AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #26-09 dated 21 July 2009
Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE
Section IV - OBITUARIES, RESEARCH REQUESTS, JOBS AND COMING EVENTS
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Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
Tenet Canceled Secret CIA Hit Teams. As CIA director in 2004, George Tenet terminated a secret program to develop hit teams to kill al-Qaida leaders, but his successors resurrected the plan, according to former intelligence officials.
Tenet ended the program because the agency could not work out its practical details, the officials told The Associated Press. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the classified program.
Porter Goss, who replaced Tenet in 2005, restarted the program, the former officials said. By the time Michael Hayden succeeded Goss as CIA chief in 2006 the effort was again flagging because of practical challenges.
CIA Director Leon Panetta drove the final stake into the effort in June after learning about the program. He called an emergency meeting with the House and Senate Intelligence committees the next day, informing lawmakers about the program and saying that as vice president Dick Cheney had directed the CIA not to inform Congress about the operation.
The CIA declined to comment on the officials' comments.
One former senior intelligence official said Wednesday that the idea never quite died because it was a capability - the details of which remain classified - that the CIA wanted in its arsenal. But as time wore on, the official said, its need became less urgent.
Another former official said that the CIA's reliance on foreign intelligence services and on drone-launched missile strikes proved over time to be less risky yet effective in targeting al-Qaida chiefs for death or capture. President George W. Bush authorized the killing of al-Qaida leaders in 2001.
According to one congressional official, the agency spent more than $1 million over the eight years that the CIA considered launching the hit teams. The official would not detail the exact amount or how it was spent.
The House Intelligence Committee is laying the groundwork for a possible investigation of the program and its concealment from Congress. In late June it asked the CIA to provide documents about the now-canceled program to kill al-Qaida leaders.
Agency officials say it is complying with the request. Panetta has at the same time ordered a thorough internal review of the program.
The committee will try to establish how much was spent on the effort, whether any training was conducted and whether any officials traveled in association with the program, a committee official said. Those factors would determine whether the program had progressed enough to require congressional notification.
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, is expected to decide as early as this week whether to press ahead with a full investigation. [Hess/WashingtonPost/14July2009]
German Intelligence Says Iran Could Have Nuclear Bomb in Six Months. Officials at the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) told 'Stern': "If they wanted to they could test a nuclear bomb within half a year."
It suggests that the Middle Eastern country already has all the necessary components and technology as well as enough centrifuges to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
The revelation has come as a shock. One BND expert said: "No one would have believed it a few years ago."
According to reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Iran has already installed more than 7,000 centrifuges in their nuclear facility at Natanz.
Since the beginning of June, 4,920 of the centrifuges have been in use producing 1.3 million tones of enriched uranium - enough for two nuclear bombs.
The 'Stern' also reported that the Iranian government is working on improving its missile system in order to be able to deliver its atomic weapons to places as far away as Europe.
German secret service have "no doubt" that Iran's missile program is "exclusively" for the building of nuclear warheads.
The BND believes Iran could produce ballistic missiles suitable for carrying the nuclear warheads in three years.
A huge network of secret companies co-ordinated by "one of the most sought after men in the world" - the Iranian Mohammad Hosseinian Said - are apparently providing the necessary components to build the ballistic missiles.
The magazine also reported that several German companies are involved. [BILD/14July2009]
CIA Caught 'Off-Guard' By Jakarta Hotel Terror Attack. U.S. intelligence officials were caught "off-guard" by the terror attacks against two U.S.-based hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia.
A senior U.S. official told ABC News the attacks came as a "surprise."
A second U.S. counter-terrorism official said the CIA and other intelligence agencies had given no indication to the White House of "any threat reporting in the last 18 months" involving the Indonesian al Qaeda affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah.
US officials had been confident that the group had been dismantled after almost of all its leaders were killed or captured in a joint operation involving Indonesian, U.S. and Australian personnel.
"They were quiet but they weren't dead," said former White House counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke, an ABC News consultant. "They were just playing dead."
U.S. law enforcement officials today said two male suicide bombers were responsible for the attacks on the Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta. Both bombers had registered as guests at the respective hotels two days ago. [Ross&Cole&Esposto/ABCNews/17July2009]
Ex-Liberian Warlord Says CIA Assisted His Jailbreak. Charles Taylor, Liberia's former president and Africa's first head of state to stand trial in an international court, claims the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped his escape from a US jail.
Taylor denied all of the 11 charges of war crimes against him in his first testimony at the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague.
One of the most intriguing mysteries of Taylor's rise to power from a rebel leader to president centers on his 1985 escape from a US penitentiary in Plymouth, Massachusetts, while waiting extradition on charges of embezzling $900,000 in Liberia.
He informed judges on Friday that he did not escape on his own and was assisted, and rather released by agents from the CIA.
The CIA had ulterior motives for getting him out of jail, Taylor said. He was to be part of a CIA-plot to overthrow then President Samuel Doe under a coup led by a Liberian military leader, Thomas Quiwonkpa.
Taylor said he was "100 percent positive" that the spy agency was providing weapons for the plot.
Before his "release," he says, a Liberian visitor had "briefed" him of the CIA's role in the Quiwonkpa plot, the training of rebels, and the plan to invade Liberia.
He then moved on to describe the prison break, saying a guard virtually "released" him by walking him through the maximum security side to the minimum security side.
The guard handed him over two men he took for CIA agents who helped him climb out of an open window and jump over the fence to freedom.
He fled to Mexico, then to Belgium and finally returned to Africa. He, however, arrived too late for Quiwonkpa's coup.
A CIA spokesman, Paul Gimiglia, rejected the allegations as "completely absurd," but the agency later declined to comment further on the true nature of its relations with Taylor, either before or after the escape.
"We do not, as a rule, comment on these types of allegations,'' a CIA statement said.
Taylor is accused of supporting Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels during neighboring Sierra Leone's 1991-2002 civil war, in which an estimated 500,000 people were killed while thousands more were mutilated, raped or otherwise assaulted.
Taylor's testimony is expected to last several weeks. However, the Baptist lay preacher whose six-year regime pillaged Liberia has yet to answer to allegations of atrocities committed from 1996 to 2002 by the militias he controlled in Sierra Leone.
He insists that the object of his reign of terror was to bring peace to the region, denying all of the charges as lies and rumors.
In a shocking defense speech, Taylor on Thursday defended his orders that soldiers display human skulls at roadblocks was an effective way of installing order. [PressIr/19July2009]
Utah Lands New Spy Center; Idaho Doesn't Come Close to Needed Infrastructure. Fueled by $180 million in federal stimulus money, the National Security Agency will build a one-million square foot data center outside of Salt Lake City. According to the Salt Lake Tribune:
Hoping to protect its top-secret operations by decentralizing its massive computer hubs, the National Security Agency will build a 1-million-square-foot data center at Utah's Camp Williams.
The years-in-the-making project, which may cost billions over time, got a $181 million start last week when President Obama signed a war spending bill in which Congress agreed to pay for primary construction, power access and security infrastructure. The enormous building, which will have a footprint about three times the size of the Utah State Capitol building, will be constructed on a 200-acre site near the Utah National Guard facility's runway.
Congressional records show that initial construction will include tens of millions in electrical work and utility construction, a $9.3 million vehicle inspection facility, and $6.8 million in perimeter security fencing. The budget also allots $6.5 million for the relocation of an existing access road, communications building and training area.
Officials familiar with the project say it may bring as many as 1,200 high-tech jobs to Camp Williams, which borders Salt Lake, Utah and Tooele counties.
It will also require at least 65 megawatts of power, about the same amount used by every home in Salt Lake City combined. A separate power substation will have to be built at Camp Williams to sustain that demand, said Col. Scott Olson, the Utah National Guard's legislative liaison.
There are few places in the U.S. that could house a data center like this, and Utah has spent years laying the groundwork to make sure that it could accommodate this kind of facility (or a Google data center, etc.). Utah did not look much different from the rest of the intermountain west region in 1997, but made a concerted effort to beef up its Internet Backbone connections. By 1999, the Wasatch Front area had one of the nation's fastest growing Internet networks. So what does that network look like after another 10 years?
Today, the Salt Lake City area has more internet backbone capacity relative to demand, than anywhere in the United States. And regional competition if you are sitting in Boise, ID, is pretty tough:
Last October, Idaho, led by INL, and the state's universities and hospitals connected to the IRON GigaPop network (Idaho Regional Optical Network) which is a great leap forward for our research institutions. The network allows institutions to connect at speeds allowing an entire CD to be downloaded in seconds, or an entire library in minutes. However, Idaho still has nowhere near the backbone capacity to attract a Google or NSA like datacenter. Congrats to our neighbors to the south for making an investment in infrastructure that is paying off by attracting billions of dollars in spending and lots, and lots, of high paying technical jobs.
Idaho, are you listening? [NewWest/18July2009]
Mossad Still Stalking Malls Near US Military Bases. Cells of young Israeli intelligence operatives continue to openly solicit relationships with U.S. military personnel from shopping mall kiosks, according to an informed source.
One such kiosk operates at the MacArthur Center Mall in Norfolk, Virginia, where a number of U.S. Navy personnel from the nearby naval bases are regularly confronted by aggressive young Israelis selling Dead Sea cosmetic products who inquire about where the personnel are stationed and the nature of their jobs. Young Israeli women working at the kiosk also appear to want to strike up a closer relationship with some of the naval personnel.
The use of young Israelis, many of whom continue to serve in a reserve status with the Israel Defense Force, as intelligence agents, has changed somewhat over the past decade. Young Israeli "art students" first conducted unsolicited visits to the homes and offices of federal and military employees trying to sell cheap Chinese-made bogus Israeli artwork while casing neighborhoods and office buildings.
Israeli-operated mall kiosks have transitioned from selling toys to cosmetics.
In November 2001, the INS arrested several Israelis, including some with military backgrounds, selling Puzzle Car and Zoom Copter toys from shopping mall kiosks and vending carts. Many of the malls were located near U.S. government facilities, including the Pentagon and CIA. A majority of the Israelis, arrested for visa violations instead of espionage, worked for a Florida-based company called Quality Sales. A spokesman for the company admitted the company hired vacationing Israeli students but they had the wrong visas. The spokesman also revealed the Israelis were deemed "special interest" cases by INS - a new government designation applied to terrorism suspects in the wake of 911. Federal authorities suspect the Israelis were using the kiosks as intelligence fronts in the same manner that Israelis were using door-to-door art sales as covers. The National Counterintelligence Center (NCIX) stated in a report issued in March 2001 that, "In the past six weeks, employees in federal office buildings located throughout the United States have reported suspicious activities connected with individuals representing themselves as foreign students selling or delivering artwork. Employees have observed both males and females attempting to bypass facility security and enter federal buildings." The report was temporarily removed from the NCIX web site.
One of the malls where the Israeli "toy sellers" based their operations was the Pentagon City Mall, just across Interstate 395 from the Pentagon. In July 2004, the mall served as the rendezvous point for alleged Israeli Pentagon spy Larry Franklin and Keith Weissman, an AIPAC official. Franklin warned Weissman that Iranian agents were going to start attacking American soldiers and Israeli agents in Iraq. Weissman then went to brief the account of the meeting to Steve Rosen, another senior AIPAC official. They both informed the Israeli embassy in Washington and Glenn Kessler, a reporter for The Washington Post. Those phone calls were being wiretapped by the FBI as part of its investigation of a major Israeli spy ring in the United States, an investigation that had been going on since before the 9/11 attacks. The FBI was also monitoring meetings between Franklin, Weissman, and Rosen, including one held in February 2003 at the Arlington, Virginia, Ritz-Carlton hotel, which adjoins the Pentagon City Mall.
In February 2005, an Israeli man named Ohad Cohen was deported, along with four other Israelis, from Omaha, Nebraska. In what was becoming a common occurrence in the United States, a total of 10 Israelis, who were working at shopping mall kiosks in the Omaha and Lincoln areas, were deported by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials for illegally working in the United States on tourist visas. The Israelis operated out of Omaha's Oak View Mall and Lincoln's Gateway Westfield Mall. The Federal government probe was reported to be part of a wider probe of Israeli shopping mall kiosk activity throughout the Midwest. In December 2004, FBI and immigration officers arrested 15 Israelis in Minnesota and three operating from a mall kiosk in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Omaha is also the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC).
Other Israeli mall kiosks around the country that hired aggressive Israeli young men and women who badger customers and ask personal questions. Israeli mall kiosks engaged in the aggressive sales practices have been set up at the North Shore Mall in Peabody, Massachusetts, and Northeast Mall in Hurst, Texas, a Dallas suburb. The mall kiosks in Peabody sell Israeli hand cream and nail files. The kiosk in Hurst has a male overseer, about 45 years old, who lives in the Bahamas.
Many of the Israeli mall vendors claim ignorance when told by customers that Israeli mall kiosks were identified as Mossad front operations in a Fox News report. More incredibly, some Israelis feign ignorance when the term "9/11" is used. They claim not to know what the term means.
Recently, there was yet another story about the use of Israeli mall kiosk operators as intelligence agents. In the most recent case in Perth, Australia, an Australian man was arrested and charged with violation of an Australian hate crime law for exposing the activities of Israeli-run mall kiosks owned by an Israeli firm in Melbourne whose products are called "Seacret - Minerals From The Dead Sea." The president of the Australian Union of Jewish Students lodged a criminal complaint against the investigator who maintained that Israeli nationals were attempting to obtain classified information on the Royal Australian Navy's Collins class submarine as well as other defense programs. [Onlinejournal/17July2009]
US Creates Military Command for Cyber Battlefield. The US military announced a new "cyber command" designed to wage digital warfare and to bolster defenses against mounting threats to its computer networks.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates formally established the command - the country's first - that would operate under US Strategic Command, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said.
The command will begin operating in October and be fully operational in October 2010, Whitman said.
The move reflects a shift in military strategy with "cyber dominance" now part of US war doctrine and comes amid growing alarm over the perceived threat posed by digital espionage coming from China, Russia and elsewhere.
US officials say China has built up a sophisticated cyber warfare program and that a spate of intrusions in the United States and elsewhere can be traced back to Chinese sources.
The officer widely expected to lead the command is Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the director of the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA).
Alexander has described cyberspace as the new military frontier that could shape the future of national security, comparing it to sea or air power.
The Defense Department said the command would streamline various cyber efforts across the armed forces and would focus on military networks.
Officials have said the command would likely be located at Fort Meade, Maryland and that the Pentagon would not be taking over security efforts for civilian networks from other government agencies.
The US military relies on 15,000 networks and about seven million computers, with more than 100 foreign intelligence agencies trying to hack into US networks, according to Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn.
"Our defense networks are constantly under attack," Lynn said in a speech last week.
"They are probed thousands of times a day. They are scanned millions of times a day. And the frequency and sophistication of attacks are increasing exponentially," he said.
The threat ranges from teenage hackers to criminal gangs acting as cyber mercenaries to foreign governments, Lynn said.
Lynn cited cyberattacks that shut down Georgia's government and commercial web sites during Russia's military incursion last year.
Defense officials have said the cyber command would focus on security efforts along with offensive capabilities to ensure "freedom of action in cyberspace" for the United States.
The precise details of US cyber military power remain secret, but it includes technology capable of penetrating and jamming networks, including the classified Suter airborne system, analysts say.
The technology has been reportedly added to unmanned aircraft and allows for users to take over and manipulate enemy sensors.
Reported breaches of the US electricity grid and of networks used by aerospace contractors building the F-35 fighter jet have underlined concerns over cyber security.
Last year, several thousand computers in the Defense Department were infected by malicious software, prompting the military to ban troops and civilian staff from using external memory devices and thumb drives.
In the proposed defense budget for fiscal 2010, the administration has proposed increasing funds for training to triple the number of cyber security experts from 80 to 250 per year.
President Barack Obama has put a top priority on cyber security and announced plans for a national cyber defense coordinator.
A recent White House policy review said that "cybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century."
Obama has promised privacy rights would be carefully safeguarded even as the government moves to step up efforts to protect sensitive civilian and military networks. [AP/23June2009]
SBU Challenges the FSB in Crimea. In line with implementing stricter security policies in Sevastopol and the Crimea, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is adopting tougher policies towards Russian intelligence activities in the peninsula. These follow the August 2008 decrees restricting the movement of Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels in and out of Sevastopol without Ukrainian consent. The SBU has officially given its Russian equivalent, the Federal Security Service (FSB), until December 13 to remove itself from Ukraine. SBU chairman Valentyn Nalyvaychenko warned that if the FSB has not left by that date, "then they would bear criminal responsibility.�
The FSB officers also operate in counter-intelligence matters. Russia utilizes its domestic intelligence agency, (the FSB) in its dealings with the CIS, because it is regarded as the "near abroad" (the SVR is used in the "far abroad"). Russian policy would be the equivalent of the FBI rather than the CIA operating in Central and Latin America.
Nalyvaychenko explained that he had consulted the Ukrainian foreign ministry before advising Moscow of the cancellation of the protocol permitting the FSB to operate in Sevastopol. Nineteen FSB officers currently operate in Sevastopol. Russian intelligence has always been thought to support separatist, anti-NATO and anti-American groups and parties, even providing Black Sea Fleet personnel who wear civilian clothes to participate in protests. Nalyvaychenko revealed that one factor behind the decision to terminate the right of the FSB to maintain its presence in Sevastopol was that they did not restrict themselves to the naval base.
One member of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee on national security and defense, Oleksandr Skybinetsky, said that most Ukrainian experts in security affairs are concerned that Russian intelligence orchestrates various groups and protest movements that are hostile to Ukrainian sovereignty. The SBU has instituted criminal charges against separatists and brought in political leaders for interrogation. The leader of the Progressive Socialist Party faction in the Sevastopol city council, Yevhen Dubovyk, was recently questioned after he threatened radical steps to unite Sevastopol and the Crimea with Russia.
A second factor of concern to the SBU is the possible recruitment of Ukrainian citizens who comprise the majority of the 20,000 workforce in the fleet and military-industrial enterprises that provide services to it. Financial inducements are hard to resist when pay in the fleet and its ancillary industries is twice that in other Russian naval units and many times higher than the average pay in Ukraine.
Why the FSB needs to be involved in the security of the Black Sea Fleet is puzzling, since this would more normally be the task of military intelligence. Ukrainian military intelligence operates in Sevastopol and it is assumed by Kyiv that Russian military intelligence maintains a presence within the fleet.
The ostensible reason the Black Sea Fleet claims it needs Russian intelligence units is to safeguard the security of the fleet on foreign territory. The question is, against whom? The SBU has offered to provide full security for the fleet. Nalyvaychenko revealed that the SBU had established a new "powerful counter-intelligence unit in Simferopil, Sevastopol and other cities of the Crimea." This unit would be ideally suited to protect the fleet, he added. As soon as this unit was established, Nalyvaychenko advised his Russian counterparts that the FSB was no longer required in the Crimea.
The SBU could deal with law and order and terrorist issues. "We do not need assistance or the physical presence of foreign secret services," Nalyvychenko said. The Russian reaction was predictably negative and similar to Yushchenko's August 2008 decrees. The Russian foreign ministry reiterated that the FSB was in Ukraine based on earlier agreements in relation to the fleet. They could only be removed through mutual agreement.
Anatoliy Tsyganok, the head of the Russian Center for Military Forecasting, believes that the FSB will ignore the Ukrainian demand. Kiril Frolov, a representative of the Institute for the CIS, warned of an "asymmetrical response" from Russia for this "unfriendly Ukrainian act against the Russian state." It remains unclear how Russia can retaliate, since Ukraine has no military base on its territory and the SBU only has a minimal presence in its diplomatic representations within Russia.
The old and technologically obsolete vessels in the fleet are not a threat to the four NATO member countries in the Black Sea. The only occasion they have been used is in the August 2008 invasion of non-NATO member Georgia. NATO has long known everything it needed to know about the Fleet. In December 1991, this author faxed to Ukrainian members of parliament, after they had held a successful referendum on independence, xeroxes of the pages pertaining to the Black Sea Fleet in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance. Open source IISS publications were purchased by the Soviet Embassy who then classified them as "confidential" and they were subsequently placed in the restricted areas ("spetsfond") of Soviet libraries.
Sevastopol was neglected by Kyiv since independence. The city has few memorials dedicated to Ukrainian history, but is full of Russian and Soviet symbols tying the twice "hero city" to Russia. The city's youth is "educated exclusively on Russian history, Russian patriotism and loyalty to Russian statehood." The fleet plays an important role in this process, which transcends its military function, "especially in the areas of education, propaganda, information and culture."
On June 12 Ukrayinsky Tyzhden asked: "What about official Kyiv?" "Well, it (official Kyiv) undertakes a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine." Russian policies towards Sevastopol are conducted within the context of "great power politics." Ukrainian policies in contrast are "the private affair of individual patriotically inclined persons who have become accustomed to disinterest from official Kyiv." [Kuzio/politicom/14July2009]
Rosenberg Backers Say Case is Still Full of Holes. For nearly six decades now, friends and sympathizers of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg have marched, picketed and petitioned the U.S. government, claiming that the Lower East Side couple were framed by prosecutors as atomic spies for Russia before they were unjustly executed in Sing Sing's electric chair on June 19, 1953.
The sensational case seared the American psyche during the Cold War and still elicits passionate debate even as many Rosenberg supporters came to believe that Julius and possibly Ethel had been at least minor players in an espionage ring starting when the U.S. was an ally of the Soviet Union during the Nazi onslaught of World War II.
Then came a stunning acknowledgement last September: For the first time, Morton Sobell, a co-defendant of the Rosenbergs who had maintained his innocence before and after more than 18 years in federal prisons, including Alcatraz, admitted to Sam Roberts of The New York Times that he had been a spy with Julius Rosenberg, passing on military and industrial secrets to the Soviets.
Sobell, now 92, also told Roberts that he didn't believe Ethel Rosenberg was guilty of anything beyond being Julius's wife, a claim disputed by historians like Ronald Radosh, author of "The Rosenberg File," who nonetheless believe that secret grand jury testimony released last September by the National Archives cast doubt on a key government charge that led to her conviction for a capital crime.
And while Radosh claimed that Sobell's disclosures shattered a fundamental assumption of the American left, there were no mea culpas coming from organizers of a recent annual memorial marking the 56th anniversary of the Rosenbergs' execution at New York University's Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives on Washington Square South.
The free event, held on the Rosenbergs' 70th wedding anniversary, drew about 75 people - some in their 80s and 90s. They heard speeches, musical tributes, messages of support from the Rosenbergs' orphaned adult children, Michael and Robert Meeropol, and from a granddaughter, Rachel Meeropol, now an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights.
There was also a reading of a petition to be sent to U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., asking once again that the government re-examine the Rosenberg-Sobell case.
"The case is still full of holes," said Richard Corey, 62, a Chelsea painter and songwriter who is co-director of the National Committee To Reopen the Rosenberg Case, which sponsored the memorial. Corey attended the event with his 95-year-old father, "Professor" Irwin Corey, the celebrated stand-up comic and activist who was blacklisted during the McCarthy era.
"Everybody now recognizes that Ethel Rosenberg was arrested and lies were told so the government could use her as a lever to get a confession from Julius, who was not involved in atomic spying. He helped an ally during World War II," contended the younger Corey. He noted in a telephone conversation that he grew up on Long Island "with an F.B.I. car parked in front of our house. All I can say is that I was extremely disappointed that my family didn't storm Sing Sing prison and get Ethel out," he said.
Long Island conductor/composer Leonard Lehrman, who co-directs the N.C.R.R.C. with Corey, noted that the secret grand jury testimony in the case suggests that key trial statements from co-defendant David Greenglass, Ethel's brother, and his wife, Ruth Greenglass, both of whom became government witnesses and pariahs on the American left, were fabricated by them and "coached by the F.B.I."
Their claim at trial that Ethel typed up notes from David Greenglass when he was an Army machinist at a top-secret, atom bomb-making facility in Los Alamos, N.M., called the Manhattan Project and moonlighting as a Soviet mole, is believed by many to have helped seal Ethel Rosenberg's doom. A jury convicted the couple in a Foley Square federal courthouse on March 29, 1951, for conspiracy to commit espionage. Their lawyer, Emanuel Bloch, protested the Rosenbergs' innocence up until the night before their deaths after worldwide pleas for clemency were ignored. French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre called their execution a "legal lynching."
None of the people interviewed for this article knew the Rosenbergs personally. But one of the speakers at the memorial, Miriam Moskowitz, 93, who was convicted in 1950 for conspiracy to obstruct justice in another Cold War case that prosecutors at the time billed as a "dress rehearsal" for the Rosenberg trial, told this reporter that she met Ethel Rosenberg in jail - the notorious Women's House of Detention on Greenwich Ave.
"On July 29, 1950, I was arrested and two weeks later Ethel Rosenberg was arrested," Moskowitz wrote in an e-mail. "She was lodged on the 9th floor and I on the 5th so we still did not meet. After her conviction she was brought down to my floor (5th) because there was a special cell there where the guard could keep her in sight all the time - they were afraid, I think, that she would do something drastic to herself. (What a joke: Ethel said they never understood that would be the last thing in the world she could ever do.) So on the 5th floor we finally met and shared 'leisure' time until she was shipped to Sing Sing prison."
Moskowitz, who is including the episode in a chapter of a book she's completing about her case and that of co-defendant Abraham Brofman, said she decided to come to the memorial because "for 56 years I have been haunted by the Rosenberg case - it was a terrible time, sheer madness and more frightening than my worst childhood bad dreams.'
She also seemed concerned about New York Timesman Sam Roberts's article on Morton Sobell's admissions, claiming Roberts misquoted him and "slanted" his account of Sobell's spy activities.
Not surprisingly, N.C.R.R.C.'s Lehrman, 59, shares that view.
"Sam twisted [Sobell's] words to make it seem as though he was admitting to more than he was," Lehrman said. "And Morty's letter that appeared in The New York Times [clarified] that he, in fact, knew absolutely nothing about any atomic espionage."
Lehrman, who was 3 years old when the Rosenbergs were executed, believes that Julius Rosenberg, regarded by many on the left as an ardent Communist, was motivated by idealistic notions about the Soviet Union - viewed by some party members as a socialist utopia free of anti-Semitism.
"Some of those who tried to help the Soviet Union as a wartime ally may have broken some laws in order to do that," Lehrman said in an e-mail. "The Cold War put their actions into a different context, just the way 9/11 put Lynne Stewart's sometimes rule-breaking defense of her client into a different light," he added, alluding to the Downtown lawyer convicted of materially aiding terrorism in her defense of an imprisoned Egyptian Muslim cleric. "She did not deserve a harsh sentence, and neither did Julius Rosenberg," Lehrman said.
The National Committee to Reopen the Rosenberg Case was directed for 42 years by Aaron Katz, who died in Florida last year at 92. Katz was also active in a predecessor group that began in 1951 called The Committee To Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, said one of the founders of that group, David Alman, 90. Alman also spoke at the Rosenberg memorial and read from a draft of a book he wrote with his late wife, lawyer and sociologist Emily Arnow Alman, called "Case for Exoneration: The Rosenberg-Sobell Trial in the 21st Century."
The Almans did not know the Rosenbergs socially when both couples were living at the Knickerbocker Village housing complex on the Lower East Side. But Alman said his wife had a brief conversation with Ethel Rosenberg at a small park nearby and never forgot it.
"My wife was walking with a neighbor who introduced her to Ethel Rosenberg in a little park and the women both had little babies with them," he recalled. "They only spoke three or four minutes, but Emily said she couldn't get it out of her mind that this woman she had spoken to in the park had been sentenced to death. It was a human connection and it led to the formation of a committee to obtain clemency in the fall of 1951. We were both deeply involved in the campaign for clemency and for a new trial."
Alman has come to believe that Julius Rosenberg, Morton Sobell and David Greenglass, the government's chief witness who testified against his sister, Ethel Rosenberg, were guilty of crimes "no matter how you parse it," but were convicted on the wrong charges.
"I don't feel what they did is any small thing," Alman said. "I can't speak for everyone, but I would have no problem if they had been tried for the crime they committed - and not treason. Greenglass and his wife weren't able to stand up to the threats [of prosecutors] and they capitulated," he added. "But they didn't tell the whole truth."
Greenglass, now 87, who supplied the Russians with classified military information, including a crude sketch of an implosion-type nuclear weapon design, served 10 years of a 15-year sentence. He later recanted his trial testimony that helped put his sister Ethel in the electric chair, claiming he perjured himself. His wife, Ruth, who had told the grand jury she wrote her husband's notes from Los Alamos in longhand before changing her story to accuse Ethel of typing them, was named as a co-conspirator in the Rosenberg case but never indicted. She died last April at 83.
Downtown lawyer Daniel Alterman, a longtime cooperating attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights, believes that the Rosenbergs could have survived a death penalty trial with a better defense.
"Ethel, I think, was innocent," he said. "I think the Rosenbergs were executed because of the hysteria of the times and the Cold War fears. Manny Bloch [the Rosenbergs' lawyer] was outmatched and none of the great lawyers were courageous enough to take the case." Alterman believes the Communist Party "wouldn't allow or pay for it."
Others believe there was serious government misconduct in the case by prosecutors Irving Saypol and Roy Cohn, as well as U.S. District Judge Irving R. Kaufman, who claimed at sentencing that the Rosenbergs' crime was "worse than murder" and helped start the Korean War. Stephen Gillers, a New York University law professor specializing in legal ethics, wrote an e-mail from abroad stating that he does not believe the Rosenbergs received a fair sentence. Gillers noted that two biographies of the late power broker Roy Cohn (by Sidney Zion and Nicholas von Hoffman) reveal that Cohn, while a young assistant prosecutor on the Rosenberg case, had "extensive and secret back-channel, ex parte communications with the trial judge, Irving R. Kaufman, about the sentencing hearing before it occurred. That violated judicial ethics rules and due process guarantees as understood at the time as well as today."
But making the case that the Rosenbergs' trial was unfair because witnesses like David Greenglass have recanted their testimony is another matter, said Gillers.
"The fact that a witness recants [whether or not honestly] does not determine whether or not the trial war fair," he said. "Unfortunately, witnesses lie all the time. Only if Greenglass lied at the behest of the prosecutors [or with their knowledge] would the trial violate the Rosenbergs' legal rights." [Reinholz/TheVillager/16July2009]
CIA Officials Committed 'Fraud on the Court,' Judge Rules. A federal judge has ruled that government officials committed fraud while defending a lawsuit brought by a former DEA agent who accused a CIA operative of illegally bugging his home.
U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth wrote that he was also considering sanctions against five current and former agency lawyers and officials, including former director George Tenet, for withholding key information about the operative's covert status.
The rulings, issued in recent months, highlighted what the judge called fraudulent work by CIA lawyers in defending a suit that Lamberth said had a lengthy and "twisted history." Brought in 1994 by DEA Agent Richard A. Horn, the suit alleged that the CIA illegally bugged his residence in Rangoon, Myanmar, while he was serving in the country.
Horn said that portions of a telephone conversation with a subordinate were used by the head of the U.S. mission, Franklin Huddle, to oust him from his post.
Horn, 63, returned to the United States and retired from the DEA in 2000, according to his attorney. His suit was sealed at the government's request.
The CIA operative and Huddle, represented by the Justice Department, fought the suit and asked Lamberth to throw it out, invoking the state's secrets privilege. The government argued that the case involved information, including the CIA operative's identity, that was too sensitive to be revealed in court.
Lamberth agreed and dismissed the suit in 2004. Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned Lamberth, ruling that Horn could try to prove his case against Huddle by using unclassified information. The court upheld Lamberth's decision to remove the CIA operative from the suit.
Early last year the Justice Department informed Lamberth that the CIA operative's cover had actually been lifted in 2002 but nobody told the judge or the appeals court about the change. A CIA lawyer learned about it in 2005 but did not alert the Justice Department, Lamberth or the appeals court, Lamberth wrote.
Lamberth identified that lawyer as Jeffrey W. Yeates. In his rulings, Lamberth chastised the former CIA operative, identified as Arthur Brown, for not informing the courts about his change in status and reinstated Brown as a defendant. Brown claimed in court papers that he told top CIA lawyers about his cover being lifted as early as 2002.
Lamberth called the decision to withhold the information a "fraud on the court."
"The CIA was well-aware that the assertion of the state secrets privilege as to Brown was a key strategy in getting the case dismissed," Lamberth added.
Lamberth ordered Yeates, Brown, Tenet and three current or former CIA lawyers - John Rizzo, Robert J. Eatinger and A. John Radsan - to file court documents explaining why he should not sanction them for the government's conduct. Attorneys for the officials and lawyers declined to comment or could not be reached. CIA spokesman George Little said the agency "takes seriously its obligations to U.S. courts."
Horn's attorney, Brian C. Leighton, said that Lamberth's rulings showed the CIA was trying to "cover up wrong-doing." [Wilber/WashingtonPost/20July2009]
Hungary's KGB-Trained Secret Service Chief Resigns. Hungarian Premier Gordon Bajnai on Monday accepted the resignation of Sandor Laborc, the head of Hungary's National Security Office, the Prime Minister's Office told local news agency MTI. Laborc was a controversial figure due to his communist-era past as a graduate of a top KGB academy in the Soviet Union.
His resignation came in the wake of a scandal over a private security firm that was suspected of spying on politicians and hacking into state computers.
The secret services chief cited "anomalies" in official investigations into the affair (which resulted in no serious charges being brought) as reasons for his decision to stand down.
Prime Minister Bajnai said Laborc had "modernized" Hungary's secret service operations during his time in the job and will remain at his post until September 1.
Laborc spent six years at the KGB's Dzerzhinsky Academy in Moscow in the 1980s, and his appointment in December 2007 by Hungary's socialist government was strongly criticized by the opposition. [EarthTimes/20July2009]
Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE
Two Centuries On, a Cryptologist Cracks a Presidential Code. For more than 200 years, buried deep within Thomas Jefferson's correspondence and papers, there lay a mysterious cipher - a coded message that appears to have remained unsolved. Until now.
The cryptic message was sent to President Jefferson in December 1801 by his friend and frequent correspondent, Robert Patterson, a mathematics professor at the University of Pennsylvania. President Jefferson and Mr. Patterson were both officials at the American Philosophical Society - a group that promoted scholarly research in the sciences and humanities - and were enthusiasts of ciphers and other codes, regularly exchanging letters about them.
In this message, Mr. Patterson set out to show the president and primary author of the Declaration of Independence what he deemed to be a nearly flawless cipher. "The art of secret writing," or writing in cipher, has "engaged the attention both of the states-man & philosopher for many ages," Mr. Patterson wrote. But, he added, most ciphers fall "far short of perfection."
To Mr. Patterson's view, a perfect code had four properties: It should be adaptable to all languages; it should be simple to learn and memorize; it should be easy to write and to read; and most important of all, "it should be absolutely inscrutable to all unacquainted with the particular key or secret for decyphering."
Mr. Patterson then included in the letter an example of a message in his cipher, one that would be so difficult to decode that it would "defy the united ingenuity of the whole human race," he wrote.
There is no evidence that Jefferson, or anyone else for that matter, ever solved the code. But Jefferson did believe the cipher was so inscrutable that he considered having the State Department use it, and passed it on to the ambassador to France, Robert Livingston.
The cipher finally met its match in Lawren Smithline, a 36-year-old mathematician. Dr. Smithline has a Ph.D. in mathematics and now works professionally with cryptology, or code-breaking, at the Center for Communications Research in Princeton, N.J., a division of the Institute for Defense Analyses.
A couple of years ago, Dr. Smithline's neighbor, who was working on a Jefferson project at Princeton University, told Dr. Smithline of Mr. Patterson's mysterious cipher.
Dr. Smithline, intrigued, decided to take a look. "A problem like this cipher can keep me up at night," he says. After unlocking its hidden message in 2007, Dr. Smithline articulated his puzzle-solving techniques in a recent paper in the magazine American Scientist and also in a profile in Harvard Magazine, his alma mater's alumni journal.
The "Perfect" Cipher?
The code, Mr. Patterson made clear in his letter, was not a simple substitution cipher. That's when you replace one letter of the alphabet with another. The problem with substitution ciphers is that they can be cracked by using what's termed frequency analysis, or studying the number of times that a particular letter occurs in a message. For instance, the letter "e" is the most common letter in English, so if a code is sufficiently long, whatever letter appears most often is likely a substitute for "e."
Because frequency analysis was already well known in the 19th century, cryptographers of the time turned to other techniques. One was called the nomenclator: a catalog of numbers, each standing for a word, syllable, phrase or letter. Mr. Jefferson's correspondence shows that he used several code books of nomenclators. An issue with these tools, according to Mr. Patterson's criteria, is that a nomenclator is too tough to memorize.
Jefferson even wrote about his own ingenious code, a model of which is at his home, Monticello, in Charlottesville, Va. Called the wheel cipher, the device consisted of cylindrical pieces, threaded onto an iron spindle, with letters inscribed on the edge of each wheel in a random order. Users could scramble and unscramble words simply by turning the wheels.
But Mr. Patterson had a few more tricks up his sleeve. He wrote the message text vertically, in columns from left to right, using no capital letters or spaces. The writing formed a grid, in this case of about 40 lines of some 60 letters each.
Then, Mr. Patterson broke the grid into sections of up to nine lines, numbering each line in the section from one to nine. In the next step, Mr. Patterson transcribed each numbered line to form a new grid, scrambling the order of the numbered lines within each section. Every section, however, repeated the same jumbled order of lines.
The trick to solving the puzzle, as Mr. Patterson explained in his letter, meant knowing the following: the number of lines in each section, the order in which those lines were transcribed and the number of random letters added to each line.
The key to the code consisted of a series of two-digit pairs. The first digit indicated the line number within a section, while the second was the number of letters added to the beginning of that row. For instance, if the key was 58, 71, 33, that meant that Mr. Patterson moved row five to the first line of a section and added eight random letters; then moved row seven to the second line and added one letter, and then moved row three to the third line and added three random letters. Mr. Patterson estimated that the potential combinations to solve the puzzle was "upwards of ninety millions of millions."
After explaining this in his letter, Mr. Patterson wrote, "I presume the utter impossibility of decyphering will be readily acknowledged."
Undaunted, Dr. Smithline decided to tackle the cipher by analyzing the probability of digraphs, or pairs of letters. Certain pairs of letters, such as "dx," don't exist in English, while some letters almost always appear next to a certain other letter, such as "u" after "q".
To get a sense of language patterns of the era, Dr. Smithline studied the 80,000 letter-characters contained in Jefferson's State of the Union addresses, and counted the frequency of occurrences of "aa," "ab," "ac," through "zz."
Dr. Smithline then made a series of educated guesses, such as the number of rows per section, which two rows belong next to each other, and the number of random letters inserted into a line.
To help vet his guesses, he turned to a tool not available during the 19th century: a computer algorithm. He used what's called "dynamic programming," which solves large problems by breaking puzzles down into smaller pieces and linking together the solutions.
The overall calculations necessary to solve the puzzle were fewer than 100,000, which Dr. Smithline says would be "tedious in the 19th century, but doable."
After about a week of working on the puzzle, the numerical key to Mr. Patterson's cipher emerged - 13, 34, 57, 65, 22, 78, 49. Using that digital key, he was able to unfurl the cipher's text:
"In Congress, July Fourth, one thousand seven hundred and seventy six. A declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. When in the course of human events..."
That, of course, is the beginning - with a few liberties taken - to the Declaration of Independence, written at least in part by Jefferson himself. "Patterson played this little joke on Thomas Jefferson," says Dr. Smithline. "And nobody knew until now." [Silverman/WSJ/14July2009]
The Middle East's Most Powerful Spooks. In a region known for cutthroat espionage, these five intelligence chiefs have leveraged their skills and connections to gain influence far above their pay grades.
1. OMAR SULEIMAN, Director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service
Career: The archetypical Arab intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman has risen from anonymous government apparatchik to serious candidate for the Egyptian presidency in less than a decade. Dubbed "one of the world's most powerful spy chiefs" by London's Daily Telegraph, Suleiman was born in 1935 in a poverty-stricken fundamentalist stronghold in southern Egypt. Choosing the military as his profession, he excelled academically, collecting degrees in Egypt and abroad and earning a transfer to military intelligence. His selection as director of Egypt's intelligence service in 1993 came just as the regime was reeling from extremist attacks against tourist sites and other critical infrastructure.
In 1995, he famously insisted that President Hosni Mubarak's armored Mercedes be flown to Ethiopia for a state visit; The car saved the Egyptian leader's life during an assassination attempt the next day. In response to the attack, Suleiman helped dismantle Mubarak's Islamist opponents, a campaign that earned him a reputation for ruthlessness. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Suleiman's experience with combating Islamist terrorists has made him a favorite of Western intelligence services hungry for insights into al Qaeda and affiliated organizations.
Influence: More than from any other single factor, Suleiman's influence stems from his unswerving loyalty to Mubarak. Of Suleiman's allegiance, a former senior Israeli intelligence officer told Haaretz, "His primary task, perhaps his only one, is to defend the regime and protect the life of the president." In a sign of presidential gratitude, Egypt's secret warrior has also recently served as its diplomatic face, traveling throughout the region as Mubarak's personal emissary. This charge includes working as a mediator during ongoing Israeli and Palestinian negotiations and as Cairo's interlocutor to dozens of Palestinian groups, including Hamas. Whether this unofficial promotion is a trial run for a Suleiman presidency remains to be seen.
2. MEIR DAGAN, Director of Israel's Mossad
Career: Meir Dagan's path to the leadership of Mossad was not a traditional one for an espionage chief who had spent most of his career in military operations, not intelligence. Born in the Soviet Union in 1945, Dagan served as a paratroop commander in the Six Day War, worked in special undercover units in the 1970s, and commanded an armored brigade in the 1982 Lebanon war. Highly decorated and wounded twice, Dagan benefited from his relationship with future Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. During Sharon's term in office, Dagan was steadily promoted through the national security ranks leading to his appointment as Mossad chief in 2002. Sharon reportedly informed his old friend that Israel required a spy service "with a knife between its teeth." Dagan, the veteran operator, seems to have obliged.
Influence: Dagan's sway was on full display in June when the Israeli cabinet met to consider extending his term to a near-record eight years. No vote was required as senior politicians including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raced to praise Dagan as "an excellent Mossad chief" who had done much to reform the service following a period of decay. Such unanimous acclaim is especially impressive at a time when Israel is relying heavily on its vaunted intelligence service to counter several threats, including that "existential" one from Iran. Dagan has clearly sought to bolster Mossad operations against Tehran with some apparent success; a parade of Israeli journalists has recently hinted at Mossad's clandestine campaign against the Iranian nuclear program.
Additionally, the assassination of Hezbollah security chief Imad Mugniyah - widely credited to Mossad - has only strengthened Dagan's hand. It was reportedly Dagan's intelligence and advice that coaxed Israeli political leaders to approve airstrikes against a possible Syrian nuclear facility in September 2007. Finally, Tel Aviv's reliance on Mossad-derived intelligence to guide its greater Iranian policy grants Dagan considerable influence over his country's foreign policy.
3. QASSEM SULEIMANI, Commander of the Quds Force, the external wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
Career: Referred to as "the tip of Iran's spear" by American journalist David Ignatius, Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani was an unknown until he assumed command of the Quds Force, the unit responsible for supporting Iran's regional allies and proxies. A decorated veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, Suleimani attracted the attention of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who appointed the young war hero to a command position within the Revolutionary Guard following the war. Since his promotion to Quds Force chief in 2000, Suleimani has been omnipresent, representing the interests of the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Central Asia.
U.S. commanders in Iraq have charged the Quds Force with passing an array of sophisticated weapons to Iraqi militia groups, leading to Suleimani's designation as a terrorist supporter by the U.S. State Department in 2007. In early 2008, he reportedly traveled to Basra, where he negotiated a cease-fire between militias and government forces, a testament to his influence within Iraq's Shiite power circles.
Influence: Suleimani's key role in overseeing Tehran's regional strategy and his relationship to the senior leadership make him a major player in shaping Iranian foreign policy. Former Western intelligence officials have suggested that Suleimani maintains a close connection to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with former U.S. counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke stating that the Quds Force "reports directly to the Supreme Ayatollah." Former CIA official Robert Grenier has echoed that sentiment, referring to Suleimani as "an extremely important and influential guy."
Although little is known about his political views, Suleimani's exploits indicate he is aligned with Iranian leaders who seek to aggressively counter any U.S. presence in the region. With Khamenei relying heavily on the Islamic Republic's security organs during the current political crisis, the fortunes of well-connected and capable regime stalwarts such as Suleimani can be expected to rise.
4. ASSEF SHAWKAT, Former commander of Syria's military intelligence agency, current deputy chief of staff of the Syrian military
Career: Few paths to power have been as unlikely - or as oddly romantic - as Assef Shawkat's. Born in the coastal town of Tartus, Shawkat served in the Syrian military while pursuing a graduate degree in history, a subject for which he has a deep affinity. Shawkat moved easily within elite circles, socializing that paid off spectacularly when he captured the heart of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's daughter, Bushra. His dogged pursuit of Bushra - her father initially opposed the relationship - earned him some measure of respect: "Anyone who could go into the home of Hafez Assad and take his daughter away without his permission has the power to do anything,'' a Syrian newscaster who had met Shawkat many times told the New York Times in 2005.
By the late 1990s, Shawkat had joined the inner sanctum, assuming command of military intelligence in February 2005 - the same month former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was assassinated. The initial findings of a U.N. commission cast suspicion on Shawkat, leading many observers to suggest that President Bashar al-Assad would hand his brother-in-law over for questioning or possible trial. In January 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department added to the avalanche of condemnation by freezing Shawkat's assets and dubbing him "a key architect of Syria's domination of Lebanon.
Influence: By 2008, having successfully avoided the calls for his extradition, Shawkat appeared poised to continue the consolidation of his power base. However, his ascension may have been stalled by the death of Hezbollah security chief Imad Mugniyah in February 2008. Killed in the heart of Damascus, Mugniyah's death was viewed as an embarrassing breach of security or even an indication of Syrian involvement. Tellingly, Shawkat was barred from participating in the joint Hezbollah-Syrian-Iranian investigation into Mugniyah's death. Additionally, just this month, Shawkat was "promoted" to deputy chief of staff of the Syrian military, a transfer that may signal a deterioration of the Assad-Shawkat relationship. However, given Shawkat's marriage to Bushra and his long-standing ties to senior members of the security apparatus, it is way too early to count him out of the Syrian power game.
5. PRINCE MUQRIN BIN ABDUL-AZIZ, Director general of Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Presidency (GIP)
Career: The youngest son of the Saudi kingdom's founder, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz lived in relative anonymity for the first 60 years of his life. Born in 1945 and educated in the West, Prince Muqrin served in the Royal Saudi Air Force and as governor of several Saudi provinces, including al-Madinah, whose capital is the holy city of Medina. In 2005, he was tapped by his half brother King Abdullah to head the GIP, a daunting task given his lack of intelligence experience and the long shadow of his predecessors, among them legendary chief Prince Turki bin Faisal.
Influence: Despite his inexperience, Muqrin's star has risen quickly in the past three years as he has become a versatile point man for King Abdullah. Muqrin's responsibilities include managing Riyadh's critical Pakistan and Afghanistan portfolio. He has been a regular visitor to Islamabad, maintaining the kingdom's relationships with a wide array of Pakistani political leaders. As for Afghanistan, Muqrin was dispatched to Kabul in January to meet leading officials, including President Hamid Karzai.
The prince might have had an ulterior motive: News reports suggest that the trip was part of Muqrin's overall campaign to bring Taliban leaders into talks with Kabul, suggesting that Muqrin is continuing his predecessor's policy of maintaining contact with Taliban leaders. A month later, Muqrin was sent to Damascus to personally deliver overtures to the Assad regime as part of the larger Arab campaign to reengage Syria. Involvement in critical Saudi foreign-policy efforts and his relative youth have positioned Muqrin well for greater responsibilities in the near future. [Devenny/ForeignPolicy/20July2009]
The Top 10 KGB Operatives According To One Compiler.
1. Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve.
Vyacheslav Konstantinovich was head of the Okhrana, the Tsars' state security outfit, from 1881 to 1904.
Solzhenitsyn ironically mocks his soft-heartedness, his squeamishness about 'perlustration' (the ungentlemanly practice of opening other people's mail) and the pitifully small number of people he sent to Siberia.
Perhaps for these reasons, the institution he once led signally failed in 1917 - a lesson not lost on Lenin and his successors.
2. Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky.
Though not strictly a Russian secret policeman, it is impossible to omit this austere Pole, who was the founding father of the modern Russian state security apparatus.
An intimate associate of Lenin, he was a Jesuitical ideologue who believed that their revolutionary ends had the historical, even the eschatological, importance to justify any means.
Though he died in 1926, the influence of Iron Feliks echoed on throughout the Soviet period.
3. Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda
Head of the state security police from 1934 to 1936. Two years later, however, he was executed as a class enemy, perhaps because his first name-which translates as 'Henry'-was suspiciously posh.
After his arrest his office was found to be full of sex toys and women's underwear.
4. Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov
Famously known as the 'Toxic Dwarf' and airbrushed out of a photo in which he was standing next to Stalin, Nikolai Ivanovich had 'issues'; had he been born in New York he probably would have spent much of his time in therapy.
A fanatical Communist, and Yagoda's successor as head of the NKVD, he thought Stalin was too soft - until he demoted him to commissar with responsibility for inland waterways, and then had him killed.
5. Jaume Ram�n Mercader del Rio Hernandez
Not Russian, obviously, but Ram�n has a place of honour in the KGB Museum in Moscow.
From an anti-Franco family, and recruited by the NKVD in his native Spain in the 1930s, the mission for which he is famous went as follows.
Travel to a city on the other side of the world-in this case Mexico City-and establish a new life there under the elaborate cover identity of Frank Jacson, a Canadian businessman.
In time, engineer a meeting with a famous Russian who lives in the city, Leon Trotsky. Patiently cultivate a friendship with him. Slowly, over many months, win his trust and affection. Then stab him forty times in the head with an ice-pick.
6. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria
Another head of the state security organs. Another sex fiend.
Apparently charming, though. And clever - he oversaw the stealing of secrets from the USA and Britain that enabled the Soviet Union to detonate a nuclear device in 1949, just four years after the Americans.
Said to be the only member of Stalin's inner circle who could have been chairman of General Motors. (Which was a compliment then.)
7. Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky
Oleg Vladimirovich's father died fighting for the Whites in the Civil War. It was perhaps for this reason that when, years later, he found himself in the security services, he started passing information to the British and Americans.
Most significantly he told the United States in 1962 that the Soviet Union was shipping nuclear weapons to Cuba, thus sparking the Caribbean Crisis. He was shopped by George Blake, the British double agent, and executed- it is said that he was fed very slowly into a furnace, feet first and alive.
8. Pavlov Sergei Pavlov
With the Soviet Union falling behind the west in developing a supersonic passenger aircraft, the powers-that-be once again turned to the KGB to sort it out.
Ostensibly Aeroflot's top man in Paris, Sergei assiduously stole blueprints and other material from Aerospatiale and the British Aircraft Corporation.
Which only left the slightly embarrassing fact that the Tu-144 - unkindly nicknamed Konkordski - looked identical to the Franco-British Concorde. This was explained away as having to do with the, um, aerodynamic whatnot, which er...
9. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Spent more time as head of the KGB than any other man-from 1967 until 1982-in honour of which he is still toasted on December 20 every year, 'State Security Police Day' in Russia.
Why December 20? It was on this day in 1917 that Iron Feliks founded the organisation.
Yuri Vladimirovich is said to have personally green-lighted the use of the poison-tipped umbrella that killed Georgi Markov, the Bulgarian dissident, on Waterloo Bridge in 1978 - still a locus classicus of Cold War skulduggery.
10. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
On December 20, 1999, having just been appointed Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Vladimirovich said this to a room full of fellow former KGB officers:
"The unit you dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed the first phase of its mission."
They all laughed. He wasn't joking - and when the laughter died down, he added, "As we all know, there is no such thing as a former agent." [Typepad/20July2009]
Section III - COMMENTARY
Military Space is Essential for National Security, by Taylor
Dinerman. Apollo was the ultimate strategic gesture of the Cold War. Few people were fooled by the plaque NASA put on the leg of the lunar lander that read: "We came in peace for all mankind."
America went to the moon to achieve a technological and propaganda-laden victory over the USSR. It was one of the decisive moments in the confrontation with communism. In the middle of the Vietnam War, when the U.S. was despised abroad and demoralized at home, the Apollo 11 mission raised the national spirit.
At that time America was only just beginning to build up its military space power. In those days the focus was the nuclear stand-off with the Soviets. The primitive spy satellites of the era were mechanical, not electronic masterpieces. They took pictures using film spooled though cameras that was then returned to Earth inside canisters suspended under parachutes grabbed in mid-air by recovery aircraft. With limited film and fuel, only the most important targets could be photographed; almost all were connected with USSR's nuclear strike forces.
The U.S. also deployed a few satellites whose mission was to listen in on Soviet and other hostile radio communications and to gather intelligence on radars and other electronic warfare systems. These satellites were and still are some of the most secret and sensitive used by America's intelligence organizations.
At the time, navigation satellites were mostly designed to support the U.S. Navy's submarine-based ballistic missiles or the Air Force's bombers. The idea that someday civilians would be using satellite signals for everything from navigating to the grocery store to certifying bank transactions would have seemed as far-fetched as the Internet.
For early warning of a Soviet missile attack, the U.S. developed the Defense Support Program series of satellites, the first of which was launched in November of 1970. These satellites, with their extremely sensitive infrared sensors, are still important and useful for military purposes. In 1991, for example, they proved essential to detecting Iraq's Scuds, or missiles.
In 1969, military satellite communication was a privilege reserved for high-ranking officers and civilians. Today, these tools are used right down the platoon and squad level of the special forces and sometimes by regular infantry and armor units. Portable satellite phones have become almost as easy to buy as cellphones.
Today military space is the critical enabling technology that makes U.S. forces the most powerful and effective in the world. The GPS constellation, with more than 30 satellites currently in operation, makes all kinds of precision-guided weapons - from large bombs to mortar shells - affordable and accurate. The system is responsible for a revolution in warfare. Accidental civilian casualties have been radically reduced. And while that fact is dramatically under-reported, it is a direct result of the use of GPS.
Optical intelligence-gathering satellites may no longer use film canisters, but the best of them are still very large and very expensive. The Clinton-era Future Imagery Architecture program that aimed to replace big satellites with smaller, more affordable ones proved a dismal failure. It has been radically restructured, but even now it is still the object of a bureaucratic food fight within the Defense Department and intelligence community. More promising has been the development of smaller specialized satellites, such as the recently launched TacSat 3, which is equipped with a hyperspectral sensor that can operate in more than 400 separate spectral bands. Early versions of these sensors could determine if a factory was making fertilizer or nerve gas just by examining the fumes that came out.
The fight over the new spy satellites is typical of the longstanding turf war that has been going on between the Pentagon and the intelligence world for the last 40 years. (It shows no sign of abating.) Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tried to solve the problem by making the Air Force the nation's "executive agent" for space. This effort failed, in part due to political obstruction and more importantly because the Air Force is just that, the Air Force, it is run by pilots and they tend to resent every penny that goes to develop and buy systems used other services. This is normal - the Navy resents providing shipping services for the Air Force and Army, and the Army often feels short changed by the Air Force and the Navy. (Let's leave the Marines out of this.)
Almost lost in all this is the fact that America's tens of billions of dollars worth of national security space assets are, to put it bluntly, completely defenseless. China's anti-satellite weapons test in February 2007 showed clearly that potential foes know how much the U.S. depends on space systems for its military might - and that they plan to attack them.
These assets could be protected, but there is no sign that the leadership in the Pentagon is ready to commit the resources, or the intellectual effort, or the political capital, needed to begin to deal with this threat.
Few in Washington want to think about it, but what we need is a new United States Space Force. Just as the Air Force was once part of the Army, space forces are rapidly outgrowing their parent service. They need to be located in a new, independent service with its own command structure, its own budget and full control over the career development of its members.
Forty years ago military space was a limited, highly specialized area with few applications beyond nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Today it is an integral part of everything the military does, yet it is still shackled to an archaic institutional structure.
It's time for a change. [Dinerman/Forbes/16July2009]
Kissing Intelligence Goodbye, by Michael
Tanji. Most national security tragedies are the result of - or directly associated with - a failure of intelligence, that is to say, the apparatus we have built and charged to find us the most valuable information possible has come up short. Some key examples of why intelligence has failed us include:
* Reliance on satellites, which take great pictures, but reveal nothing of human emotion or intention.
* Reliance on only angels and boy scouts, when the greatest threats come from demons and malcontents.
* Adherence to a system that rewards quantity, not quality; promotes generalists and relegates expertise.
Intelligence (the information and the apparatus) isn't solely to blame for failures and tragedies. It doesn't matter how good the information is, or how insightful the analysis, if those who it is delivered to misuse or abuse it for their own purposes. However, this is less a comment on 'who lost country X' or 'why did we get surprised by development Y' as it is a reflection on our seriousness with regards to what needs to be done to obtain the information necessary to avoid surprise and save lives.
A few days ago the President announced that he was not going to subject those intelligence producers who treated terrorist detainees harshly to investigations and possible prosecutions. Shortly thereafter it was announced that those who approved of the harsh treatment and conditions could very well be investigated and prosecuted. Today we learn that the government will be turning over photos of alleged abusive interrogations to the ACLU, who will no doubt make the photos public in short order. We can go round-and-round about what constitutes torture and where respective moral lines should be drawn, but the bottom line is that if you are about improving intelligence, the best course of action is - for the time being - to shut up about all of this.
No clear thinking intelligence officer can interpret the political actions associated with terrorist interrogations any other way than this: shut up and color. This is not about condoning torture or approving of harsh treatment, nor is it about going all-in on the good-cop school of interrogation. This is about recognizing that in a sufficiently challenging situation, under the most intense pressure, swimming in a sea of known and unknown unknowns, are we going to give people the room to maneuver - and make mistakes - as we march towards a goal of an effective and righteous solution?
If we are not, well, you know what that means:
- We will almost assuredly go back to relying on technical means to gather intelligence, losing any ground we gained in the human arena.
- We will continue to be blindsided by demons and malcontents.
- Intelligence's slide towards run-of-the-mill government bureaucracy will be complete; "managers" will focus on headcount and budget, driving leaders and risk-takers out of business.
Almost nothing remains secret forever. Before there was 9/11 there was Pearl Harbor, and we know about all there is to know about the failures of our intelligence (and decision-making) apparatus. Heck, we even bring some vindication to those we initially vilified. This idea that we have to immediately solve or somehow bring closure to every intelligence-related "scandal" is so amazingly short-sighted and counter-productive it makes one wonder if this nation has the will or the intestinal fortitude for an intelligence apparatus at all. True, you can get 90% of what you need to know to deal with the world legally and cheaply (if not for free), but that last 10% is what is supposed to help you avoid the sneak attack.
Rooting out and divining that 10% used to be what they paid us for. [Tanji/Threatswatch/4July2009]
Targeting Terrorists, by Richard A. Clarke. Not since 1975 when the Church Commission investigated Nixon-era abuses in intelligence agencies, have such unusual things occurred in the world of Washington intelligence agencies as in these past few weeks. The Democratic House of Representatives threatened to pass an intelligence authorization bill which the Democratic White House has promised to veto. The former Democratic congressman who now heads the Central Intelligence Agency has been having a public disagreement with leading House Democrats about whether the CIA lies to Congress. There is a controversy about a secret CIA program to do something most Americans presumably want the CIA to do, to kill al Qaeda terrorists. The attorney general is rumored to be looking for a special prosecutor to investigate CIA interrogators, even though the president seemed to have earlier told CIA employees that there would be no prosecutions about alleged torture. Former CIA employees are publicly trotting out the claim that all of this attention "hurts the Agency's morale" and that damage could result in another successful terrorist attack on the U.S. Even seasoned Washington policy wonks are finding it hard to navigate their way through all of those stories and make some sense of what has been going on.
Unless we understand what all of this drama is really about, we will not get the delicate balance right between the needs of a democracy and the rule of law on one side and the requirements of a secret intelligence service on the other. And this democracy needs a functioning secret intelligence service to protect it against the current genres of threat.
All of this recent Washington activity about intelligence is perhaps best understood as three distinct, but related stories playing out against a backdrop of suspicion about what the previous administration may have done in reaction to the 9-11 attacks. It is also part of a 60-year historical pattern of manic swings of opinion in Washington about the efficacy of covert action.
The first story should probably have been headlined "House Democrats finally realize intelligence oversight system is broken." Most of the time the CIA collects and analyzes information, but on rare occasions it goes beyond reporting and tries to change things in the world by carrying out activity in secret, activity which it does not want attributed to the United States. For three decades laws have required the president to inform key Congressional leaders before the CIA undertook such "covert actions." For most of those three decades few of the Congressional leaders eligible to be briefed took that responsibility very seriously. Often they would grudgingly make time to meet with someone from the CIA, ask a few questions, and go on their way. That Congressional disinterest generally suited the CIA, which did not really want any serious supervision of covert action by anyone outside of the Agency, least of all by members of Congress. Had a Congressional leader really wanted the oversight responsibility for covert action, the notification system would have made that almost impossible.
Here is how that system works for sensitive programs: Eight Congressional leaders get calls from the CIA director's office, asking for an immediate appointment to brief on a "sensitive matter." The CIA does not say what the subject of the briefing is, so there is no way the congressmen can get ready for the meeting. The briefing usually occurs with only one congressman in the meeting at a time. None of the expert staffers from Congress can come to the meeting, or even know after the fact what was discussed. If the congressmen find the proposed covert action troubling, there is little they can do but express that opinion orally in the meeting. Because the subject is highly classified, the congressmen cannot easily send a letter to the president dissenting.
In short, the oversight of covert activity was more of a ritual than a reality. House Democrats seemed finally to understand that this month in the wake of confusion about what House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was or was not told several years ago about waterboarding. They, therefore, proposed an amendment to significantly broaden who in Congress could be told about covert action. The CIA, reasoning that if more people knew about a proposed covert action the chances of a program leaking to the media would increase, persuaded the White House to issue a rare veto threat if the amendment passed. What is unusual is that the White House staff did not succeed in working out a compromise behind closed doors and avoiding the public spectacle of warring Democrats.
The second intelligence-related story last week involved a several-year-old secret program which CIA Director Leon Panetta allegedly learned about in late June. When Mr. Panetta asked if Congress had been briefed, he reportedly was told that former Vice President Dick Cheney had blocked such notification. Mr. Panetta is said to have then cancelled the program and immediately informed the Congressional intelligence committees. Rather than being pleased by such quick action, the House Democrats used this diligence by Mr. Panetta as an example of how the oversight system does not work and why their amendment to expand the notification process should be passed. CIA proponents used the story as an example of how highly classified programs get leaked if you tell Congress about them. The initial news stories did not, however, reveal what the canceled program had been. Only after several days of investigation did the Wall Street Journal report that the hush-hush effort, which provoked Mr. Panetta's wrath, was a program to kill al Qaeda terrorists. Most Americans might not think it was a big secret that CIA agents were trying to kill al Qaeda members, but in the weird world of Washington intelligence, it was.
For over a decade, in three different presidencies, there has been an ongoing debate about whether and how to kill al Qaeda terrorists and what part of the U.S. government should have the mission. The 9-11 Commission report details how President Clinton decided that killing Osama bin Laden and his supporters was not a violation of the ban on assassinations, how he authorized attacks, and how the CIA failed successfully to use that authority. Several media accounts this week indicate that after 9-11, the CIA put together a more serious effort to take out terrorists, but that the program was variously activated, deactivated, and put on hold by the four directors the CIA has had since 9-11. Senior CIA officers have been reluctant for years to create hit squads, fearing that a wave of CIA assassinations of terrorists would provoke a major al Qaeda retaliation against U.S. intelligence officers worldwide. They have also, with good reason, doubted the ability of their own agency to successfully kill the right people and then escape. Some have pointed to the Israeli terrorist targeting effort as evidence that such killings can be counter-productive, providing the terrorist groups with propaganda victories. Israeli experts are themselves split on the effectiveness of their killings, but it does seem likely that it has made it harder for terrorist leaders to operate.
It is puzzling that some people object to U.S. personnel killing terrorists with sniper rifles or car bombs, but have little apparent problem with CIA and Department of Defense personnel tracking down specific terrorist leaders with Predator drones and then killing those leaders with the unmanned aircraft's Hellfire missiles. The terrorist groups probably see little difference in how we choose to kill their leaders. The dramatically increased Predator strikes that began last October have reportedly killed much of the leadership of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and related groups operating near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Without those attacks, the situation in that region would undoubtedly have become much worse. One unnamed administration intelligence official recently told a reporter that the Predator hits on terrorist leaders are "the only game in town" because of the inability of the CIA to come up with any other way of effectively combating terrorists along the border. Thus, the real reason some in U.S. intelligence may not want attention given to the issue of hit squads against terrorists may be their embarrassment that for both bureaucratic reasons and lack of capability, the CIA has been unable and often unwilling to attack terrorist leaders except from the air. The two top leaders of al Qaeda have now been fair game for the CIA for a decade.
The third of the recent CIA-related stories was about the possibility that Attorney General Eric Holder may appoint a special prosecutor to investigate whether some CIA interrogators broke the law by the way in which they used waterboarding and other
"enhanced interrogation techniques." Mr. Holder is said to have been sickened by the description of what some CIA personnel may have done, as detailed in a 2004 report by CIA Inspector General John Helgerson. Most people thought the president had put the prospect of such an investigation to rest when he went to CIA headquarters and promised the staff that there would be no prosecutions. Examined carefully, however, what the president said was no one would be charged for carrying out what were, at the time, the procedures approved by President Bush and his Justice Department. The Helgerson Report apparently says some CIA personnel went well beyond even what the Bush guidelines permitted. The report is also alleged to say that little of real intelligence value was gained by the torture.
If a special prosecutor investigates, he may have to decide whether to accept the defense of "I was only following orders." The United States rejected that defense at Nuremberg. If it rejects it again, low-level CIA staff and contractors might be tried. Or, they might be offered a way out if they detail whose orders they were following. There is, therefore, at least some potential for political-level officials being tried. The distracting and divisive frenzy that would ensue is probably one of the last things the Obama White House wishes to see. Nonetheless, as the history of special prosecutors shows, once launched, such investigators cannot be easily recalled or redirected.
It is this prospect of some CIA personnel being investigated, as well as the moves to expand Congressional oversight, that have provoked several former CIA staff and unnamed current intelligence officers to complain to the media that they are on the verge of damaging the Agency's morale. If that morale is decreased, they warn, some intelligence officers will quit, others will become even more risk averse, and the probability of another 9-11 like attack will increase. Of course, if people keep telling CIA employees that their morale should be poor, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
One thing that these recent stories have in common is that they occur in an atmosphere in Washington in which many believe that after 9-11 the previous administration, guided by the former Vice President, ignored laws, abused power, illegally hid their activities and engaged in excesses that, in the end, were counter-productive. Backers of the former Administration, of course, contend their actions were not counter-productive and, they claim, prevented attacks. In the absence of some Commission or Group of Wise People creating the definitive account of what did and did not happen, those suspicions stand and, it seems, grow. To date, however, President Obama and former Vice President Cheney are in agreement that such a truth commission would be a bad idea because it might become a diverting, dividing, and partisan circus. Others fear that it would set a precedent that would allow new administrations to criminalize the acts of their predecessors. Those objections could be addressed by a truly bipartisan panel of respected statesmen, if there still are people who can rise above partisan politics. The Commission would also need both subpoena and immunity powers to preclude criminal charges. Until we have such a Commission, these issues will linger and make it difficult for policy makers, legislators, and intelligence officers to know where the boundaries are.
Overarching all of this controversy is whether, when, and how the United States should engage in covert action. One former CIA director once told me that "CIA should do intelligence collection and analysis, not covert actions. Covert actions almost never work and usually get the Agency in trouble." Can a nation with as many interests and enemies as we have be safe with no covert action capability? There have repeatedly been periods since World War II, when White House policy makers saw a threat so concerning that they wanted the CIA to use lethal force secretly against an enemy (the Viet Cong, the Sandanistas, al Qaeda). The Agency has often responded in a way that involved excesses, which eventually triggered investigations and recriminations. The ensuing public review often becomes partisan and reflects on the entirety of CIA. The Agency then enters into a period when it dismantles much of its covert action capability and loses its institutional memory. Then time passes, another threat emerges and the wheel is reinvented. Often that wheel is not round.
Since well over 90% of the CIA's personnel are not engaged in covert action, but are doing the important work of intelligence collection and analysis, this cycle of contentiousness suggests that perhaps covert action should be done by someone else. We need a professional intelligence gathering and analysis organization and it would be better if that agency were not tied to, prejudiced by, and often tainted with a connection to covert action. If we are capable as a nation of learning from history, we should also take this opportunity to decide that covert operations should be done rarely, and then only by a special component of the military and perhaps by a small, separate, civilian agency under the joint supervision of a group of experienced administration and bi-partisan Congressional overseers. Democracy and the rule of law are not inherently incompatible with self defense involving a secret intelligence service. Its just that the way we do it now does not work well. [Clarke/WSJ/18July2009]
The Big Question: What's Gone Wrong at the CIA, and Should it be Abolished? by Rupert Cornwell. The CIA is currently embroiled in two controversies that go to the heart of the problems surrounding the world's largest intelligence agency. It is accused of keeping Congress in the dark about a secret post-9/11 project, on the orders of the former vice-president Dick Cheney and probably in violation of the law. Meanwhile the Justice Department is moving towards a criminal investigation of whether CIA operatives illegally tortured captured terrorist suspects. A rule of thumb about an intelligence service might be: the less you hear about it, the better it's probably doing its job. Instead, the CIA seems to be eternally in the headlines.
But hasn't that always been the case?
Indeed. Almost from its inception in 1947, at the start of the Cold War, the agency has made news. In 1953, it staged the Operation Ajax coup that overthrew the democratically-elected government of Iran (with repercussions that continue to this day). In 1961 came the humiliating failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, the most spectacular of many unavailing efforts by the CIA to get rid of Fidel Castro.
After other abuses were revealed, including the agency's tangential involvement in Watergate, the agency's sins were subjected to an unprecedented public investigation by the Church Committee, under Senator Frank Church of Idaho, in the mid-1970s. But that did not prevent further scandals, notably the 1985/86 Iran-Contra affair, in which the CIA had an important role.
So why doesn't the CIA work better?
One reason is the historic fragmentation of US intelligence operations. At the last count, 16 separate government agencies were involved in intelligence. Of them, the CIA has always been the most important, but formally only primus inter pares. The consequence was bureaucratic infighting that severely strained relations with the Pentagon and with the FBI in particular. The inability of the CIA and the FBI to share information was one reason why 9/11 went undetected, and although the Intelligence Reform Act, passed by Congress in 2004, was supposed to address that, it only did so up to a point.
The Act set up the post of Director of National Intelligence, in overall charge of all US intelligence. It is, for instance, no longer the CIA but the DNI who provides the daily intelligence briefing for the President. The CIA director now reports to the DNI, and the multitude of agencies do seem to be working together more effectively. But the Act did not address the CIA's real problems: the way in which its paramilitary side often operated outside the law, and its basic competence in its core field of intelligence gathering.
How come the CIA has a paramilitary side?
It has been there almost from the outset. In 1948 the agency was specifically empowered to carry out subversion and sabotage and "support of indigenous anti-communist movements in threatened countries." There have been fiascos (like the Bay of Pigs), and the illegal overthrow of democratic governments (for example Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973). But some such operations have been hugely successful - take the clandestine support for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, which contributed mightily to the subsequent fall of communism in the Soviet Union.
Are these operations out of control?
Yes and no. Back in 1947 Dean Acheson, later to become Secretary of State, said he had "the gravest forebodings" about the fledgling CIA, warning that no one - not even the President - would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it. More recently however, especially during the "war on terror", the greater risk has seemed the opposite: that the agency could be a de facto private army for the President (or in the case of Dick Cheney, for the vice-president). Bypassing Congress and the Pentagon, it could act as it pleased (and did, by setting up secret camps abroad, torturing terrorist suspects, or kidnapping them and sending them for torture elsewhere, even though in some cases the victims were completely innocent). But you could equally argue the CIA is not under-regulated, but over-regulated.
Spy agencies in democracies the world over face conflicting pressures. By definition they work in secret, often in unmentionable matters of national security. But they must also be publicly accountable. In no democracy is this tension more institutionalised than in the US - as this latest affair involving the former vice-president underlines. On this occasion, Mr. Cheney and the CIA may have broken the law, violating the agency's duty to "fully and currently inform" Congress about its activities. But sometimes oversight by Congress hurts the agency.
In the 1990s, for instance, lawmakers complained that too many unsalubrious people were on the CIA's foreign payroll. The agency had to shed many employees, to the detriment of its operations. More broadly, the constant threat of public scandal, Congressional meddling, and a rapid turnover in directors, have badly damaged morale.
What about intelligence-gathering?
Almost by definition you hear more of the mistakes of an intelligence agency than of its successes - the bad things that didn't happen because good prior intelligence headed them off. Even so, the CIA's failures are huge. 9/11 happened despite its best efforts. It was wrong about Saddam Hussein's non-existent WMD. It was slow to see the economic weakness, and then the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It missed India's nuclear test of 1998, which prompted a series of counter-tests by Pakistan.
How much does it all cost?
The total US intelligence budget is classified, but is reckoned to be in the region of $40bn. The CIA itself reportedly has 20,000 employees, though that figure too is classified. In fact the bulk of spending is believed to go on hi-tech agencies like the National Security Agency, which carries out global electronic surveillance and eavesdropping, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates reconnaissance satellites.
So is the US just not very good at spying?
There's surely some truth in that. Unlike, say, Israel (or even Britain), the US has never had to rely on intelligence for its survival. The US system is probably too open, while Americans by nature are simply more comfortable with the quantifiable (numbers, statistics, blanket phone intercepts, satellite pictures and the like) than with "humint" - the subtler, sometimes treacherous, but ultimately even more precious human intelligence from flesh-and-blood sources, that Washington lacked so conspicuously in Iraq.
After the Cold War, Richard Helms, one of the most venerated intelligence professionals in US history (and the only CIA director convicted of lying to Congress) remarked that "the only remaining superpower doesn't have enough interest in what's going on in the world to organise and run an espionage service." The 9/11 attacks have surely dispelled that insouciance, but perhaps not the underlying mentality.
Why not just abolish it?
Some, notably Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the late New York Senator, have urged precisely that. The US, they argue, would be better off closing down the CIA and turning its intelligence operations over to the State Department and its paramilitary side to the Pentagon, ending what they see as little more than a national embarrassment.
Does the US need the CIA?
Every country needs an agency with "deniability" in order to carry out its dirty work
*The latest re-organization of US intelligence must be given time to work
*For all its failings, the CIA has had its share of successes and still performs a valuable service
The agency has done a great deal wrong and inflicted huge harm to America's international image
*It is too large and unwieldy, and more trouble than it's worth
*It is too easily used by presidents to circumvent the constitution, and without its independence its real value is lost. [Cornwell/Independent/14July2009]
[Of course, this British author does not make the same prescription for the UK secret intelligence services....only the American ones. Hmmmmmmm. Objective, not.]
Section IV - OBITUARIES, RESEARCH REQUESTS, JOBS AND COMING EVENTS
Elizabeth Ashford-Russell. Elizabeth Ashford-Russell, who has died aged 88, spent half the war in Africa and Italy working for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - better known as MI6) and later, as the wife of a British diplomat, traveled extensively in Latin America.
When, in 1947, she was suggested as a possible number two in one of the SIS sections in Italy, Elizabeth Ashford-Russell encountered an implacable hostility to women officers, and reconciled herself to an inevitably supporting role in diplomatic life. She did so with great energy and few complaints, while ensuring that she could lead a separate life away from the cocktail and dinner party circuit.
She was born Elizabeth Catherine Todd on January 18 1921 at Ootacamund (now Tamil Nadu) in the Nilgiri Hills of southern India, where her father, who was based in Madras, was a member of the Indian Civil Service. Sent to England while still a young girl, Elizabeth lived with her grandparents before being placed in the care of a retired Irish officer and his wife, who neglected her and her sister and applied the funds set aside for the children's care to their own wellbeing.
Her parents eventually returned, but Elizabeth's experiences fostered a mental toughness and emotional containment that endured throughout her life.
Educated at Southlands School, Exmouth, she passed her Oxford entrance exams in the spring of 1939, and spent the summer in France, taking a job teaching English to the daughters of a French family near Pau. But with France mobilising and conscripts on the move, she became stranded and only got back using a third class railway ticket aboard one of the last boat-trains to England.
With war imminent, she decided to postpone going up to Oxford and instead found a job for eight months decoding telegrams at the Office of Censors before starting a secretarial course.
By the spring of 1941, her course completed, she was presented with the choice of working in Churchill's office or accepting an apparently more mundane - but much better paid - job at the Passport Office. Subsequently she was embarrassed to admit that the extra �2 a week won her over and she reported for work at 54 Broadway, St James's Park.
There was indeed a passport office on the ground floor, but this proved merely to be a convenient front for what was, in fact, the main office of the Secret Intelligence Service. Elizabeth Todd's role was to act as third secretary to Colonel Claude Dancy, the deputy head of SIS. Such was his importance that she saw a regular procession of prominent figures passing through the office, including General de Gaulle, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Calthrop, SIS's liaison officer with Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the later-notorious Kim Philby.
But the greatest anticipation was reserved for an envelope that would arrive each day marked ISOS, and which contained decoded information from the Enigma intercepts at Bletchley.
Although possessed of remarkable qualities, Dancy was a man of his time and strongly believed that, while women might be acceptable as junior staff, they were not suited to being SIS officers. In an attempt to find some additional responsibility, Elizabeth Todd obtained a posting in Algiers where she worked for the head of the SIS's Italian section, liaised with a number of the senior Free French, and immersed herself in the local culture.
From there, in October 1943, she was sent to Bari in southern Italy, a place (she recalled) of flat landscapes, grey skies, fascist sympathizers and endless troops in transit. The SIS station to which she was sent was in a mess, lacking focus, agents or good officers. But over the next nine months it was transformed by the arrival of a number of people whose lives shaped her own.
First came an eccentric half-Jewish, trilingual 40-year-old code breaker from Bletchley called Sheridan Russell. He was followed by Brian Ashford-Russell (no relation), who had been sent out to rebuild and run the section.
Over the next 18 months, agents were recruited, trained and dropped by submarine or Lysander behind the retreating German lines.
The section and its agents included several individuals who became prominent in postwar Italy, including Sandro Pertini, who rose to be the country's president. A number were uncovered and shot by the Germans, while others were sent to concentration camps.
At first Elizabeth Todd's role was largely organisational, but it evolved to include developing cover stories for agents, working with document forgers and pinpointing drops and pickups for the Lysander pilots and Falucca crews. For this work and for some other more covert operations, she was mentioned in despatches, something to which she never subsequently made any reference.
With the Germans retreating northwards through Italy, the Bari operation moved to Rome, where she remained for the rest of the war, frequently travelling north to debrief agents or comfort the families of those missing. In mid-1945 she finally returned to England and prepared herself to go up to St Anne's College, Oxford, to read History. She and Brian Ashford-Russell, 14 years her senior, married in 1946.
A mistake on her tutor's part meant that she had just two years instead of three in which to complete her Oxford degree. But she immersed herself in her subject and, guided by Marjorie Reeves, a mediaevalist who became one of her mentors, gained a very good second. Had she had the extra year, Marjorie Reeves thought Elizabeth Ashford-Russell would have gained a first and, on this basis, recommended her for a research degree. But by then, her husband had been offered the post of consul in Bari.
The diplomatic life on which she embarked for the next 20 years took her from Bari to Paris, then to Rome, Mexico, New York, Argentina and South Africa before finally returning to Rome. She took the opportunity to travel extensively and adventurously, particularly in Latin America, and to pursue her interests in art, architecture, drama, music or food. For seven years after her husband retired from the Foreign Office, she became director of studies at The Cygnets, an old-fashioned finishing school in London.
In 1980, when she retired from her last job as editorial assistant at the Architectural Review in Queen Anne's Gate, she was amused to rediscover a secret tunnel that she had first walked through 40 years earlier to the neighbouring wartime premises of the SIS.
Elizabeth Ashford-Russell, who died on June 11, is survived by three daughters and a son; her husband died in 2003. [Telegraph/15July20009]
Shi Pei Pu, Singer, Spy and 'M. Butterfly,' Dies at
70. Shi Pei Pu, a Beijing opera singer and spy whose sexually convoluted love affair with a French Embassy worker created one of the strangest cases in international espionage and was the inspiration for the Broadway show "M. Butterfly," died in Paris on June 30th.
Mr. Shi (pronounced Shuh), who was convicted of espionage in France in 1986 along with his lover, Bernard Boursicot, was believed to be 70. He had also been believed for years to be a woman, at least by Mr. Boursicot, who served time in prison after the affair and became a laughingstock in France.
Mr. Boursicot, who is 64 and has been living in a nursing home in France while recovering from a stroke, showed no sadness when he learned of Mr. Shi's death in a telephone interview.
"I'm not surprised," he said, in a tone that suggested weariness with a former lover's theatrics. "It is a long time he has been sick. Now it's over 40 years." Asked if he had any sadness at all, Mr. Boursicot said: "He did so many things against me that he had no pity for, I think it is stupid to play another game now and say I am sad. The plate is clean now. I am free."
In the 1988 Broadway play and the 1993 film "M. Butterfly," Bernard Boursicot was depicted as a high-ranking diplomat and Shi Pei Pu as a beautiful female opera singer who met in 1964. In fact, Mr. Boursicot was a 20-year-old high school dropout who had finagled a job as an accountant at the newly opened French Embassy in Beijing. His few sexual experiences had been with male schoolmates, and he was determined to fall in love with a woman, he wrote in his diary.
Shi Pei Pu was 26 when they met, delicate and charming. He lived as a man and taught Chinese to the diplomatic wives. He told Mr. Boursicot that he had been a singer and a librettist in the Beijing Opera. One perfect night in the Forbidden City Mr. Shi told Mr. Boursicot a story no romantic could resist: Mr. Shi said he was a woman who had been forced to go through life as a man, because her father required a son. A short time later, the men became lovers, although the sex, Mr. Boursicot would later say, was fast and furtive, always carried out in the dark.
When the affair was discovered by the Chinese authorities, Mr. Boursicot passed them French documents, first from the embassy in Beijing and later from his posting at the consulate in Ulan Bator, Mongolia.
Mr. Boursicot spent most of his life outside China and was romantically involved with men and women. On his rare visits to Shi Pei Pu, sexual contact was circumscribed. On one visit, Mr. Shi presented him with a 4-year-old boy, Shi Du Du, who Mr. Shi said was their son.
In 1982, Mr. Boursicot - then living openly with a male companion, Thierry Toulet - was able to arrange for Shi Pei Pu and Shi Du Du to live with him in Paris. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Boursicot and Shi Pei Pu were arrested. Mr. Shi first told the police he was a woman, but he admitted the truth to prison doctors, showing them how he hid his genitals.
Shi Du Du explained the mystery of where he came from in his statement to the police: he was from China's Uighur minority, he said, and had been sold by his mother. "It was not that my mother did not love me," he said. "We were starving."
Mr. Boursicot, hearing that Shi Pei Pu was a man and always had been, sliced his throat with a razor blade in prison.
In 1986, Mr. Shi and Mr. Boursicot received six-year sentences for espionage. They were pardoned a year later. Mr. Shi is survived by Shi Du Du, who lives in Paris and who, Mr. Boursicot said, has three young sons.
Although Mr. Boursicot and Mr. Shi occasionally spoke over the years, relations were strained. Mr. Boursicot said that they last spoke a few months ago and that Mr. Shi told him he still loved him.
Mr. Shi enjoyed the spotlight, performing in public as an opera singer, but disliked talking about his romance with Mr. Boursicot, particularly the sexual specifics. "I used to fascinate both men and women," he said in a rare interview in 1988. "What I was and what they were didn't matter." [Wadler/NYTimes/2July2009]
Calvin Tenney. The niece of Calvin Tenney (OSS/CIA) asked me if any AFIO members had worked with Calvin overseas or here in the US. I can relay any information members would be willing to share to her. My email is firstname.lastname@example.org.
Thanks, Roger Denk
POW Executed in Flossenburg Germany. I visited the Flossenburg KZ last Sunday. It was a very moving and unsettling day. While there, I saw something that made me wonder if I can add figures up right anymore. I am trying to find out the names of all U.S. service members who were executed or incarcerated in the Flossenburg KZ. I saw a memorial tablet with a Lt. V.A. Soskice (attached SOE) listed as being executed on 29 March, 1945. I also saw a tablet listing two unnamed U.S. Flyers. The tablet was from the Association of Polish Veterans. I also read a statement from a Mr. A. Mottet (Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team), made shortly after the camp was liberated. In his statement he said he met a Lt. John Sullivan, U.S. Army, who was also executed there. In the chapel built since the end of the war, by Polish ex prisoners, another memorial tablet lists two Americans (anonymous flyers) as having died in the camp. The numbers do not add up. So I am looking to figure out why, and then some of us retired soldiers will start taking care of the U.S. monuments at the camp.
I will take the time now to thank you for any help, or clues you might be able to give me. Take care and be safe!
CW3 Ret. Guy Wiltfang
Intelligence During World War I. I am currently developing a research project about the use of intelligence in World War I.
It will deal with neutral Denmark caught between its two most important trading partners Germany and Great Britain.
The Danish intelligence service secretly took sides in the conflict and helped the British intelligence service despite warnings from the Danish government.
Copenhagen seems to have been a espionage centre during WWI much like Stockholm was it during WWII. It is this story I am trying to dig deeper into.
In that effort I need some help!
1) Are you aware of any specialists dealing with intelligence during WWI?
2) Are you familiar with any international research networks dealing with WWI studies?
I hope you can help me!
All the best - Peer Henrik Hansen, Ph.D. in History, Address: Ejboparken 59, st.th., 4000 Roskilde, Cell phone: +4561103850, E-mail: email@example.com
McMunn Associates, Inc - a Parsons company is hiring for the following 5 full-time, FLSA exempt positions.
Applicants must possess a current TS clearance with eligibility for SCI access with the U.S. Government.
POC is Molly Ryan, firstname.lastname@example.org or 703-481-6100 ext. 103
The Web Developer will work as part of a contractor team on the staff of the National Maritime Intelligence Center.
- A college degree in Computer Science, Information Science, or a related field.
- Demonstrable knowledge of Web technologies, protocols, and tools to include IIS and Apache web servers, both Windows and Unix.
- Database development, relational database design, and database protocols, and will be able to address HTML and scripting compatibility issues between different browsers and computing platforms.
- Excellent knowledge of applicable data privacy practices and laws.
- Ability to clearly document features, technical specifications, and infrastructure requirements for self-produced technical work and job processes.
- Strong oral expression and briefing skills along with demonstrated writing and public speaking ability.
- Must be able to continuously monitor industry trends, technologies, and standards and be able to research, recommend, and apply new technologies as they emerge.
- Current Hands-on experience with Web-database integration and a range of database platforms.
- Experience in gathering, analyzing, and meeting functional and/or business requirements.
- Basic understanding of project management principles.
- Experience with managing web sites/content for U.S. Military and/or U.S. Intelligence Community analysis organizations.
Salary Range: Highly competitive total compensation package. Salary negotiable based on experience and qualifications.
Geographic Location: Suitland, MD
Travel: Limited local travel is expected.
MARITIME POLICY ANALYST
The analyst will work as part of a contractor team on Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) and/or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) subject areas where a high level of interaction is maintained and expected.
- Demonstrable capabilities in topical research, data analysis, and development and visual presentation of analytical conclusions.
-Strong oral expression and briefing skills along with demonstrated writing ability.
- Two or more years experience in analysis and development of policy impacting the maritime domain.
- U.S. Military and/or U.S. Intelligence Community experience analyzing commercial maritime activity, maritime trade issues, or law enforcement-related issues (counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, criminal networks).
- Working knowledge of GMII and/or MDA areas.
- Experience with and capability to use standard data processing software (Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint) is required.
- Capabilities to logically document reasoning will be assessed.
- Working knowledge of MS Project.
- Project management experience.
- A current TS clearance with SCI access is required.
- Bachelor's Degree in political science, international affairs, or a related discipline.
- Five plus years experience in U.S. Military and/or U.S. Intelligence Community analysis organizations. Direct experience or expertise in GMII, MDA and/or commercial maritime issues.
Salary Range: Highly competitive total compensation package. Salary negotiable based on experience and qualifications.
Geographic Location: Suitland, MD
Travel: Limited CONUS and OCONUS travel is expected.
Foreign Port Threat Analyst
The Foreign Port Threat Analyst position supports the USCG and DHS international port security programs. Develops Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) based analytic judgments regarding the presence, intent, and capabilities of terrorist and criminal organizations, state and non-state adversaries, smugglers, and other offenders seeking to damage, illegally exploit, or disrupt components of the port transportation systems or visiting ships. Assesses threats to a foreign port, or threats exportable to the US carried by ships calling at that port. (MSRAM is a USCG-developed risk assessment methodology based on threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences)
- Perform analytical tasks that will result in the production of port threat assessments.
- Educated-native English language skills, with solid written and oral communication skills.
- Must be able to use National Intelligence Community databases and research/collaboration tools such as A-Space.
- Skilled in using MS Office suite of business productivity tools, including Word, Excel, Access, and PowerPoint.
- Maritime commerce, merchant marine, or sea-service (USN/USMC/USCG) operational, policy, or regulatory experience.
- Experience with USCG MSRAM and port security management.
- Demonstrate mastery of desktop publishing software.
- Experience with law enforcement agencies at federal, state, local, and tribal levels, with familiarity working with law enforcement information or supporting criminal investigations.
- Able to conduct social network analysis and use link-analysis software
- Able to conduct geopolitical analysis using foreign government information and related intelligence.
Salary Range: Highly competitive total compensation package. Salary negotiable based on experience and qualifications.
Geographic Location: Suitland, MD
Travel: U.S. travel likely; some foreign travel anticipated.
All-Source Analyst, Imagery/UAV Emphasis
Imagery Analysis with experience in UAV/full-motion video exploitation. Provide in depth analysis support in one or more of the following disciplines: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Targeting, All Source Analysis. Provide assistance and training in the production of exploitation reports. Provide rapid-response on-site expertise in support of emerging operational requirements from U.S. Navy and other validated operational users. Provide on-the-job training and research support for military watch standers and analysts and support implementation of the existing FIST Training Plan, Job Qualification Requirements (JQR) and FIST Certification Plan. Develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for each discipline area in support of the FIST Training and Certification Plans.
- Five to eight years experience in the IMINT discipline listed above, with thorough familiarity with UAV imagery systems and processing and exploitation of full motion video imagery as used in U.S. military operational support.
- Knowledge of national technical means and systems
- Demonstrated understanding of a wide variety of discipline-specific analysis tools and exploitation software as well as familiarity with other analysis tools widely used in the US Intelligence Community (MIDB, JWICS, JDISS) used to support tactical commands.
- Ability to express views clearly and succintly, both orally and in writing
- Strong interpersonal skills for the training, mentoring and guidance of junior personnel new to intelligence and intelligence support.
- Experience in more than one of the intelligence domains listed above
- Familiarity with current U.S. Navy tactical intelligence support doctrine, operations and products
- Direct experience or expertise in the provision of tactical intelligence support to operational commands
- Qualification or certification as a trainer or instructor (e.g., MTS).
Salary Range: Highly competitive total compensation package. Salary negotiable based on experience and qualifications.
Geographic Location: Washington/Metro, D.C.
Travel: Travel to conferences and meetings in the local Washington, DC area will be required. Some travel outside the Washington, DC area may be required.
Joint Targeting Training and Education Coordinator
Continuing education and training coordinator to support the Joint Intelligence Training Academy Pacific (JITAP), at Ford Island, Oahu, HI. The position calls for an individual who will help develop, implement, organize and instruct a Joint Targeting Training Curriculum supporting staff officers at USPACOM, the Pacific Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) and PACOM components.
- Minimum of 10 years recent experience as demonstrated by service as a civilian employee of one of the military departments, rated officer or, intelligence officer, or senior non-commissioned officer (E-8/E-9).
- Qualification as a certified targeteer, or extensive experience in targeting at the tactical and operational levels.
- Demonstrated ability to apply advanced analytical concepts and methodologies
- Understand "blended learning" techniques and implementation while displaying unparalleled presentation and facilitation skills
- Certification as Master Training Specialist (Navy) or other service equivalent
- Joint duty assignment, preferably at COCOM level, and preferably in PACOM
- Bachelor's degree
- Previous experience organizing joint exercises or certification training
Salary Range: Highly competitive total compensation package. Salary negotiable based on experience and qualifications.
Geographic Location: Pearl Harbor, HI
Travel: Up to maximum of 25% (defined as 25% of your time traveling) to coordinate training with PACOM
TO APPLY: McMunn Associates, Inc - a Parsons company is hiring for the following 5 full-time, FLSA exempt positions.
Applicants must possess a current TS clearance with eligibility for SCI access with the U.S. Government.
POC is Molly Ryan, email@example.com or 703-481-6100 ext. 103
EVENTS IN COMING TWO MONTHS....
26 July 2009, 10 am - 5 pm - Beachwood, OH - The AFIO Northern Ohio
Chapter, in conjunction with the Maltz Museum of Beachwood Ohio are
hosting a special brunch, speaker - Gene Poteat - and exhibit. Topic:
Industrial Espionage. Gene Poteat, our AFIO National
President, is coming to Cleveland from AFIO Hqtrs to speak at our
Sunday Brunch. Gene’s talk will be a part of a special brunch event at
the MALTZ MUSEUM in Beachwood. Because of this, we WILL BEGIN EARLIER
THAN USUAL, at 10:00 a.m.
10:00 – 11:00 - Brunch, catered by Appetite, with informal talk by Gene Poteat adding some perspectives about the noon exhibit on Japanese Internments in WWII.
11:00 – Noon, Tour Exhibit: “The Enemy Within: Terror in America --1776 to Today” - Traveling exhibit of the International Spy Museum
Noon – 1:00 - Presentation: Maltz Museum Auditorium - S. Gene Poteat , National President, Association of Former Intelligence Officers, on INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
1:00 – 5:00 - Visit Maltz Museum’s Resident Exhibits
COST:$20.00 per person, payable by check in advance
Location: Maltz Museum, 2929 Richmond Rd., Beachwood, OH 44122
Mail check marked “Brunch” to Dianne Mueller
RSVP: Email or phone to Dianne Mueller to firstname.lastname@example.org
28 July 2009, noon onwards - Washington, D.C. - The July Defense Intelligence Forum will be sponsored jointly by DIAA and DACOR. It will meet at DACOR
Bacon House, 1801 F Street, NW. Registration will begin and cash bar
will open at 1200. Lunch will be at 1230. The program will start at
about 1245. DACOR is an easy walk from Farragut West and Farragut North
Metro stations. Several parking garages are nearby. The speaker
will be LTG Patrick M. Hughes (USA, Ret), who will speak on the dilemma
and dynamics of growing global instability. General Hughes is on the
DIAA board of directors and is a DACOR member. A former director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, he retired after 35 years of Army service.
He returned to government in 2005 as Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis (Chief of Intelligence) at the Department of
Homeland Security. He is now Corporate Vice President for Intelligence
and Counterterrorism at L-3 Communications.
DACOR members will make reservations directly with DACOR. All others send by 20 July a check for $25 per person to DIAA, 256 Morris Creek Road, Cullen, Virginia 23934. Give the name, association (AFIO, DIAA, FAOA, NMIA, etc.), email address, and telephone number for each person. Registration will begin and cash bar will open at 1200. Lunch will be at 1230. The program will start at about 1245. DACOR cash bar prices: Soft drinks $1, beer and wine $2, and spirits $3
28 - 29 July 2009 - CTDS 2009 - FREE 2-Day Training and Development Seminar Presented by MVM and the Silver Eagle Group for Government professionals and industry leaders. This free two day event features training from CI Centre, Center for Personal Protection and Safety (CPPS), Conflict Kinetics, CSG, MVM, and SEG.
The goal of the CTDS program is to facilitate awareness of and preparedness for the current demands and evolving threats in today’s global environment. Participation in each component of this year’s program is on a first come, first serve basis.
CTDS 2009 Featured Courses -
• Jihad / Narco-terrorism
• Rapid Response Planning Process
• Advanced Urban Tactics
• Hostage / Terrorist Survival
• Marksmanship Performance Baseline
CTDS will be held at the Silver Eagle Group, 44620 Guilford Dr. Ashburn VA, 20147
CI Centre Counterterrorism training course:
This seminar will provide the necessary foundation for understanding what the radicalization process
teaches about Islam to potential jihadist recruits, and how Islam is used by extremists to justify
militant jihadism. The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies provides a wide range of
dynamic, in-depth and relevant education, training and products on counterintelligence,
counterterrorism and security, taught by some of the most experienced professionals in the field
Seats 50 per day and available Day One from 8am – 12pm and Day Two from 1pm — 5pm
Select your own calendar based off of featured events.
Food available for purchase on site.
CI Centre: Provider of education and training in Counter-intelligence, Counterterrorism, and security
Wednesday, 29 July 2009; 6:30 pm - More Sex(pionage) - Continued Tales of Spies, Lies, and Naked Thighs [at Spy Museum] "God gave me both a brain and a body, and I shall use them both…”—Rose O’Neal Greenhow, Confederate Spy
It’s one of the oldest tricks of the trade: sexpionage. From ancient intrigues to current schemes, spies, counterspies, and terrorists may conduct their undercover activities under the covers! International Spy Museum Board Member and author H. Keith Melton will reveal how seduction is used as a tool to attract and manipulate assets, to coerce and compromise targets, and to control spies in both reality and fiction. Featuring authentic KGB sexual entrapment videos and newly-released technical details of the infamous Russian “honey traps,” Melton will tell all about the spies who stop at nothing to get their man—or woman! For your further titillation, the country’s leading intelligence bibliographer, whose name we cannot disclose, will review the literature of “sex and espionage” with recommendations for further reading. 18 and older only. Where: International Spy Museum, 800 F St NW, Washington, DC, Gallery Place/Chinatown Metrorail Station
Tickets: $20; Advance Registration required. Tickets are non-refundable and do not include admission to the International Spy Museum. To register: https://web.spymuseum.org/e-commerce/ItemList.aspx
Thursday 30 July 2009, Noon - 1 p.m. - Washington, DC - SPY MASTER: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West [at the Spy Museum] He was one of the youngest generals in the history of the KGB, and his intelligence career spanned the better part of the Cold War. As deputy resident at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, he oversaw Moscow’s spy network in the United States, and as head of KGB foreign counter-intelligence, he directed several Soviet covert actions against the West. In his memoirs, Spymaster, KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin (Ret.) provides an unparalleled look at the inner workings of Moscow’s famed spy agency. Join Kalugin to hear firsthand how he became disillusioned with the Soviet system, fell out with Russian president Vladimir Putin, and what he thinks of recent intelligence riddles from Moscow, including the death of Russian intelligence defector Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006. Join the author for an informal chat and book signing. Where: International Spy Museum, 800 F St NW, Washington, DC, Gallery Place/Chinatown Metrorail Station TICKETS: FREE. No registration required.
August 2009 - Viera (Melbourne), FL - The AFIO Florida Satellite
Chapter luncheon will feature Captain Richard P. Jeffrey USN Retired,
Pearl Harbor survivor. Captain Jeffrey’s account of the
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was video-taped by the U.S.
National Park Service and is now an Oral History in the archives of the
USS Arizona Memorial in the harbor at Pearl where it may be viewed by
visitors. Captain Jeffery is a U.S. Navy Academy Class of 1939
graduate. He is a survivor of the 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor attack,
having been an Ensign aboard the Battleship USS Maryland. Later he
served on General Eisenhower’s Headquarters Supreme Commander Allied
Forces staff in Europe.
The luncheon takes place at the Indian River Colony Club. For further information or reservations contact George Stephenson, Chapter President email@example.com (321 267-6292) or Donna Czarnecki DonnaCZ12@AOL.com Chapter Treasurer.
Saturday, 8 August 2009 - Orange Park, FL - The AFIO Northern Florida Chapter meets to hear Maj Brian Bailey, USMA, West Point, on Geospatial Issues and Strategic Successes.
The meeting will be held at its traditional location, the Country Club of Orange Park on Loch Rane Boulevard, west of Blanding Boulevard.
Social hour runs from 11:00 am to noon, lunch from noon until about 12:45 pm, followed by a brief break. Guest speaker presentation will begin at about 1:00 pm, and Chapter business and discussions at 2:00 pm. Adjournment will be by 3:00 pm. A reminder that all compatriots and their spouses, guests and potential members are cordially invited...indeed, encouraged! This meeting’s principal guest speaker will be Major Brian Bailey, currently serving on the faculty at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Among Brian’s special duties, including Kuwait where he held a classified position in communications, have been geospatial and technologically driven assignments. In addition to geospatial issues relative to tactical and strategic successes, Major Bailey will address other communications challenges in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. His interface with key techology has placed him in the forefront of his peers, including mention in a White House communique. He recently became one of the first home-based technologists. He and his family logically make their home near West Point. RSVP right away for the 8 August 2009 meeting to Quiel at firstname.lastname@example.org or 904-630-7175. The cost will be $16 each, pay the Country Club at the event.
NEW DAY - Monday, 10 August 2009, 6:30 p.m. - Washington, DC - How To Break A Terrorist [at the Spy Museum]. “Respect, rapport, hope, cunning, and deception are our tools."—Matthew Alexander
Interrogation is the ultimate battle of wills. The most expert interrogators have an arsenal of tactics at-the-ready. Gauging their target, they must quickly assess which psychological strategies will work to gain the most reliable results. Air Force officer Matthew Alexander is part of a small group of military interrogators who went to Iraq in 2006 trained to get information without using harsh methods. He sat face-to-face with hardened members of Al Qaeda and convinced them to talk. Alexander, author of How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq, will describe the true story of the critical interrogation he conducted that led to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Alexander will share his riveting experiences and reveal what it takes to be a great interrogator.
Where: International Spy Museum, 800 F St NW, Washington, DC, Gallery Place/Chinatown Metrorail Station
TICKETS: $12.50; Advance Registration required. Tickets are non-refundable and do not include admission to the International Spy Museum.
To register: https://web.spymuseum.org/e-commerce/ItemList.aspx
Friday, 14 August 2009 - Tysons Corner, VA - AFIO National SUMMER Luncheon...AFIO SUMMER LUNCHEON, Friday, 14 August 2009,
10:30 a.m. to 2 p.m.
Gen. Michael V. Hayden,
NSA - CIA - AIR FORCE
Former Director of
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
PLEASE NOTE: General Hayden's remarks at this event
are presented on a
"For Background Use, Only - Not for Attribution" basis.
Current policies and the U.S. Intelligence Community
Ronald Kessler- Morning Speaker
Best-selling Intelligence Author, Journalist
on his impressive upcoming book
[to be available at event]:
IN THE PRESIDENT'S SECRET SERVICE: Behind the Scenes With Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents They Protect
EVENT LOCATION: The Crowne Plaza
1960 Chain Bridge Road • McLean, Virginia 22102
Driving directions here or
use this link: http://tinyurl.com/8228kw
Thursday, 20 August 2009, Noon - 1 p.m. - Washington, DC - The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America [at the Spy Museum] In 1993, former KGB officer Alexander Vassiliev was permitted unique
access to Stalin-era records of Soviet intelligence operations against
the United States. The notes Vassiliev took and subsequently made
available to Library of Congress historian John Earl Haynes and
professor Harvey Klehr, offer unprecedented insight into Soviet
espionage in America. Based on this unique historical source, Harvey
and Klehr have constructed a shocking, new account of Moscow’s
espionage in America. The authors will expose Soviet spy tactics and
techniques and shed new light on a number of controversial issues,
including Alger Hiss’s cooperation with Soviet intelligence, journalist
I.F. Stone’s recruitment and work for the KGB, and Ernest Hemingway’s
meeting with KGB agents. Join the author for an informal chat and book
Where: International Spy Museum, 800 F St NW, Washington, DC, Gallery Place/Chinatown Metrorail Station
TICKETS: FREE. No registration required.
17 September 2009 – San Francisco, CA – The AFIO Jim Quesada Chapter hosts R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence and member of AFIO's Honorary Board. R. James Woolsey speaks on: Spies, Energy and the New World of the 21st Century: The relatively comfortable world of having a stolid bureaucratic energy and a secure national infrastructure has been replaced by something far more difficult to deal with. As we make decisions about what direction our society should take regarding energy, keeping in mind that we need for it to be increasingly clean, secure, and affordable, what threats and problems should be at the center of our concerns, and what are some of the approaches that can help us deal with all three needs? United Irish Cultural Center 2700 45th Avenue, SF. 11:30 AM no host cocktails; noon - luncheon. $25 member rate with advance reservation and payment; $35 non-member rate. RSVP/pre-payment is required. E-m ail RSVP to Mariko Kawaguchi (please indicate meat or fish) email@example.com and mail check made out to "AFIO" to: Mariko Kawaguchi, P.O. Box 117578 Burlingame, CA 94011.
13-16 October 2009 - Las Vegas, NV - AFIO National Symposium - Nellis AFB, Creech AFB. Details and registration forthcoming.
AFIO 2009 Fall Convention in Las Vegas, Nevada
13 October to 16 October, 2009
Cold Warriors in the Desert: From Atomic Blasts to Sonic Booms
Symposium will feature presentations on the testing of atomic weapons, airborne reconnaissance platforms, and more. Onsite visits to Nellis Air Force Base - Home of the Fighter Pilot, the U.S. Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site - the former on-continent nuclear weapons proving ground, and Creech Air Force Base - the home of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (currently deployed for combat missions in the Middle East, yet piloted from Creech).
Preliminary Agenda HERE for scheduling of your travel
Harrah's Hotel Registration is available now at: Telephone reservations may be made at 800-901-5188. Refer to Group Code SHAIO9 to get the special AFIO rate.
To make hotel reservations online,
go to: http://tinyurl.com/lsx23o
Special AFIO October Symposium Las Vegas rates are available up to Friday, September 11, 2009
For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events
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