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By Brian J. Smith, CPP, CFE
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demanded a fundamental reassessment of how the United States protected its homeland. Americans were justifiably angry. Nearly 3,000 people had been murdered on American soil, and the country demanded accountability, reform, and assurance that institutional barriers would not again prevent critical intelligence from reaching those capable of acting upon it.
The subsequent investigations identified serious failures across the national-security apparatus, particularly in intelligence collection, analysis, coordination, watchlisting, and information sharing. The 9/11 Commission documented significant shortcomings involving the FBI and the intelligence community, while emphasizing a broader systemic problem: diffuse responsibility, inadequate joint action, barriers to information sharing, and an inability to integrate intelligence held throughout government.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security. Beginning March 1, 2003, approximately 180,000 personnel from 22 organizations were brought into the new department. The United States Customs Service was not transferred intact. Its inspection, investigative, trade, and enforcement capabilities were divided among new organizations.
This article argues for a rigorous retrospective examination of that decision. The issue is not the patriotism or competence of today’s DHS personnel. The issue is organizational architecture: whether the 2003 structure preserved the institutional knowledge, specialized authorities, professional culture, mission coherence, and accountability developed by the Customs Service across more than two centuries.
Brian J. Smith, CPP, CFE is a former Supervisory Special Agent, U.S. Department of the Treasury, United States Customs Service; Doctoral Candidate, Statecraft and Strategy, The Institute of World Politics.