



I. CURRENT ISSUES



Cold War Strategy for Genuine Peace with China

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Executive Summary

U.S. foreign policy has consistently attempted to address symptoms rather than the causes of tension with China. The resultant policies of engagement depend on a failure to recognize the reality of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Cold War actions against us. A relaxation of tensions cannot take place without a relaxation of concerns – but the engagers either dismiss those concerns or censor themselves about the realities of CCP domestic and foreign policies.

U.S. policy has adopted some defensive policies and must adopt more. But what is missing is a sustained offensive strategy designed to eliminate the true cause of tension: the totalitarian and aggressive nature of the CCP.

Such a goal, which the current Administration abjures, necessitates utilizing various neglected instruments of statecraft: public diplomacy, political and ideological warfare, and psychological strategy. It requires identifying and undermining the CCP regime's "center of gravity" which is its internal security system. The nucleus of that system is its monopoly of communications and information alongside its Marxist-Leninist ideology with Chinese characteristics. U.S. policy must help break that monopoly and, in the process, seek the sympathy of, and alliance with, the Chinese people to assist them in their efforts to hear truth in the face of the official lies of the regime, communicate with one another, and demand and realize political change.



For decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been conducting anti-U.S. Cold War actions that our government has consistently downplayed and ignored. The Xi Jinping regime's dramatic military buildup, its threats and aggressive actions, its global efforts at strategic influence, and its dishonesty concerning the Covid virus, have finally forced greater realism about the CCP's nature and strategic intentions. The result has been the gradual strengthening of U.S. defenses against CCP actions. What is missing, however, is a sustained offensive strategy, particularly in the spheres of political-ideological warfare, information operations, and psychological strategy – instruments heavily concentrated in our public diplomacy and intelligence communities – that will bring us closer to eliminating the source of tensions between the U.S. and the CCP.

A review of some salient CCP actions against us is a prerequisite of any new strategy:

- Preparing to fight us, it has conducted the world's largest military buildup for years.
- It leads us in deploying hypersonic missiles against which we have no defenses.
- It may lead us in the weaponization of Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, and in fields where we refrain from weapons development, such as bioweapons that target individuals with specific genetic characteristics and "neurostrike" weapons to attack the brain.
- Its agents established an illegal biological laboratory replete with dangerous pathogens in California's Central Valley.
- It has developed space weapons and conducted laser tests to blind U.S. satellites.
- Its armed forces, the so-called People's Liberation Army (PLA), attempted to export AK-47s and shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles to Los Angeles criminal gangs – arms which were intercepted by U.S. Customs.
- Its armed forces have taken many aggressive actions against U.S. and allied aircraft and naval vessels.
- It has made constant threats to Taiwan, including invasion dress rehearsals.
- It has threatened Japan, the Philippines, and others in the region.
- It propagandizes its people and armed forces that the U.S. is "the main enemy."

- It pursues a global strategy to establish a presence at the world's major naval chokepoints and build port facilities and bases as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.
- Its massive espionage targets our national security secrets and intellectual property, using cyber espionage, and thousands of human intelligence collectors: e.g., according to a senior U.S. counterintelligence official, 25,000 such collectors in Silicon Valley alone.
- It conducts many forms of economic warfare against us. Since our gross strategic error of giving Beijing Permanent Normal Trade Relations status and admitting it to the World Trade Organization, it has conducted predatory trade practices incurring enormous damage to U.S. business while we have become dependent on Chinese supply chains for countless products vital to our national well-being.
- With a history of using narcotics as a weapon since the Korean War, Communist China exports fentanyl and its chemical components to the U.S. and to Mexican drug cartels for re-export to the U.S., killing hundreds of thousands of Americans. The Orwellian surveillance regime very well knows who manufactures the fentanyl components and mails them abroad. Combined with its economic warfare and espionage, its narcotics warfare makes its “economic activity” indistinguishable from that of the most notorious organized crime syndicates.
- CCP intelligence – the MSS – through the United Front Work Department, operates some 600 front organizations in the U.S. Among their activities is support for movements (and groups such as the self-described Marxist Black Lives Matter organization) designed to aggravate racial divisions within our country.
- CCP agents and fronts conduct surveillance of Chinese Americans, operate covert police stations in our cities to enforce CCP law, and threaten those who oppose the regime by threatening their relatives in China.
- The CCP conducts massive influence operations: targeting our media, federal, state, and local politicians, former cabinet members and intelligence agency directors, current and retired flag officers, business leaders, Hollywood, the computer gaming industry, the Chinese American community, academic leaders, Sinologists, and students at all levels with special attention to graduate students of international affairs, law students, and students at Historically Black Colleges and Universities.
- CCP intelligence conducts massive personal data collection, including: the theft of 21 million Office of Personnel Management background dossiers of holders of security clearances; the medical records of 80 million Americans stolen from the Anthem medical insurance company; millions more personal records stolen from the Equifax credit rating agency; the DNA acquired from Chinese-owned ancestry companies; etc. Much of this information can be used to establish a CCP-style social credit system here in the United States.
- CCP-controlled TikTok not only collects the personal data of millions of Americans, but propagandizes us with narratives advancing regime interests, glamorizes narcotics usage, and promotes pornography among American teenagers in increasingly extreme doses.
- CCP leaders have given us an avalanche of lies, deceptions, and broken promises in their diplomacy.

The failure of successive U.S. Administrations to share most of these facts with the American people and the world is one of the greatest failures of leadership in the modern era. The result is that so many Americans, including corporate leaders thirsting to do business with China, still harbor enormous illusions about the CCP and its intentions. The one exception was the last Administration, with such notable departures from previous practice as:

- Vice President Mike Pence's 2018 Hudson Institute address, which was compared to Churchill's Iron Curtain speech;
- The production of a coherent Indo-Pacific Strategy by the National Security Council;
- The inclusion of a section on information policy in the 2017 National Security Strategy;

- Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger’s 2020 speech in Mandarin to the Chinese people stressing a democratic tradition in recent Chinese history; and
- The consistent policies of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, including his practice of distinguishing between the CCP and the Chinese people, and the Policy Planning Staff’s seminal paper of December 2020: “Elements of the China Challenge,” a document likened to George Kennan’s Long Telegram.

Unfortunately, while the Biden administration has made progress in strengthening regional alliances in East Asia and retaining selective sanctions, it has slid back to the “engagement” diplomacy of previous Administrations, effectively abandoning the previous Administration’s inchoate efforts to cut to the heart of the sources of U.S.-CCP tensions.

Hence, Biden polices perpetuate illusions about the CCP in three ways: 1) by failing to make the distinction between the Chinese people and the Communist regime; 2) by treating that regime as if it is a permanent fixture that legitimately represents the nation; and 3) by constantly attempting to create the atmospherics of peace rather than the substance of genuine peace. They target symptoms rather than causes of tension and fail to realize a cardinal principle of diplomacy: that one can never achieve a reduction of tensions without a reduction of concerns. The concerns we have are the totalitarian nature of the Chinese Communist regime, its crimes against humanity, and its cold war actions against us.

At the root of all these regime policies is the source of tensions: the very nature of CCP, its genetic code, its DNA. That nature is defined by the regime’s ideological foundation, which produces the profound political incompatibility between the CCP and the U.S.

The failure of so many of our foreign policy makers to understand this ideological dimension reflects a foreign policy culture that minimizes the importance of ideology and belief systems.

Early in the Cold War, George Kennan observed that the Soviet Communist Party hated us not for what we do, but for who we are: a democratic republic whose

very existence was a source of ideological contagion and a repudiation of the validity of Marxism-Leninism. The same principle holds true for the CCP and the threat it perceives to its only enduring legitimizing principle of Party-state authority: “Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics” whose current incarnation is “Xi Jinping Thought.”

For decades, our leaders believed that if we traded with China and helped it with our technology, we would entice the CCP to loosen its grip on tyrannical monopolistic power. So, with the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms

– a policy indistinguishable in principle from Lenin’s New Economic Policy – it was assumed that “China” had ceased being communist. This illusion was born of ignorance about communism, an ideology and political system which too many people believed no longer existed, even in the last two decades of the Cold War. As David Satter entitled one of his books

about Soviet communism: *It was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway*.

The resultant policies of engagement with the regime – a repetition of the Cold War policy of “détente” – have inevitably proved to be counterproductive: they serve the CCP’s interests by psychologically disarming America, eroding our vigilance and defense preparedness.

Senior Administration officials regularly attempt to downplay and ignore the reality of CCP Cold War actions against us. A representative example is Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s statement: “China is not going away. We’re not going away. So in the first instance we have to find a way to coexist and coexist peacefully. We know we’re in an intense competition. We talked about the competition to try to shape the post-Cold War era. At the same time, we are determined that that competition not veer into conflict...”¹

These officials either ignore reality, or deliberately mischaracterize it in hopes that, by treating the CCP as a competitor rather than an adversary, we can encourage it to keep the relationship at the level of competition rather than conflict. This is a typical fea-

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1. CFR Haass interview, 6/28/23.

ture of the historically discredited pedagogical foreign policies that attempt to teach adversaries to be good citizens by treating them as if they *are* good citizens.

Secretary Blinken's statement also applies to China the prominent Cold War assumption that the USSR was a permanent feature of the global landscape. That assumption, which was the basis of the policy of "détente," was disproven by the historic collapse of the Soviet empire. If the USSR proved not to be permanent, why should we believe that the CCP regime is permanent?

There are five categories of people who advocate engagement policies and the lack of realism underlying them:

- The proponents of "diplomatism" who place priority on diplomatic process over diplomatic substance and tend to dismiss concerns that are the source of tensions.
- Those who have been influenced or deceived by CCP propaganda, disinformation, or other perceptions management and influence operations.
- Those who indulge in wishful thinking or willful blindness about CCP intentions and behavior.
- The business executives, academic leaders, Sinologists, scientists, cultural organization leaders, and others who personally profit from engagement with China.
- The people and institutions who have been corrupted, co-opted, or recruited by the CCP, including:
 - Former Secretaries of State and Defense who open doors in China to U.S. corporations and who censor themselves regarding the CCP threat;
 - Newspapers like the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* that have received large sums to publish CCP propaganda and then similarly censor themselves; and
 - "Agents of influence" such the former Defense Intelligence Agency officer and National Defense University professor who passed classified information to Chinese agents and influenced intelligence analysis, policy, and national defense education about Chinese affairs.

The policy of engagement, however, has proven to be a manifest failure – as Beijing's Cold War policies continue with ever greater intensity. Engagement

policy almost never includes efforts to establish reciprocity and a level playing field or impose serious costs upon the CCP. Insofar as U.S. policies do resist CCP cold war actions, they are defensive and reactive and inordinately tolerate or ignore the CCP's depredations – especially in the spheres of political warfare.

A new strategy is necessary – and it must surely address defensive measures. The most salient of these measures involves reviving our military, preventing the theft of our technology, and restricting the regime's access to our capital markets, its participation in hi-tech joint ventures, and its consequent ability to exploit such access for its own technology development. There is considerable literature that already covers such defensive policies. What is missing, however, are not only policies of reciprocity but an offensive strategy that would put the CCP on the defensive. Herewith are a few suggestions for such a strategy.

A new strategy should be based on a double-pronged approach toward "China": a cold war policy – essentially a policy of reciprocity – toward the illegitimate and aggressive Communist Party-state, and a warm policy toward the peoples of China.

The first requirement of a new strategy is a coherent goal, which should be to eliminate the source of tensions between the CCP and the U.S.: the DNA of the Communist regime. This means ending the CCP's totalitarian monopoly of power. Since Secretary Blinken has said that this is not our goal, this Administration will not do what is necessary: namely, to help the Chinese people demand and realize political change. And this necessitates exploiting the regime's vulnerabilities and identifying others through better "opportunities intelligence."

One potential vulnerability is in Beijing's military economy. The CCP has thus far avoided Soviet-style economic vulnerabilities: first by having enjoyed decades of espionage, intellectual property theft, and massive overt and covert U.S. scientific-technological assistance. Meanwhile, its effort to educate legions of scientists and engineers will likely yield innovations that can challenge the U.S. in several sectors. Despite all this, the communist system constrains its people's freedom of intellectual intercourse and entrepreneurship: e.g., censorship of published material limiting the full development of Artificial Intelligence. The CCP therefore continues to depend on espionage to secure new technologies.

Only when we severely restrict the CCP's intellectual property theft will we be able to exploit a military industrial vulnerability. But this requires serious technology security policies and two components of

counterintelligence: counterespionage and offensive counterintelligence operations.

China has so many spies with such unlimited access, and we have so few agents to follow them, that counterespionage will not solve the problem until we restrict Chinese entry into the U.S. the way we restricted Soviet visitors. This will require a greater de-coupling of our two economies and less dependence on Chinese supply chains. This must be complemented by the much more cost-effective policy of reviving a serious offensive counterintelligence strategy designed to insert misleading information into CCP intelligence channels that would diminish the value of its intelligence collection and distort the CCP's decision-making.

Another CCP vulnerability is the ongoing crisis of corruption. According to good Leninist principles, the Party must be like medieval monasteries — separate from society while having a decisive influence over it. Its cadres must be disciplined and have “Party-mindedness.” Over time, however, that discipline has eroded.

Marxism-Leninism, of course, is not only a theory of knowledge, history, economy, politics, and society, it is also a handbook of how to seize and wield power. A key element of CCP power is its rigorous system of enforced conformity that identifies deviations of many types. Excessive cynicism — characterized by cadres who use their Party membership as an opportunity for self-advancement — is one of those deviations. And the CCP is replete with such cynics.

In the USSR, the Party was full of cynics and communists of convenience who were susceptible to corruption. They took bribes from the Mafia, invested in underground enterprises, and developed forms of self-interest that were at variance with the Party's interest. In their corruption, they became members of *society*, ceasing to be separated from it, and lost their Party-mindedness. They ceased being good ideological robots and became human beings — even in their corruption. Andropov and Gorbachev fought this corruption with ideological purification campaigns with the latter cracking down on the most corrupting influence: the underground economy.

Having studied how this factor contributed to the Soviet collapse, the CCP attempted to avoid it by co-opting self-interest and making it compatible with being a good Party member. This policy, however, has not worked out so well. Xi has had to conduct massive anti-corruption campaigns — precisely because of the breakdown of Party discipline. He sends deviationist journalists to re-education programs using ideology

to compel conformity. He purges senior CCP officials. He knows what Lenin, Stalin, Gorbachev, and Mao all knew: that ideology is key to the internal security system. It establishes semantic, speech, and thought control, and ultimately, behavior control.

How, then, can a breakdown of Party discipline be exploited? First, by exposing it — by showing how the Party's methods of rejuvenating discipline necessitate attacking the human dignity of ordinary citizens and Party members themselves — an attack that requires everyone to repeat the official Party line falsehoods, thus denying them freedom of conscience and independent moral agency.

The Party has internal divisions that can be exacerbated. Just as Boris Yeltsin made a genuine break with the Party, figures within the CCP have done so and may do so again. China needs defectors from Party orthodoxy who, like Yeltsin, can call on the police and armed forces not to shoot at fellow citizens. Moral and ideological support for those figures can encourage them.

This brings us to the main vulnerability. The central fact of Chinese political life is the regime's illegitimacy, its rule without the consent of the governed. Consequently, the Party has a mortal fear of the people and of ideological threats to its legitimacy, particularly democratic ideas that could inspire the people to reject it. When Taiwan holds elections, the CCP goes ballistic, shooting missiles over the Taiwan strait. When dissidents wrote manifestos on Democracy Wall, they were sent to the *Laogai*.

The degree of the Party's fear can be measured by the size of its internal security system that has created an Orwellian surveillance state:

- The CCP's monopoly of information and communications, specifically, its control over the internet, its censorship via the Great Firewall, its massive internet police force, and its jamming of foreign broadcasts.
- Its control over education, publishing, cinema, gaming, and other entertainment.
- Its control of capital and the priorities to which it is allocated.
- Its CCP prefects who supervise all economic and social activities to ensure conformity with Party norms.
- Its revival of Mao-style mass mobilization for social control and to reform behavior.
- Its secret police informants who prevent all organizations within society from becoming opposition cells.

- Its prisons and slave labor camps – the *Laogai* – and its system of lesser punishments for non-conformism.
- Its propaganda and revisionist history designed to co-opt the people through nationalistic appeals.
- Its political-psychological manipulation: specifically, inducing the Chinese people fatalistically to accept CCP rule as life's inescapable reality, or coercing them into submission to the CCP's "big lie" – its false legitimacy.

In war, including Cold War, offense necessitates targeting the enemy's center of gravity, which is that without which the enemy cannot make war, that without which the enemy cannot survive. The center of gravity in China is that internal security system. That system enables the CCP to suppress internal resistance by atomizing society: keeping the people paralyzed by fear and mistrust and thus separated from one another, making it impossible to organize cells of resistance. So, to combat the fear, isolation, and hopelessness suffered by those who dissent from CCP orthodoxy, we must give them hope and help build up their courage. This calls for a psychological strategy. But in contrast to Defense Department "psyops" which are tactical, this requires psyops at the national strategic level – an art of statecraft utterly neglected in our government.

A strategy to achieve peace with China cannot simply be defensive, reactive, and anti-communist. It must help the Chinese people overcome the structures of the internal security system, accentuate the rift between the nation and the CCP, and present the people with a positive alternative. It is a moral-political-ideological-cultural-psychological strategy – non-military instruments of conflict that are the essence of cold war.

Crucial ingredients of this strategy are:

- to anathematize the CCP by bearing moral witness to its violations of the human rights of the Chinese, Uighur, Tibetan, and Mongolian peoples;
- to reinforce in the people's minds the illegitimacy of the regime;
- to discredit features of the regime and its ideology that are contrary to traditional Chinese culture; and
- to offer alternative ideas and ideals that can inspire the people to resist.

During the Cold War, the human rights activist and inventor of the Soviet H-bomb, Andrei Sakharov, told the Kremlin bosses that they would never have peace with the West until they achieved peace with their own people. That meant respecting the people's human rights. This was a central insight that led to American success in the ideological war against the USSR. We offered the Soviet peoples a vision of human rights, political and economic freedom, the rule of law, and the consent of the governed. A similar ideological strategy must target the CCP and support the peoples of China.

Accentuating the people's alienation from the Party requires informing them about Communist crimes with which they do not want to be associated: the murder of tens of millions of citizens, genocide of the Uighurs, the cultural genocide of Tibet, slave labor, persecution of religious groups and the Falun Gong, forced organ harvesting, forced abortions, intellectual property theft, economic coercion, reckless environmental despoliation, official corruption, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and more. It means exposing the ill-gotten wealth of CCP officials, who did little or nothing to create it. So many of these facts are hidden from most people in China or obscured by official propaganda.

Telling such truths means ending the default diplomatic practice of self-censorship. Once our leaders start telling such truths about the CCP, the way President Reagan told them about the Soviet empire, we will also send Beijing one of the strongest possible signals of strength – an expression of the will to defend ourselves that enhances deterrence. In doing so, it will merely reciprocate the CCP's demonization of the U.S.

Abandoning self-censorship tells the Chinese peoples that American leaders are willing to stand up to the CCP and are no longer so fearful of its power or of losing business opportunities. If free American leaders cannot resist Beijing by telling the truth, how will the Chinese people think they can? When President Reagan's words "evil empire" reverberated into the depths of the Gulag Archipelago, they immeasurably raised the spirits of dissidents like Anatoly (now Natan) Sharansky who testified to their dramatic effect. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn declared: "One word of truth outweighs the world."

Reinforcing in the people's minds the regime's illegitimacy necessitates understanding the arguments communists use to create the illusion of legitimacy. It then requires both positive and negative strategic ingredients. The positive dimension – offering an

alternative to communist rule – requires arguing the superiority of democratic republicanism. The negative dimension involves exposing the falsehoods and inadequacies of the legitimizing vehicles. Both dimensions necessitate overt policy and covert political action.

Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics is the Party's indispensable legitimizing instrument. Its argument, translated into simplest terms, is that the Party knows the laws of history better than everyone else, and that it can therefore help steer history in the direction of the radiant future. As that argument wore thin, the Party resorted to an auxiliary principle, arguing that "history" bestowed its favor on the Party by giving it its victory in the 1949 revolution. Thus, the CCP claims to have been the unique force that could unite China and end its century of foreign humiliation. But this variant of the original Marxist principle has also ceased to be compelling. So, the Party had to try another method to help justify its rule: its oversight of a rising economy.

But the growth rate of recent years has drastically declined, and, in any event, huge swaths of the Chinese population have not benefited from the economic gains that were realized. Of course, the opacity of the system means that we cannot be sure about the CCP's economic statistics, which are full of deceptive numbers. But given Xi's policies, the previous era of productivity is unlikely to continue. This is due largely to three factors:

1. The socialist economy's inevitable dislocations: e.g., the state allocation of capital creates asset bubbles such as in real estate, which could cause a financial crisis.
2. The shrinking population – which has historically correlated with economic decline.
3. The prospect of a decreasing ability of the CCP to steal our technology, as it dawns on our leaders that it is not in our national interest to invest billions in research and development (R&D) only to hand our intellectual property over to the CCP. This realization will inevitably produce the gradual de-coupling of our economy from

China's, forcing the CCP to increase its R&D investments.

So, the CCP's auxiliary legitimizing principle will continue to erode. Consequently, Xi and his Party will continue to rely on the ideology to maintain Party discipline, combat corruption, and as a bonus, eliminate rivals for power. Even if the cadres cease to believe in some or all of it, it can never be abandoned, not only because of its legitimizing role, but because it sets the standard against which deviationism is measured. All concerned – both CCP cadres and the people – must submit to the standard either out of loyalty, self-preservation, or fear, or else suffer consequences.

So, acceptance of the ideology – and living in the pervasive atmosphere of the official lie – inevitably produces anomie, despair, and the psychological feeling of futile resignation. It amounts to recognition that the CCP is all-powerful and cannot be resisted. Meanwhile, the CCP's aggressive foreign policy complements this psychological strategy by taking actions that show

the regime's invincible power. As the theoretician of Marxism, Leszek Kolakowski, has noted, the ideology reminds everyone of who has got the gun.

Western elites who engage with China rarely see this psychological profile of most Chinese, Uighur, Tibetan, and Mongolian people. They interact with the heads of officially approved organizations and businesses controlled by CCP members, leaders of the armed forces, or executives sufficiently in conformity with the Party's strictures that they have access to necessary capital, licenses, and permits.

Discrediting the ideology requires renewed education about Marxism-Leninism. As in certain periods of the Cold War, arguments exposing the falsehoods of the ideology will have to be resurrected. Given the widespread ignorance of these arguments, it is necessary to review just a few:

- The false assumption of the perfectibility of human nature through social, political, or economic engineering (the creation of the "new man").
- The false denial of objective moral standards.

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- The false and pseudo-scientific “laws” of the dialectic: the unity and conflict of opposites, the shift from quantitative change to qualitative change, and “the negation of the negation.”
- The historical inaccuracy of applying dialectical change to the course of history (i.e., progress resulting from class struggle).
- The nonsensical assumption of the materialist foundation of all existence, and the monocausal economic explanation of historical change.
- The fallacy of the necessity of enhancing revolutionary consciousness among the oppressed.
- The fantasy of the inevitable victory of communism and the withering away of the state.
- The fantasy that a classless society is inevitable – notwithstanding Milovan Djilas’ observation that communism always creates a new oppressor class – the Communist Party.

Discrediting this ideology includes exposing the glaring antithesis between communist materialism and moral relativism on the one hand and the ancient spiritual traditions of Chinese culture on the other. China has absorbed a variety of Western influences. But Marxist materialism and moral relativism are two of the most toxic imports.

In his 1920 Speech to the Komsomol, Lenin declared that there are no objective moral standards: what is good helps the Party and the revolution; and what is evil hinders them. For all its facade of moral absolutes, the standards of communist morality are relative: shifting according to the changing requirements of the Party. In the process, this “morality” rejects the natural moral law, the law written on the human heart, the “law of human decency,” in favor of arbitrary and contingent man-made law like the Nazi law that made it legal to gas the *untermenschen* and Soviet law that made it legal to murder “class enemies” and enslave prisoners of conscience. This is the morality of “might makes right” that posits that the end justifies any means necessary to attain it. So, the CCP follows this “moral order” and rejects natural law and religiously grounded morality precisely to protect its power.

So, the CCP persecutes, suppresses, and attempts to control religion in China. The CCP, just like the Soviet Communist Party and the Nazis, sees it as a mortal threat. Religious adherents – Taoists, Con-

fuicians, Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims – have either a loyalty to a higher authority than the CCP or a higher concept of the origin of moral/ethical principles than the CCP. In contrast to the Party’s enforced relativism, their worldviews rest on a philosophical foundation that recognizes the existence of truth and objective moral standards. That means that they will not be willingly derailed and controlled by falsehoods and relativistic morality. The moral authority that characterizes their belief systems challenges that of the regime.

Furthermore, religious adherents possess a unity that diverges from the Party’s enforced conformity. Confucianism and Taoism (and derivatives such as various forms of Chinese folk religion and Falun Gong) unite in recognizing a transcendent Way of Heaven that provides moral order to the world – again, a challenge to a moral order that is contingent on the interests of the Party. Meanwhile, Tibetan Buddhism represents a unifying factor that prevents the Sinicization of Tibet. Tibetan Buddhist monasteries are seen as “alternative conceptions of society” that challenge communist authority. In the case of Christianity, the Church is understood to be the “body of Christ” and believers recognize that they are all united in that body.

U.S. policy must therefore provide support to religious adherents in China. This can take the form of moral, rhetorical, and diplomatic support to the persecuted. It means publicly bearing witness to the violations of their human rights. It can mean providing sacred texts, religious liturgies, prayers, meditations, homilies, and philosophical reflections as appropriate to each of the major religious communities. During the Cold War, U.S. broadcasters transmitted religious programming of this kind in different faiths to believers in the USSR who were denied religious freedom. There were – and are – no Constitutional constraints from doing so, and such programming proceeded unimpeded but appreciated by the target audiences for decades. Support can also involve helping organizations that champion the cause of persecuted religious adherents.

Given the success the CCP has had in eliminating religion and its derivatives from Chinese life – whether by murder, persecution, atheistic propaganda, outlawing the teaching of religion to children, etc. — the requirements of effective ideological war dictate that we must expose the Chinese public to forbidden ideas that can undermine Party-enforced atheism. This can mean promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It can mean distribution of literature

and broadcasting programs that discuss even basic metaphysical concepts – so many of which are shared by both the monotheistic religions and those historic oriental religions that recognize the Way of Heaven and even certain quasi-deistic concepts of a creator: How did anything come to be? What put the bodies of the universe in motion and that gave living things the potency to act? Is there an unmoved mover? Is there an uncaused cause? Is there a necessary being – in contrast to the contingent nature of observable beings? Does time go back infinitely, or must it have had a beginning? Are there objective moral standards that always apply to all people everywhere? If so, what is the origin of those standards? Are people accountable for how they live their lives? Are there ultimate consequences for crimes and transgressions?

None of these questions is sectarian, nor do they depend on any religious revelation: they all fall under the category of basic philosophy. The very posing of such questions undermines the entire communist worldview and ultimately the legitimacy of the Party.

Various dimensions of ideological and cultural warfare must be targeted toward multiple audiences – youth, the intelligentsia, individual ethnic groups, and the people as a whole. They must include the distribution of literature, including forbidden traditional Chinese literature, satire, films, music, art (including poster art and caricatures), and video games. The promulgation of humor that ridicules the communist system and the deification of its leaders can also provide inspiration and a balm for the frustrations of living under systematic injustice.

The effort to win over the Chinese people should include the de-ideologizing of history. The regime has brainwashed its people into believing that the U.S. has consistently been part of foreign efforts to humiliate the Chinese nation. Missing from this narrative is the story of how we helped China resist Imperial Japan, and how we assisted it in developing 10,000 technologies over recent decades as a sign of our goodwill.

Given how the CCP's imported Marxist culture is radically opposed to Chinese Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist traditions, the critique of that culture is best communicated to the people by the Chinese diaspora communities. They must be actively assisted in such

efforts – by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), our public diplomacy offices in the State Department, and covertly. Their message must be magnified by the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and private broadcasters and websites.

U.S. government outreach to that Chinese diaspora, as well as the Uighur, Tibetan, and Mongolian diaspora is strategically important in itself. During the Cold War, the Reagan White House maintained contact with the diaspora communities of the captive nations of Eastern Europe and the USSR. They were regularly briefed on U.S. strategy and given moral support for their efforts to liberate the lands of their ancestors. These groups were rarely invited to the White House, except when Presidents were seeking reelection support. Now, they were invited to proffer

advice on public diplomacy based on their cultural knowledge.

These organizations and émigré dissidents possessed networks of trusted contacts who could help both official and private covert efforts to support liberation movements like the Solidarity trade union in Poland or the “people's fronts” in the USSR's union republics. Dissidents within the Soviet empire were provided with technology and matériel that could help with internal communication, such as fax machines, mimeograph machines, and even paper (whose supplies were monopolized by the Party-state). Altogether, the message this support sent to the peoples of the captive nations was that they were not alone.

Exploiting the division between the Party and the people necessarily involves undermining the credibility of the CCP to speak for the Chinese nation. The Party's appeal to Chinese nationalism makes its regime a “national socialist” (i.e., Nazi-like or fascist) political order as much as an “international socialist” one. After Lenin and Stalin destroyed so much of traditional Russian culture, religion, history, and identity, Stalin had to resurrect Russian historical heroes, religion, traditions, and national pride in order to harness the power of Russian nationalism to defeat Hitler. The Soviet war effort was not called the “Great Class War” or the “Great Communist War,” but rather the “Great Fatherland War.” Xi Jinping's “China Dream”

The regime has brainwashed its people into believing that the U.S. has consistently been part of foreign efforts to humiliate the Chinese nation. Missing from this narrative is the story of how we helped China resist Imperial Japan, and how we assisted it in developing 10,000 technologies over recent decades as a sign of our goodwill.

and his theme of “national rejuvenation” amount to a similar effort.

So, credible voices must send the clear message to members of the CCP’s armed forces that the “PLA” is a Communist Party army and not a true national army. A similar message must be sent to every student, businessperson, and exchange participant visiting the United States that the CCP’s intelligence services (to which China’s National Security Law requires them all to report when demanded) are the Party’s organs and not the Chinese nation’s. The message must be that true Chinese patriotism has a spirit of solicitude toward the welfare of the Chinese nation and not of its oppressive and illegitimate regime.

A vigorous public diplomacy effort must compete for the sympathy of the Chinese people. We must call them our allies in the cause of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. We must convey our respect for traditional Chinese culture. In addition to having the psychologically strategic effect of encouraging popular resistance to communism, a constantly repeated policy of “alliance” and solidarity with the Chinese peoples will combat the CCP propaganda that U.S. policies to counter CCP espionage and “active measures” amount to “anti-Asian hate.”

Our traditional diplomats must understand this public diplomacy priority and not undermine it by official demarches, agreements, and symbolic gestures – photos with warm handshakes, embraces, kisses, bows, champagne treaty-signing ceremonies, etc. – whose effects are to confer legitimacy on the CCP and demoralize the people. To emphasize this point: U.S. foreign policy must develop a serious capability to conduct a two-track foreign policy toward all tyrannical and aggressive adversary countries: maintaining a cool and, where necessary, businesslike relationship with the oppressive regime while maintaining a warm relationship with the people. This is a skill that has been systematically ignored by our diplomatic establishment and implemented only occasionally by Presidential administrations sensitive to this requirement.

Conveying truth, democratic ideas, human rights, and a vision of political, economic, religious freedom, and a restoration of Chinese cultural traditions requires a massive effort to revive our international broadcasting capabilities: particularly the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), which utilize not only radio but television and the internet. It also requires support for private broadcasters such as the Sound of Hope, which reaches significant audiences in China. *The nucleus within the larger center of gravity of the CCP’s internal security system is the Party’s*

monopoly control of information and communications. Therefore, the central strategic objective of a U.S. strategy must be to break that monopoly.

Recently, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Congress appropriated \$20 million for our broadcasts to that region. While every nickel is welcome, this was not serious, especially after these services stopped broadcasting in the one way – short-wave radio – that can reach meaningful numbers of people especially in times of crisis. When confronted with the same challenge during the Cold War, the Reagan administration appropriated \$2.5 billion for our broadcasters (\$7.9 billion in today’s dollars).

Today, we must reach the Chinese people in every way possible: through shortwave, medium wave, DRM (Digital Radio Mondiale – which is the application of the digital revolution to radio broadcasting), television, and satellite broadcasting. All these must be transmitted on many frequencies, 24 hours per day. We must make major investments – even a Manhattan Project-like investment – to circumvent the Great Firewall and to overcome the CCP’s massive censorship apparatus. We must use instruments like StarLink and Lynk Global, a company that is putting hundreds of satellites into space that are becoming orbiting cell phone towers. These technologies enable us not only to communicate the truth to the Chinese people but also help them to communicate with one another.

Some allege that radio broadcasting is not worth the money or the effort because signals can be jammed, and audiences are small. This was the case during the Cold War as well. The USSR had 2,500 jamming stations, and shortwave signals could not be heard in cities. But there were periods of “twilight immunity” and north–south immunity, during which determined listeners outside the cities could hear our broadcasts.

Critical news heard by a single listener can go “viral” through personal human contacts. Audience sizes can dramatically increase during crisis periods. In national strategic terms, international broadcasting is ridiculously inexpensive in comparison to virtually all other components of our national security posture. The Obama administration’s attempt to end the few remaining hours of shortwave broadcasts to China was designed to “save” \$8 million (that is with an “m”) until Congress repudiated the policy and restored the funds.

When we dismantled our VOA and Radio Liberty (RL) broadcasts to Russia and Ukraine, we effectively helped Vladimir Putin establish a monopoly of information that enabled him successfully to brainwash

millions of Russians with pro-invasion propaganda. The failure to optimize communications with the Chinese people similarly gives the Xi regime a much greater opportunity to co-opt, propagandize, and make aggression more acceptable to the Chinese people.

A full spectrum communications strategy must apply Artificial Intelligence (AI) to offensive cyber strategies in the new field of “cognitive warfare.” These strategies must not only communicate with the Chinese people but penetrate CCP-controlled AI systems designed to restrict the free flow of information. This necessitates circumventing the CCP’s ideologically dictated efforts to prevent its AI from absorbing and communicating true information within China.

We must also communicate with Chinese students, businesspeople, and others who visit us. Thousands of them come here because they are privileged members of the Communist order. But Chinese students cannot take full advantage of American freedom. They are tracked technologically via their cell phones, by secret police minders, and by CCP front organizations and Confucius Institutes that should be shut down. We should also dismantle the CCP’s covert police stations on our territory designed to suppress Chinese residents here. We should make special efforts to reach Chinese students and help them communicate with the rest of the world without fear that their CCP-supplied cell phone is bugged. We should consider giving each of them vouchers to help them purchase their own non-bugged phones.

Communist regimes not only fear the truth, but the instantaneity of information and those media by which the people can access to communicate with millions of their fellow countrymen. When there is a civil disturbance in a totalitarian country, the regime first cuts off all communications to the locality of the disturbance. Only then does it crush the demonstration, the riot, or the strike. If news of such an event gets out to the rest of the nation, it is that the disturbance was crushed, and that resistance is futile. But if the news gets out before it is crushed, the opportunity arises for the disturbance to spread.

This is how a shipyard strike mushroomed into the millions-strong independent trade union/resistance movement in Poland. The “Solidarity” union strikers developed underground lines of communication to the VOA and Radio Free Europe (RFE) that enabled them to broadcast to the Polish nation about the very existence of their strike. The regime cut off all communications to Gdansk, but the nation got the news that the strike was happening and had not yet

been crushed. Millions decided to join the movement in “solidarity” with the strikers, and it sparked the collapse of the Soviet empire. When Solidarity leader and later Polish President Lech Walesa was asked how important the VOA and RFE were for the rise and sustenance of the Solidarity movement, he replied: “Would there be life on earth without the sun?”

Lest this testimony is seen as an isolated one, when Czechoslovakia’s first post-communist President, Vaclav Havel, made a state visit to Washington, his priority was to thank VOA broadcasters for keeping his nation’s flame alive for half a century. Similarly, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn testified that our international broadcasters were *the most powerful weapon we possessed in the Cold War*. As he put it, “Such as it is, the press has become the greatest power within the Western World, more powerful than the legislature, the executive and judiciary. One would like to ask; by whom has it been elected and to whom is it responsible?”²

There are as many as 180,000 civil disturbances annually in China: demonstrations, riots, and strikes, usually protesting local CCP corruption, exploitation, land grabs without proper compensation, religious persecution, and the Covid lockdown policy. The Chinese people as a whole are unaware of most of these disturbances because of the regime’s information monopoly. Consequently, the possibility of mobilizing the “people power” to oppose CCP’s tyranny is severely constrained. A new strategic paradigm that places priority on the potential of popular resistance can dismantle this tyrannical trap and dramatically increase the possibilities for peace.

I have attempted to set forth some of the elements of an offensive strategy utilizing information, political, cultural, and ideological warfare, and psychological strategy. These are all vehicles of statecraft, variations of which Beijing uses against us on a daily basis. It is time that we responded with truth, courage, and strategic professionalism in the interests of genuine peace.

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2. From “A World Split Apart,” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Commencement Address, Harvard University, June 8, 1978. <https://www.solzhenitsyncenter.org/a-world-split-apart>.