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By JR Seeger
As the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has arrived, there have been no shortage of opinion pieces and reviews of the history. I don't intend to compete with these sophisticated discussions. Rather, I wanted to spend a moment reviewing the US response to the 9/11 attacks from the perspective of an intelligence foot soldier in the post-9/11 battlefield.
CIA officers—analysts and case officers, especially—regularly build a regional specialty and language capability. Mine was Southwest Asia and my languages were the various dialects of Persian. For that reason, I returned to reporting sources who could provide insight into the complexities of the Islamic extremism (both Sunni and Shia extremism) and the political consequences for the region as two extremist states developed side by side. This is not to suggest that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Caliphate of Afghanistan were allies. They were absolutely enemies. The Taliban were especially brutal in their repression of Shia in Afghanistan, and they butchered Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Taliban were also narcotraffickers who waged combat operations against the Iranian border guards attempting to stop heavily armed narcotics convoys from driving across to Iran. The Taliban saw the Islamic Republic as a heretical regime and the leadership in the Islamic Republic saw the Taliban as hateful reminders of the great Sunni-Shia battles from over a thousand years ago.
How could the CIA design a campaign against the Taliban in such a short period of time? The answer is that the CIA nurtured relationships and collected intelligence in the region for years before 9/11. Also, throughout the 1990s, the CIA maintained a profound liaison relationship with the intelligence services of the neighboring countries who were hostile to the Taliban. The events of 9/11 and the absolute refusal on the part of the Taliban to surrender the al-Qaʻida leadership resident in Afghanistan created the opportunity for the CIA to action a plan that had been considered since the al-Qaʻida attack on the USS Cole in 2000.
It was not difficult for the CIA to assemble the first half-dozen teams because the team members had spent years working on targets in Southwest Asia, had the language skills, and had the regional experience. Our Special Forces colleagues had not focused on Afghanistan, but they had worked extensively in the border states of the former Soviet Union. They were familiar with the Islamic extremist targets of the region, and they mobilized quickly to join the fight.
Several lessons emerged. First, the US Intelligence Community and the US Special Operations community must build specialists to conduct intelligence and unconventional warfare operations anywhere in the world. Second, in failed states and war zones, intelligence officers and Green Berets must have the language skills along with an understanding the region culture and history. We cannot predict where the next hot spot will be, so we must build cadres of specialists who will be prepared when needed to travel to a new hot spot and start work immediately. Crisis response is not for the generalist who receives the mission but isn't familiar with the people or the place.
Third, the partnership between the IC and special operations community must be seamless. To make that happen, mid-level officers from both "tribes" must experience the "way of doing business" of their colleagues. In the 1990s, there were many opportunities to work together, and those opportunities resulted in an easy transition into "one team, one fight." From 2001 until 2020, this experience was an everyday occurrence in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, individuals who lived that world have departed or soon will retire. This training will be essential for future success.
Fourth, liaison relationships matter. In the fall of 2001, CIA teams and US Special Forces deployed into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan. While it would not have been impossible, it would have been far more difficult if these same teams had deployed from aircraft carriers or through clandestine means. What we can predict through a simple study of post-World War II is that we will need liaison partners and treaty allies (such as NATO) to smooth the way to resolution of the next crisis.
The US response after 9/11 was resolute. It was also sophisticated and conducted over a long timeline that began in the mid-1980s. It demanded a combination of military strength, diplomatic skills, and intelligence capability. In the case of the intelligence capability, it required men and women who had years of experience working human-intelligence and covert-action operations that set the stage for the first four months after 9/11. These lessons may seem simple, but they are not simplistic.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.
JR Seeger is a retired CIA officer, author, and book-reviewer.