Season 2 of the Emmy Award winning series launches on Netflix in just a few days. Based on John le Carré’s first post-Cold War classic of the same name, the new installment continues to follow Jonathan Pine on his international exploits.
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Season 2 of the Emmy Award winning series launches on Netflix in just a few days. Based on John le Carré’s first post-Cold War classic of the same name, the new installment continues to follow Jonathan Pine on his international exploits.

Peter C. Grace | Georgetown University Press, 05 Jan 26
In the early days of the Cold War, the United States faced a crisis in intelligence analysis. A series of intelligence failures in 1949 and 1950, including the failure to warn about the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made it clear that gut instinct and traditional practices were no longer sufficient for intelligence analysis in the nuclear age. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter Bedell Smith, had a mandate to reform it.
Based on new archival research in declassified documents and the participants' personal papers, The Intelligence Intellectuals reveals the neglected history of how America's brightest academic minds were recruited by the CIA to revolutionize intelligence analysis during this critical period. Peter C. Grace describes how the scientifically sound analysis methods that they introduced significantly helped the United States gain an advantage in the Cold War, and these new analysts legitimized the role of the recently created CIA in the national security community. Grace demonstrates how these professors―such as William Langer from Harvard, Sherman Kent from Yale, and Max Millikan from MIT―developed systematic approaches to intelligence analysis that shaped the CIA's methodology for decades to come.
Readers interested in the history of the Cold War and in intelligence, scholars of intelligence studies, Cold War historians, and intelligence practitioners seeking to understand their craft's foundations will all value this insightful history about the place of social science in national security.

Shawnna Morris | Pen and Sword History, 30 Nov 25
In a history once thought too big for one book, the individual lives and careers of the Cambridge Five are now woven together in a single action-packed saga.
The Cambridge Spy Ring: The Treachery of the Five Who Got Away tells the incredible true story of the five most damaging spies in British history, from their recruitment at Cambridge University to their infiltration of the highest levels of government, all while successfully eluding prosecution.
When legendary KGB spymaster Arnold Deutsch began cultivating his network of agents, he didn’t try to entice established bureaucrats. He instead sought out young rising stars with elite educations and promising futures, enlisted them as spies, and sent them into government careers where they would gain access to the most coveted state secrets in an increasingly polarised world. Beginning with the recruitment of the audacious Kim Philby, who would become the de facto ringleader, we follow the exploits of Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross as they funnel a deluge of confidential documents and privileged information to the Soviet KGB.
Their espionage adventures spanned nearly two decades, from the Spanish Civil War and Stalin’s Great Purge, through the Second World War, to the early Cold War. Their antics would not be complete without binge drinking, fist fights, car wrecks, romantic liaisons, and the heartless betrayal of friends and country alike.
The Cambridge Spy Ring finally pieces together the full account of all five Cambridge Spies in one compelling history.

Carl W. Ford Jr. and Kathleen M. Vogel | Routledge, 16 October 2025
This book examines the roots and elements of the research and knowledge-generation problems in US intelligence.
The work identifies the crux of the problem as the lack of a research capability in US intelligence, which has developed over the past 40 years due to a variety of organizational decisions that prioritized current intelligence reporting and a focus on structural solutions to fix intelligence failures. The book argues that this is the principal cause of recent major intelligence failures regarding 9/11, the 2003 Iraq War, and the current Russia–Ukraine War. Throughout the book, the authors aim to provide short-, medium-, and long-term, policy-relevant recommendations to intelligence officials and members of the US Congress, in the form of workforce, leadership, and organizational changes that can be implemented to address existing research shortcomings in intelligence analysis. The book’s conclusions will also be relevant to the intelligence agencies of other countries.
This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, national security, US politics, defense studies, and international relations.