AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #38-07 dated 1 October 2007
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*** 25-27 October 2007 - McLean, VA - AFIO National Intelligence "Counter-Jihad" Symposium ***
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The Resurgence of the Worldwide Islamic Jihad
Against the West
Understanding and Needed Response
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What the U.S. needs to do once we are beyond all the Political Correctness
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Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE
Section III - SEEKING ASSISTANCE, BOOK REVIEWS AND COMING EVENTS
Coming EventsCurrent Calendar Next Two Months ONLY:
For Additional Events two+ months or more....view our online Calendar of Events
Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
Mexico May Be Unable to Stop
Bombings. With the Mexican government finding it difficult to guard much of the country's petroleum pipeline network, preventing further attacks on it depends upon a national security apparatus that analysts warn may not be up to the task.
Once a brutally efficient weapon of the one-party regime that ruled for most of the 20th century, Mexico's domestic intelligence service has been weakened over the past decade by budget cuts, personnel purges and the shifting priorities of a more democratic society, the analysts say. Some of the more experienced spy masters have been cashiered or farmed out to state and federal agencies. Networks of operatives that once infiltrated opposition groups have been idled or abandoned. Phalanxes of analysts have been divided up among competing government bureaucracies. And, with the threat of an armed insurgency considered slight, the government's pared-down counterintelligence resources have been largely devoted to the drug war.
Many Mexicans might find it hard to mourn the dismantling of the old counterintelligence apparatus. It was, after all, the clandestine hammer of the often violently intolerant political system that ran Mexico for 71 years until 2000. Anchored by the Federal Security Directorate, which reported to Mexico's president, the counterintelligence apparatus played a key role in the so-called "dirty war" of the 1970s.
Mexican troops and agents cracked down on urban and rural guerrilla groups and caused the deaths or disappearances of at least 530 people, according to a government report released last year.
The security directorate was dismantled in the late 1980s as evidence of its agents' narcotics corruption and repressive excesses became too much to ignore. CISEN, the agency that replaced the directorate, remains Mexico's primary intelligence service, this country's equivalent of the CIA. When Mexico was jolted by the mostly Maya Zapatista rebellion in southernmost Chiapas state and the EPR attacks in Oaxaca and Guerrero states in the 1990s, CISEN was given a large budget and presidential support. But that support weakened when those rebel movements waned.
Beginning in 1998, with the creation of the Federal Preventative Police, the best analysts were transferred to other agencies and given tasks unrelated to political espionage, analysts say. Since the start of this decade, CISEN'S payroll was cut from 3,000 people to about 1,500. Its budget was slashed by nearly half, to just $70 million - out of a $203 billion federal budget. Meanwhile, bureaucratic infighting and shifting political agendas forced out some of the more experienced CISEN chiefs, who went to work for state governors or private corporations. [HoustonChronicle/23Sept2007]
Israeli German Arrested In Lebanon On Espionage
Charges. A man with dual Israeli and German citizenship was arrested on charges of espionage. According to press reports the man was identified as Daniel Sharon and is currently being held by the Lebanese military intelligence for questioning.
Lebanese police were investigating a murder of Mussa al Shalaani, in a Beirut suburb, when the probe led them to Sharon. According to the investigation Shalani had been shot with a gun belonging to his roommate. When police questioned the roommate, he claimed that he had lost the gun. He also told police that he had been in the presence of his German friend staying at the Four Points Sheraton Hotel. A hotel employee later told police that Sharon had offered him money in order to register him under a different name.
Police later arrested Sharon and on further examination determined that he had visited Lebanon 11 times since 2005. The last visit had been days before his arrest. [Infolivetv/23September2007]
U.S. Won't Send Kidnap Suspects to Germany. U.S. authorities have told Germany that they will not extradite 13 purported CIA agents sought in the alleged kidnapping of a German citizen. A Justice Ministry spokeswoman said the Bush administration told Berlin it would not hand over the group and said the ministry had, as a result, decided against giving Washington Munich prosecutors' formal request for their arrest.
The Justice Ministry last month sounded out U.S. authorities' willingness to cooperate with legal proceedings against the suspected agents, sending a legal request that officials call a common first step in dealing with international arrest warrants.
Munich prosecutors issued warrants for the arrest of the 13 purported CIA agents at the end of January, accusing them of wrongfully imprisoning Khaled el-Masri and causing him serious bodily harm. El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, maintains that he was abducted in December 2003 at the Serbian-Macedonian border and flown by the CIA to a detention center in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he was abused. He says he was released in Albania in May 2004, and that his captors told him he was seized in a case of mistaken identity.
Human rights campaigners have focused on el-Masri's story in pressing the United States to stop flying terrorism suspects to countries other than the U.S. where they could face abuse - a practice known as extraordinary rendition. In a separate case, Italy also has issued arrest warrants for purported CIA agents.
U.S. officials have declined to address the case in public. However, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that the United States has acknowledged making a mistake with el-Masri. CIA spokesman George Little said Saturday that the agency would not comment on the case. [Armborst&Heilprin/AP/23September2007]
Guidelines on FBI Confidential
Sources. Late last year the Attorney General approved revised guidelines for the use of confidential informants by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The guidelines require that confidential human sources be subjected to a new validation process to help ensure that their information is reliable. The guidelines also generally require that the FBI and prosecutors inform responsible law enforcement authorities if they discover that an FBI source is engaged in "unauthorized criminal activity."
The Guidelines were included in voluminous FBI answers to questions for the record of a recently published Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on "FBI Oversight," December 6, 2006. To see the entire guidelines, visit http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/chs-guidelines.pdf. [FAS.org/23 September207]
Former RAW Man Booked for Official Secrets Breach. The Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered a criminal case against Major Gen (Retd) V K Singh, a former official of the country's external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), for divulging official secrets. Singh could be arrested soon.
Maj. Gen Singh had recently questioned the previous government's sagacity behind making public the telephonic conversation between then Pakistan army chief General Pervez Musharraf and his chief of staff, intercepted by the Research and Analysis Wing during the 1999 Kargil war. Singh's residence was raided by CBI sleuths. A CBI spokesperson said the former army officer, who worked with RAW between 2000-04, was found in possession of a lot of "secret, incriminating documents" and was being questioned. Earlier, the investigating agency booked Maj Gen Singh under the Official Secrets Act for divulging official secrets in his book "India's External Intelligence-Secrets of RAW", in which he questioned the internal functioning and unaccountability of the agency.
A CBI spokesperson said Maj Gen Singh has been "booked under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act for making wrong communication." CBI sleuths searched his residence at Palam Vihar in southwest Delhi and seized several documents.
In his book, Singh questioned the erstwhile Vajpayee government's decision to hand over the transcription of the telephonic conversation between Pervez Musharraf and his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz to former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif in June 1999. Singh also wrote of the communication systems procured by the Special Protection Group for the prime minister from an American firm in 2001 and how the RAW leadership failed to carry out due diligence. Singh also questioned the lack of parliamentary control over the RAW's functioning and the total financial autonomy. [SIFY/21September2007]
Unisys Probed for Homeland Security
Breach. The FBI is investigating allegations that Unisys failed to detect a Chinese Web site's cyber break-ins on computers at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and then tried to cover up its shortcomings, according to reports.
Unisys won a $1 billion contract in 2002 to build and manage information technology networks at the department and the Transportation Security Administration. But evidence gathered by the Homeland Security Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives indicates network-intrusion devices were not properly installed and monitored. As a result, some 150 DHS computers were compromised by hackers using a Chinese-language Web site from June through October in 2006. Besides the original $1 billion contract, Unisys received a $750 million follow-up deal in 2005.
Unisys, based in Blue Bell, Pa., disputed the charge with a statement saying: "We can state generally that the allegation that Unisys did not properly install essential security systems is incorrect. In addition, we routinely follow prescribed security protocols and have properly reported incidents to the customer in accordance with those protocols...We believe that a proper investigation of this matter will conclude that Unisys acted in good faith to meet the customer's security requirements."
An aide on the Homeland Security Committee told the newspaper that the FBI was investigating Unisys for criminal fraud. The committee also has called for the DHS to look into the matter. The committee also said the contractor allegedly had falsely certified the computer network had been protected to cover up its failings. [Reuters/25September2007]
UA Effort Sifting Web For Terror-Threat
Data. Terrorists use the Web as a virtual university of how-to videos for making bombs, enticing recruits and plotting attacks - but University of Arizona researchers are zeroing in on them. UA's Dark Web project scours the Internet to listen in on terrorist chat rooms, untangle the vast network of extremist links and spot threats emerging daily. That gives Tucson the world's largest database of terrorist-generated Web sites, a collection of more than a half billion pages, postings, images and videos - a new tool for the military and U.S. agencies to use in assessing threats. And now the UA will use a $1.5 million federal grant to look deeper into one pressing danger: how the Web teaches extremists to set up improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the roadside bombs often used against U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
The Army's military intelligence school at Fort Huachuca is also working to gather intelligence on IEDs. Officials there can't comment specifically on Dark Web, but fort spokeswoman Tanja Linton noted that the Internet makes the job of intelligence officers more challenging.
The UA is collaborating with various federal intelligence agencies and essentially taking orders for what Dark Web will focus on. Its success lies in the sophistication it brings to analyzing social linkages between groups and the ability to identify and track individual authors by their writing styles. That component, called Writeprint, helps combat the Web's anonymity by studying thousands of lingual, structural and semantic features in online postings. With 95 percent certainty, it can attribute multiple postings to a single author. From there, Dark Web has the ability to track a single person over time as his views become radicalized. The project analyzes which types of individuals might be more susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups, and which messages or rhetoric are more effective in radicalizing people.
At its start, Dark Web had the capability to collect and analyze Internet activity in English, Spanish and Arabic. It's now branching out into other languages, with German and French already incorporated into the system, and Chinese, Farsi and Dutch among about 10 others in the works. [Swedlund/ArizonaDailyStar/25September2007]
NGA Chief Says Cyberspace Intel Faces Growing Security Threat. The U.S. cyberspace intelligence network is battling a growing threat to its cyberspace assets, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Director Vice Adm. Robert Murrett says. But the concern is not just that of the intelligence, defense or even government communities. "It's not just an intelligence issue," he said. "It's just as important on Wall Street." More than that, Murrett said, it is becoming more difficult to protect cyber-related assets from attack, hacking or other interruptions, test the ability of the agency and others to protect their security, and at the same time collect and disseminate the necessary intelligence.
The concern has been more intense lately. "Everyone's been hit," he said. A "hit" could be anything from a major assault to a relatively young civilian's interest in finding out what might be available on the intelligence community's cyber networks, Murrett said. Murrett would not deny that full-scale attacks, even state-sponsored ones, are occurring. "People are attempting to do these kinds of things," he said.
Addressing a more blatantly visible threat to U.S. space sources, Murrett said China's anti-satellite tests show the potential vulnerability of a variety of platforms. "They show the importance of having a broader architecture," he said. For example, the NGA should not rely too heavily on space assets and use airborne and other commercial ones. The agency and its customers should be neutral in terms of where the information comes from, he said. [Fabey/LATimes/27September2007]
Spy Officials Tracking Key
Scientists. Tracking scientists moving from country to country to share their expertise in building biological weapons is a major challenge, a top U.S. intelligence official said Wednesday.
Unlike nuclear weapons or missiles, biological weapons can be manufactured in relatively nondescript facilities that are hard to detect. That makes tracking the people with the know-how to build the weapons themselves even more critical, said Vice Adm. Robert Murrett, director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The agency analyzes imagery intelligence that comes from aircraft and satellites.
Biological weapons use viruses, bacteria or toxins rather than explosives to target people, animals or agriculture. They can be loaded onto a traditional warhead or dispersed by less sophisticated methods, like the letters containing deadly anthrax spores mailed to Congress and media outlets in 2001. Because they are easier to hide than nuclear weapons or missiles, biological weapons are best tracked by monitoring those with expertise to make them - a formidable challenge in itself, Murrett said.
Tracking individuals trying to spread biological weapons know-how is beyond the capabilities of his agency alone, Murrett said. It requires multiple intelligence agencies to combine their intercepts, data bases and analyses. The NGA's classified annual budget has increased significantly in the past five years, in large part to support the demands of war commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said.
Murrett said he has sent additional people to Iraq to help with U.S. efforts to target insurgents at the neighborhood level and more recently to Afghanistan to focus on the Pakistan border, where al-Qaida has re-established itself. [Hess/AP/28September2007]
New Defense Intelligence Policy. A new Pentagon policy directive for U.S. military intelligence mandates information-sharing with U.S. domestic agencies and foreign partners and recognizes the leading role of the new director of national intelligence.
Although both have been longstanding priorities for the Bush administration, the new directive, drafted in the office of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, retired Gen. James Clapper, and quietly published last month, is the first time they have been promulgated in such a high-level policy document inside the Pentagon.
The directive, the product of two years of work by the policy team, says defense intelligence agencies "have an affirmative responsibility to share collected and stored information, data, and resulting analysis with....other relevant federal agencies, and civilian law enforcement officials, as appropriate."
The directive, which replaces one more than 20 years old, also explicitly recognizes the role of the director of national intelligence, stating that all defense intelligence and counter-intelligence activities "shall conform to U.S. law and presidential guidance concerning the authorities and responsibilities" of the new post. [UPI/28September2007]
Psychiatrist Who Evaluated FBI Spy Loses Appeal. A Maryland court upheld disciplinary action against the psychiatrist who leaked details about the sexual habits and mental health of convicted spy Robert Hanssen in 2001.
A three-judge panel of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld lower court rulings against Alen J. Salerian, who had been hired by defense attorneys to evaluate Hanssen, a former FBI agent arrested for giving highly classified information to Russia. The two met over the course of a week in April 2001, during which Hanssen admitted he had a "long history of sexual betrayal and exploitation" of his wife - a fact that Salerian later shared with Hanssen's wife.
Court documents said Salerian was warned repeatedly by Hanssen's attorney, Plato Cacheris, not to disclose any details of his conversations with the former FBI agent. Salerian, along with most others involved in the case, had also signed a letter from the U.S. Attorney General promising not to disclose information about Hanssen due to "national security interests" involved. In May 2001, within a week after telling Hanssen's wife about the sexual betrayals, Salerian was fired by Cacheris. Salerian also received a letter from Hanssen forbidding him from discussing their meetings with anyone other than defense attorneys, including family members and "certainly with anyone outside the family." But in the following weeks, Salerian was quoted in numerous media outlets discussing Hanssen's mental state. In a June 2001 CBS report, Salerian claimed that he had disclosed the information with Hanssen's permission.
Salerian, who believed the FBI, the church and the medical system had failed Hanssen, said it was "a situation where there was life and death involved and I had to make a call as a physician to say what I think is right." In a disciplinary hearing against Salerian, Hanssen testified via telephone that he had agreed to let Salerian tell his wife about the sexual exploits because Salerian convinced him that the media were about to publish it. Hanssen pleaded guilty to espionage in July 2001 and is serving life in federal prison. Hanssen's attorneys and wife filed a complaint against Salerian in September 2001 with the Maryland State Board of Physicians, charging he disclosed confidential information. That same month, Salerian's license to practice medicine in Maryland expired. He applied for reinstatement of his license in September 2002, only to be told the board was charging him with immoral and unprofessional conduct and violating attorney-client and physician-patient privilege. He attempted to withdraw his application in July 2003, but was told he could not do so while charges were pending.
An administrative law judge initially recommended that Salerian be fined $20,000, have his license revoked and be barred from applying for reinstatement for up to three years. In January 2005, the board decided instead that Salerian be fined $5,000 and be placed on probation for two years, which would not end until he completed an ethics course. Salerian challenged the action, but it was upheld by the Montgomery County Circuit Court. He raised 10 issues in his appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which rejected all 10. [Fletcher/CapitalNewsService/27September2007]
Spy Charges for US Computer
Duo. Two computer engineers in California have been charged with conspiring to steal microchip designs to sell to the Chinese military. US citizen Lee Lan and Chinese national Ge Yuefei are accused of stealing computer chip designs from their employer Netlogics Microsystems. The two are alleged to have formed a company to develop chips based on the stolen designs. They then contacted the Chinese army to sell the chips, prosecutors said. Their indictment also alleges they stole documents from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, which has an office in California's Silicon Valley. The two companies design and make microchips and processors for use in networking equipment with possible military uses.
Mr. Lee and Mr. Ge have each been charged with two counts of economic espionage, two counts of theft of trade secrets and one count of conspiracy. They face up to 15 years in prison if convicted. Only three other people in the US have been convicted of economic espionage - stealing trade secrets to benefit a foreign government. All three cases were related to computer parts or software in Silicon Valley outside San Francisco. [BBC/29September2007]
US Spy Chief Says Al-Qaida Recruiting Europeans. The top US intelligence officer warned on that al-Qaida continues to recruit Europeans for explosives training in Pakistan as it is easier for Europeans to enter the United States without a visa.
Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell told the Senate Judiciary Committee that European al-Qaida recruits in the border region of Pakistan are being trained to make explosives using commercially available substances. McConnell also said he was worried that Osama bin Laden's recent video and audio releases may be a signal to terrorist cells to carry out its operations. The spy chief said that its unusual that the al-Qaida chief who did not appear over the last year surfaced again. It calls for the US to be vigilant, he said. [RTTNews/27September2007]
Nigeria Arrests Foreign "Spies." A well-known US aid worker and her two German companions have been arrested in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region. Security officials say Judith Burdin Asuni, Florian Alexander Opitz and Andy Lehmann are being held on suspicion of "espionage and terrorism". The Germans had been filming masked youths from the Ijaw community in Delta State, allegedly without clearance. Delta militants have been conducting a violent campaign for the oil-rich area to get a larger share of the oil money. The BBC's Alex Last in Lagos says the two German nationals had come to Nigeria to do preliminary research for a possible TV documentary about the Niger Delta.
The US embassy in Abuja told the BBC that it was in touch with the Nigerian government over the continued detention of Mrs Asuni, who is married to a Nigerian and has lived in the region for 36 years. "All we know is that Judith Asuni is a peace worker who got funding from academics and international donor agencies to work for peace in Nigeria," the embassy said. Mrs Asuni runs a high-profile non-governmental organization called Academic Associates Peace Work and has run workshops with the Nigerian police on conflict management. [BBCNews/28September2007]
Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE
Intelligence Veteran Aims to Motivate Young
Analysts. Mike Wertheimer may be the most dangerous man in U.S. intelligence. You would probably never guess it, judging from his lengthy and opaque title - assistant deputy director of national intelligence for analytic transformation and technology. A perfect testament to the well-worn bureaucratic tradition of offering little insight by tossing around a lot of words. Wertheimer's squishy and unassuming title only hints at some vague, general notion of what he actually does for a living. Particularly for the uninitiated, the moniker buries a sense of authority beneath a pair of prefixes (assistant deputy) and offers an unsatisfying buzzword descriptor (transformation), whose etymology points to some consultant's pocket glossary. The title screams "middle management" and thus reassures, "This guy is not a threat."
That message is especially ironic, because to thousands of powerful career employees in the American intelligence community, Wertheimer is, in fact, very threatening. He threatens to upend their world, to change the way they work, and to foist on them the values of a younger generation of spies, who happen to outnumber them. He also threatens to change the way that policy makers use intelligence to reach decisions, and so to "transform" the intelligence agencies' role in the government. All of this makes Mike Wertheimer very dangerous to people who oppose his basic assumptions. And he knows that. He also knows that, to many thousands more in the intelligence field, he is something of a savior.
To understand the origins and purpose of Wertheimer's office, of which he is the first occupant, it helps to refer to a document that also bears a lengthy title, the report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Better known as the WMD commission report, it provides a painstaking explanation of how 15 intelligence agencies collectively failed to discover that Saddam Hussein's Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction.
The contrary assertion that he did have those weapons - and thus was a threat to the Middle East and a potential benefactor for terrorists - was, of course, the Bush administration's chief casus belli for the Iraq war. The claim was backed up at the highest levels of the intelligence community in a National Intelligence Estimate released to Congress in October 2002. The WMD commission, which published its findings in 2005, echoed the sentiments of many intelligence professionals, including some who had participated in and blessed the flawed prewar analysis, by pronouncing the episode "one of the most public - and most damaging - intelligence failures in recent American history."
Wertheimer's job is to prevent any more such failures and to make sure that the intelligence agencies can accurately predict a host of catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks and disease outbreaks. The commission laid much of the blame for the bad call on Iraq at the feet of analysts, whom it called "the voice of the intelligence community." Although the problems begin with the failure to collect the right information in the first place, the commission particularly faulted the analysts' inability to make sense of intelligence, and to present their judgments to decision makers.
To be sure, many career analysts object to the "flaws" the commission cited in their tradecraft, regarding both Iraq and another notorious intelligence failure: the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. But very few argue with the substance, or the roots, of these breakdowns.
The "intelligence community," as the agencies are collectively known, hardly operates as one, and this lack of coordination and - especially - collaboration among analysts means that agency leaders and their clients often don't know what the analysts don't know. The disconnect also means that contrary analysis - of which there was a significant amount in the run-up to the Iraq war - may find no quarter in analysts' final judgments. It is a disastrous situation for policy makers, who are increasingly turning to nongovernment experts and the news media for rapid, cogent analysis that the intelligence agencies can't always provide. The WMD commission identified the fix: "Integrate the community of analysts." That's easier said than done, of course, but Wertheimer and others who understand how very un-integrated the analysts are today know that it is prescriptive advice that they can't afford to reject.
The Threat Within
"Post-9/11, we coined a term, the 'asymmetric threat,' " Wertheimer says. "That's a fancy way of describing a future in which the targets for intelligence, the things that we will focus on, are built, designed, and operate completely differently than the way we do." Transformation, that fuzzy word in his title, means "removing that asymmetry."
Before the attacks, the intelligence community was "like a power builder - very muscular but not very fast," Wertheimer says. Today, the agencies need to be swift. They need to analyze more information faster. But analysts also need new ways to connect to one another, to benefit from one another's knowledge. If a specialist on sub-Saharan Africa at the Defense Intelligence Agency is studying terrorist inroads into tribal communities, shouldn't a CIA expert in Africa studies know that? Might she have something useful to contribute to the inquiry?
Collaboration isn't an especially novel concept, and the WMD commission wasn't the first to suggest that analysts do more of it. But Wertheimer is the first official in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence - the "czar" of the community - to make collaboration a full-time job.
Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the former principal deputy director of national intelligence who is now the CIA director, created the position after talking with Wertheimer two years ago about how to change the way the community operates. The new intelligence director, Mike McConnell, has forcefully backed the transformational efforts, as has his deputy in charge of analysis, Tom Fingar, a career analyst who used to run intelligence at the State Department. Fingar, who is essentially the only official layer between Wertheimer and McConnell, is the political muscle in this endeavor. Wertheimer is the idea man, "my philosopher of transformation," as Fingar recently put it.
Transformation has less to do with changing procedures than with changing people. A key pillar is a suite of new information-sharing and collaborative technologies that look and feel a lot like Google, Wikipedia, and My Space, the networking and search tools that younger analysts grew up using at home and in their dorm rooms. These newcomers have been baffled to find that these 21st-century staples aren't widely used within the intelligence community.
The first of the new intelligence tools came online recently. Analysts can now log on to Intellipedia, a collaborative knowledge base that they can use to swap leads and examine one another's work. (Officials say that Intellipedia helped one group of analysts create a helpful report on Iraqi insurgents' use of chlorine gas to increase the lethality of improvised explosive devices.) Later this year, Wertheimer's team will launch A-Space ("A" for analyst), modeled after MySpace and the popular website Facebook. Officials hope the new site will help analysts create social networks outside established channels.
In addition to the new tools, Wertheimer and his colleagues have created unusual training programs. One sends analysts to a monthlong retreat at a classified location where they work alongside private-sector experts to investigate complex intelligence topics. Another takes young analysts out of their assigned jobs for two years and puts them through an intensive training program where they learn the tradecraft but also such on-the-ground spy skills as defensive driving and weapons handling. Agencies will ultimately deploy these analysts to global hot spots to support spies in the field.
It's no accident that Wertheimer and his team are aiming these new tools and programs at the younger crowd. Sixty percent of U.S. intelligence analysts have five years of experience or less on the job. In the larger intelligence community of about 100,000 employees, which includes clandestine operatives and support staff, those young workers are about 40 percent of the rolls. America's spies are decidedly green, and they're not comfortable - or particularly useful - working in bureaucratic silos without Internet browsers, instant messaging, and social networking sites on their desktops.
In his quest for transformation, Wertheimer is playing to this youthful workforce that finds collaboration neither newfangled nor threatening. For these analysts, networking is just the way information moves. But to the intelligence establishment, information is power, and relinquishing it means losing that power, as the WMD commission and many other critics have repeatedly lamented.
It seems illogical to the generation of electronic socializers, but when information moves around, and becomes known to people who don't have the "need to know," veteran members of the community view it as no longer special because it's no longer secret. Too much collaboration also threatens to reveal the sources and methods by which agencies obtain information - secrets they must zealously guard lest those sources dry up or get killed.
Sharing and secrecy are opposing forces. So this is Wertheimer's task: Transform the massive intelligence bureaucracy into a collaborative network, in which loose lips are, in a way, encouraged; introduce technologies that many seasoned analysts neither understand nor trust; and build a cadre of young, ambitious rookies, who just can't believe they're not allowed to check their personal e-mail at work, into the future of the business.
The opposition is fierce. When The New York Times wrote about A-Space recently, analysts commented about the piece, and about Wertheimer, on a private intelligence community blog. Some recorded their dramatic dissent. "I guarantee," one intelligence employee wrote, "Mike Wertheimer will cause people to get killed over this."
"I am threatening the status quo," Wertheimer says. "And that's a hard pill to swallow for anybody."
Taking the Blame
Wertheimer, 50, is a mathematician who earned his master's and Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He spent 21 years as a cryptologist at the National Security Agency, and rose to become the agency's most senior technical leader. On paper, he fits the stereotype captured in an old joke among NSA hands: "How can you tell an extroverted analyst? He's the one who looks at your shoes when he's talking."
But Wertheimer defies typecasting. When he speaks, he looks people in the eye, but often from above - he is 6 feet, 1 inch tall. He has arching eyebrows that signal when he's listening but also serve as a warning for when he's about to descend with an impassioned argument or an analogy that he thinks perfectly captures what he's up against. (In a recent conversation, Wertheimer compared the government's attempts at collaboration to the Borg, the supremely villainous race of cyber-aliens on Star Trek: The Next Generation who "assimilate" whole societies by stripping people of individual character traits and turn them into one giant collective.) If you spotted Wertheimer in a room, or even better, watched him work a room, you might wonder why he hasn't sought his fortune on the motivational speaking circuit.
When he speaks, you get the feeling that he's talking to you. He reveals a lot about himself, which might be unsettling if he weren't so earnest about connecting his flaws and fears to his intelligence work.
At a recent conference on analytic transformation in Chicago, Wertheimer confessed to a crowd of more than 400 people that after the 9/11 attacks he felt personally responsible for not anticipating Al Qaeda's strike. He became depressed, he said, and was inconsolable until his father snapped him out of it.
"I don't blame you for this," Wertheimer's dad told him, and then warned, "You're scaring your kids," who thought that whenever their father had to rush back to the office, something very bad was about to happen. Wertheimer briefly left government in 2003 to work as a technology consultant but returned two years later.
Wertheimer is like a number of other veteran intelligence officials who were involved in the global hunt for terrorists before 9/11. They feel that their own actions - more precisely, their inactions - allowed the disaster. Wertheimer says he blames himself and his colleagues. He thinks he personally failed and, accepting his part in a broken system, he seems to have no qualms about tearing it down and rebuilding.
"It is something that he can appreciate as being absolutely critical to the future of this country and the protection of the country, and when you hear him speak, you get caught up in that emotion," says Tim Sample, a former analyst and staff director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence who knows Wertheimer well. Sample is president of the nonprofit Intelligence and National Security Alliance, which co-hosted the Chicago conference with the intelligence director's office.
In large measure, Wertheimer's charisma comes from his willingness to defy tradition. "We are going to share more," he said in his Chicago speech. "We are going to take risks."
Directing his remarks at those who would rather preserve the status quo, he said, "For the first time, the challenge is not why we can't do it; it's how you're going to find a way to secure this." Rather than appeasing members of the intelligence community who blanch at collaboration and its attendant security risks, Wertheimer lays the burden on their shoulders and tells them that if collaboration doesn't happen, they'll take the blame.
But if Wertheimer succeeds, it probably won't be by convincing his intransigent opponents. Rather, he will work with that younger generation at whom transformation is aimed. By and large, these newer members of the community are optimistic and, like him, believe that the intelligence community is dangerously broken.
Sean Wohltman, a 25-year-old counter-terrorism analyst with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, embodies the kind of optimistic disillusionment that Wertheimer wants to harness. Two years after defending his master's thesis in geographic information science at Virginia Tech University, Wohltman joined the government "following a call for patriotism," he said. He encountered "disappointment and disillusionment" in his first three months on the job, however.
As Wohltman explained to the Chicago conference, "When I first logged on to what I expected to be a terminal from 24's [counter-terrorist unit] command center, I was instead driven to my agency's home page, which flashed information about an upcoming picnic and links to fill out my health insurance. And not only that, it launched in Netscape." Those in the audience who laughed understood that Netscape is an obsolete Internet browser.
Later, Wohltman explained why it mattered to him that the intelligence agencies were so far behind the technological curve. In 1999, when the popular and controversial music file-sharing system Napster debuted, he pointed out, Ricky Martin's "Livin' la Vida Loca" and other corporately manufactured pop hits topped the Billboard charts. Only artists from big record labels got mass recognition, and listeners were cut off from the bounty of independent and innovative artists who excelled in a variety of musical styles. But that year, Napster's collaborative technology allowed fans of lesser-known artists to share songs, which in turn boosted their recognition, fanned their popularity, and led to greater awareness of the wider music scene. It also fueled the market for independent music and challenged the record companies' dominance of the industry.
Taking Wohltman's analogy, Wertheimer says that the intelligence agencies could be compared to the record companies. Information is filtered through a hierarchical process that culminates in senior executives choosing what intelligence to disseminate to customers. Similar to Napster, tools such as Intellipedia and A-Space - known as "disruptive technologies" - bypass this process and get more information out to a wider audience.
But will collaboration guarantee better analysis? Did Napster improve music quality? Did it benefit the industry as a whole? Recording artists and companies sued Napster for copyright infringement, and the network shut down in 2001, eventually to be reborn as a pay-for-service system.
Napster did pave the way for other innovative technologies, which adapted to customers' demands to buy music a la carte, rather than having to pay for an entire album. Today, Apple's iTunes sells songs for 99 cents and threatens the record companies' control of their own products. Collaboration, in a sense, won out, and customers' demand for more music, delivered in new ways, has opened the market to more artists. "Will this lead to better music?" Wertheimer asks. "I can't believe that it will not."
Wertheimer and other transformation proponents often point to iTunes, and the hugely successful iPod music player, to support their theory that collaboration can fundamentally change and improve people's lives. And they reason that A-Space, Intellipedia, and other innovative services will create demand in the intelligence community and overwhelm the transformation naysayers.
Wertheimer channels the enthusiasm of Apple's CEO and co-founder, Steve Jobs, whose rousing keynote speeches, known as "Stevenotes," command more press coverage and world attention than speeches by most members of Congress. But as with Jobs, some skeptics question both the substance and the goal behind Wertheimer's zeal.
Early in Jobs's career, a co-worker coined the term "reality distortion field" to describe the aura that the Apple prophet cast over his spellbound audiences. The term could easily apply to Wertheimer's enthusiastic showmanship. Wikipedia describes RDF as "the idea that Steve Jobs is able to convince people to believe almost anything with a mix of charm, charisma, exaggeration, and marketing. RDF is said to distort an audience's sense of proportion or scale. Small advances are applauded as breakthroughs. Interesting developments become turning points, or huge leaps forward." (The phenomenon has been applied to other leaders, as well.)
Wertheimer does, in fact, applaud certain advances as breakthroughs that others - particularly those outside of government - might find underwhelming. For instance, one planned transformation program, the Library of National Intelligence, would be a repository of all the documents produced by all of the agencies. Eventually, Wertheimer hopes, analysts will search the library for key terms, and an automated system will help to judge who should have access to classified materials. He calls this program "huge."
Why is it huge? Some observers would have a hard time believing that the agencies didn't already have such a resource, the kind that most large organizations take for granted. LexisNexis, for example, contains copies of every article published in most of the country's periodicals. Following basic business practices, most companies compile and retain their internal documents for research and for legal purposes.
Wertheimer is careful to put things in perspective. "It's big," he says of the library. But then he quickly follows up: "For us, it's huge." And he's right. Much to the consternation of the WMD commission and others, this is a giant leap for the intelligence community, a kind of moon-landing moment.
But do collaborative libraries - and wikis, blogs, networking websites, and special training - make transformation worthwhile?
Change Without End
Mark Lowenthal retired in 2005 as the assistant director of central intelligence for analysis and production. Among seasoned intelligence officials, he is considered one of the most knowledgeable authorities on analysis, the agencies' shortcomings in that regard, and the education of young analysts in the ways of the tradecraft. So in Chicago, when Lowenthal stood up to question why Wertheimer and the DNI's office are expending so much energy on transformation, people listened intently.
"You are urging this transformation for an end that I do not understand," he told Wertheimer. "Collaboration is not an end in itself, to my mind. You want to do this, I think, ... to make analysis better. What does that mean? It means it would be faster? It would be more comprehensible? It would be more accurate more often? I don't think you have a way of knowing at the end of the day when you get there."
Lowenthal doesn't dismiss collaboration out of hand, and he has spent a sizable part of his career trying to create a true intelligence community. But his remarks reflected a palpable skepticism among those who think that it is impossible to know whether Wertheimer's ideas will actually fix intelligence. Lowenthal told him, "I think, unfortunately, a lot of this is pandering to a bunch of commissions that have no understanding of what we do for a living, or the nature of our work, and to a workforce. And I don't think that's a sufficient ground for a transformation. And so I'm left here wondering, what's the end state? For what reason?"
Wertheimer responded that he didn't have a satisfactory answer. The best he could offer, he said, were anecdotes. He has spent the past two years talking to analysts and trying to figure out what those who achieved real breakthroughs - overcoming "hard problems," he said - had in common.
The few successes were not enough to prove a theory, he admitted. But the one trait these breakthrough-makers shared was - perhaps not surprisingly - collaboration. These were analysts who challenged old assumptions, re-examined evidence that had been set aside as useless, and shared information beyond normal channels. They also, Wertheimer said, ignored their bosses' admonitions that such inquiries - going back to ground that had been plowed unproductively before - were "career killers." Bucking authority is another of Wertheimer's recurring themes. He says that a colleague once told him, "You will have succeeded when you become really hard to manage."
Wertheimer, however, plays down the notion of analysts as revolutionaries. "I don't like the thought that transformation is changing something from the past to something new," he says. Rather, transformation is about "creating an environment in which more things could happen than could happen in the past. It's liberating. Let's call it 'analytic liberation.' "
Wertheimer seems perfectly comfortable working in this gray area, where there is no obvious way to know whether his ideas are working and where concepts change on the fly (transformation becomes liberation) and the end goal isn't defined at the outset.
Were it not for the DNI's backing, such a nebulous, high-risk approach to preventing another intelligence disaster might never take flight. Wertheimer might still go down in flames, but taking that risk appears to suit him just fine.
"We can't afford the kinds of mistakes that we're making based on the way we're doing business today. It's just the bottom line," he said. Riffing off the intelligence blogger's comments, he added, "If I'm the first one to get killed, so be it."
The Hard Sell
Bravado may obscure Wertheimer's pragmatic streak. He is provocative and excitable, and sometimes brash. But those who know him well say that he is also humble and self-deprecating.
He frets that he will become too personally associated with his cause. "I'm a little worried about this being too personality-driven," he says. "This has got to be about ideas. We have to sell people on the ideas."
Wertheimer knows that the reason his pitch isn't resonating with enough people his own age is because he has failed to demonstrate how middle managers and veteran analysts - the people who are feeling most threatened - can take part in this grand enterprise, how they can be "liberated."
Wertheimer, the realist, has promised to find a place for them. But he does not apologize for embracing young analysts and for assaulting the culture that reared him. "We don't allow our people to reach their full potential," he told the audience in Chicago. "This is a society, this is a community, that tamps down potential."
"We treat [analysis] like a guild," Wertheimer said later, a society of apprentices who study at the feet of masters. "This is like making a fine violin or studying opera. That [approach] makes a lot of sense at the scale that you build violins or have opera singers. But we're talking about massive [numbers] of young people coming in.... They learn on their own. They don't read the rule book. They don't read the owner's manual," he said. "They click buttons and investigate, and if they get bored, they do something else."
If the two sides of this generational divide are irreconcilable, Wertheimer doesn't seem worried, because the rookies have the clear majority. "It's simply a matter of time," he said. "Now, the question we all have in our minds is, how much time can we afford? We can't afford another day."
Several younger colleagues once asked Wertheimer to name his greatest career achievement at the National Security Agency. At one time, he said, he was the world's leading expert on a certain cryptographic technology, the smartest man alive on that one subject. But "that's not what makes me so accomplished," he said. "It's that I'm no longer the No. 1 expert, and that the experts are in this room, because I taught them. And they exceeded everything I could have done on my own."
That's one way Wertheimer judges success: Someone comes along and does it better. It doesn't quite answer his critics' concerns that his ideas might be flawed to begin with. But Wertheimer is a strong believer in the "wisdom of crowds." He and his bosses are betting that collaboration is the way to fix what's broken with intelligence and, by extension, to keep people from dying.
If they are right that transformation, in all its forms, is the key to stopping another terrorist attack, or to avoiding another catastrophic intelligence failure, then it seems a decent bet that the next generation of analysts will follow Wertheimer's lead.
"If I can just start something for which a handful of folks better and smarter than me take over," he said, "if you could put that in my epitaph, I would die a happy man." [Harris/NationalJournal/24September2007]
Section III - SEEKING ASSISTANCE, CAREERS, BOOK REVIEWS AND COMING EVENTS
The Story of Jules Rosen. As part of a research project regarding a biography of my grandfather, I would appreciate any information or insights from AFIO members or academic researchers with experience in Latin America regarding Mr. Jules Rosen who served the US government in Latin America during World War II and, I believe, after the war in Venezuela. Jules Rosen was part of a refugee family that fled Germany in 1934, settling in the United States. In the late 1930s his career took him to Japan where he lived in Yokohama prior to Pearl Harbor as a businessman in the silk trade. Rosen returned to the United States and then moved to Venezuela. Any background or details on Rosen’s experience during the war as part of the US government intelligence effort against the Axis and also after World War II when he remained in Caracas, Venezuela and reportedly also worked on behalf of US intelligence would be extremely valuable. In Venezuela in the post-war period Rosen ran several companies until the early 1960s when he left the country, including CA Insecticidas Mundiales and Richard J. Buck and Company (stock brokers). Rosen’s work for US intelligence remains a key part of the biography that deserves prominent attention. I would be happy to contact those with information and insights to share. Those with information should contact David Rosen at email@example.com
Seeking seasoned Intelligence Professionals with the following backgrounds: ONIR, AGI, AGI Functional Management, and RF Technology being sought by APPLIED SYSTEMS RESEARCH, INC.
Applied Systems Research, Inc. (ASR) is a dynamic and growing small business specializing in Advanced GeoSpatial Intelligence (AGI), Overhead Non-imaging Infrared (ONIR), Imagery, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Space Sensors, Radar, RF, and Electro-Optics. Our customers include: NGA, DIA, CIA, NRO, OSD, DARPA, ONR, DTRA, MDA, and the Military Services.
Currently, ASR is seeking seasoned Intelligence Professionals with the following backgrounds: ONIR, AGI, AGI Functional Management, and RF Technology. These positions are for key individuals to guide our customers in implementing critical and sensitive intelligence initiatives; positions require a unique blend of technical and management skills. All positions require a bachelor’s degree in a related field (or equivalent experience), a minimum of 5 – 7 years of experience in the Intelligence or Systems Acquisition fields, an active TS/SCI Security Clearance, good technical and/or programmatic skills, and good written/oral communication and computer skills. Primary job locations are in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan area.
ASR offers a competitive salary and excellent benefits, as well as substantial entrepreneurial incentives.
For more details send your resume or summary of experience to firstname.lastname@example.org, ATTN: R. Konrath
Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intelligence Memoir, By Douglass H. Hubbard, Jr.
In Special Agent, Vietnam, Douglass H. Hubbard, Jr., relates the story of a highly dedicated and professional group of men who served voluntarily as officers, enlisted men, and civilian special agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Vietnam. Through Hubbard's eyes - he served three consecutive tours as one of about two dozen civilian agents - the reader enters the clandestine and often dangerous world of counterespionage and crime, all amid the sights, sounds, and smells of the Vietnam War.
Civilian special agents, despite their rather uncertain combat status as civilians, left secure stateside jobs and families behind, donned military uniforms, and carried weapons. They lived and worked in the field with sailors and Marines. They shared the same dangers and discomforts as military personnel, and - often in cooperation with their Vietnamese counterparts - supplied the naval services with counterintelligence and criminal investigative support. From communist infiltrators and fragging incidents to the murder of a visiting singer, Hubbard skillfully portrays the underlying chaos of a tour in Vietnam.
Special Agent, Vietnam is the only book that addresses this aspect of the Vietnam War. It will appeal not only to those with an interest in the U.S. presence in wartime Vietnam, but also to those interested generally in military history, intelligence, counterintelligence, and criminal investigation. [AwaniPress]
Nation, by Robert Kagan. From the author of the immensely influential and best-selling Of Paradise and Power, comes a major reevaluation of America's place in the world from the colonial era to the turn of the twentieth century.
Robert Kagan strips away the myth of America's isolationist tradition and reveals a more complicated reality: that Americans have been increasing their global power and influence steadily for the past four centuries. Even from the time of the Puritans, he reveals, America was no shining "city up on a hill" but an engine of commercial and territorial expansion that drove Native Americans, as well as French, Spanish, Russian, and ultimately even British power, from the North American continent. Even before the birth of the nation, Americans believed they were destined for global leadership. Underlying their ambitions, Kagan argues, was a set of ideas and ideals about the world and human nature. He focuses on the Declaration of Independence as the document that firmly established the American conviction that the inalienable rights of all mankind transcended territorial borders and blood ties. American nationalism, he shows, was always internationalist at its core. He also makes a startling discovery: that the Civil War and the abolition of slavery - the fulfillment of the ideals of the Declaration - were the decisive turning point in the history of American foreign policy as well. Kagan's brilliant and comprehensive reexamination of early American foreign policy makes clear why America, from its very beginning, has been viewed worldwide not only as a wellspring of political, cultural, and social revolution, but as an ambitious and, at times, dangerous nation. [RandomHouse]
Wednesday, 3 October 2007; 6:30 pm - Washington, DC - The Truth is Out There: Conspiracy Theories and Their Use by Intelligence Agencies at the International Spy Museum “Once contracted, conspiracy theory is an incurable condition.”—Christopher Andrew in Eternal Vigilance Do you believe the U.S. Army manufactured AIDS as a biological weapon? That Washington has been covering up UFO sightings for decades? Or that the CIA was involved in Kennedy’s assassination? If so, you are not alone. Americans are obsessed with conspiracy theories to a point that many have come to believe our democracy is really controlled by invisible forces operating behind the scenes. What makes conspiracy theories so appealing and why have they become so prevalent in this day and age? Do some of them contain a grain of truth? And who stands to gain from spreading these ideas? Join Robert Alan Goldberg, author of Enemies Within, as he unravels the mysteries of many popular conspiracy theories and International Spy Museum historian, Thomas Boghardt, who will reveal how intelligence agencies across the world have used these ingenious inventions as political weapons. Tickets: $15 REGISTER: http://www.spymuseum.org/programs/register.html
October 2007, 11:30 a.m. - San Francisco, CA - AFIO Jim Quesada Chapter
hosts Lynnette Terrett, CEO Rapid Map on "The Future of Geointelligence
Applications for Military, Security and Law Enforcement"
Lynette Terrett is a recognized authority in the field of GPS systems integration, geo-spatial engineering and geo-mobile computing solutions. Lynnette is Co-Founder and CEO of Rapid Map, based in Melbourne Australia. The company develops and deploys geo-spatial intelligence systems to military, federal and state law enforcement, fire, emergency response and environmental infrastructure markets worldwide. In 2004, Rapid Map entered into a joint venture with National Geographic where Lynnette has been integral in the development of products providing spatial data, environmental, health, emergency and asset management solutions for all tiers of Government in the US. Lynnette has been working with Falchion Enterprises to design implementation for advanced geo-spatial intelligence solutions for Military, DHS, Law Enforcement and Private Security organizations and to support covert operations for intelligence agencies. Lynnette’s presentation will cover technology trends as they relate to applications for geo- intelligence collections and communications, addressing the emerging requirements for military, security and law enforcement.
Cost: $25 per person, Member Rate with advance reservations or $35 per person, Non-Member Rate or at door without reservation Time: 11:30 AM No Host Cocktails; 12:00 Noon Luncheon. Place: United Irish Cultural Center (UICC) - St. Patrick’s Room (2nd Floor) 2700 – 45th Avenue, San Francisco, CA.
Please respond no later than 5 PM, 9/21/07. Reservations not cancelled by the end of the day 9/25/07 must be honored. Please send your reservation, including check made out to AFIO and your menu choice to: Mariko Kawaguchi, PO Box 117578, Burlingame, CA 94011-7578, or email her at email@example.com or call (650) 622-9840 X608.
Thursday, 4 October 2007; 12 noon – 1 pm - Washington, DC - Corporate Spy: Industrial Espionage and Counterintelligence in the Multinational Enterprise at the International Spy Museum In May of 2006, PepsiCo alerted the Coca Cola Company that someone was trying to sell Coke’s secrets. An FBI sting implicated a secretary who has since been sentenced to eight years in federal prison for conspiring to steal trade secrets from the famous beverage maker. How unusual was this case? How frequently are businesses under attack? How can they protect themselves? Join Steeple Aston, PhD, author of Corporate Spy, as he uncovers the world of the corporate spies: who they are and how they operate. You’ll learn the warning signs and hear about some of the most dramatic cases of industrial espionage in recent years. Free! No registration required! Join the author for an informal chat and book signing.
5 October 2007, 5:30 pm - New York, NY - The AFIO New York Metropolitan Chapter hosts an evening meeting to hear Haviland Smith. Smith is a retired CIA station chief having served in East and West Europe and was chief of CIA's Counterterrorism Staff. He served in Tehran, Beirut, Prague, Berlin and Washington. A classic spymaster's tour of duty. Undergraduate of Dartmouth, a Master's from University of London, both in Russian Studies. Mentioned several times (positively - uh oh) in Tim Weiner's intellectually dishonest fictive book, "Legacy of Ashes" [a skewed and laughably cherry-picked pseudo-history mistakenly taken by its own press to title itself "The History of CIA"]. In more accurate (and honest) journalist hands...those of Benjamin Weiser [same paper, but different ethical standards]...Weiser's book "A Secret Life" notes that Haviland Smith made significant contributions to the fascinating field of intelligence operations tradecraft. Haviland Smith is well-known for being a dynamic, mesmerizing speaker! Join us this evening and find out. NEW LOCATION: CLUB QUARTERS (Was the Chemist's Club), 40 West 45th St, (between 5th and 6th Aves) TIME: Doors Open 5:30 PM; Speaker 6:00 PM; Open Bar 7:00 PM to 8:00 PM; COST: $35 pp. Checks in Advance or Pay at Door. Checks: Payable to Jerry Goodwin, 530 Park Ave 15B, New York, NY 10021. RESERVATIONS: Not Required Questions? Call 212-308-1450
6 October 2007 - Seattle, WA - AFIO Pacific Northwest Chapter Meeting looks at the Air Defense Sector. The meeting features Capt Cannady, LTC Woodard, and Maj. Krueger. An outstanding program is planned with speakers from McChord AFB and the Washington National Guard. Captain Matthew Cannady is the Intelligence Officer assigned to the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS) at McChord. He will provide an in-depth briefing on the workings of the Air Defense system on the West Coast. Lt. Colonel Timothy Woodard the J2 of the Washington National Guard and Major Bill Krueger will provide a detailed briefing on the recently created 194th Intelligence Squadron. The cost of the meeting will be $25 which includes a breakfast buffet. Time: 09:30am - 1:30pm. Where: South View Lounge at the Museum of Flight. The meeting is open to anyone interested in national intelligence whether they are a member or not. The chapter welcomes family, friends and associates to attend. Please mail your checks, payable to AFIO PNW Chapter, to: AFIO PNW Chapter, 4616 25th Ave NE Suite 495, Seattle, WA 98105. Please RSVP Fran Dyer at: FD@CromwellGroup.us.
Sunday, 7 October 2007, 1130 - 1330 - Beachwood, OH - THE Northern OHIO AFIO Chapter luncheon features C. Frank Figliuzzi, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation Cleveland on "FBI Intelligence Effort Against Terrorism and Economic Terrorism" Location: Hilton Cleveland East /Beachwood 3663 Park East Drive, Beachwood, Ohio 44122 Tel: 1-216-464-5950 Cost: $25.00 per person
RSVP: Veronica Flint, 1481 Bell Rd, Chagrin Falls, OH 44022 (440) 338-4720 firstname.lastname@example.org
A Connecticut native, Mr. Figliuzzi earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in English Literature from Fairfield University and a Juris Doctorate with honors from the University of Connecticut School of Law. Figliuzzi was appointed an FBI Special Agent in August 1987 and assigned to the FBI's Atlanta Division where he worked terrorism and foreign counterintelligence investigations. In 1992 he was promoted to the National Security Division at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, with responsibility for oversight of economic espionage matters. In 1995, Mr. Figliuzzi was named Supervisory Senior Resident Agent, Palo Alto Resident Agency, in the FBI's San Francisco Division. His office, near Silicon Valley, led the FBI in investigations of foreign sponsored thefts of trade secrets. In 1997, Mr. Figliuzzi was tasked to lead one of the FBI's first squads exclusively devoted to crimes against children. This San Francisco squad was responsible for responding to child kidnapping, investigating child pornography and unsolved child abductions and murders. In 1998 Mr. Figliuzzi was promoted to Unit Chief in the Office of Professional Responsibility at FBI Headquarters. In this position he adjudicated allegations of serious misconduct against FBI personnel in the Eastern United States. In 1999, Mr. Figliuzzi was appointed Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Miami Division, the fifth largest in the country. He led the Miami Division's White Collar Crime Branch known for its successful investigations of high profile public corruption and corporate fraud cases. Following the attacks of 9/11/2001, Mr. Figliuzzi was selected to head FBI Miami's new Counterterrorism Branch. He implemented the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force with 160 personnel from 34 agencies. He served as on-scene commander during the nation's first anthrax murder in Boca Raton, Florida. In August 2004, Mr. Figliuzzi was promoted to Inspector. Based in Washington, DC, he led teams responsible for assessing FBI operations around the world. In December 2005, Mr. Figliuzzi became the FBI's Chief Inspector. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III named Mr. Figliuzzi the Special Agent in Charge of the Cleveland Division on October 4, 2006.
Tuesday, 16 October 2007; 7 pm - Washington, DC - Syriana. Movie and post-film talk with former CIA Officer, Robert Baer. “Intelligence work isn't training seminars and gold stars for attendance…” —Bob Barnes in Syriana Corruption and power drive the plot of Syriana, a multi-layered thriller that weaves together emirs, analysts, intelligence officers, and immigrant workers. In the thought-provoking film, one commodity connects everything—oil. This shocking depiction of ruthless deals and raw emotion is inspired by the experiences of former CIA case officer Robert Baer—the screenplay is drawn from Baer’s books See No Evil and Sleeping with the Devil. Baer’s twenty-year career in the Directorate of Operations took him to assignments in Northern Iraq, Lebanon, and Tajikstan. His understanding of the Middle East shaped the film and brings a grim realism to this exploration of a double-crossing and morally skewed world. Join Baer for a special screening and discussion of the award-winning film. Program to be held at the National Portrait Gallery, Eighth and G Streets, NW Tickets: $15 REGISTER: http://www.spymuseum.org/programs/register.html
17-18 October 2007 - Chantilly, VA - AFCEA International Classified Fall Symposium - Top Secret SI/TK As part of an ongoing series for business executives with active intelligence community clearances, the AFCEA will be exploring Intelligence Community and National Security issues as they relate to the topic of information sharing and collaboration. The event will be held at the National Reconnaissance Office in Chantilly. Four focused sessions will address what has worked, what has not worked, and what still needs to be done. This is a critical topic requiring changes not only within the government and Intelligence Community, but also for marketing ideas for the private sector. For further details see: http://intel.afcea.org
18-19 October 2007 - Laurel, MD - The Symposium on Cryptologic History sponsored by the Center for Cryptologic History, to be held at Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD. WEDNESDAY, 17 October 2007 - National Cryptologic Museum Foundation General Membership Meeting
Guest Speakers: Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger and Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence.
THURSDAY, 18 October 2007 - 2007 Symposium on Cryptologic History theme is CRYPTOLOGY AND COMMUNITY by The Center for Cryptologic History. Topics: World War I: European Cryptology, COMINT and the World War I Blockade, COMINT at Caporetto, World War I: American Cryptology, First Time Out: SIGINT and the Punitive Expedition, Early ‘National-Departmental’ Evolution and Intelligence
Technology in the World War I Era, World War I, an Intelligence Revolution?, Cryptologic Leadership, The Four-Rotor Bombe, Personal Memories of Joe Desch, Telephone Secrecy in World War II, Computers and Cryptology, Early Technological Development in Cryptology: A First-Hand Account, Cryptography and the Birth of the U.S. Computer Industry: Some Management Observations, The Laboratory for Physical Sciences at a Half-Century.
FRIDAY, 19 October 2007 topics will be: History and Intelligence: The View from France and Germany, U.S. Army Tactical SIGINT Units in the European Theater of Operations, The Office of Censorship During the Second World War, The Leslie Howard Story: a Wartime Mystery, ALES is Still Hiss: the Wilder Foote Candidacy and What’s Wrong With It, Intelligence Assessment & Collection: Case Studies Regarding Korea during 1968-1969, History and the Technologist, The Law, the Media, and Intelligence, The Development of Case Law on Cryptology, The Media and Secrecy in American Intelligence, History and Intelligence Literature, Current Literature on Counterintelligence, NSA History Publications: Past, Present, and Future.
Speakers: Dr. William J. Williams, Chief, Center for Cryptologic History; John C. Inglis, Deputy Director, NSA; Dr. John Ferris, University of Calgary; Dr. John Schindler, Naval War College; Dr. David Hatch, Center for Cryptologic History; Mark Stout, Institute for Defense Analyses; Dr. Michael Warner, Office of Director of National Intelligence; Jennifer Wilcox, National Cryptologic Museum; Deborah Anderson; Mel Klein, NSA(Ret); James Pendergrass, NSA(Ret); James Boone, NSA(Ret); Dr. Kent Sieg, Center for Cryptologic History; Dr. David Hatch, NSA Historian, Center for Cryptologic History
Dr. David Kahn, Author of The Codebreakers; Michael Bigelow, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; Dr. Larry Valero, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Douglas Wheeler, University of New Hampshire; Dr. John Haynes, Library of Congress; Dr. Harvey Klehr, Emory University; Richard A. Mobley, Independent Scholar; Brian Snow, NSA(Ret); Kevin Powers, NSA(Ret); Dr. William Nolte, University of Maryland; Robert L. Benson, NSA(Ret); and Barry Carleen, Center for Cryptologic History.
FURTHER INFORMATION: National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History; 301-688-2336 or at email@example.com or visit www.cryptfoundation.org
LOCATION: Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory Kossiakoff Center, Laurel, MD
19-20 October 2007 - Hampton Beach, NH - The Fall 2007 meeting of the AFIO New England Chapter will be held at the Ashworth-by-the-Sea in Hampton Beach. A full description of services as well as directions to the hotel are available at http://www.ashworthhotel.com/ Their main speaker will be Andy Bacevisch. They will also hear from their own Gene Wojciechowski. Andrew Bacevisch was born in Normal, IL in 1947 and is a 1969 graduate of West Point. He served in Vietnam commanding an armored cavalry platoon, and later earned an MA and PhD in history at Princeton while teaching at West Point. After his army service, he taught at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies before coming to Boston University, where he headed the Center for International Relations for several years. He is the author of a number of books on the US military and his op-ed pieces appear regularly in the national press. The program will begin with a Friday evening complimentary wine and cheese social at the Ashworth-by-the-Sea starting at 6:00 PM. This get-together is a wonderful opportunity to renew friendships, as well as make new ones in a relaxed informal setting. We anticipate that our speakers will join us at the social. This may be followed by a no-host dinner at local area restaurants. Our Saturday schedule is as follows 9:00 - 10:45 a.m. Meeting Registration, 11:00 - 11:20 a.m. First Speaker, 12:00 - 1:15 p.m. Luncheon,1:15 - 2:15 p.m. Keynote Speaker, 2:30 p.m. Adjournment. For additional information contact firstname.lastname@example.org
20 October 07 - Kennebunk, ME. The Maine Chapter of AFIO will host John Robb, author of "Brave New War." Robb, a graduate of the Air Force Academy and Yale University, has worked as a special operations counterterrorism officer and is a successful software CEO pioneering in weblogs and RSS. He has worked, lived ,and traveled extensively throughout the world. Over the past few years he has been analyzing guerrilla insurgencies on his blog Global Guerrillas. Robb offers a unique insight into terrorism, global security, and U.S. vulnerabilities to this type of warfare. The meeting, which is open to the public, will be held at the Kennebunk Free Library, 112 Main Street, Kennebunk, at 2:00 p.m. Further information at 207-985-2392
22-26 October 2007 - The Midwest Chapter of AFIO is planning a trip to Washington, DC The trip will run from Monday, October 22, 2007 through Friday, October 26, 2007. Plans are being made to visit the White House, the Pentagon, and the Capitol, with the possibility of laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. All other tours will be worked around the laying of the wreath and scheduled tours provided by the government. Contact Angelo DiLiberti at 847-931-4181 for more details and a registration reply form. Spaces are limited and reply forms must be submitted early for tour background checks.
23-24 October 2007 - NMIA Symposium for 2007 visits the National Reconnaissance Office - SECRET/NOFORN. Attendees must hold SECRET/NOFORN clearance. Fee: $475 pp. Includes presentation by LTG David Deptula, A-2, HQ USAF Transformation followed by speakers on AF Cyber Command, Airborne ISR and ISR Personnel Development. Day two features Under SecDef James Clapper on “Revitalization of DOD Counterintelligence” followed by speakers from the Office of the SECDEF discussing the future of CI at military commands and the merger of CI and HUMINT. To signup visit https://www.123signup.com/event?id=xmhks
25-27 October 2007 - McLean, VA - AFIO National Intelligence Symposium. The AFIO National Intelligence Symposium runs Thursday, October 25 through Saturday, October 27, at the Sheraton Premiere Hotel in Tysons Corner, VA. Details to be sent directly to all members.
The Resurgence of the Worldwide Islamic Jihad
Against the West
Understanding and Needed Response
A special multi-media tour de force - films and documentaries, experts, officials & authors, panels
What the U.S. needs to do once we are beyond all the Political Correctness
AGENDA: View complete online Agenda here.
REGISTRATION: To sign up for the event, complete or print this online form.
HOUSING: Special AFIO Symposium Room rate of $119 per night available for LIMITED TIME [to October 5th] at the Sheraton-Premiere Hotel. To make your room reservations quickly online at this special convention rate, use this link. To make reservations by phone, call this toll free number: 1-888-625-5144. The Sheraton Premiere is located at 8661 Leesburg Pike Vienna, VA 22182 Phone (703) 448-1234.
1-2 November 2007 - Tysons Corner, VA - AFEI Hosts a CYBER DETERRENCE Conference, examining the legal, technical & policy implications stemming from cyber attacks. Luncheon speaker will be Mr. Richard Clark, Former Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Security. Conference will assist you in gaining important insights into the National Cyber Deterrence Policy. Also provides an opportunity to network with knowledgeable individuals who focus on Cyber Deterrence. Further info at http://www.afei.org/brochure/8a01/index.cfm
3 November 2007 - Indian Harbour Beach, FL - AFIO Florida Satellite Chapter meets at the Eau Gallie Yacht Club to hear Bill Parsons from JFK Space Center. The AFIO Florida Satellite Chapter luncheon speaker will be Mr. William W.(Bill) Parsons Jr., Center Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center. Mr. Parsons will give an overview of the Constellation Program and NASA's plans for the next generation of space exploration. His talk will highlight the Ares Launch Vehicle, the new Orion Capsule, and the groundwork that NASA is putting into place that will allow us to go to the Moon, Mars and beyond. Location: The luncheon will be held at the Eau Gallie Yacht Club, Indian Harbour Beach. The luncheon will have an option of a seafood entrée or a beef entrée. The cost is $19.00 per person. A social time and cash bar will begin at 11:30 a.m. with lunch at 12:30 p.m. Reservation can be made by contacting George Stephenson, Vice President, by e-mail at email@example.com. Please put AFIO luncheon in the Subject Block to insure the e-mail will be opened.
Wednesday, 7 November 2007; 7-10 pm - Washington, DC - An Evening with Eric O'Neill, former FBI, at the International Spy Museum. No Breach in protocol allowed. What if you were assigned to watch the most damaging spy in U.S. history? What if it was up to you to capture his personal electronic memo book? What if they made a movie out of your story? That’s exactly what happened to Eric O’Neill. As a young operative in the FBI, O’Neill was put into position as Robert Hanssen’s assistant. The story of that brief assignment and Hanssen’s capture and arrest was the inspiration for the recent film Breach. Now it’s your chance to dine and debrief with O’Neill. Be one of only 18 guests at Zola for a three-course meal where you’ll hear the inside story of the intense time O’Neill spent attempting to deceive the ultimate deceiver. Special guest Juliana O’Neill will shed light on her own stressful involvement in the events of February 2001. CIA clandestine service veteran, International Spy Museum Executive Director, Peter Earnest, will host this unique evening. Please call 202.654.0930 or write firstname.lastname@example.org to register or with special dietary needs. Tickets: $220
9 November 2007, 9:30 a.m. - Arlington, VA - ACICV Annual Day of Remembrance. The Army Counterintelligence Corps Veterans association will hold their 2007 annual Day of Remembrance at Fort Myer and Arlington National Cemetery. This Day honors former members, supporters and friends of Army Counterintelligence of whose death ACICV has learned since the 2006 Day of Remembrance. Attendees will meet at 0930 at Spates Community Center, McNair Road, Fort Myer for group transportation to the Tomb of the Unknowns for a Wreath Laying Ceremony at 1015. Following the Ceremony attendees will return to Spates Community Center for the ACICV Memorial Service and Luncheon. For specific information please contact Mrs Elly Burton, Ph: 703-591-3848, or by e-mail to email@example.com
Thursday, 15 November 2007 - Colorado Springs, CO - AFIO Rocky Mountain Chapter holds luncheon meeting on Terrorists in Colorado. The chapter meets at the Falcon Room of the Air Force Academy, starting at 11:30 am. Price: $10.00 payable at the door. Our speaker is Warren Gerig, a new AFIO member. Warren will talk about a well known major terrorist and how their lives crossed in four different countries.Yet, they never met each other and today the terrorist lives 60 miles from Warren and The Air Force Academy. Reservations to Dick Durham by November 12, 2007 at Riverwear53@aol.com or call him at Telephone: (719) 488-2884
17 November 07 - Kennebunk, ME - the AFIO Maine Chapter hosts Jeffrey H. Norwitz, Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and Professor of National Security Studies at the U. S. Naval War College.Norwitz will speak on "Spy Catching and Tales of Counterintellience" will take us from the American Revolution to the present time. Special Agent Norwitz holds a degree in Criminal Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College. He has written for a number of prestigious journals and frequently lectures at some of he nation's most influential academic institutions as well as overseas to foreign navy and military audiences. He is the recipient of numerous awards in the fields of teaching and public service and currently holds the John Nicholas Brown Academic Chair of Counterterrorism at the Naval War College. The meeting will be held at 2:00 p.m. at the Kennebunk Free Library, 112 Main St., Kennebunk, and is open to the public. Information at 207-985-2392
Wednesday, 28 November 2007; 6:30 pm - Washington, DC - Robert Hanssen: Colleague, Friend, and Traitor. Former senior FBI official David Major at the International Spy Museum. “One might propose that I am either insanely brave or quite insane.” —Robert Hanssen, November 2000 With the recent release of Breach, Robert Hanssen is once again in the public eye and the topic of much discussion. Who was the real man who betrayed his country and may be the worst spy in U.S. history? David G. Major knows. Major worked with Hanssen for 14 years at the Bureau. He was the FBI executive supervisor in Hanssen’s chain-of-command for three years and considered him a fellow employee and friend for over two decades. Major, retired FBI supervisory special agent, founder of the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, and International Spy Museum board of directors member, provides a glimpse into the real personality and psychology of one of the most damaging spies in U.S. history. He will explore why Hanssen’s betrayal was so difficult to uncover, his own theories on what motivated the spy, his perspective on Breach, and the status of U.S. counterintelligence in the wake of this profoundly important spy case. Tickets: $23 REGISTER: http://www.spymuseum.org/programs/register.html
Friday, 30 November 2007; 12 noon – 1 pm - Washington, DC - Chief of Station, Congo - Station Chief Larry Devlin at the International Spy Museum. As station chief in the Congo, Larry Devlin fought the Cold War in one of its hottest arenas. On 1 July 1960, the Congo declared independence from Belgium; and on 5 July, the army mutinied and governmental authority collapsed. When Devlin arrived five days later he found himself in the heart of Africa, fighting for the future of perhaps the most strategically influential country in the continent, its borders shared with eight other nations. In his memoir, Chief of Station, Congo, Devlin describes his life as a master spy in Africa, one whose assignment to assassinate political leader Patrice Lumumba (which he didn’t carry out) is back in the news with the June release by the CIA of the “family jewels.” Free! No registration required! Join the author for an informal chat and book signing.
For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events
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