1940 by the Abwehr German security service in Belgrade to work against the British in London and eventually America. Popov reported the approach to M16 and after careful screening, was given the code-
name TRICYCLE. In 1974, he published his autobiography, SpyCOUNTERSPY that made several controversial claims. Foremost among them was that FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, had known about the attack on Pearl Harbor well beforehand, but had failed to warn the country. Only marginally less outrageous were Popov’s claims to have been the model for James Bond.

Journalist Russell Miller adds new detail to the TRICYCLE story based on recently released documents in the British and American National Archives, and papers provided by the Popov family. He provides many interesting new facts about the Double Cross System and TRICYCLE’s handing by MI5, though analysis of their significance is sometimes open to challenge. An example concerns the claim, made by Popov in his book and Miller in his, that TRICYCLE was “the inspiration for” or “rather in the mould of James Bond” (p. 5). Yet the quotations Miller cites as evidence from British intelligence files raise their own doubts. The assessments that Popov has a greater attraction for women “than might be expected from his personal appearance...” or that he has the facial characteristics of a “Mongolian Slav,” that he was “a careless dresser” “short, and not handsome,” (p. 6) are not suggestive of the characteristics of a “Mongolian Slav,” that he was “a careless dresser” “short, and not handsome,” (p. 6) are not suggestive of the James Bonds known to movie goers.12

There are also some inaccuracies about MI6 players that he mentions. For example, his comment that “Kim Philby... ran MI6 operations on the Iberian peninsula” (p. 50) is untrue; Philby was a counterespionage officer and he studied but did not run operations.

Miller’s difficulties increase when he turns the American side of the TRICYCLE story. Tasked by the Germans to go to the United States and establish agent networks and answer questions in a questionnaire by the Abwehr, Popov, in coordination with British intelligence, arrived in New York on August 10, 1941 where he contacted the MI6 station and the Bureau. The questionnaire was in the form of a microdot, the first the FBI had ever seen. Several questions concerned the naval base at Pearl Harbor. According to Miller, “until the end of his life Popov was convinced that Hoover, motivated by personal animosity, was responsible for ignoring the clear warning that he had brought with him to the Unite States that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor.” (115). The “personal animosity” charge followed from Hoover’s obvious disapproval of the Balkan playboy cover which Popov executed with skill and persistence. In his book, Popov charged Hoover had not even sent the questionnaire to the White House, the War Department, or the Navy Department. In his well documented study of these questions, Tom Troy shows beyond any doubt that Popov is wrong on both points, documenting that the questionnaire was sent to the principal agencies involved, though they did nothing. Troy also suggests that if the Pearl Harbor message was as clear as Popov some historians later claimed, the British would not have relied on a low-level double agent to be the messenger.13 Miller cites MI5 comments that the Pearl Harbor data should have been transmitted separately but “no one ever dreamed Hoover would be such a bloody fool.” (p. 254-5). Another interpretation might be that the British didn’t want America to take preventative action and thus used TRICYCLE as courier not likely to get much attention, but this act would have been transparent to the State Department and eventually historians. Despite what Miller claims as ‘full access to FBI records,’ he does not resolve this issue, though he lays out the various sides well.

Hoover’s final insult to Popov was delivered in a Reader’s Digest article in April 1946 in which it was explained “how the FBI ‘discovered’ the existence of microdots. The Balkan Playboy was mentioned as the unknowing carrier of the discovery made by the FBI laboratory (p. 248). Miller retaliates by including as fact the statement that Hoover “was exposed as a closet homosexual and... cross dresser” (p. 92) among other undocumented insults.

The book adds much new material about Popov’s personal life before the war and in the European business world after WWII, it neglects to mention the prison term he served for ... And though he was unquestionably a valuable double agent for four years, nothing in the book or his file supports the author’s contention that Popov was the “most extraordinary double agent” in the second world war most would give that accolade to GARBO.14 Finally, the careless errors15 and many undocumented comments place the book in the easy to read but of limited scholarly value category.

In the first modern biography of Harriet Tubman (nee Ross), Jean Humez documents the story of this most famous female slave born in Maryland in about 1820. Best known for her work with the Underground Railroad in the 10 years preceding the Civil War, Tubman also served as a Union scout or spy in South Carolina through most of the war. Though she never went to school and never learned to read or write, she learned the tradecraft of the clandestine life the old fashioned way and was never caught.

Tubman’s early life was typical for the times. In 1844, though she was the legal property of a white man, she was permitted to married John Tubman; they were childless. When her owner died in 1849, she feared being sold, and leaving her husband behind, escaped to the North on her own. She soon found abolitionist friends who helped her find work. In December 1859, she made her first return to Maryland to help some relatives escape and thus the Underground Railroad was born. During the next ten years she worked with John Brown and Frederick Douglass among other famous spokesmen of her cause.

The bulk of the book is devoted to stories of Tubman’s life, before, during and after the war, that she dictated to others or that were reported by journalists and friends. The details of her spying days are told in one chapter. It is not clear just how she came to serve the Union Army in the Sea Islands off South Carolina and Georgia, but records show she was working out of Beaufort, South Carolina in May 1862. Union troops mounted expedition from the Islands and Tubman did the preliminary scouting. Her most famous operation was the Combahee River Raid in which she commanded a group of scouts with results that led to the capture and the capture of 800 slaves from their Southern owners. She also found time to be a nurse...
in the hospitals and toward the end of the war went to Washington to reveal their deplorable conditions.

For years after the war she applied for but was never granted a pension because the government said she had never been an official employee. Thus her income came mainly from talks or dictating articles. She did collaborate with a co-author and dictated an early autobiography, but had no documentation. Ms. Humez has collected every story and anecdote about Tubman and provided extensive bibliography of primary sources. And though there remain documentary gaps in her life story, Harriet Tubman’s service to the Union is solidly recorded and this volume is a fitting tribute to a remarkable life.

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The editors of this anthology have assembled thirty-five articles on the major functions of the intelligence profession written by intelligence officers, national security journalists, academics, think-tank analysts, novelists, and politicians. Topics range from the familiar history of the intelligence community, collection and analysis, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action, to those with considerable contemporary relevance, as for example, the relationship of intelligence to policy, the danger of politicalization, accountability, the quagmire of intelligence reform, and establishing intelligence services in new democracies.

With so many contributions, selecting a few for comment risks unintended offense. Still, by its mere inclusion one ought to contribute to a non-fiction reader on intelligence? Mr. Kemp’s interesting contribution, The Rise and Fall of France’s Spymasters, argues that before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War, the French government concluded it didn’t require “first rate intelligence organizations.” (p. 438) Afterward, the reverse was true. He presents names, facts and figures, in support of arguments that make intuitive sense, but he makes clear that the paper is “based on private conversations with former and present French intelligence operatives” and diplomats. (p. 442) Thus he leaves readers with a conundrum the answer to which is left as an exercise for the student.

The purpose in creating this book was to fill a gap that grew as more and more courses on intelligence matters appeared in university curricula over the last thirty years. So many valuable texts were written to meet the demand that no course could assign them all and parts on their content was soon out of date. What was needed then was a reader with contributions by recognized professionals, that covers the main issues of the profession—the proven practices and the controversial policies—from many points of view. This book meets that need.

Since all the articles have appeared elsewhere in journals or books, the editors contribute chapter length introductory essays for each of the nine sections to provide a common thread and historical parallels from topic to topic. For anyone seeking greater understanding of the strategic intelligence in today’s very challenging world, they will find it in this volume.

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END NOTES

1 Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence together with additional views, December 2002, s. Rept. no. 107-351 107th Congress, 2d session. H. Rept. no. 107-792, Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before And After The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001.

2 Created by OSS Director William Donovan for the same purpose as SOE, OSS-So Branch had virtually the same organization.

3 Occasionally authors have stated each team was composed of one British, American and Frenchman. See for example, Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, Spybook: The Encyclopedia of Espionage, 2nd edition (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 339. But as Ford notes, the only requirement was that men from each country participate in the program and only 7 teams had one member from the three main countries. Teams were constructed to meet local conditions. See John Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War Era, Vol. 3: OSS Jedburgh Teams (Part I), p. ii.


7 Greville Wynne, Contact on Gorky Street (New York: Athenaeum, 1962).

8 Nigel West, The Friends (London: Weidenfeld, 1998). West noted that at the time not even American had a plane that would accomplish the feat, but Wynne remained adamant.


10 See also a review of Spy Book by D. Cameron Watt, Intelligence and National Security, 16:1: 348-49, that is not critical of the errors, but has a statement at some length the omission of many British sources and European espionage cases. For a review that lists some of the errors not mentioned here, see J. Ransom Clark, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 11:2: 239-42.

11 Chief of British foreign intelligence.


13 I met Dusko Popov after his book was published in 1974. There was nothing in his appearance or manner to suggest that he was the role model for James Bond and he indicated that was the publisher hype. He did say that an episode in Ian Fleming’s Casino Royale was close to his own experience at a casino during the war that he thought Fleming had witnessed. Miller mentions this on page 89, but does not give a source.

14 Hoover’s final insult to Popov was delivered in a Reader’s Digest article in April 1946 in which it was explained “how the FBI ‘discovered’ the existence of microdots.” The Balkan playboy was mentioned as the unknowing carrier of the discovery made by the FBI laboratory (248). Miller retaliates by including, as fact, a statement that Hoover “was exposed as a closet homosexual and . . . cross dresser” (92), among other undocumented insults.


“...
INCOMING

Ward Warren

As Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection at the CIA from 1991 to 1995 I wrote a column for the CIA quarterly, in-house publication, Studies in Intelligence. I wanted to call it Incoming in analogous agreement with the military’s description of an artillery attack. I was overruled. In a remarkable display of unimaginativeness, the column was called Books In Brief. The column amounted to an annotated bibliography of possible use to those tortured souls interested in the literature of Intelligence. In recognition of the fact that those tortured souls are still out there somewhere, I am going to resume the column for The Intelligence and for PERISCOPE. I will also take the opportunity to give the column its rightful name. I will continue my usual practice regarding letters of complaint and argument and citations of errata. They will be returned unopened.

The Economist got uptight on March 19. The article below puts this out. The title stolen from John Sullivan’s book Spies and Lies about his career in calligraphy or polygraphy, I can’t remember which. John would certainly not resent my theft, in part because we’re friends and in part because I justifiably reviewed his book favorably.

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SPIES AND LIES

Dr. Guiche: Have you read Ceranotes?

Cyrano: I have - and found myself the hero.

Tilting at windmills in the Central Intelligence Agency guarantees two things - fatigue and the assurance that Holland will not be a field assignment. Windmill tilting was my hobby during 29 years in the CIA as an operations officer and, sure enough, I’m tired and I never got assigned to Holland. Now, in the twilight of my life, I’m going to draw myself up for one last crepuscular joust. The lance has gotten heavier, its haft is splintered, and I need glasses in the gathering dusk, but today’s windmills are larger and have bigger vanes. Maybe I can pierce one of those vanes and draw real blood as opposed to the metaphorical and mostly Pyrrhic victories of my earlier sallies. This foray is more important. The Economist has gone off the rails with a March 19 article entitled Can Spies Be Made Better. So giddily up Rocinante. There’s work to be done.

Why attack The Economist when The New York Times and its co-conspirators in Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco publish more or less the same or worse misinformation about the intelligence community almost daily? First, nothing can be done about The New York Times or its ideological clones, but The Economist based on its past record may be salvageable. The March 19th article may read like David Corn wrote it, but a quick check revealed that he is still at The Nation. Second, the CIA recommends The Economist to prospective employees at the various open information sessions around the country. The Agency considers The Economist the gold standard for information on foreign affairs and current events so any cracks in its integrity will produce confusion and consternation among these prospective “Spies.” And “Spies” is the first flaw in the article that needs correction. The article is not talking about “Spies,” it’s talking about Case Officers or, in current Agency parlance, Operations Officers. If The Economist cannot get this simple fact straight, what else might it misconstrue?

Well, for starters it should distinguish between Case Officers and their agents. In the article’s third paragraph:

At one point, every CIA case-officer working on Cuba was a double agent.

It probably means to say that every Cuban asset was a double agent. If the Case Officers were double agents, they would all be in jail. The same paragraph includes:

All but three CIA officers working on East Germany allegedly worked for the Stasi.

Here again, the article probably means that all but three assets working against East Germany were working for Stasi, the East German Intelligence Service. And the same paragraph indict the CIA for not recruiting more Soviet agents during the cold war.

A more telling record, according to several former spooks, is that the agency in those years did not recruit a single mid-level or high-level Soviet agent. Every significant CIA informant was a volunteer.

Given that the recruitment of agents is usually a close-held bit of operational activity, it’s hard to accept that the “several former spooks” could be so certain of the Agency’s failure in this respect, and even if it were true, the handling of the volunteers represents a significant operational success. Most reports cite a dozen or more of these volunteers who were handled efficiently and secretly for many years until Aldrich Ames identified them for the Soviets. Ames is not a success story to highlight on the Agency’s resume, but the volunteers and their handling by the CIA indicate an operational competence that belies the patronizing tone adopted by The Economist.

Even more than the obvious misstatements in the article, it is the tone of the article that should be remedied by the magazine’s editorial staff if it is to retain credibility. Agency officers are not “spooks.” They are government officials and deserve respect until specific, provable allegations can be cited to erode that respect. It is especially absurd to include, as the article does, the Agency’s analysts under the spook rubric. Many of these analysts are not under cover and even if they do have a minimal cover their actual day-to-day activities resemble a college faculty more than a clandestine analytical production line. William Langer and Sherman Kent, the progenitors of the analytical side of the Agency specifically designed it to resemble a college faculty. And in a supposedly responsible article, the use of the word “thuggish” in a description of the aides that Porter Goss brought with him from Congress is reprehensible. These four aides “most of whom have had no previous experience of intelligence work” include a former analyst and Case Officer with a Doctorate from Oxford University, a former Case Officer with an impressive resume from the private sector, an intellectually brilliant former deputy Attorney General, and a close Congressional associate of Porter Goss with a demeanor and a reputation that could be described as “thuggish” only by adherents of the per-
sional destruction school so common in Washington and now apparently adopted by *The Economist*.

These “said to be thuggish managers” according to the article are responsible for sacking “a dozen senior spooks” and for the resignation of another “two dozen who have quit in fury.” The actual count is four; two who resigned rather than accept demotion, one who resigned because he felt it was simply time to try something else, and finally the former Executive Director who truly had no experience with Intelligence work. The Executive Director was offered another position, but resigned instead. He was not sacked.

One reason the article lacks credibility is it use of unnamed “former spooks” as sources. If these sources are willing to talk for publication, they should have the strength of character to put their names to the information. The article’s use of a named source, Lindsay Moran, who wrote a book about her one-tour career with the Agency, is a bit like citing the bat boy for the Beaumont, Texas Tigers as a source of information about the front office strategy in Detroit. Miss Moran was not, by her own admission, a successful Case Officer and she seems even less suited to be a source of information when she barely worked long enough to learn how to spell CIA.

Not everything in the article deserves criticism, but the effective points have been made before usually with a less thuggish approach. “American’s secret world is inefficient and demoralised, and has been for some time.” That’s probably true, but mostly, at least as far as the CIA is concerned, because the end of the Cold War moved the focus of the policy makers in the nineties away from foreign intelligence and on to domestic matters. The Peace Dividend came in part from the Intelligence Community, and the change took its toll. In his 1947 work, *Strategic Intelligence*, Sherman Kent points out that inefficiency and demoralization are the inevitable result of a lack of interest in intelligence by the policy makers. The recent history of the CIA relationship with the policy makers validates Kent’s prediction. The attack on the World Trade Center and the election of George Bush, however, has laid the groundwork for a resurrection of the competence and energy of the Intelligence Community as a whole and of the CIA in particular. Regardless of how the new relationship between the Community and the new Director of National Intelligence shakes out, the Bush administration’s interest in Intelligence and the appointment of Porter Goss as CIA Director will certainly help restore some of the Agency’s reputation. What can be done to restore the reputation of *The Economist* after its article on spies is a matter for another day.

An now, my work is done so I’ll point Rocinante toward the hacienda where Dulcinea waits with a back rub and Sancho Panza will have prepared a dry martini, shaken but not stirred, just the way we like them.

The flood of books on Intelligence by Intelligence officers continues. Inside the Intelligence Community, we read these books with a base of experience that allows, in most cases, a mature, subtle, and sophisticated understanding whether we like the book or not. But what about the people without the advantage of an inside look? What do they think? I regularly discuss Intelligence books with a graduate history student from George Mason University whose interest is Foreign Affairs. As an experiment, I asked him to write a review of one of those books. The review below is the product. I will continue this practice with each APIO publication until the student receives his MA and gets a job. Longer if he is still willing.

As with all government agencies, the CIA has a bureaucracy, a culture, and a mission. The function of bureaucracy is to support the mission by acquiring and channeling the resources that are necessary and available. Culture, broadly defined, represents who works in a particular agency and why. The culture of an agency will determine how it goes about accomplishing its mission. The State Department likes to talk because it is filled with diplomats. The National Security Agency with its mathematicians and engineers likes its computers and listening posts. When the bureaucracy and the culture are in sync and focused on the mission good results occur, but the opposite is also true; when the bureaucracy and culture lose sight of the mission—and in fact work against it—disaster is sure to follow.

Robert Baer’s *See No Evil* is a first-hand account of what happens to an agency that loses its identity. In its infancy, the CIA was filled with the spirit and the people of the wartime OSS. That spirit began to fade with the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and descended to its lowest with the Church and Pike committee hearings of the mid-1970s. At this point the bold and daring CIA began its slow decline into the wilderness of political correctness and bureaucratic stagnation. The focus on the CIA’s main mission of recruiting and handling assets slowly disappeared from the intelligence landscape. With their ability to orbit ninety miles above the earth, satellites offered a clean and unobtrusive platform for gathering intelligence. Of course, as Baer points out, all these clean methods have serious limitations: Satellites cannot look inside a series of buildings in the Biqa valley to see if Americans are being held hostage.

Several situations Baer writes about are disturbingly illustrative of dangerous paths the CIA has followed in gathering human intelligence. From the case officer in Paris who was more interested in proselytizing than debriefing, to the political protest over a covert bugging operation that could have negative consequences for an oil company, Baer draws a portrait of a CIA unable—or unwilling—to engage in the activities for which it was created and upon which the security of the United States rests so heavily.

Although the inability of the CIA to collect human intelligence effectively is widely discussed by politicians and pundits, Baer provides a compelling account of how and why this state of affairs came to pass.

In the current push for intelligence reform, it is critical to realize that shuffling boxes on an organizational chart or adding more top-level bureaucracy is not a magical cure for organizations that have lost focus. Rather, high-ranking intelligence officials need to refocus the energy of their agencies onto the appropriate targets. The function of the intelligence community is not to conduct business in a manner so as not to offend US Senators; it is to gather the information that will ensure the safety of the American people. We are the ultimate client for the intelligence community and we deserve better.

Ward Wesley Warren retired in 1989 after 30 years as an operations officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations where he was stationed at numerous
Also noted…


A cross between an exhibition catalog (of the same name held at the Museum in 2005) and a photographic history of a broad range of groups and activities in the U.S. deemed by the writers to fall under the rubric “terrorism.” This includes the militia groups, the KKK, the German American BUND, McCarthyism, the Weather Underground, SLA, McVeigh-Nichols, up to al Qaeda. Excellent photographs, pull-out timeline, and domestic security legislation chart. Exhibit is now on tour throughout the United States.


The author, who worked for CIA in both Washington and Germany, has written a splendid yarn involving Arab terrorist efforts to blow up the Capitol, and the combined efforts of the heroine, DC Homicide, the FBI and the CIA, to stop them. A perfect novel to curl up with on the airplane or beach. It will grip your interest as the tautly constructed plot unfolds. A few coincidences are a bit of a stretch and the character development tends to be sketchy, but the book moves along at such a headlong pace that these are minor quibbles. — review by Mary Lynne McElroy, AFIO.


Retired Naval Intelligence officer (and AFIO member) Dr. Frederic N. Smith presents the fruits of a lifetime avocation in a neat Biographical Directory of more than one thousand “flag rank Russian and Soviet naval officers.” To cover the years from 1917 to 1999 has not been an active duty with the U.S. Navy since 1963. But he has doggedly latched on to any name with the rank of admiral attached to it.

A sampling of the difficulties involved can be found in the Introduction and Notes. As experienced readers will surmise, during most of its history, the Soviet government fiercely guarded any information which could conceivably be of military or intelligence value. Handing out factual information about top officers was not an official public relations function. All too often, as Dr. Smith notes, flag-rank officers would appear at official events, and we would have no clue as to who they were!

Dr. Smith has noted with some amusement the attention lavished upon visible new features of a Soviet vessel, such as an unusual array of antennae, is a surprising indifference to the identity of the up-and-coming officers aboard.

Let us demonstrate how some biographies are easier to winkle out and piece together than others. Take, for example, entries for two of the nine Admirals Smirnov. The career of Admiral of the Fleet Nikolay Ivanovich Smirnov occupies two pages in this Directory. It is followed by five lines offering all of the information available on “Adm. Smirnov, P.A.” He was Commissar of the Navy in 1938, and was executed in 1939.

Obviously, by means of the wealth of detail involved, a working concept can be derived of the structure and organization of the Soviet/Russian navy, over the passage of time.

The Directory also offers a very useful fourteen-page thumbnail outline and chronology of the Russian Navy from the days of Peter the Great to the end of the 20th century. For those who hadn’t given it much thought, it brings to one’s attention the difficulties of a navy doomed by geography to operate in enclosed seas — the Baltic and Black Seas — and hostile or distant seas, such as the Barents and North Pacific. — review by Dr. Sue Huck.


Mason explores a wide range of human emotions and events — a columnist tries to blackmail a crusading senator, a doctor convicted of euthanasia is asked to commit the act again years later, and a forgotten French town is liberated by a deserter and experiences close calls in a satirical retrospective of Cold War Europe.

“Cutting” continued from page 52…

What were they thinking, as they went off singing in the morning to hunt down helpless victims of every age and sex? On a scale of one to ten, the mental activity seems to hover about one point five, with occasional blips to two. The government said to do it, that nothing bad would happen. All my friends are doing it. They fine you if you don’t. There’s a lot of loot. Sometimes it’s fun. Beats farming.

“We sang on the paths, we downed unuwagwa [banana beer]... The days seemed much the same. We swapped gossip, we made bets on our victims, we spoke mockingly of the cut girls, squabbled over looted grain. We made fun of every cry for mercy. We went about our business without a care in the world — provided that we concentrated on killing during the day, naturally.”

In 37 brief topical chapters, Hatzfeld interweaves the testimony of his dozen killers on subjects as diverse as women, looting, torture, the role of cadres, and the men’s own fate. While seemingly disorganized, this book is relentlessly mind-boggling.
Transforming U.S. Intelligence

Edited by Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber

“Transforming U.S. Intelligence supports the mandate of the new Director of National Intelligence by offering both careful analysis of existing strengths and weaknesses in U.S. intelligence, and specific recommendations on how to fix its problems without harming its strengths. These recommendations, based on intimate knowledge of the way intelligence works, include suggestions for the creative mixing of technologies with new missions to bring about the transformation of U.S. intelligence without incurring unnecessary harm or expense. The goal is the creation of an intelligence community that can rapidly respond to developments in international politics, such as the emergence of nimble terrorist networks while reconciling national security requirements with the rights and liberties of American citizens.”

—Richard K. Betts, Columbia University

The intelligence failures exposed by 9/11 and the missing WMDs in Iraq have made one thing clear: change is needed in the U.S. intelligence community. Transforming U.S. Intelligence argues that transforming intelligence requires as much a look to the future as to the past and a focus more on the art and practice of intelligence than on its bureaucratic arrangements. In fact, while the recent restructuring, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, may solve some problems, it has also created new ones. The authors of this volume agree that transforming policies and practices will be the most effective way to tackle future challenges facing the nation’s security.

This volume’s contributors, who have served in intelligence agencies, the State or Defense Departments, and the staffs of congressional oversight committees, bring their experience as insiders to bear in thoughtful and thought-provoking essays that address what such an overhaul of the system will require. In the first section, contributors discuss twenty-first-century security challenges and how the intelligence community can successfully defend U.S. national interests. The second section focuses on new technologies and modified policies that can increase the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and analysis. Finally, contributors consider management procedures that ensure the implementation of enhanced capabilities in practice.

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Jennifer E. Sims is a visiting professor with the security studies program at Georgetown University. She has served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in the Department of State as a senior intelligence officer. She has published a number of works on intelligence and arms control, including Icarus Restrainted: An Intellectual History of Nuclear Arms Control, 1945-1960.

Burton Gerber served for 39 years, most of it overseas, as an operations officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. He frequently lectures on ethics as related to public policy and intelligence.

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FORTHCOMING

MY FBI: BRINGING DOWN THE MAFIA, INVESTIGATING BILL CLINTON, AND WAGING WAR ON TERROR

by Louis J. Freeh

Freeh led the FBI from 1993 to 2001, through some of the most tumultuous times in its long history. This is the story of a life in law enforcement, and his
struggle to strengthen and reform the FBI while ensuring its freedom from political interference.

Bill Clinton called Freeh a “law enforcement legend” when he nominated him as FBI Director. The good feelings did not last. Going toe-to-toe with his boss during the scandal-plagued ‘90s, Freeh fought hard to defend the Bureau from political interference and to protect America from the growing threat of terrorism. When Clinton later called that appointment the worst one he had made as president, Freeh considered it “a badge of honor.”

This is Freeh’s personal story, from his Catholic upbringing in New Jersey to law school, the FBI training academy, his career as a US District attorney and as a federal judge, and finally his eight years as the nation’s top cop. This is a look at American law enforcement in the run-up to September 11. Freeh is clear-eyed, frank, and offers vision for the struggles ahead.

Louis J. Freeh served as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1993 to 2001. He now is senior vice chairman of MBNA which was acquired by Bank of America in July 2005.

_THE CIA AND CONGRESS:_ THE UNTOLD STORY FROM TRUMAN TO KENNEDY


From its inception in 1947 and for decades afterward, the Central Intelligence Agency was shrouded in secrecy, with little real oversight by Congress—or so many Americans believe. David M. Barrett reveals that during the agency’s first fifteen years, Congress often monitored the CIA’s actions and plans, sometimes aggressively.

Drawing on newly declassified documents, research at some two dozen archives, and interviews with former officials, Barrett provides a colorful account of relations between American spymasters and Capitol Hill. He chronicles the CIA’s dealings with senior legislators who were haunted by memories of our intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor and yet riddled with fears that such an organization might morph into an American Gestapo. He focuses in particular on the efforts of Congress to monitor, finance, and control the agency’s activities from the creation of the national security state in 1947 through the planning for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Barrett highlights how Congress criticized the agency for failing to predict the first Soviet atomic test, the startling appearance of Sputnik over American air space, and the overthrow of Iraq’s pro-American government in 1958. He also explores how Congress viewed the CIA’s handling of Senator McCarthy’s charges of communist infiltration, the crisis created by the downing of Pilot Gary Powers in a U-2 spy plane, and President Eisenhower’s complaint that Congress meddled too much in CIA matters. Ironically, as Barrett shows, Congress itself often pushed the agency to expand its covert operations against other nations.

The CIA and Congress provides needed historical perspective for current debates in Congress and beyond concerning the recent failures and ultimate fate. In our post-9/11 era, it shows that anxieties over the challenges to democracy posed by our intelligence communities have been with us from the very beginning.

“Barrett reveals a CIA that made its own rules, wrote its own budget, classified its own secrets, and persuaded the Congress to like it. A rich and fabulous story that sheds new light on just about every significant episode in the first decades of the Cold War and confirms what many have long suspected—secrecy is the great enemy of democracy, and vice versa.” —Thomas Powers, author of Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda

DAVID M. BARRETT is associate professor of political science at Villa nova University and author of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers and Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers.

THE LAST OF THE COLD WAR SPIES: THE LIFE OF MICHAEL STRAIGHT—THE ONLY AMERICAN IN BRITAIN’S CAMBRIDGE SPY RING


MICHAEL WHITNEY STRAIGHT, the scion of a rich American family, was taken to Devon, England when his mother remarried an Englishman. His parents began a progressive school in an ancient Tudor Manor, Dartington Hall. The gifted Michael moved from the left-wing liberalm of Dartington to the London School of Economics and then Cambridge University.

At Cambridge in the early 1930s, he fell amongst the notorious Ring of spies operating for the KGB. Straight was emotionally blackmailed by Russian agents Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt and recruited by them to the KGB. Straight at 20, and with mixed feelings was sent to the US to spy for the Russians. Yet he sought ways to please two masters: Stalin (through directives from Burgess and Blunt), and Straight’s own burning ambition to become a senior political figure - even US President.

Stalin wished to insinuate him into the heart of American capitalism as an agent on Wall Street. Straight pulled strings to be placed inside the Government of family friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt, with an aim to making his run in politics and eventually becoming Moscow’s man in the White House. In Washington DC from 1937, he provided intelligence reports and confidential government documents to his Russian Controls and KGB associates for five years.

Straight took over his mother’s magazine, The New Republic, in 1941 and used it as a Communist propaganda sheet. He also used his family wealth to fund several Communist fronts. He made his run for the Democratic Party immediately post-war. But a journalist who knew some of his murky past threatened to expose him. The Democrats dumped Straight. His main ambition thwarted, Straight then turned his mind and resources to pushing another
candidate for the Presidency—left-winger Henry Wallace. If this succeeded, there would be a potential communist puppet in the White House.

In keeping with a lifelong dilemma of conflicting ambitions and masters, Straight socialized and worked with U.S. Presidents over six decades. He was the stepbrother of Jackie Kennedy, with whom he developed a close relationship before, during, and after John Kennedy's Presidency. Straight was Richard Nixon's choice to be deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts. He was the relationship between presidents and their CIA directors—detailing the decisions that continue to shape the intelligence community. This book, the behind-the-scenes look at the CIA's relationship with the presidents, reveals how intelligence gathering works, and how political issues often interfere with government business.

- Why President Harry Truman distrusted the CIA yet ended up expanding it.
- How President John F. Kennedy was the CIA at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and got burned.
- That President Nixon strongly mistrusted the "Ivy League" CIA yet tried, unsuccessfully, to use it as a way out of Watergate.
- That President Gerald Ford was confronted with three reports of egregious and illegal CIA misdeeds, and how he responded by replacing CIA director Colby with George H. W. Bush.

Drawing on his own years as DCI, as well as interviews with living presidents, Straight provides a view of the inner workings of the Agency. The book concludes with a blueprint for reorganizing the intelligence community and strengthening the relationship between the CIA and the president.

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**THE VENDETTA: FBI HERO MELVIN PURVIS’S WAR AGAINST CRIME, AND J. EDGAR HOOVER’S WAR AGAINST HIM**


By the end of 1934 Melvin Purvis was, besides President Roosevelt, the most famous man in America. Just thirty years old, he presided over the neophyte FBI’s remarkable sweep of the great Public Enemies of the American Depression—J. Edgar Hoover. The Director of the FBI was immensely jealous of the agent who had been his friend and protégé, and vowed that Purvis would be brought down. A vendetta began that would not end even with Purvis’s death. For more than three decades Hoover trampled Purvis’s reputation, questioned his courage and competence, and tried to erase his name from all records of the FBI’s greatest triumphs.

Alston Purvis is Melvin’s only surviving son. With the benefit of a unique family archive of documents, new testimony from colleagues and friends of Melvin Purvis and witnesses to the events of 1934, he has produced a authentic new telling of the gangster era, seen from the perspective of the pursuers. By finally setting the record straight about his father, he sheds light on what some call Hoover’s original sin: a personal vendetta that is an early example of of Hoover’s bitter, destructive paranoia.

Alston Purvis has appeared widely in the media, including the History Channel and A&E, to talk about his father. He is head of Boston University’s design department.

Alex Tresiniowski is a senior writer for People magazine specializing in politics, crime and current events. The author of five books, including an upcoming biography of boxer Billy Conn, he lives in New Jersey.

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**BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION: A FUTURE WORTH CREATING**


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**BURN BEFORE READING: PRESIDENTS, CIA DIRECTORS, AND SECRET INTELLIGENCE**


The members of the notorious Cambridge spy ring which betrayed Britain to the Soviet Union in the 1930s are well known: Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. But there was another member, a mysterious American whose role has escaped historical scrutiny. In the year before Straight died, in frank interviews with him, from government files and from confessions from former intelligence officers, Roland Perry has painstakingly produced an intriguing and illuminating account of Straight’s crucial role in the most damaging spy ring of all time.

—Phillip Knightley
Military-strategy consultant Barnett follows his ballyhooed The Pentagon's New Map with this unconvincing brief for American interventionism. Echoing the now conventional wisdom that a larger, better-prepared occupation force might have averted the current mess in Iraq, Barnett generalizes the notion into a formula for bringing the blessings of order and globalization to benighted nations throughout the "Non-Integrating Gap." A "System Administrator force" of American and allied troops—a "pistol-packing Peace Corps"—could, he contends, undertake an ambitious schedule of regime change, stabilization and reconstruction in Islamic countries and as far afield as North Korea and Venezuela, making military intervention so routine that he terms it the "processing" of dysfunctional states. Barnett's ideas are a rehash of Vietnam-era pacification doctrine, updated with anodyne computer lingo and New Economy spin. Implausibly, he envisions Americans volunteering their blood and treasure for a "SysAdmin force" fighting for international "connectivity" and envisioning the world rallying to the bitterly controversial banner of globalization. Worse, he has no coherent conception of America's strategic interests; "the U.S. is racing... to transform [the] Middle East before the global shift to hydrogen [fuel] threatens to turn the region into a historical backwater," runs his confused rationale for continued American meddling in the Muslim world. That Barnett's pronouncements are widely acclaimed as brilliant strategic insights (as he himself never tires of noting) bodes ill for American foreign policy. —Publisher's Weekly, Reed Business Information

THE MYSTERIOUS PRIVATE THOMPSON: THE DOUBLE LIFE OF SARAH EMMA EDMONDS, CIVIL WAR SOLDIER


Gansler chronicles the intriguing life and times of a woman who served as a man during the Civil War. Fleeing from home at age 17 to escape an abusive father and avoid an unwanted marriage, Sarah Edmonds lived as a man for two years before she heeded Lincoln's call for more troops and enlisted in the Second Michigan Infantry. Performing her duties with distinction, she won the respect and admiration of the men she served alongside, even after they discovered, many years later, her astounding secret. Resuming her female identity and marrying after the war, she lived a relatively tranquil life until she decided to seek a military pension 20 years later. Enthusiastically supported by her former comrades-in-arms, she became the only woman to secure a soldier's pension for her Civil War service. Although questions remain whether she also served—as she claimed—as a Union spy, Edmond's gender—bending Civil War experiences are well worth checking out. —Booklist

IN SEARCH OF A BEGINNING: MY LIFE WITH GRAHAM GREENE


For more than thirty years, Yvonne Cloetta shared her life with Graham Greene. After years of tormented love affairs and dangerous exploits, the novelist found solace and understanding with this remarkable Frenchwoman, whoassured his famously melancholic nature yet allowed him to create some of his greatest work. Greene knew that the time might come when Cloetta's privacy would be invaded, and his advice was to either refuse to speak or to tell the truth. This Cloetta has done with the help of family friends and biographer Marie-Françoise Allain. What emerges is an intimate and revelatory portrait of Greene.

She describes Greene secretly taking a minor role in a Truffaut film, dining with Charlie Chaplin on the Côte d'Azur and visiting his friend the double-agent Kim Philby in the USSR's twilight.

RIGHTING THE STORY OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE

Tess Stirling, Dria Nalecz, Tadeusz Dubicki. Intelligence Cooperation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II (Valentine Mitchell, 616 pp. $95)

British accounts of the acquisition of the Germans' Enigma encoding machine have ignored the essential role played by Polish intelligence along with its other feats in the Second World War. Here is a work that rights the memory of Polish intel's contribution to the Allied cause.

In 1939, Polish intelligence offered the British Enigma, plus the keys to decoding Wehrmacht messages, 80 per cent of which the Poles could read. The British, focused on trying to read Japanese naval codes and so protect their empire in Asia, showed little interest in the offer—until they found themselves at war with Hitler.

In an introduction to Intelligence Cooperation, written with Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka, Britain's Tony Blair gives recognition to the Poles' achievements. Better late than never.

A British historian and two Polish ones have edited this work with contributions from a variety of researchers. The result relates not only the story of the acquisition of Enigma but how the Poles smuggled it to England in the middle of the war a copy of the German V-2 rocket and its top-secret fuel.

Lest any readers be inclined to regard the Poles as a somewhat parochial folk, they will learn that Polish intelligence was active from Japan to every part of Europe, whether Nazi occupied or neutral. Among other extraordinary feats, it acquired the full order of battle of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe before the Normandy landings.

In 1941 a Pole in Greece, Jerzy
Iowan-Szajnowicz, destroyed a German submarine, sank a destroyer and sabotaged an aircraft engine factory so that planes equipped with its engines crashed. In Afghanistan, Bronislaw Telatycki, according to the citation making him an officer in the Order of the British Empire, he significantly helped neutralize that country as a center of hostile activity. This is a book that should find a wide readership, despite its price, far beyond Chicago.

—Derk Kinnane Roelofsma in AFIO WINs

**Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives Have Penetrated Washington**


As Americans continue to worship at the altar of cultural diversity and endorse religious tolerance for tolerance sake, Muslims masquerading as “moderates” have insinuated themselves into the very fabric of American society, taking advantage of our blind trust and gaining footholds in our education system, government, workplace, law enforcement, and military. In this startling book, investigative journalist Paul Sperry uses interviews and classified documents to explain how, for the past thirty years, these Islamist extremists have been covertly working to destroy our constitutional government and the ethics on which our nation was built. Their goal, according to Sperry, is to replace the U.S. Constitution with the Quran and turn America into an Islamic state. And, as Sperry details point-by-point, they have been unwittingly aided by the media, government, and citizens, who don’t fully understand the dangers of the Muslim faith.

Perry explodes the facade of moderation and patriotism that Muslim scholars, imams, clerics, businessmen, and other leaders in the burgeoning Muslim community in America have conveyed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In reality, the Muslim establishment that publicly decries the radical fringe—represented by al-Qaida’s brand of Islam known as Wahhabism, the official religion of Saudi Arabia—is actually a part of it. The only difference is that they use words and money instead of bombs to accomplish their goals.

**Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism**


National security historian Timothy Naftali relates the full back story of America’s attempts to fight terrorism. On September 11, 2001, a long history of failures, missteps, and blind spots in our intelligence services came to a head, with tragic results. At the end of World War II, the OSS’s “X-2” department had established a seamless system for countering the threats of die-hard Nazi terrorists. But those capabilities were soon forgotten, and it wasn’t until 1968, when Palestinian groups began a series of highly publicized airplane hijackings, that the U.S. began to take counterterrorism seriously. Naftali narrates the game of “catch-up” that various administrations and the CIA played—variously and sometimes successfully—with varying degrees of success—from the Munich Games hostage-taking to the initial bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and up to 9/11. In detail, Naftali shows why holes in U.S. homeland security discovered by Vice President George H. W. Bush in 1986 were still a problem when his son became President, and why George W. Bush did little to fix them until it was too late. Naftali concludes that open, liberal democracies like the U.S. are incapable of effectively stopping terrorism. For anyone concerned about the future of America’s security, this masterful history will be necessary—and eye-opening—reading.

**Other Recent or Forthcoming Titles**


Presents unique perspective on war in Afghanistan.


Explores the world of the ranchers and farmers who must deal with all the illegal immigration.


Argues that the U.S. is returning to its pre-9/11 complacency.

*The World Was Going Our Way—The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, Newly Revealed Secrets from the Mirokhin Archive* by Christopher Andrew. (Basic Books, Oct., $29.95)

The second collection from the KGB archives offers insights on world-wide operations.


This former U.S. special forces officer reveals the origins of the first multinational unit to go behind enemy lines in WWII.

*How to Spot a Liar* by Greg Hartley and Maryann Karinch. (Career Press, Sept., $14.99)

Former military interrogator Hartley suggests ways to get at the truth in all settings.

*Dare to Repair Your Car: A Do-It-Herself Guide to Maintenance, Safety, Minor Fix-It’s, and Talking Shop* by Julie Sussman and Stephanie Glaras-Tenet. (Collins Books, Sept., $14.95)

The authors of Dare to Repair offer help for even the most car repair–challenged woman. Why do we mention it? The co-author is the wife of former DCI George Tenet.
BALLOT FOR ELECTION OF BOARD MEMBERS FOR 2006
Terms run January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009.

For those who have not already cast votes by e-mail, please send vote no later than 25 November 2005.

VOTE FOR NO MORE THAN SEVEN CANDIDATES. A photocopy of this ballot is acceptable. Ballot is available online at www.afio.com/ballot2006.htm for Speed Voting.

☐ I vote for all seven nominated candidates below or ☐ I vote for selected candidates as indicated by check marks.
Clearly PRINT your name at right so we can verify your membership status and that it is current.

Sarah BOTSAI, Ph.D., NSA, Retired. Charter Member, Senior Cryptologic Executive Service. Education: PhD, American University, International Relations; National War College. Assignments outside NSA: Deputy Director, White House Situation Room; Intelligence Community Staff; Cryptologic Advisor, USCINCPAC; Faculty, National War College. Intelligence Community Activities: Editorial Board, Studies in Intelligence; Executive Committee, National Cryptologic Museum Foundation.

Keith COGGINS. President & Chief Executive Officer, as well as Chairman of the Board, of Varec, Inc., a global market leader in measurement, control and automation solutions for oil & gas, defense and aviation markets. He has been active in military, government, commercial and international business for over 30 years. Coggins holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology and has used his scientific expertise to develop many patented products, including an automated and secure fuels management system used at all U.S. Department of Defense facilities worldwide, major oil companies and many commercial airports. He is very active in the current activities in Iraq, having provided systems and support to the military, oil ministry and Baghdad airport. He has been a strong supporter of AFIO.

Christopher N. DARLINGTON. More than 32 years with CIA where he worked mainly within the Directorate of Operations, and had six overseas assignments primarily in developing countries. He also served tours within the Directorate of Intelligence and on the IG Inspections staff, and prior to retirement was the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Africa in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Upon CIA retirement in 2000, he rejoined the NIC as a contractor where he manages the NIC Associates Program, designed to enhance cooperation between academia and the Intelligence Community—a mission that meshes well with AFIO’s. He is the recipient of the Career Intelligence Medal. In addition to AFIO, he is a member of CIRA [Central Intelligence Retirees Association] and a member of the board of Governors of DACOR [Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired].

Amado GAYOL. Gayol was Officer in the airborne battalion of the 2506 brigade involved in the Bay of Pigs, 1961, where he was captured and sentenced to thirty years in prison. After two years in prison the US paid his ransom. He was an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, trained as a U.S. Army Special Forces Captain, Airborne Ranger qualified, wounded in combat in the Dominican Republic. 3 year veteran of the Vietnam war, served 25 years as a Senior Operations Officer with the Central Intelligence Agency where he was a specialist on Non-Official Cover (NOC). He is the recipient of the CIA Intelligence Star for Valor and the U.S. Army Purple Heart. He retired from CIA in 1995 and is President of Gayol and Associates, Florida-based International Security Consultants providing governmental and CEO intelligence & security services [protection from kidnappings, extortion, product contamination]. He is also co-President/Owner of APS ID, a leading biometric and security systems integration company located in Miami, Florida.

Walter JAJKO, Brig. Gen., USAF(Ret). A DoD Senior Executive-6 with many years of service in the Intelligence Community, he was assigned as the DARPA Fellow/Professor of Defense Studies at Institute of World Politics, a graduate school in Washington, DC. Served for many years in Office of Secretary of Defense for the Under Secretaries of Policy, Intelligence, and Acquisition. He was the Assistant to SecDef (Intelligence Oversight) responsible to the Secretary and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board; Acting Deputy Under SecDef (Policy Support); and Director, Special Advisory Staff with responsibility for policy, operations, and support in reconnaissance, covert action, clandestine collection, special operations, covert, psychological operations, and perceptions management. DoD representative for sensitive NSC activities. If elected, Jajko seeks “portfolio” as AFIO’s “foreign minister” with responsibility for establishing relationships with similar organizations in countries allied to U.S.

Gary W. O’SHAUGHNESSY, Maj. Gen., USAF(Ret). 33 years in the USAF, retired in 1993. During Air Force career, commanded units and managed intelligence activities in Europe and Pacific. Spent most of his career serving in the intelligence field with assignments ranging from tours with NSA to Director of Intelligence (J-3) at the U.S. European Command’s headquarters in Germany (EUCOM). From 1989-1993, was involved in managing and restructuring SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and Scientific/Technical Intelligence resources, focusing these intelligence assets on the requirements of theater warfighters. Orchestrated the consolidation of 16,000 Air Force intelligence personnel under a single organization, and employed many of these resources in support of U.S. operation in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm while Commander of Air Force Intelligence Command (now AIA) and the Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC). Currently Vice President, Government/Defense Operations for Oracle Corporation where he interacts with the Military, Intelligence and Homeland Security communities to develop information technology solutions. He joined ORACLE in 1993.

E. Alan PLATT. Retired in 2001 from the Senior Intelligence Service of the Central Intelligence Agency—a career of almost 35 years. At CIA he was in the Directorate of Operations where he served six field assignments, four as Chief of Station. At headquarters he was Special assistant to the DDCI, Deputy Chief of Special Activities Division (Covert Action), Acting Chief of the Counterintelligence Center and served a tour at NSA as Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, where he managed a global, multi-billion dollar enterprise of several thousand civilian and military personnel. Platt has been recognized with numerous awards for outstanding contributions to U.S. Intelligence. He his expertise is in areas of global operations management, leadership development, national security and intelligence policy, and counterintelligence, clandestine and information operations.

[blank lines for write-in candidates]

Send vote to: AFIO - Votes, 6723 Whittier Ave Ste 303A, McLean, VA 22101.

If you have not done so and you prefer to avoid envelopes and stamps, you can send your vote by e-mail. Send to vote@afio.com supplying the names of your selections, or just write “ALL SEVEN” if applicable, and remember to indicate either your full name or your NEW membership number.