Weekly Intelligence Notes #44-03 19 December 2003
Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINs) are commentaries on Intelligence and related national security matters, based on open media sources, selected, interpreted, edited and produced by AFIO for non-profit educational uses by AFIO members and WIN subscribers. Don Harvey contributed to this report.
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CONTENTS of this WIN
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YEAR 2020 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE BEGUN -- At a time when the bulk of the intelligence community is focused on terrorists, Iraqi unrest, and on-going or virtually on-going violence throughout the world, the National Intelligence Council has launched its 2020 Project. The effort to come up with a range of scenarios the world could face in 2020 is part of a long-range forecasting endeavor and will, unusually, have an unclassified product. The Chairman of the Council, Robert L. Hutchings, noted that looking years ahead would help policymakers navigate what he described as a "period of profound flux in world affairs." The council is made up of senior analysts who advise the DCI, are located in CIA's headquarters, but are not part of the agency. Over the next year, the council will bring together specialists on demographic, technology and regional affairs to produce a paper by December 2004. Foreign scholars will be consulted for their views on their home regions as well as the United States. The sort of questions the council will confront pertaining to the world in 2020 include:
· Will the United States, Europe and Japan be able to maintain a decent quality of life for their masses of elderly people? Will mass retirements strain national economies to the point of a global slowdown?
· What countries are most likely to fall apart and become potential terrorist havens? How will already-failed nations such as Sudan fare in the future?
· Will the slowly-developing and the yet-to-develop nations create a backlash that undermines the global trading system? Will the self-interests of developed nations obviate meaningful and continuing global trade developments?
· What would it take for the Chinese Communist Party to evolve so much that it could accommodate all the new political, economic and social forces that have been unleashed by economic growth? "I'm personally attracted by the theory that China can either become aggressive or powerful, but not both," Mr. Hutchings said in a recent interview at CIA. "A China that was reverting to threatening behavior would be a closed China that wouldn't be open enough for economic growth." [Unmentioned would be the associated question - - how strong would a closed and threatening China have to be to establish itself as the suzerain of the Far East?]
· What is the most likely aftermath in 2020 of the US-led invasion of Iraq?
Since it is the common experience of intelligence practitioners to find themselves totally engulfed in current problems [and/or engulfed by the criticism of ill-informed or constitutionally-hostile commentators], an endeavor to look well into the future is commendable as well as almost unique. (Harvey) (based on WashTimes / AP 5 Dec '03, p13)
AL QAEDA TRYING HARDER AGAINST SAUDIS -- Although Osama bin Laden has directed al Qaeda machinations against Saudi Arabia for some time, a classified CIA report has recently concluded that al Qaeda has intensified its efforts to foment instability in the Kingdom with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the royal family. [With some 7,000 princes, the "family" probably more accurately resembles a growing tribe.] The allegedly top-secret assessment was described to the reporter by unidentified intelligence and other officials. Completed in early December, the CIA Intelligence Memorandum opined that al Qaeda has decided to launch the major destabilization drive sooner rather than later because waiting could cost it more losses in followers and weaponry to the ongoing Saudi crackdown. According to a senior official familiar with the document, he believes the Saudis have "taken down" most of the terrorists' senior in-country leaders and have "badly damaged" the total network. The government forces have arrested hundreds of suspected militants, killed a number of others in shoot-outs, and uncovered secret caches containing tons of weapons and explosives. The analysis noted that while only a fraction would be ready to take up arms against the royal family, as many as 10,000 Saudis, many disgruntled by corruption and a lack of employment opportunities, could support the al Qaeda. The in-country al Qaeda commander was killed in a shoot-out in May but has been replaced with a new leader, Ahdul Aziz Isa Abdul Mohsen al-Mugrin (who also uses the name Abu Hajir). Abu Hajir fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina, smuggled weapons into Spain and Algeria, and served as al Qaeda's liaison to a radical Islamic group in Algeria.
It has been apparent in recent months that the Saudi hierarchy decided allowing support to fundamentalist Islamic radicals and various modes of indirect funding of terrorist organizations no longer was in their best interest. From an outsider's viewpoint, the internal house-cleaning has been surprisingly vigorous [considering the royal family survival could depend on it, perhaps not so surprising] and apparently effective in considerable measure. Again from an uninformed basis, the Saudi intelligence organization does not appear to be as ineffective as it appeared to Westerners in earlier years. It is not inconceivable that Western intelligence organizations could have been of assistance to the Saudis; perhaps on a second-hand or third-hand basis, the Israelis could have made a contribution as well. Jordanian and Turkish help would be a given. (Harvey) (based on Phila Inquirer 11 Dec '03, J Landry)
NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE - NEARBY VULNERABILITIES -- The "shock and awe" that resulted from the swiftness of the American victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom was due to Network Centric Warfare (NCW), our military's new warfighting capability, which gets the right information, in the right format, at the right time, to the right warfighter. The core of this new capability is communications, especially satellite communications. In Iraq, our military didn't have enough of their own satellites and had to lease non-encrypted commercial ones - a financial boom for the commercial satellites. But the military quickly woke up to the problems of saturation, low data rates and vulnerabilities, for commercial satellites are susceptible to enemy jamming and exploitation. This August, the commercial Telstar-12 satellite stationed over the Atlantic Ocean, was repeatedly jammed while attempting to relay the State Department's TV news program, WorldNetDaily, into Iran. Clearly the satellite is well beyond the range for any jammer based in Iran. The U.S. finally traced the jamming signal to Bejucal, the Russian signal intelligence (SIGINT) site just outside Havana. As expected, Fidel Castro ignored the State Department's diplomatic protest. So two third-world countries, Iran and Cuba, successfully challenged the U.S. dominance of space-or rather, the core of U.S. military power.
It has been reported that Castro has also allowed the Chinese intelligence service to conduct SIGINT and cyperwarfare against the U.S. from the Bejucal site. Castro's response to State Department protests was that the jamming signals had originated from an Iranian diplomatic mission, that the operations had been terminated, and Cuba was blameless. Clearly, jamming, hacking, and intercepting commercial satellites can be done by virtually anyone, including the Chinese Falun Gong dissidents and terrorists groups.
Dr. Michael Waller of the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., wrote on WorldNet Daily, August 7, 2003, "by successfully jamming a U.S. communications satellite over the Atlantic Ocean, the regimes of Cuba and Iran challenged U.S. dominance of space and the assumptions of free access to satellite communication that makes undisputed U.S. military power possible." When despotic anti-American dictators are left alone for nearly a half-century -- as we have done with Fidel Castro -- there is a price to pay, not only by the victimized Cuban people, but for Americans as well. We should not make the same mistake with North Korea….deal cutting and tacit acceptance comes back to hurt us. (Poteat)
LACKADAISICAL UN ANTI-TERRORISM REPORTING -- In addition to the routine sharing of intelligence on terrorists and their activities, the nations of the United Nations are required by Security Council resolutions to report their efforts to freeze assets, control borders, crack down on nefarious "charities" and comply with arms embargoes. Reports of the individual nation's efforts were due to be reported to the Council's committee overseeing sanctions against the Taliban, al Qaeda and related groups were due at the end of October. More than half (108 of 191) did not get around to submitting their reports.
Reactions to this at-least-indifferent performance have varied. The US State Department comment was, "I think our focus is to continue working with these states to help them meet their reporting requirements and other Security Council obligations. We'll do that, bilaterally and through the UN to ensure compliance with existing resolutions." A diplomat from Kenya said Nairobi would present its report to the Security Council in a few weeks. An Indonesian diplomat, after pointing out the "lot of work" associated with anti-terrorism measures, said resources in his country were going toward the apprehension of terrorists, not the filing of reports. But he acknowledged that the work is important "because the reports create a better understanding of what countries are doing."
It can be anticipated that the vociferous advocates of transferring responsibility for the campaign to defeat the terrorists in Iraq to the United Nations will not cite this performance to buttress their position. Hopefully, the various intelligence organizations that can make a contribution to the anti-terrorism effort have been and will continue to work cooperatively bilaterally and as part of willing groups. (Harvey) (WashTimes, 3Dec03 , p11 /Betsy Pisik)
IGNORE INTELLIGENCE TO YOUR PERIL -- Italian military headquarters in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyah were blown up November 12 by terrorists who drove a truck through the main entrance to the former chamber of commerce compound bearing more than 800 pounds of explosives. An unusual feature of this worst attack on US allies in Iraq, 30 Italians and Iraqis were killed, was the fact that the Italian leadership had been warned three times by their intelligence officers of an imminent attack on the country's contingent in the city.
The main Italian building was located less than ten yards from the headquarters entrance, which had been modified to slow down any entering suicide vehicle, but post-attack visitors to the site said the passageway was not sufficiently narrow to force a vehicle to go slowly. No huge concrete barriers were in place, nor were perimeter areas (the headquarters sits on a main thoroughfare) closed to traffic. Six days after the attack, the head of Italian military intelligence (Sismi), told an oversight committee that as early as July his organization warned of the danger in the south of Iraq. The Defense Minister quickly dismissed the remarks, saying that Sismi's intelligence officers had issued nothing precise, that Sismi had passed information to the chain of command but, "this does not mean that intelligence had foreseen that there would be attacks."
Italian intelligence documents ["examined by The Washington Post"] contradict the Defense Minister. On 6 October, Italian intelligence warned of an "imminent attack," possibly by mortars, against either Italy's military force in Nasiriyah or Polish troops in southern Iraq. Two days later, intelligence predicted that an attack, organized by members of the Fedayeen, would take place "against the Italian contingent in Nasiriyah" and named two of the organizers. The next day, the Italian intelligence named two more Fedayeen believed to be planning an attack on Italians. The defenses of the headquarters were never increased despite the warnings; the Italian army chief of staff stated three days after the attack that isolating the Italian contingent would have interfered with its desire to work with the Iraqi public. The Italian intelligence reports in Nasiriyah reported cooperation between former Iraqi officers and the Fedayeen and also detailed a role in the attack by Ansar al-Islam, the violent fundamentalist organizations with ties to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan.
The tragedy has several aspects worth noting: to demand who, what, where, when specifics in terrorist intelligence is a stupid dream; [conversely, the lack of specifics in warnings on terrorist attacks always affords politicians an easy excuse and potential fall-guys]; considering they were strangers to the area, the Italian intelligence people developed quite good data; the good data leads to the inference there are friendly Iraqis cooperating in Nasiriyeh; the desire to work with the Iraqi public is well and good, but protect your bases adequately; Rome politicians should realize that one needs to pay at least some attention to the facts when dumping on intelligence types [a passing familiarity with the Washington ebb-and-flow could have taught Rome that much]; and finally, intelligence liaison between friendly intelligence services is worth the effort for more than the exchange of data [it is unlikely the Sismi would have leaked their documents to the Post directly but probably could find a liaison buddy to handle it]. (Harvey) (WashPost 8Dec03, pA20 by Daniel Williams, Baghdad)
Three technically elegant Flash “shows” of Israeli-based writer’s view of current terrorist acts and Israel origins:
“The New Anti-Semitism and the Islamic Expansionism”: (http://www.conceptwizard.com/pipeline_of_hatred.html)
”History in a Nutshell”: (http://18.104.22.168/conen/conflict_2.html)
“Nutshell Two”: (http://22.214.171.124/nutoo/nutshell3.html)
Referred to us by GeraldN, who adds: “ I Am personally in agreement with the basic premise. Fully expect the Egyptian press to blame SARS on a Jewish plot. They’ve claimed worse. The only caveat I have is that Muslims have not initiated all the religious conflicts noted in the presentation, particularly in the Balkans and the Eritrea/Ethiopia conflict, the latter being largely a secular struggle, over Eritrean territorial integrity; as Ethiopia still doesn’t quite accept Eritrea’s independence. As for the conflict over Kashmir, neither side has clean hands.”
BIOMETRIC READERS - CAN THEY BE EASILY FOOLED? -- Wiesław Bicz [W.Bicz@optel.pl] of Optel Ltd (a ultrasound fingerprint recognition
manufacturer) provides a webpage collection of links to papers describing
different means that might be used to trick biometric fingerprint readers
through use of artificial fingers or other methods…deceiving fingerprint
readers and other biometric devices. The authors study and rate numerous
biometric devices and address security issues of the equipment.
NEW MI5 FILES RELEASED -- MI5 files on Communist and Nazi agents in the UK during WWII - The British Public Records Office has made its eleventh Security Service release containing 198 files, bringing the total number of MI5 records in the public domain to 1,844. Here is a brief overview and description of the most interesting and newsworthy files.
As with previous releases the bulk of records are personal files relating to individuals (KV 2), with a small number of subject files (KV 3), policy files (KV 4), organization files (KV 5) and list files (KV 6).
The majority of files are from 1939-45 but there are a considerable number from the inter- and post- war periods, dealing with a range of groups and subjects, including: right-wing extremists; Russian and British Communists and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and related groups; Communist intelligence agents; the organization and operations of the Security Service, including files relating to the Double Cross system; the system for intercepting postal and telephone communications; various Jewish groups and organizations; and Anglo-Soviet co-operation in Persia during the Second World War.
Of the personal files in this release, the most notable include those relating to German spies landed in Ireland during the Second World War and those on various British right-wing sympathizers, such as Lady Diana Mosley (KV 2/1363-1364), Arthur Chesterton, the founder of the National Front (KV 2/1345-1350) and Arnold Leese (KV 2/1365-1367). There are also files on the British Communists Cecil Day Lewis (KV 2/1385) and Eva Reckitt (KV 2/1369-1375) and the French anti-fascist André Malraux (KV 2/1386).
The personal files are listed under the following categories:
Right-Wing Extremists (KV 2/1335-1368)
German Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/1286-1318)
German Intelligence Officers (KV 2/1319-1334)
Soviet Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/1391-1409)
Communists and Suspected Communists, including Russian and Communist Sympathisers (KV 2/1369-1390)
Double Agents (KV 2/1275-1285)
Soviet and other Communist front organisations (KV 2/1432)
Soviet Intelligence officers (KV 2/1410-1431)
For full details, jump over to: (http://www.pro.gov.uk/releases/nov2003_mi5/list.htm)
SPIES: More Than Two Years After 9/11, the Dots Remain Farther Apart Than Ever -- review by Jim McGee, CQ Staff, in Congressional Quarterly HOMELAND SECURITY – INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 16, 2003
McGee writes: “CQ Homeland Security review that traces appropriations through thousands of pages of budget records, public testimony and agency documents shows that something very different from the "meaningful and sustained reform" of counterterrorism intelligence has come to pass.
“Instead of unifying the key agencies with tighter management and streamlined coordination of their analytic centers, technology, budgets and personnel, the record shows that Congress and the Bush administration did the opposite: They collaborated in adding new layers of duplication, cost and bureaucratic overlap to an already bloated system.”See fulltext at: (http://www.cq.com/corp/show.do?page=crawford/homeland_20031217) and let us hear your opinions on this assessment.
NEW INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - “CUT THE RED TAPE AND ADAPT THE RULES” - SADDAM'S CAPTURE THE RESULT -- “The capture of Saddam Hussein was a much-needed shot in the arm for American intelligence services. President Bush made special mention of our intelligence analysts in his address after the capture. Yet, as a onetime CIA analyst, I think it's important to examine why this mission was so successful. In large part, it was because analysts were allowed to ignore many long-held beliefs about how intelligence is "supposed" to work…“The hunt for Saddam Hussein was so important that it forced everyone to cut the red tape and adapt the rules to let our analysts show just how good they really are. If only the system always worked so well. In our new age of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and rogue states, we will need the agility to redirect an intelligence organization before an attack. “At the same time, the hunt for Mr. Hussein highlights some of our weaknesses. The search was conducted more like a police dragnet than a traditional intelligence investigation. Because our military controls Iraq, our personnel could roam the countryside freely, cordon off areas and interrogate sources repeatedly, and no one really had to be concerned about exposing his identity as an American.” (Bruce Berkowitz OpEd piece, NYT)(via C. LaClair) (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/19/opinion/19BERK.html)
JOHN Le CARRÉ IS MR ANGRY NOW THAT SMILEY’S DAY HAS GONE -- “Poor old John le Carré. First he lost his theme – the Cold War – and now he is losing his audience. Those who listened to the end of the embarrassing interview he gave to Jim Naughtie on the Today programme [UK] must have squirmed, as I did, when le Carré compared himself to Victor Klemperer, the great diarist who survived the Holocaust, and compared the Americans, by implication, to the Nazis.” (lead paragraph from a piece by Daniel Johnson, 2 Dec 03 in the Telegraph [UK] at:
CLEARED GOVERNMENT CONSULTANTS SOUGHT BY 31 DECEMBER -- Do you have an active Top Secret Clearance? If you are an AFIO member and have clearances, and you are looking to enter the exciting world of government consulting with the prestigious consulting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton (www.bah.com), please send your resume to Jamie Miller at email@example.com by Dec. 31, 2003 to be eligible for a variety of intelligence-related positions working with new Department of Homeland Security, the CIA, FBI, State Department, and other government agencies. Many new positions are open. Note that resumes will only be accepted until Dec. 31st, 2003.
POSITIONS: Provide a detailed assessment of Intelligence Information Needs Management pertaining to the Source Management Offices within the Source. Define the impact and implications of proposed IIN Management processes, ICMAP and the proposed transformation initiatives within the Source Management Mission Area on existing CTO processes and define possible impacts on the proposed Source. Document changes to existing CTO IIN Management processes and suggest new CONOPS incorporating results from other initiatives, including ICMAP and the SMMA transformation. Define and refine new IIN Management processes with the goal of moving from requirements management to collaborative IIN management.
QUALIFICATIONS -- Consulting: You will be primarily responsible for planning, organizing and leading tasks and projects, and ensuring the quality of client deliverables. You will apply well-developed consulting, assignment management and functional skills in the execution of the work. You will be a role model of the firm's core values and play a significant role in: Maintaining and expanding client relationships through delivery of high quality work; Leading, coaching and developing junior staff; Managing client assignments, technical/functional content, budgets and staff resources.
FUNCTIONAL/INDUSTRY KNOWLEDGE: 5-7 years of experience with imagery collection management, Experience with collection management tools, including Fishtools; Knowledge of imagery systems capabilities; Knowledge of Intelligence community management policies, processes, procedures, and practices; Possession of excellent oral and written communication skills.
EDUCATION: BS degree in a related field required, RMS Certification
CLEARANCE: Applicants will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information; TS/SCI clearance is required. Do not delay. Send your resume to Jamie Miller at firstname.lastname@example.org by Dec. 31.
INTELLIGENCE CAREERS IN IRAQ -- CACI, a leading provider of information technology, logistics, intelligence analysis, and security services is currently seeking top performers for positions in the Iraq. Immediate opportunities include:
Senior Counterintelligence Agent: Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent or interrogator with 10 years of experience. Individuals must be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Knowledge of the Arabic language and culture a plus. Position requires former MOS 97B/E, 351B/E, 35E
Interrogators: Individuals must be trained interrogators with at least 5 years of experience in interrogation. Individuals must be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Knowledge of the Arabic language and culture a plus. Position requires former MOS 97E, 351E, ASI 9N and N7 desired.
Some locations require individuals to work and live in a field environment with minimum medical facilities. Applicants must possess the ability to work extended work hours in difficult surroundings for up to one year. All positions require that candidates meet eligibility requirements for Government security clearances. These full time positions offer competitive salaries and outstanding benefits packages. If interested, forward your resume to: Tim Strike at email@example.com or Phone: (888) 842-5150 ext. 7 or by Fax: (703) 679-4510. CACI is an Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/D/V
ANALYSIS & OPERATIONS SPECIALISTS NEEDED -- We are looking for former agents with experience in analysis and operations as area specialists for Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba or China. This long term contract will be in support of the Counter Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA) in Crystal City under the direction of retired AFOSI SA Dave Crawford. Pay will depend on experience, ranging from about 75K to 85K a year. TS/SCI required. Anyone interested can send me their résumé, via fax, email, or snail mail to: Glenn Schultz at firstname.lastname@example.org, recently retired Senior Special Agent, US Army CID, now a Program Manager for TKC Communications, LLC, 11320 Random Hills Road, Suite 300, Fairfax, VA 22030; O: 703-934-8131; F: 703-934-8134.
LOOKING FOR SCIF-ABLE SPACE -- TKC Communications, LLC is in need of approximately 2,500 square feet of unused SCIF space in the National Capitol Region. As an alternative, they are interested in space that would lend itself to being SCIF’d. Send hints or specific locations via email to: Glenn Schultz at email@example.com, or by mail to him at TKC Communications, LLC, 11320 Random Hills Road, Suite 300, Fairfax, VA 22030; O: 703-934-8131; F: 703-934-8134.
AFIO JANUARY LUNCHEON -- AFIO's first luncheon of 2004 is Tuesday, January 20th. The event kicks off with military intelligence analyst CDR Richard A. Mobley, USN (Ret) discussing current North Korea instability from perspective of "Flash Point North Korea - The Pueblo and ECD-121 Crises" - his book just out from Naval Institute Press. Our post-lunch speaker will be terrorism expert Dr. Michael Ledeen, senior fellow at American Enterprise Institute (AEI) specializing in U.S. foreign and security policy. Dr. Ledeen's background includes stints with the NSC, State and Defense departments, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and several teaching positions worldwide. The venue will remain the popular Tysons Corner Holiday Inn (hidden behind office towers across from Tysons II Mall) starting at 10:30 A.M with badge pickup. Registration $29.50 pp members and their invited guests, via email to firstname.lastname@example.org with your credit card info, or phone 703-790-0320 or by fax at 703.790.0264. No registrations at the door. Parking at Holiday Inn is easy -- Park in covered garage, or at any sign saying “Hotel Guest, Only.” Rain or Shine, you’re covered!
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