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Collaboration has sometimes been defined as two or more people, entities, or organizations working jointly to complete a task or achieve a goal. And, it has also been defined as traitorous cooperation with an enemy. My recollections of a definition for collaboration were always of that latter, never hearing or reading the former expressed by NSA managers or supervisors when it came to working jointly with other agencies such as the CIA (i.e., it was neither encouraged nor discouraged). This article highlights a few instances where I and my CIA and CTC counterparts decided it was in the best interest of our agencies and the IC to collaborate.
During the 1990’s I was then assigned as an analyst-reporter to a NSA Counterintelligence division, being tasked to identify and follow the officers of an unnamed Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS). This entailed reporting on any information we were able to glean from raw traffic databases on officers already known to us by name, as well as attempting to identify those known only by a pseudonym, moniker, or code name (e.g., Aldrich Ames [kolokol], David Greenglass [bumblebee], or Kim Philby [sohnchen] ).
UNMASKED: After NSA acquired additional information on an important FIS target known to us as BATMAN (not his real pseudo), I believed the chances of identifying him had greatly improved and, therefore, decided to give him another go. Having acquired a basic understanding of a computer language associated with the database I would be using, in which a user could construct their own search algorithm rather than simply relying on the database’s standard search, I decided to craft my own searches. I thought this approach might reduce the amount of data that was retrieved and, therefore, would need to be reviewed. After tweaking my search, I obtained about ten names and associated information, which I then compared to the information we already held on BATMAN. I had already determined an ideal candidate must satisfy eight criterion in order to be considered as a strong possible, so the process of elimination began. I had reviewed the first six names as I recall, and the best I could do was to tick off about four of the eight criterion for each. However, on the seventh name, a “Bruce Wayne” (obviously not his real name), I got hits on all eight criterion. [Yes, I did check the three remaining names]. At that point I decided to reach out to Stephen—not his real name—at CIA, a person who I had gotten to know on the secure gray phone who had been reading and commenting on my reporting. After Stephen answered I told him, I think I know who BATMAN is, a target of considerable interest to his office and Agency as well. He requested the name, which I gladly shared in hopes of obtaining corroborative information which would increase my confidence in going forward with reporting on his identification. Stephen said he would check the name against CIA's records and get back to me, which he did about an hour later. According to Stephen, they held information on a person named “Bruce Wayne” who was believed to be a member of the FIS in question and who had been known to operate under cover. As an aside, Stephen requested my secure fax number, saying he wanted to send me a photo of Bruce Wayne. Receiving CIA’s background information on Bruce Wayne gave me the confidence to proceed with reporting this intel, which we then published. I later learned from Stephen that Bruce Wayne had been identified out and about, approached, and offered employment with Langley, which he refused.
SURVEILLED: A few months after our successful collaboration on BATMAN, Stephen called with a request. He asked if it would be possible to provide advance notification on a particular type of FIS meeting. I told him these particular meetings were rare occurrences, happening maybe a couple times a year, and the chances of identifying one before it was held was slim. Nothing popped up over the next couple months that would satisfy the parameters Stephen had outlined, and I had pretty much given up hope until one day I got a hit on exactly what he had requested. I called Stephen, providing him with the five W’s, following up our conversation with a serialized report later that day. I didn’t think much about what I had shared with Stephen until one day a CIA Ops Cable showed up in my email inbox. Paraphrasing parts of the cable I had received from Stephen, it stated a CIA team had successfully observed the meeting, identifying participants, vehicles and their license plates, and a safe house to which the members later adjourned.
THWARTED: Shortly after our successful collaboration on the “meeting” Stephen called to say goodbye, wishing me well and telling me he had received an assignment. Stephen never implied I would be receiving a new CIA “handler” and it was then I understood this collaboration of ours was personal—not organizationally inspired—and built on mutual trust over time. Things became relatively quiet from across the Potomac for the next few months until one day I received a call from Bill (not his real name) at the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). He had called thinking I might be able to assist CTC with something important. I initially backed off, stating I was assigned to a CI division and CT subjects were not on our turf. Bill inquired if I had read a particular CTC report, which included intel pertaining to the FIS I was assigned; and I responded I had not read the reporting because I was not cleared for it. He then asked to speak with my supervisor, to facilitate my immediate access to the reporting. After reading it I understood why Bill had contacted me, and I convinced my supervisor I believed there was enough of our FIS’s involvement for our Division to undertake Bill’s request. According to the CTC intel, our assigned FIS had been involved in the training of a third country terrorist organization, and Bill wondered if I might be able to identify some members who had received training in assassinations. A couple of hours later I called Bill with some good news, providing him a heads up on names that were a good fit with CTC’s lead information and that we would subsequently be reporting. Later our Division learned via the grapevine the reported names had likely been shared with the host country, thereby neutralizing the potential threat these terrorists had posed to Americans and others.
*The author served for over 50 years in the IC, first as an Air Force SIGINTer for 22 years followed by a 28-year career at NSA as a Senior Intelligence Analyst. Larry held a variety of positions throughout his lengthy career, serving in the Far East, CONUS, Middle East, and Hawaii. His IC collaboration first began in the mid-1960’s, when as a young Airman in Taiwan he worked with CIA’s on-island mission planners on Chinese Nationalist U-2 collection flights.