AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #04-08 dated 28 January 2008


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CIA on Prepublication Review. "The CIA requires all current and former Agency employees and contractors, and others who are obligated by CIA secrecy agreement, to submit for prepublication review to the CIA's Publications Review Board (PRB) all intelligence-related materials intended for publication or public dissemination," according to a 2007 regulation on the subject.

The scope of the requirement, according to CIA, is expansive. It "includes, but is not limited to, works of fiction; books; newspaper columns; academic journal articles; magazine articles;... letters to the editor;... scripts; screenplays; internet blogs, emails, or other writings;" and so forth.

A redacted version of the latest version of the CIA regulation was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the James Madison Project, a non-profit advocacy organization. The Project's director, attorney Mark S. Zaid, frequently litigates pre-publication review disputes against the CIA.

Related background on CIA prepublication review policy, including a (redacted) handbook for agency reviewers (pdf), can be found at [SecrecyNews/25January2008] 

Dulles Papers Released by CIA to Princeton Are Now Online. The Central Intelligence Agency has released to Princeton University some 7,800 documents covering the career of Allen W. Dulles, the agency's longest-serving director, which now can be viewed online.

Dulles (1893-1969), a Princeton alumnus who headed the CIA from 1953 to 1961, was renowned for his role in shaping U.S. intelligence operations during the Cold War. Last March, the CIA released to Princeton a collection of letters, memoranda, reports and other papers - some still redacted - that the agency had removed from Dulles' papers after his death and before their transfer to the University in 1974.

"These materials, long estranged from the Allen Dulles Papers, help round out the documentary legacy of Dulles and his pivotal role in American intelligence history. The material related to his espionage work during World War II is especially illuminating," said Daniel Linke, curator of Public Policy Papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, which houses the Dulles Papers. The CIA retains many documents related to Dulles' time as head of that agency, but Linke noted that those released "provide insight into not only Dulles, but the classification process and, in my opinion, its shortcomings. Scholars reviewing some of this material will scratch their heads and wonder why the agency thought it necessary to restrict some of these documents for decades." 

The Allen W. Dulles Digital Files released to Princeton contain scanned images of professional correspondence, reports, lectures and administrative papers covering Dulles' tenure with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - a U.S. intelligence agency created during World War II and forerunner of the CIA - as well as his career with the CIA and his retirement. The CIA culled these documents from Dulles' home office, and the agency maintains the originals.

The collection includes correspondence and narrative statements documenting Dulles' activities during World War II, especially relating to the work of individuals involved in the war effort in Europe. The files also include more than 1,000 war telegrams from the OSS office to Washington, D.C. Documents from the 1950s and 1960s deal almost exclusively with the Cold War, mostly focusing on intelligence and the Soviet Union along with some covering Sen. Joseph McCarthy and the Communist threat in the United States. Items relating to Dulles' time with the CIA have been heavily redacted, obscuring the names of correspondents as well as individuals and events mentioned in reports and letters.

These digital files complement the Allen W. Dulles Papers maintained by Mudd Library. More information on that collection can be found online.

Dulles earned a bachelor's degree in 1914 and a master's degree in 1916 from Princeton, both in politics, and received an honorary doctorate in 1957. He was a veteran of the OSS and served as chief of its Bern, Switzerland, office. His successes there led to Dulles being named chairman of an intelligence review committee in 1948 that faulted the organization of the then-fledgling CIA. In 1950, he was named the CIA's deputy director of plans, the agency's covert operations arm, and in 1951, he became the CIA's deputy director. After the November 1952 election, President Eisenhower appointed Dulles as CIA director.

His brother, John Foster Dulles (a 1908 Princeton graduate), served as Eisenhower's secretary of state, and the two men worked closely during their joint service. The CIA under Dulles' leadership established the dual policy of collecting intelligence through a wide variety of means, as well as taking direct action against perceived threats.

Dulles' notable achievements in intelligence gathering included the development of the U-2 spy plane program, the recruitment of Soviet Lieutenant General Pyotr Popov as a U.S. spy, and the tapping of a sensitive East Berlin phone junction by tunneling under the Berlin Wall. The CIA's direct actions during Dulles' tenure included notable successes and failures. CIA operatives orchestrated the overthrow of the government of Iran in 1953 and Jacob Arbenz's regime in Guatemala in 1954. However, efforts to oust Fidel Castro from Cuba following his rise to power consisted of a series of failures culminating in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Dulles retired shortly thereafter.

In retirement, Dulles wrote books (including two autobiographical works) about his career in intelligence and appeared on numerous television programs to discuss foreign policy. He was called to public service once again in 1963, when he was named to the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of President Kennedy. His connection to the CIA and its activities in Cuba would fuel later speculation about possible U.S. government complicity in Kennedy's assassination. [Princeton/24January2008] 

UK Prepares Expulsion Order for 34 Spies [sic]. In what could be one of the most dramatic East-West standoffs since 105 Soviet spies were expelled from Great Britain in 1971, officials in London are considering the banishment of 34 Russian spies.

Reports say Great Britain's intelligence service has provided Home Secretary Jacqui Smith with the names of the Russian spies operating in the country as diplomatic tensions escalate with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Smith, the tough-talking first woman to hold the post, has signed expulsion orders which can be "instantly served" should the crisis deepen further, and final decision will be made by Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

"It might well lead to what would be little less than a full rupture between London and Moscow," said one veteran diplomat. "The only hope is that Putin will back off. But right now there seems little chance of that."

Two of the alleged Russian spies are senior staff at the imposing Russian embassy in London's most expensive street, Kensington Palace Gardens. Inside the building are members of Russia's foreign intelligence service, SVR, and its military intelligence agency, the GRU.

Among the senior spies on the expulsion list are the embassy's political section chief, Alexander Sternik, and senior counselor, Andrey Pritsepov, the personal aide to the ambassador.

The list is seen as part of "a significant response" to the recent interrogation of British diplomats and staff at the British Council offices in Russia. One British Council employee, Stephen Kinnock, the son of the former Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock, described his arrest as "something out of the Cold War."

Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin is the premium, online intelligence news source edited and published by the founder of WND. [WorldNetDaily/24January2008] 

Like FBI, CIA Has Used Secret 'Letters'. For three years, the Bush administration has drawn fire from civil liberties groups over its use of national security letters, a kind of administrative subpoena that compels private businesses such as telecommunications companies to turn over information to the government. After the 2001 USA Patriot Act loosened the guidelines, the FBI issued tens of thousands of such requests, something critics say amounts to warrantless spying on Americans who have not been charged with crimes.

Now, newly released documents shed light on the use of the letters by the CIA. The spy agency has employed them to obtain financial information about U.S. residents and does so under extraordinary secrecy, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, which obtained copies of CIA letters under the Freedom of Information Act.

The CIA's requests for financial records come with "gag orders" on the recipients, said ACLU lawyer Melissa Goodman. In many cases, she said, the recipient is not allowed to keep a copy of the letter or even take notes about the information turned over to the CIA.

The ACLU posted copies of some of the letters on its Web site. In most cases, nearly all the text had been redacted by CIA censors.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged the occasional use of the letters but dismissed the criticism that the practice was unusually secretive. The requests always have been voluntary and intended to "obtain data for such legitimate purposes as counterintelligence and counterterrorism," spokesman Paul Gimigliano said. Nondisclosure orders, counterterrorism officials have said, prevent leaks that might alert suspects to an investigation. [Warrick/WashingtonPost/24January2008] 

Venezuelan Admits Helping Hide Source of Cash-Filled Case. A Venezuelan attorney pleaded guilty Friday to helping with a scheme to cover up the source of $800,000 allegedly sent to the campaign of Argentina's president in a suitcase.

Moises Maionica, 36, admitted he acted as a conduit between Venezuela's intelligence service and Guido Antonini Wilson, a dual U.S.-Venezuelan citizen who lives in Key Biscayne. Argentine customs officials discovered the cash Aug. 4 in a suitcase carried by Antonini off a private flight from Venezuela. The suitcase did not belong to him, said prosecutor Thomas Mulvihill, but to an executive with Venezuela's state-run oil company. Antonini cooperated with the FBI investigation and recorded conversations with Maionica and others, Mulvihill said.

Authorities charged five men, including Maionica, in December with acting as agents of the Venezuelan government without registering with the U.S. Justice Department. The men tried to cover up the Venezuelan source of the $800,000 and that it was bound for the campaign of Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, prosecutors allege.

The others charged in the case are Venezuelans Franklin Duran, Charles Kauffman and Antonio Canchica Gomez and Uruguayan Rodolfo Wanseele Paciello. The men face up to 15 years in prison and $250,000 in fines. Canchica has not been arrested. Under the terms of his plea agreement, Maionica could receive a reduced punishment if he cooperates with investigators. Attorney Ruben Oliva called Maionica a "gentleman of character and integrity beyond reproach" who got caught up in an international scandal without realizing the consequences. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse," Oliva said.

Maionica, Duran and Kauffman initially met with Antonini Aug. 23 at Jackson's Steakhouse on Las Olas Blvd. Maionica admitted to telling Antonini he was acting at the request of high ranking Venezuelan officials and to setting up a phone call between Antonini and the head of Venezuela's intelligence service.

U.S. investigators claim the Venezuelan government sent an emissary to persuade Antonini to help in the alleged cover-up and that Antonini was both threatened and offered $2 million to keep quiet.

The governments of Argentina and Venezuela have both bitterly denounced the U.S. investigation as politically motivated - a charge the Bush administration has denied. [Blum/Sun-Sentinel/24January2008] 

Japanese Spy Charges Downgraded to Financial Malfeasance. The case of the Japanese government employee accused of giving secret information to Russian intelligence has taken an unexpected turn: Japanese officials have said that after investigating further, they have found there was no espionage. The Japanese official originally suspected of providing classified information actually gave Russian diplomats translations from the foreign press and summaries of presentations at conferences.

Mikhail Galuzin, a counselor at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, was summoned to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to hear the protest of Keiichi Katakami, deputy director of the ministry's department of European countries, in connection with the case of the 52-year-old employee of the Japanese cabinet's Information Research Office accused by the Japanese security police of passing confidential documents to the second secretary of the Russian embassy. The case has caused a public outcry in Japan and was commented on by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. Spokesmen for the Russian embassy, in response to Japanese requests for cooperation in the case, expressed perplexity over it and stated that it was being used by those who wish to hinder the development of Japanese-Russian relations. 

The Japanese suspect has been charged with violations of confidentiality and of corruption. He is thought to have received $37,000 from the Russian diplomat in the course of several months. He cannot be charged with espionage, because the documents he passed to the Russians were not classified. [Kommersant/24January2008] 

Russia Says Foreign Spies Seeking WMD Data. Russia's domestic security service said on it had foiled several attempts by foreign spies to obtain technology for weapons of mass destruction. The Federal Security Service (FSB) said Western and Asian spy services had tried to obtain information about nuclear enterprises in Siberia and from scientists working on secret high technology projects. One Chinese citizen had been expelled and several other foreigners were refused further entry into Russia for seeking information on weapons of mass destruction, the FSB head in the Novosibirsk region of Siberia said.

Russian security services have frequently claimed to uncover foreign spying and planned attacks by rebels, but rarely give details on attempts to steal secret data on weapons of mass destruction.

Russia, which has the second biggest store of nuclear weapons in the world after the United States, says its weapons arsenals are carefully guarded. [Sweeney/Reuters/25January2008] 

Hackers Breach Power Grids. A CIA analyst speaking at the SANS 2008 SCADA and Process Control Summit in New Orleans has admitted that hackers have not only been able to penetrate the power grids of several countries, but also successfully cut power to several cities, all from the relative safety of the Internet. Central Intelligence Agency analyst Tom Donahue was quick to point out that all the attacks were external to the United States, but not so quick to provide specifics of the incidents. Donahue claimed the objective was simple criminal extortion rather than being driven by a terrorist agenda. 

Conference organizers, the SANS Institute, posted a statement by Donahue which stated that "We have information, from multiple regions outside the United States, of cyber intrusions into utilities, followed by extortion demands. In at least one case, the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities. We do not know who executed these attacks or why, but all involved intrusions through the Internet." The SANS Institute added that according to Mr. Donahue the CIA "actively and thoroughly considered the benefits and risks of making this information public, and came down on the side of disclosure."

According to Brian Contos, Chief Security Officer at Arcsight, which is an active member of all these cybersecurity consortia, there are a whole host of projects underway in the US to ensure that such penetration of national infrastructure utility services is made as difficult as possible:

* Project LOGIIC has been created to minimize the opportunity for a cyber attack to severely damage America's oil and gas infrastructure.
* DATES is a Department of Energy initiative to integrate technologically-advanced controls and cyber-security devices into the electricity grid and energy infrastructure.
* I3P is bringing together various national organizations to make use of the cross-disciplinary research available to ensure that control systems used in critical national infrastructures are made more resilient to attack and just as importantly allow for a more rapid recovery if any attack proved to be successful.

And finally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved eight new mandatory critical infrastructure protection (CIP) reliability standards to protect the nation's bulk power system against potential disruptions from cyber security breaches. FERC Chairman Joseph T. Kelliher says it has achieved a milestone "by adopting the first mandatory and enforceable reliability standards that address cyber security concerns on the bulk power system in the United States. The electric industry now can move on to the implementation of the standards in conjunction with improvement of these standards in order to increase the security and reliability of the bulk power system."

The eight CIP reliability standards address the following topics:

1. Critical Cyber Asset Identification
2. Security Management Controls
3. Personnel and Training
4. Electronic Security Perimeters
5. Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
6. Systems Security Management
7. Incident Reporting and Response Planning
8. Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets [DaniWeb/25January2008] 

Islam Didn't Cause Global Tensions, Ex-CIA Official Says. Angry, violent reformers and terrorists would have arisen out of the Middle East with or without Islam, says a former top CIA official. "A world without Islam would still see most of the enduring bloody rivalries whose wars and tribulations dominate the geopolitical landscape," Graham Fuller, the CIA's former head of long-term strategic planning, writes in the cover story of this month's issue of the magazine Foreign Policy.

Fuller, 69, who lives in semi-retirement north of Vancouver, says in the article that a terrorist attack on the U.S. like that launched Sept. 11, 2001, would likely have occurred even if the Muslim religion had never existed. "If not 9/11, some similar event like it was destined to come," Fuller, an adjunct professor at Simon Fraser University, argues in his opinion piece, titled "A World Without Islam."

Islam provides a convenient scapegoat for those trying to explain the origins of terrorism, he says. "It's much easier than exploring the impact of the massive global footprint of the world's sole superpower," says Fuller, who spent most of his career with the CIA in Muslim countries, advising top U.S. government officials.

"In the bluntest of terms, would there have been a 9/11 without Islam? It's important to remember how easily religion can be invoked when other long-standing grievances are to blame. Sept. 11, 2001, was not the beginning of history."

It's too comfortable for Western observers to ignore a long history of Western colonialism in the Middle East while blindly identifying Islam as the key source of global tension, he says. If Muhammad had never founded Islam in seventh-century Arabia, Fuller writes, the Middle East would likely have become dominated by Eastern Orthodox Christianity, which has had a history of violent conflict with the West and the Roman Catholic church, including during the Crusades.

"Today, the U.S. occupation of Iraq would be no more welcome to Iraqis if they were Christian. The United States did not overthrow Saddam Hussein, an intensely nationalist and secular leader, because he was Muslim.... Nowhere do people welcome foreign occupation and the killing of their citizens at the hands of foreign troops."

He notes that the "principal horrors" of the 20th century "came almost exclusively from strictly secular regimes: Leopold II of Belgium in the Congo, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin and Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot. It was Europeans who visited their "world wars' twice upon the rest of the world - two devastating global conflicts with no remote parallels in Islamic history." [Winston-SalemJournal/25January2008] 

Soviet Theme Park Features Belt Whippings, KGB Interrogations. Mickey Mouse, roller coasters, and cotton candy typify the average theme park. But in one Lithuanian town, those amenities are exchanged for belt whippings and some good old fashioned KGB interrogation. It's called "Gulag tourism." And Grutas Park offers visitors a journey back to 1984 to remind citizens what life was like under Soviet rule. Organizers believe that for those old enough to remember life in the Soviet Union, visiting the park can be therapeutic, filled with old memorabilia and humor.

"There are still many in Lithuania who are sick with Soviet nostalgia," said one organizer, "so we've started this show to help them recover."

After an amiable introduction, visitors are quickly transported back 25 years. They are ordered to stop smiling or thinking and are chased through an elaborate labyrinth of corridors. Any misstep can result in a violent encounter with angry KGB agents. All of the activity lasts two hours, costs more than 35 Euros, and takes place inside a bunker located in the woods.

For younger visitors, the park can serve as an interesting history lesson. "It was scary indeed the way they treated people," said a young woman who had just visited the park. "And people didn't know what to do. They would do whatever they want with people and that was frightening." [Edwards&Doster/RawStory/22January2008] 

Ex-Russian Operative Led UN 'Spy Nest'. A former Russian top spy says his agents helped the Russian government steal nearly $500 million from the U.N.'s oil-for-food program in Iraq before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Sergei Tretyakov, who defected to the United States in 2000 as a double agent, says he oversaw an operation that helped Saddam's regime manipulate the price of Iraqi oil sold under the program - and allowed Russia to skim profits.

Tretyakov, former deputy head of intelligence at Russia's U.N. mission from 1995 to 2000, names some names, but sticks mainly to code names. Among the spies he says he recruited for Russia were a Canadian nuclear weapons expert who became a U.N. nuclear verification expert in Vienna, a senior Russian official in the oil-for-food program and a former Soviet bloc ambassador. He describes a Russian businessman who got hold of a nuclear bomb, and kept it stored in a shed at his dacha outside Moscow.

The 51-year-old Tretyakov had never spoken out about his spying before this week, when he granted his first news media interviews to publicize a book published Thursday. Written by former Washington Post journalist Pete Earley, the book is titled "Comrade J.: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America after the End of the Cold War."

His defection was first reported by the AP in 2001. Shortly after, the New York Times broke the news that he was not a diplomat, but a top Russian spy who was extensively debriefed by the CIA and the FBI.

Some of the people named or referenced by a code name in the book have denied Tretyakov's claims. The Russian mission to the U.N. said Friday it would have no immediate comment. Stephane Dujarric, a spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, described Tretyakov's allegations as potentially serious violations of law and U.N. rules. But Dujarric said it would be up to others to prosecute if the allegations are substantiated: "Since the U.N. can't prosecute, it is now up to national governments to prosecute."

Tretyakov defected to the United States with his wife and daughter in 2000, after serving as a double agent passing along secrets to the U.S. government. He calls his defection "the major failure of Russian intelligence in the United States" and warns that Russia, despite the end of the Cold War, harbors bad intentions toward the United States.

The decision to defect, he said, was made only after his mother died in 1997, and he had no other close relatives alive in Russia who could be used to blackmail him. The Tretyakovs now live in retirement in an undisclosed location. [Heilprin/AP/26January2008] 

Disabled Spy Satellite Threatens Earth. A large U.S. spy satellite has lost power and could hit the Earth in late February or early March, government officials said Saturday.

The satellite, which no longer can be controlled, could contain hazardous materials, and it is unknown where on the planet it might come down, they said. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is classified as secret. It was not clear how long ago the satellite lost power, or under what circumstances.

"Appropriate government agencies are monitoring the situation," said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the National Security Council, when asked about the situation after it was disclosed by other officials. "Numerous satellites over the years have come out of orbit and fallen harmlessly. We are looking at potential options to mitigate any possible damage this satellite may cause." He would not comment on whether it is possible for the satellite to perhaps be shot down by a missile. He said it would be inappropriate to discuss any specifics at this time. A senior government official said that lawmakers and other nations are being kept apprised of the situation.

The spacecraft contains hydrazine - which is rocket fuel - according to a government official who was not authorized to speak publicly but spoke on condition of anonymity. Hydrazine, a colorless liquid with an ammonia-like odor, is a toxic chemical and can cause harm to anyone who contacts it.

Such an uncontrolled re-entry could risk exposure of U.S. secrets, said John Pike, a defense and intelligence expert. Spy satellites typically are disposed of through a controlled re-entry into the ocean so that no one else can access the spacecraft, he said. Pike also said it's not likely the threat from the satellite could be eliminated by shooting it down with a missile, because that would create debris that would then re-enter the atmosphere and burn up or hit the ground. Pike, director of the defense research group, estimated that the spacecraft weighs about 20,000 pounds and is the size of a small bus. He said the satellite would create 10 times less debris than the Columbia space shuttle crash in 2003. Satellites have natural decay periods, and it's possible this one died as long as a year ago and is just now getting ready to re-enter the atmosphere, he said.

Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow with the National Security Archive, said the spacecraft likely is a photo reconnaissance satellite. Such eyes in the sky are used to gather visual information from space about adversarial governments and terror groups, including construction at suspected nuclear sites or militant training camps. The satellites also can be used to survey damage from hurricanes, fires and other natural disasters.

The largest uncontrolled re-entry by a NASA spacecraft was Skylab, the 78-ton abandoned space station that fell from orbit in 1979. Its debris dropped harmlessly into the Indian Ocean and across a remote section of western Australia. In 2000, NASA engineers successfully directed a safe de-orbit of the 17-ton Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, using rockets aboard the satellite to bring it down in a remote part of the Pacific Ocean. In 2002, officials believe debris from a 7,000-pound science satellite smacked into the Earth's atmosphere and rained down over the Persian Gulf, a few thousand miles from where they first predicted it would plummet. [Sullivan&/Hess&Riechmann/AP/27January2008] 


Pakistan Rebuffs Secret U.S. Plea for C.I.A. Buildup. Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, and CIA Director General Michael V. Hayden secretly traveled to Pakistan early this month to press President Pervez Musharraf to allow the Central Intelligence Agency greater latitude to operate in the tribal territories where Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups are all active, according to several officials who have been briefed on the visit. During the visit, Mr. Musharraf rebuffed proposals to expand any American combat presence in Pakistan, either through unilateral covert C.I.A. missions or by joint operations with Pakistani security forces. Instead, Pakistan and the United States are discussing a series of other joint efforts, including increasing the number and scope of missions by armed Predator surveillance aircraft over the tribal areas, and identifying ways that the United States can speed information about people suspected of being militants to Pakistani security forces, officials said.

American and Pakistani officials have questioned each other in recent months about the quality and time lines of information that the United States has given to Pakistan to use in focusing on those extremists. American officials have complained that the Pakistanis are not seriously pursuing Al Qaeda in the region.

The Jan. 9 meetings, the first visit with Mr. Musharraf by senior administration officials since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, also included the new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the director of Pakistan's leading military intelligence agency, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. American officials said the visit was prompted by an increasing sense of urgency at the highest levels of the United States government that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are intensifying efforts to destabilize the Pakistani government.

Despite the insistence of administration officials that the United States and Pakistan have a common goal in fighting Al Qaeda, Mr. Musharraf has made clear in public proclamations that it is far from his first priority. At the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland last week, Mr. Musharraf said several times that the 100,000 Pakistani troops that he said were now along the border were hunting for Taliban extremists and "miscreants," but he also said there was no particular effort being put into the search for Qaeda fighters.

In Washington, however, the Bush administration has said that fighting terrorists, chiefly Al Qaeda, is the primary purpose of the $10 billion in American aid that has been sent to Pakistan, mostly for reimbursements for the cost of patrolling the tribal areas. President Bush has often praised Mr. Musharraf for fighting terrorism, pointing out that Al Qaeda has tried to kill the Pakistani leader. But White House officials were silent when Mr. Musharraf said this week that his efforts were focused on the Taliban, and that the main problem the United States faced was in Afghanistan, not Pakistan.

Accounts of the discussions between Mr. Musharraf and the intelligence officials were provided by American and Pakistani officials over the past two weeks after The New York Times inquired about the secret trip. While officials confirmed some details of the discussion, much remains unknown about the continuing dialogue between Islamabad and Washington.

The trip by Mr. McConnell and General Hayden, a 14,000-mile over-and-back visit for one day of discussions, occurred just five days after senior administration officials debated new strategies for dealing with Pakistan. No decisions were made at that meeting of the National Security Council, which gathered all of Mr. Bush's top national security officials but not the president.

In the ensuing three weeks, however, the debate appeared to be intensifying, as senior American officials said they believed that American forces - whether as combat troops or trainers - could enhance the efforts of Pakistan's military in the mountainous and lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Other officials said that recent intelligence analysis indicated that Al Qaeda was now operating in the tribal areas with an impunity similar to the freedom that it had in Afghanistan before the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

The C.I.A. operatives in Afghanistan and the covert Special Operations forces there have made little secret of their desire to move into the tribal areas with or without Mr. Musharraf's explicit approval. In the administration, there has been discussion of whether Mr. Bush should give orders to allow them more latitude. Currently, they are limited to specific missions - for example, going after Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if they have specific intelligence in hand. Mr. Musharraf has explicitly rejected that, and within days after Mr. McConnell and General Hayden's departure, he told a Singapore newspaper that any unilateral action by the United States would be regarded as an invasion. In Davos, he dismissed the idea that Americans could be effective in the tribal areas.

On Thursday , Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the United States was willing to send combat troops to Pakistan to conduct joint operations against Al Qaeda and other militants if the Pakistani government asked for American help. Mr. Gates said that Pakistan had not requested American assistance, and that any American troops sent to Pakistan would likely be assigned solely to train Pakistani forces. Small numbers of American Special Operations forces now train their Pakistani counterparts.

American and Pakistani spokesmen confirmed that the meetings between Mr. Musharraf and American intelligence officials took place, but they declined to offer any details. 

Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Mahmud Ali Durrani, said in an interview that the meetings were about "improving coordination, discussing the war on terror, and filling the gaps between intelligence and operations," but he declined to provide details.

In dealing with the American requests, Mr. Musharraf is conducting a delicate balancing act. American officials contend that now, more than ever, he recognizes the need to step up the battle against extremists who are seeking to topple his government. But he also believes that if American forces are discovered operating in Pakistan, the backlash will be more than he can control, especially because the Taliban and Al Qaeda are trying to cast him as a pawn of Washington. The result appears to be a compromise: Mr. Musharraf is willing, they say, to accept training, equipment, and technical help, but has insisted that no Americans get involved in ground operations.

Pakistani officials insist they are taking the militant threat seriously and have completed major operations in the Swat Valley to drive out extremists. In the past few days, about 1,000 Pakistan Army troops and Frontier Corps paramilitary forces have also launched a three-pronged attack against the South Waziristan stronghold of Baitullah Mehsud, a militant leader with links to Al Qaeda who is the main suspect in the assassination of Ms. Bhutto. [Schmitt&Sanger&Khan/NYTimes/27January2008] 

German Court Cases Highlight International Face of Terrorism. The Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig ruled Thursday, Jan. 24, that the German Intelligence Agency (BND) can bug the telephones of suspected terrorists even when there is no immediate threat to Germany. The possibility that "sleepers" in Germany are involved in plans for international attacks is sufficient grounds for strategic monitoring, the court decided.

According to the Parliamentary Control Committee (PKG), the BND employed strategic monitoring tactics some 24,400 times, with 21 cases considered relevant to the intelligence services. 

The case had been brought by a man currently serving time in a Cologne jail for terrorist activities. In October 2005, a D�sseldorf court sentenced him to eight years behind bars for his involvement in the Al-Tawhid organization. The evidence against him was based on a telephone conversation in which he was heard to offer his services as a suicide bomber.

The complainant argued that the intelligence services' tapping of his telephones in October and November 2001 was illegal, with his lawyer arguing that indications of planned international terrorist activity was inadequate grounds for supervision.

"This is absurd," said a representative from the BND. "In this era of international terrorism, investigators cannot be restricted by national borders."

Also on Thursday, a court in Schleswig-Holstein sentenced a German of Moroccan origin to jail for setting up an Al-Qaeda cell in Sudan, Africa, with people he met on the Internet.

Redouane E.H., a 38-year-old mobile-phone and Internet shop manager based in Kiel, will serve five years and nine months for smuggling fighters into Iraq and funding Al-Qaeda.

Most of the evidence in the case against E.H. came from Internet chat logs. The judge said it was the first time evidence had been obtained from phone calls via the Internet and used to convict someone in a German court.

E.H. has been on trial since July, accused of uploading to the Internet messages of support for Osama Bin Laden and details on how to construct bombs. He also raised 5,000 euros ($7,400) to support a jihad or holy war, before his arrest in July 2006.

He took part in a training camp in Algeria in December 2005 before embarking on the Iraqi smuggling operation and finally the move into Sudan to aid al Qaeda of Mesopotamia.

The man originally came to the University of Kiel to study philosophy, and said that he became a radical Muslim after the death of his brother in 2003. "From today's perspective, I realize it was bizarre lunacy," he told the court as the trial drew to a close. "I just don't understand how I ever got involved in it."

E.H. was convicted under an extra-territorial law that makes it a crime for someone in Germany to establish or belong to a terrorist organization anywhere in the world. [DeutcheWorld/25January2008] 


Policy Disruption by the NIE, by Edward A. Turzanski , Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Homeland Security. [Editors' comment: While the WIN editors disagree with some of the major premises of this article, we chose to publish it because we found it thought provoking, and because we believe our readers benefit from knowing what the press is saying about intelligence. As always, we welcome your comments.] On December 3, 2007, the U.S. intelligence community declassified the key judgments portion of the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities." Critics of the Bush administration have seized upon the document as proof positive that the president and his foreign policy team have intentionally overstated the status of Iran's nuclear weapons program - just as was allegedly done with Saddam Hussein's Iraq - to justify a shoot-then-ask foreign policy. In fact, the substance, omissions, timing, and authorship of the document speak more to what many have come to see as a relentless guerrilla campaign by the analytical portion of the intelligence community against the president's foreign and antiterror policies than they do to any policy deception by the administration.

Of all the activities and products generated by the intelligence community, none has proven to be as problematic over time as NIEs, which represent the collective wisdom and judgment of the 16 agencies that compose the intelligence community. Because these agencies must agree on the conclusions reached, the documents often provide low-risk, "lowest common denominator" intelligence judgments, and the conclusions are often qualified to the point of being useless to policymakers. Dissenting opinions are not generally welcome and are routinely relegated to footnotes, and in many cases, these footnotes remain classified. In the case of the 2007 Iran NIE, only the key judgments section has been declassified, leaving some 140 pages - and doubtless some footnotes that would highlight disagreement on key points - outside public scrutiny.

Not only is this unhelpful in the effort to discern what is really happening on a given issue, but NIEs have on occasion delivered astoundingly incorrect judgments on crucial matters of national interest. A 1962 NIE stated that the Soviets would not place missiles in Cuba; two in 1974 said that Hanoi was unlikely to launch a major offensive in the first half of 1975; and one in 1989 suggested that hostilities in the Persian Gulf were unlikely over the next two years. In the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War, the intelligence community produced an assessment of Saddam's WMD and overall military capabilities that was much too benign. To compensate, it erred on the other side of caution and produced one on his pre-2003 invasion status that was far too robust. In assessing the NIE on Iran, it has to be noted that the intelligence community has an unenviable record in correctly assessing the status of nuclear weapons programs, having missed key events in the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR, Pakistan, Libya, North Korea and Iraq.

To further complicate matters, the 2007 NIE appears to directly contradict the fundamental finding of a 2005 NIE which maintained that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program. In stating "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" and that as of the end of October 2007, Tehran had not restarted the same, the 2007 NIE undermines the rationale put forward by the Bush administration to compel Iranian cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its nuclear program. As if this reversal was not dramatic enough, it was made public while the Bush administration was in the advanced stages of engineering a third round of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran for its noncompliance with IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Thus, the published portions of the NIE severely, and maybe permanently, set back the goal of forcing Iran to open its nuclear sites to IAEA scrutiny. They surprised both friends and foes of the Bush policy towards Iran.

Because both the substance and timing of the declassified portions of the NIE have had such a large effect on policy, the president and Congress need to compel satisfactory answers to several questions.

First, what intelligence prompted the change in assessment of the Iranian nuclear weapons program? The intelligence community is entrusted with the critical job of presenting to elected policymakers information about threats and adversaries that is real-time, value-added, policy-relevant and predictive. This is why we spend nearly $45 billion per year on an intelligence capability and why we allow the intelligence community to keep its sources and methods out of the public realm. This information, or "intelligence," is neither intended to be a policy recommendation nor expected to be a prophecy. The intelligence community cannot make policy because it is not accountable to the electorate, and it should not opine on matters about which it does not have credible sources of information. The declassified portions of the 2007 NIE do not address the basis upon which the key judgment about Iran's suspending its nuclear weapons program in 2003 is predicated. Subsequent to the publication of the key judgments, the intelligence community did state that the source was confidential information held by the Iranian military, and additional reporting has mentioned intercepts of communications and a defector as possible sources. The veracity of these sources has been vigorously challenged by allied intelligence communities and by at least one international group - the IAEA, headed by Mohammed El Baradei, no friend of the Bush administration - normally not disposed to supporting the Bush administration's posture on nonproliferation matters.

Second, what assumptions does the intelligence community make about the present and future state of the program? If some person(s) within the Iranian military provided the key information that led to the intelligence community's fundamental reassessment of its position on the Iranian nuclear program, it would be reasonable for policymakers to ask what else is known about the program's current state. Here the NIE is less instructive in its key judgments than it is in a footnote thereto. The NIE assesses "with moderate confidence" that Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007 and with "moderate-to-high confidence" that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. As to Iran's intentions, it acknowledges that "we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons." But the footnote carries a bombshell: "For purposes of this Estimate, by 'nuclear weapons program' we mean Iran's nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment." Many in the nonproliferation business would argue that the distinction between military and civilian nuclear programs is artificial at best, and that continuation of Iran's nuclear activity, outside IAEA inspection and at a scale (3,000 centrifuges) far beyond what a peaceful nuclear energy program needs, is precisely the work that will allow Iran to make the jump to usable nuclear weapons. Even if it has suspended work on warhead design, if Iran is still enriching uranium, we should know how quickly Iran could build a warhead if it enriches enough uranium to place into one. The NIE only says that Iran could likely produce enough uranium for a warhead by 2009, and more in the period 2010 to 2015.

The third question is, what prompted the change in Iran's actions in fall 2003, as the new NIE says it did (a dramatic policy shift)? The NIE presents beliefs about the philosophy of Iranian leadership without providing specific supporting information: "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs." "International pressure" could only refer to the U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, where the Taliban had been routed, and Iraq, where Saddam had been toppled. Yet the NIE goes on to state "This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might - if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible - prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be." 

If the first part of the key judgment is to be believed (that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure), then clearly fear of preemptive military action motivated the Iranians, much as it did Libya's Khaddafi, who gave up his nuclear program rather than face the fate which claimed Saddam. It is highly unlikely that those who wrote the 2007 NIE are arguing for military action against Iran; though the effect of the document in eroding international consensus for further sanctions could make preemptive military action more likely if another NIE - or some other state (e.g., Israel) reaches a different key judgment about Iran's nuclear weapons program.

This leads to the fourth question: How do the intelligence communities of our allies and the IAEA view the key judgments of the NIE? By all accounts, the Bush administration was dismayed by the reversal in the 2007 NIE. Its allies in Britain and Israel were even more displeased; while the French, reflecting the disposition of the pro-American President Nicolas Sarkozy, have remained largely silent on the matter. A senior British official expressed concerns that the U.S. intelligence community fell under the influence of Iranian misinformation on the key question of whether Iran had ended its nuclear program, commenting "It's not as if the American intelligence agencies are regarded as brilliant performers in the region. They got badly burned over Iraq." The Israelis were even more demonstrative in their disagreement, stating publicly that they would present their Iran nuclear weapons evidence to Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on his December 9 visit to Israel. Perhaps the most telling reaction came from an unnamed IAEA senior official quoted in the New York Times as saying "To be frank, we are more skeptical. We don't buy the American analysis 100 percent. We are not that generous with Iran."

This brings us to a final question: Is there anything about the way in which the NIE was produced and released that can provide a better understanding of its context? As former American UN Ambassador John Bolton has observed, a number of the individuals involved in drafting and approving the NIE were not intelligence professionals, but former State Department officials imported into the office of the Director of National Intelligence under former DNI John Negroponte. Three of them are known as being opposed to Bush administration policies concerning Iran and Iraq: C. Thomas Fingar, deputy director of national intelligence for analysis; Vann H. Van Diepen, national intelligence officer for WMD and proliferation; and Kenneth C. Brill, director of the National Counterproliferation Center. Van Diepen is known to be especially resistant to the use of sanctions to achieve changes in the disposition of states such as Iran and has many allies in the State Department/intelligence community analysis wing of the national security structure who believe that the path to a more stable world lies in negotiating with Iran (without precondition). News accounts have also reported that the Bush Administration was forced into declassifying the key judgments when it did because the New York Times had indicated that it would be publishing a leaked version of the document.

The leak and subsequent publication of the Iran NIE stopped cold the administration's efforts to engineer a new round of sanctions to compel Iranian cooperation with IAEA monitoring efforts ("Why punish the Iranians if there's no there, there?" argue the Russians and Chinese). And so, the Bush administration's foreign policy has once again been disrupted by an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. From extraordinary rendition of terror suspects to the NSA's communication intercept program, from interrogation methods to uncontroversial programs such as the SWIFT terror finance monitoring program; unelected, unaccountable members of the intelligence community, who are sworn to maintain the confidentiality of classified programs and materials, have tried to influence policy (and to our lasting detriment have often succeeded) by means of unauthorized, illegal leaks to media sources.

The 2007 NIE now joins the sad recitation of instances of policymaking by leaking and adds the element of policy disruption by NIE. It is worth recalling the findings of the 2005 Robb-Silberman Commission, which investigated what the intelligence community knew about WMD programs around the world. That commission stated that "Across the board, the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world's most dangerous actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten years ago." Thus we have an intelligence community that has a difficult time divining the secrets of our adversaries, is even worse at keeping our own secrets, and appears to have a hard time staying out of policymaking. Our next president cannot afford to continue to be burdened by an intelligence analysis gang that cannot - or will not - shoot straight. Transforming it into a competent tool of American policy should be at the top of the priority list for the new administration. [Turzanski/FPRI.ORG/January2008] 

Anatomy of a Cover-Up: Notes on the Assassination of JFK, by AFIO Life Member Peter B. Martin. Even to this day, the President Kennedy assassination continues to fascinate and mystify minds the world over. Very few people are satisfied with the findings of the Warren Commission Report. This paper will begin with the premise that there was a cover-up simply because the particulars of the case inevitably leads one to that conclusion.

Once you believe there was a cover-up, the question that comes to mind is: Why? What would be the reason for a government to go through such convoluted conduct all through the post assassination process other than to hide or disguise the truth? If the Mafia was behind it, as some suggested, why not disclose the fact to condemn the institution, using this horrendous crime to devastate its reputation, thereby weakening its structure? If the US intelligence community was involved, as some cranks believe, such a secret couldn't have been kept over such a long period of time. Word would have gotten out long ago, as those agencies are notorious for not being able to keep secrets, as everyone knows who has worked in them. (This was later confirmed to the author by Gen. Vernon Walters, ex-DDCI, who added, at any rate the majority of CIA people were democrats.)

There was really only one reason to keep the perpetrators secret and construct a cover-up, and that was to avoid WW III. There would have been such an outburst from Americans against the USSR that it might have inadvertently triggered a nuclear war. Evidence indicates that this was what the US government was afraid of from the beginning; they realized the seriousness of the event, that Oswald had KGB connections, (the FBI had a thick file on him) they knew of the possible ramifications and the likely consequences; hence the cover-up. Released files on the case reveal that the intelligence community was warned of the threat and didn't do enough to avoid it, consequently, there was an immediate scramble to disguise the specifics of the assassination so as to shore up the reputation of the Secret Service.

There is a distinct possibility that Oswald was a gunman, but not the "lone gunman" as the Warren Commission concludes. The suggestion that Oswald using that rudimentary, 6.5 mm, bolt action, Italian Mannlicher-Carcano military rifle to shoot 3 accurate shots in the specified elapsed time strains credibility. Even hired expert marksmen who tried couldn't load and shoot the weapon as fast as portrayed in the Warren Commission Report, much less with any accuracy. Taking in all the evidence from the infamous Zapruder film, the trajectories, the audio reports of gunfire and the crucial timing, the only possible conclusion is that there was more than one gunman doing the shooting.

Oswald was so unprofessional in his actions during that fatal day he couldn't have possibly been anything other than a dupe, to be caught as the professionals made their getaway. Following the assassination, Oswald might just as well have left the book depository doing a 2-step and singing, "I shot the sheriff..." He goes out, leaving his rifle behind, then guns down a policeman with a handgun, hides in a cinema and eventually gets arrested. Oswald insists during the police interrogation that he didn't shoot the president and is only a "patsy". He tells Earl Warren that it is too dangerous for him in Dallas to talk and requests a transfer, promising to tell all if he gets out of Texas. Warren refuses. Then the scenario then gets even more outlandish, Jack Rubenstein, aka Jack Ruby, enters the stage during a jail transfer and fatally shoots Oswald in the police station. Ruby is convicted and gets the death sentence, is later reprieved but before his re-trial he succumbs to his terminal illness. (Did he know he had cancer before he shot Oswald and knew he was condemned to die anyway?).

Oswald merits examination. He was an American defector living in Moscow. In the '60s the KGB would look upon any such person with great suspicion. They must have examined and evaluated him thoroughly and maybe found that he could be useful to them. The KGB must have been responsible for the introduction of the attractive pharmacist, Marina Prusakova to Oswald, as it could hardly have been a coincidence that she was living at the time with an uncle who was a colonel in the MVD (security service of the Soviet Interior Ministry). Wondrously, she married this foreigner in less than 2 months, in the days when one would need special permission from the state to marry a foreigner, something not easily granted at that time. A short while later, Oswald recants and wants to return to the US; not only is permission granted for him exceptionally quickly, the Soviets even allow Marina (the niece of a colonel in the MVD!) to leave with him; all rather astonishing considering the epoch and the background of the couple, one could almost say unprecedented. The KGB must have orchestrated the whole affair and needed the Oswalds in the US for some mission. There is no other plausible explanation for such unique Soviet conduct, other than on the unlikely grounds that they were just wanted to get rid of Oswald; but why allow Marina out as well?

A sinister, damning incident occurred following Oswald's return to America. Two months before the assassination Oswald paid a visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City ostensibly to get a visa. Instead of meeting a visa clerk he met with a senior KGB agent, one Valery Vladimirovich Kostikov from the 13th Department that handles "wet affairs" (assassinations). Furthermore, an "Eyes Only" report, sent after the assassination revealed that on Sept. 18, a Nicaraguan named Gilberto Alvarado saw Oswald take $6,500 from someone in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. The US ambassador to Mexico, Thomas Mann, sent a cable that read: "there appears to be a strong possibility that a down payment was made to Oswald in the Cuban Embassy here, presumably with the promise of a subsequent payment after the assassination."

The question of a cover-up concerning the desperate early hours of the assassination is pretty much a given. Autopsy notes were "lost" and Kennedy's brain disappeared and to this day has not been found. Again, such measures raise the question: why?

According to records, a while after Oswald was killed, Deputy Attorney General Nick Katzenbach wrote a memo clarifying the reasons for a presidential commission of "unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions" on the assassination of JFK. This implied that a cover-up was essential. He wrote: "The public trust must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial...." "Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting the thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists."

The KGB never had any qualms about sacrificing one of their own for the security of a deception. The defector Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko is an outstanding example. He was a KGB officer who volunteered his services to the CIA one day in May 1962. It is important to note that he was not recruited but was a "walk-in". He made his approach during an arms-control conference in Geneva. He proffered some first-rate intelligence and became an noteworthy agent in place.

During the lengthy debriefings he expressed numerous times that he could never think of defecting because of his wife and children who he was very attached to. However, several months after the assassination, he stunned his CIA handlers by saying he had wanted to defect and would never return to Russia. He went on to tell them all he knew about the Oswald case going to great lengths to assure them that the KGB was not behind the assassination.

There were many things in what he recounted that didn't add up, yet he did continue to furnish first rate intelligence. To this day there are a few insiders who still think he is a false defector. Whatever, the very fact that he came over to the other side to volunteer the information about Oswald implies that the Soviets had something to hide, were somehow caught up in the assassination, maybe with the complicity of Cuba, or the inverse. In any event, they had their cover-up and the United States had theirs. The cover-ups worked. WW III never took place.



AFIO Hosts 2008 Online Auction. AFIO will be holding the Second AFIO Auction later this spring and is searching for items members might no longer want which might be donated and sold in this charitable auction. If you have an item or two that you would like to donate to AFIO [the sale price at auction will be your IRS tax-deductible donation - sometimes far more than you ever expected] that would be of interest to those in the intelligence community [members, scholars, readers, professionals, enthusiasts], please contact us with the details at Last year the pipe of, and a photo from, former DCI Allen Dulles were donated and went into someone's collection as treasured new collectibles.

Research Requests

Joe Goulden writes: INFO ON FBIS: As many of you are aware, because I have bugged you for interviews the last several years, I am doing a book on Cold War intelligence, one that stresses successes of the Intelligence Community from 1945 until The End. (To understate, my conclusions by no means parallel those of a recent book on the Agency that I shall leave nameless.) One area in which I have found only sparse information pertains to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. I would like recollections of FBIS veterans who can brief me on early FBIS analyses about Soviet and other Communist bloc activities. Also helpful would be memories of working conditions in FBIS - where you were, what you did on a daily basis, the sort of detail that add life to a narrative. If you would care for a brief biographical statement about who I am, and what I have done over the years. I will cheerfully e-mail one to you. My e-mail address is You might have read my reviews on intel books in The Washington Times in recent years, many of which were reprinted in The Intelligencer and other AFIO publications. Joseph C. Goulden, Washington, DC.

Book Review

Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War, by Pete Earley. Review by Joseph C. Goulden. Observers who are feeling uneasy about Vladimir Putin's rule of Russia - include me among them - will find grounds for increased worry in an unsettling book by the veteran Washington writer Pete Earley, Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War (G. P. Putnam's, $24.95, 340 pages). A strong theme of Mr. Earley's splendid book is how corruption pervades post-Soviet Russia, with the explicit blessing of Mr. Putin himself.

Mr. Earley tells the story of Sergei Tretyakov, who achieved high rank first in the KGB, and then in the SVR (Sluzhba Vnezhney Razvedki), the foreign intelligence service that replaced the KGB's overseas arm when the USSR collapsed. (The title stems from Tretyakov's KGB code name, "Comrade Jean.")

From 1995 to 2000, Col. Tretyakov was the ranking SVR agent in the United States, working from the New York rezidentura and directing some 60 agents against the United States and its allies in the United Nations. Although his KGB roots spanned three generations, he became disillusioned with the Soviet system and its successor, and in 2000 he defected.

What Mr. Earley reveals is that for an undisclosed number of years before defecting, Tretyakov worked secretly for the FBI, risking his life on a near-daily basis.

Not wishing to let the SVR know exactly what secrets Tretyakov revealed, intelligence officers interviewed by Mr. Earley were economical in relating details of what he did as a defecting-in-place. They would not even reveal when he began working for the United States. But one "high-ranking intelligence official" involved in the defection said that Comrade J delivered more than 5,000 top secret SVR cables to the FBI, and more than 100 classified SVR intelligence reports. His material was used to prepare some 400 intelligence reports that circulated as high as the White House level. He named names of persons - diplomats, academics, government officials and others - who spied for the Soviets in Manhattan, at the UN and in Canada, his previous post. He provided insight into President Boris Yeltsin's thinking during debates over NATO expansion, the military campaigns in Kosovo, and elsewhere. He laid bare SVR secrets of Soviet tradecraft that were invaluable to U.S. counterintelligence.

One assertion sure to stir controversy is Tretyakov's assertion that the SVR considered Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state during the Clinton Administration, to be a "SPECIAL UNOFFICIAL CONTACT," the term the SVR used to "identify a top-level intelligence source who had high social and/or political status and whose identity needed to be carefully guarded." (Another person so designated was Raul Castro, Fidel's brother.) Tretyakov emphasized that Talbott was "not a Russian spy," but a self-styled expert who could be "massaged" to do the Soviets' bidding. He states, "Mr. Talbott saw himself as an expert on Russia and he thought he knew what was best for the country and its people. The SVR had seen this arrogant attitude before in Western leaders." Unbeknownst to Mr. Talbott, a Russian diplomat with whom he was close chums followed an SVR script in their conversations to elicit what was being discussed in the highest levels of the Clinton Administration. (Mr. Talbott was an Oxford classmate of the president.) For the record, Mr. Talbott told Mr. Earley that Tretyakov's charges were "erroneous and/or misleading."

Tretyakov puts Russian fingerprints on some previously disclosed perfidies at the UN and elsewhere. He confirms that Mr. Putin had direct knowledge of how Russian officials used the so-called "Oil for Food" program ran before the toppling of Saddam Hussein to put scores of millions of dollars into their own pockets and those of Kremlin superiors, as long suspected by investigators. He offers direct evidence that the "Nuclear Winter" scenario pushed by the late scientist - and anti-nuclear activist - Carl Sagan in the 1970s was part of a KGB-directed disinformation campaign to halt deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe by NATO.

That Tretyakov was considered a gold-plated defector is borne out by the fact that he "was given a financial package significantly higher than what any other previous Soviet spy ever received," in the words of an FBI official. He and wife Helen own a $600,000 house and live off investments. Daughter Ksenia received a master's degree from an Ivy League university. (Tretyakov asserts that he asked for nothing when he defected, that the United States volunteered any benefits he received.)

Mr. Earley did earlier acclaimed books on the John Walker spy ring and Aldrich Ames. Although CIA and FBI officers arranged his initial contact with Tretyakov, they then stepped aside and let the defector tell his story in 126 hours of taped interviews, with no official input form the intelligence community. Spy buffs will love Tretyakov's gossipy accounts of National Enquirer-style sexual and alcohol misbehavior in KGB and SVR offices. A five-cloak read from a writer who knows the business. [Goulden/WashingtonTimes/20January2007]

Job Opportunities

Applied Integrated Technologies, Inc (AIT) is seeking to hire more than 20 Intelligence Analysts with a solid understanding of counterintelligence and HUMINT operations for work in Iraq. Analysts should have 3 to 7 years working with such tools as Analyst Notebook, ASAS Light, BATS, (M3), CIDNE, Pathfinder as well as other data mining utilities in support of HUMINT operations. The jobs are at the Task Force level (in the Green Zone), and are in support of several ground breaking initiatives. The focus is on counterintelligence and counterterrorism. The positions are full time job opportunities and contain complete and comprehensive benefits. These positions come with an excellent salary (up to $145K) and above market yearly increases.  A SECRET clearance is required, a TOP SECRET is desired. Inquiries and applications should be directed to Milton Hardy at 301-614-9700 ext. 18,

McMunn Associates, Inc. seeks to fill 4 full time positions. POC: Molly Ryan, (703) 481-6100 ext. 103,

Senior Counterterrorism Planner
Minimum Security Clearance Requirement: Top Secret (TS), Candidate must possess a current DOD or other agency Top Secret or DOE "Q" clearance to enable immediate start of employment.
Minimum 10 years of Federal/State and/or private sector experience and qualifications in the areas of counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction policy and training as demonstrated by verifiable experience in one or more of the following areas:
- Interagency and/or Joint experience in the design, development, coordination and facilitation of site-specific, realistic exercises
- Law enforcement crisis management experience to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats
- Interagency emergency (consequence) management experience in response to the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive incidents
- Infrastructure protection planning to include risk-based assessments and site-specific security planning
- Continuity of operations planning and development
- Operational intelligence involving terrorist-based threats, and national security affairs.
This job entails the design, development, coordination and facilitation of a variety of interagency counterterrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) exercises ranging from Tabletop Exercises (TTX) to Command Staff Exercises (CSX) to Full Field Exercises (FFX) at a number of locations throughout the United States. A Bachelor's degree, with a graduate degree in National Security Affairs, Criminal Justice, or cognate disciplines preferred. The position requires a professional level of fluency in the Microsoft Office (particularly PowerPoint) suite of applications, excellent research skills, and strong analytical, public speaking, facilitating, and people skills. Travel requirements comprise approximately 10% of the job. Geographic Location: Washington/Metro, D.C. 20001

Counterdrug Seizure Database Analyst
Counterdrug Seizure Database Analyst to work at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Minimum Security Clearance Requirement, Current eligibility for TS/SCI. Skill and experience requirements are as follows:
- Minimum of two years experience in Counter-narcotics operations and analysis, preferably in an interagency setting
- Demonstrated expertise in working with various SQL-supported databases, to include data input, extraction, manipulation and analysis
- Ability to monitor other classified, as well as unclassified, U.S. and foreign sources, including the Internet, derive reportable information from them, and enter the data into the database on a daily basis
- Ability to draft intelligence reports and summaries
- Ability to prepare and provide intelligence briefings to senior officials, to include use of Microsoft Office software applications such as PowerPoint, Excel, and Access.
- Foreign language ability desired, but not required

Counter Narcotics Trafficking Intelligence Analyst
Minimum 5 years experience. Current TS/SCI eligibility based on SSBI current within the last 4 Ũ years as documented in JPAS. The incumbent will collect and analyze all-source intelligence information on selected topics in a wide range of subjects related to narcotics trafficking, including social sciences, economics, financial markets, business, history, culture, politics, geopolitics, business, law enforcement, political-military affairs, and international relations. Capable of writing concise reports suitable for an executive-level audience, easily understandable in a single rapid reading. Capable of making oral presentations to a variety of audiences including senior officials. Capable of using applicable software tools including word processing, spreadsheets, presentation applications, database applications, internet search tools, and public and private information resources. May include translations to and from foreign languages, with analysis. Geographic Location: Crystal City, VA, Job Location: On-site in Government facility; office and watch-floor environment; occasional travel, Work Schedule: Primarily day work, with some watch or surge requirements during times of contingency or crisis operations
Required Capabilities:
1. Position requires expert regional knowledge and all-source intelligence analysis. The ideal candidate would have a skill set similar to an intelligence or law enforcement professional with extensive regional experience and/or an academic background in Area Studies or a US Army Foreign Area Officer (Latin America ? 48B; South Asia ? 48D) with intelligence analysis experience.
2. Demonstrated proficiency in written and oral communications in English.
3. Bachelor degree in International Relations, Area Studies, or other applicable discipline.
Desired Capabilities:
1. In-country/in-region Latin America or South Asia (Afghanistan) experience, especially working with Embassy/Country Team.
2. Professional-level proficiency (DLPT 3/3) in Spanish, Pashto, Dari or other appropriate language.
3. Master degree in Area Studies, International Relations, National Security Studies, or Strategic Intelligence strongly desired.


Senior Maritime Analyst
5+ yrs experience. Must be eligible now for Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (TS/SCI). This is a full time position at the National Maritime Intelligence Center, Suitland, MD. The analyst will work as part of a contractor team on Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) subject areas where a high level of interaction is maintained and expected. The position is anticipated to be available approximately 1 November 2007.
Required: The successful applicant must demonstrate high capabilities in topical research, data analysis, and development of analytical conclusions and remedial courses of action. The incumbent must possess strong oral expression and briefing skills along with demonstrated analytical writing ability. The applicant must possess or be eligible for TS/SCI clearance with the U.S. Government. The successful applicant will have five or more years experience in analysis of commercial maritime activity, maritime trade issues or law enforcement-related issues (counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, criminal networks). Experience in all-source analysis within the U.S. Military and/or U.S. Intelligence Community is required. Working knowledge of or experience with GMII and/or MDA areas is required. Experience with and capability to use standard data processing software (Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint) is required. Capabilities to logically document reasoning will be assessed.
Desired: A Bachelor�s Degree in criminology, law enforcement, international affairs or a related discipline is highly desired and will significantly enhance an applicant's chance of success. More than five years experience in U.S. Military and/or U.S. Intelligence Community analysis organizations is highly desirable. Direct experience or expertise in GMII, MDA and commercial maritime issues will significantly enhance an applicant's chance of success.


Holt Bradford Westerfield.  Longtime AFIO member, former President of the AFIO New England Chapter from 1998 to 2001, Yale University Damon Wells Professor Emeritus of International Studies and political science, died peacefully on January 19, 2008 at the age of 79 near his summer home in Watch Hill, Rhode Island. His wife, Carolyn, and children, Pamela and Leland, remember a life dedicated to intellect and devoted to family. At Yale, his tenured career spanned more than forty years. There, Westerfield introduced several generations of future political leaders to American foreign policy and statecraft, including the current President and Vice President, two Directors of CIA, Director of NSA, Secretary of Defense and several seated and former Senators. In 1993, Yale College recognized him with the first Byrnes-Sewall Award for effectiveness in stimulating undergraduate learning. In 2003, Yale bestowed on him the Phi Beta Kappa Devane Medal, in appreciation for his lifetime in teaching. He was raised in academia, born March 7, 1928 to Mary Beatrice and Ray B. Westerfield, himself a Yale professor of economics. He is survived by his immediate family, Carolyn, Leland and Pamela Bingham, granddaughters, Isabel Putney, Serena Donwoody, Avery Campbell, and Lindsay Bradford, by his brother, Putney and cousin Chaplin B. Barnes. A memorial service for Professor H. Bradford Westerfield will be held at Yale University Battell Chapel on April 9. He will be cremated.

Michael F. Speers.  Longtime AFIO member, former President of the New England Chapter in the early 1980s, intelligence bibliophile who once ran a shop in Weston, Vermont, died peacefully on January 21, 2008 at the age of 76 at his home in Kennebunk, Maine. Mike was the heart, soul and sparkplug of AFIO New England. His ability to pick and entice top speakers, generate fellowship, and excite interest in the ongoing scholarship of the intelligence community was unique. The Chapter became a very large part of his life, and anything he touched -- meetings, trips abroad, whatever -- was expertly planned and rewarding.  AFIO presented him with many awards and honors to celebrate his large contribution. A Princeton graduate and a State Department professional, at the end of his active career Mike was seconded often to AID, and regularly sent around the world, the Near East and Africa especially, to solve local problems. He had a career as an Army Intelligence Officer and also worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development. He was active for many years with the Kennebunk Maine Libraries and Museums. He is survived by his wife, Sue, and by a son and daughter, and several grandchildren. He will be interred in Arlington Cemetery, in Virginia, later this year, in a private, graveside service. Founding members of AFIO New England will miss him. [bh]

Coming Events


30 January 2008 - Colorado Springs, CO - 10am-4pm -TECHEXPO Top Secret Hiring Event - - Active Security Clearance Required.

Wednesday, 30 January 2008, 6:30 pm – Washington, DC – “Spies on Screen” - The Lives of Others – Burton Gerber, retired CIA case officer, at the Spy Museum. Today there are 5,000 surveillance cameras in New York City – 200 in Times Square alone, and the UK has a larger network that successfully helped it round up the terrorists seeking to blow up transit system. So, while It may feel Big Brother is watching, these surveillance efforts are quite different from the tactics used by the German Democratic Republic before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Oscar-winning film, The Lives of Others, captures the effect that a culture of permanent suspicion and total surveillance had on the average citizen, and it also poses the intriguing question of what happens when a surveillant begins to sympathize with his target. Based on his own experiences as a CIA station chief in three Communist countries, retired CIA case officer Burton Gerber will place the film in context and discuss its accuracy and the ethical implications of espionage and counter-espionage. Co-sponsored by the Goethe-Institut in Washington, DC. Tickets: $20 per person. Visit for tickets.

2 February 2008 - Indian River, FL - Florida Satellite Chapter Luncheon.  The next luncheon for the Florida Satellite Chapter, AFIO will be on 2 February 2008 (Saturday), at the Indian River Country Colony Club (IRCC). There will be a cash bar beginning at 11:30 a.m. and a 12:30 p.m. lunch. The luncheon speaker will be COL Harry Pawlak, USAF Retired. COL Pawlak (a Chapter member) will speak about his involvement in a Recon Mission in Asia. He was forced to land in a hostile area without radio communications and walked almost three weeks before being picked up. The luncheon cost is $17.00. There will be a beef entr�e or fish entr�e option. Contact George Stephenson (Vice President) at for reservation information. Please put AFIO in the subject block to insure the e-mail will be opened. Col Pawlak is currently President of Matrix Management LTD.

5 - 6 February 2008 - San Diego, CA - 9am-4pm - WEST 2008 -

Tuesday, 5 February 2008, 6:30 pm – Washington, DC – “Mata Hari and Houdini: Entertaining Spies”– authors Pat Shipman and William Kalush at the Spy Museum. Were they or weren’t they? Mata Hari’s reputation as a seductive beauty who used her wiles to gather intelligence is well-known. But history reveals a different story. Meanwhile, Harry Houdini, the “World’s Greatest Escape Artist,” is known for his magical feats and his pursuit of fake spiritualists. But was he also a covert operative? In this demystifying evening, Pat Shipman, author of Femme Fatale: Love, Lies and the Unknown Life of Mata Hari, and William Kalush, co-author of Houdini: The Making of America’s First Superhero, lift the veil of time from these two legends. Was the infamous dancer executed for espionage or for shameless behavior? Did Houdini use his theatrical tours as a cover for collecting intelligence for the U.S. or perhaps the British? Tickets: $20. Visit for tickets.

Wednesday, 6 February 2008, 6 pm - Las Vegas, NV - The AFIO LV Chapter to discuss "Implications of Intelligence Scotomas in Latin America" with John Alexander, Ph.D. The Chapter holds their evening event at Nellis Air Force Base Officers' Club (Submit guest names by January 31st). Join them at 5 pm in the "Check Six" bar area for Fellowship, beverages and snacks/dinner. Their featured speaker for the evening will be: JOHN B. ALEXANDER, PH.D., discussing "Implications of Intelligence Scotomas in Latin America." His presentation addresses the major conflicts that are emerging throughout Central and South America, yet go nearly unnoticed by U.S. policy makers and the public. It can be argued that one or more wars are being ignored, and at our peril. There are also established terrorists networks that run from the Middle East through Latin America and into the U.S. In fact, our drug policies have destabilized countries, regions, and possible the hemisphere. RSVP no later than Thursday, January 31st for entrance to the Base.
Send email to Eppley, Christine J. at or call her at 702-295-0073. They look forward to seeing you!

8 February 2008 – San Francisco, CA – The AFIO Jim Quesada Chapter hosts William Overholt, Director of Asia Policy Division, RAND Corporation. Dr. William Overholt has a long history of analyzing Asia in both the public and private sectors. Most recently, he conducted research on financial reform in Asia as a joint senior fellow with the Center for Business and Government and the Asia Center at Harvard University. He is the author of five books including The Rise of China, winner of the Mainichi News/Asian Affairs Research Center Special Book Prize. He has spent 21 years managing research units for investment banks, mostly based in Hong Kong: he was a managing director and head of Asia Research for Bankers Trust and spent three years as chief of Asia strategist and economist for the largest Japanese investment bank, Nomura. Prior to that, he spent eight years at Hudson Institute managing studies for the NSC, DoD, Department of State, ACDA, NASA, and various corporations. Dr. Overholt will speak on economic developments and intelligence in China. Mr. Overholt’s presentation will cover such topics as Asian geopolitics transformed, China and India: which will be more important and what everyone needs to know about China.
The meeting will be held at United Irish Cultural Center, 2700 45th Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94116 (between Sloat and Wawona). 11:30 AM no host cocktails; noon - luncheon. $25 member rate with advance reservation; $35 non-member rate or at door. E-mail RSVP to Mariko Kawaguchi (please indicate meat or fish) no later than 5PM 1/30/08: or mail check made out to "AFIO" to Peter Bresler, 1255 Post Street, Suite 427, San Francisco, CA 94109. Call Roger Dong (650) 339-0010 for any questions.

Sunday, 10 February 2008 1030 – 1330 - Beachwood, OH - AFIO Northern Ohio Chapter hosts Timothy R. Walton, author, CIA and Navy Veteran on "24 Years with the CIA." Timothy R. Walton has a B.A. in philosophy from the College of William and Mary, and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia. While in graduate school he had a Fulbright scholarship to do research at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, France.
From 1970 to 1976, he served in the U.S.Navy on ships and bases in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.
For 24 years, he was an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, during which he worked with personnel from law enforcement, the military, and foreign liaison services.
He has had a variety of experience teaching analysis, including:• Classes at the CIA's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis.• Mercyhurst College's program in the Washington D.C. area.• The Director of National Intelligence's "Analysis 101," which is offered to new analysts in all of the components of the US Intelligence Community.• A graduate-level class in competitive intelligence for the Johns Hopkins University business school.
He is also the author of The Spanish Treasure Fleets, the story of the centuries-long maritime struggle to control the flow of precious metals from Spain's colonies in Latin America.
Location: Hilton Cleveland East /Beachwood (Location not yet confirmed), 3663 Park East Drive, Beachwood, Ohio 44122, Tel: 1-216-464-5950 Fax: 1-216-464-6539
Cost: $24.00 per person
RSVP: Veronica Flint, (440) 338-4720 or at

16 February 08 - Kennebunk, ME - The Maine Chapter of AFIO will hear Brian Featheringham from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security.  Featheringham is responsible for the six southern counties of the State of Maine. The meeting, which is open to the public, will be held at the Kennebunk Free Library, corner of Rt. 1 and Rt. 35 in Kennebunk at 2:00 p.m.  For information call 207-364-8964 or 207-985-2392

Thursday, 21 February 2008, 12 noon – 1 pm – Washington, DC – author debriefing and book signing – Pete Earley author of Comrade J, at the Spy Museum. From 1997 to 2000, a man known as Comrade J was working in the U.S. as the highest-ranking operative in the SVR – a successor agency to the KGB. He directed all Russian spy action in New York City, and personally oversaw every covert operation against the U.S. and its allies in the UN. Comrade J recruited spies, planted agents, manipulated intelligence, and influenced American policy – all under the direct leadership of Boris Yeltsin followed by that of Vladimir Putin. He was a legend in the SVR: known as the man who kept the secrets. Then in 2000 he defected and turned the tables on Mother Russia – for two years he had acted as a double agent for the FBI. In Comrade J, Earley gives an account of this extraordinary spy. Free, no registration required.

22-23 February 2008 - Baltimore, MD - 3rd International Conference on "Ethics in the Intelligence Community", Sponsored by: International Intelligence Ethics Association and Johns Hopkins University School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership. Intelligence ethics is an emerging field without established principles for resolving the ethical problems confronting the intelligence community. Intelligence work has no theory analogous to "just war" theory in military ethics. Consequently, a focus of this conference is to provide a forum in which the application of ethical theories to intelligence problems can be discussed and a theory of “just intelligence” developed. This conference is co-sponsored by The International Intelligence Ethics Association and Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Leadership.
The conference will be held at The Johns Hopkins University-Mt. Washington Conference Center, in Baltimore, Maryland. The conference is open to all relevant disciplines, including political science, history, law enforcement, philosophy, international relations, theology, and to representatives of all legitimate stake-holders in intelligence ethics, including government, the press, and non-governmental organizations.
The 2-day conference begins on Friday morning, February 22nd and ends on Saturday afternoon, February 23, 2008. Attendees will be provided all meals during this time. The conference will consist of academic papers and panels, in a traditional lecture format with audience discussion. Privacy Policy: All presentations and discussions are on a “not for attribution” basis. No recording devices (cameras, audio recorders, etc.) that can capture images and sound are permitted.
A sample of the topics at the conference include:
• Torture & Ticking Time-Bombs: Empirical Research Regarding Moral Judgments
• Can Just War Theory Contribute to a Normative Framework for Intelligence Ethics? National Security vs. Social Security
• The Utility And Practicality Of A Code Of Ethics Specifically Addressing The Officer-Agent Relationship (i.e., HUMINT) And Could Such A Code Be Meaningful Or Useful In Real Operational Settings?
• A Professional Ethics Review Board for the Intelligence Community: Is it possible?
• Accountability vs. Politicalization: An Ethical Difference - With Case Studies
• Developing a Moral Framework for Making Complex Ethical Judgments For the Intelligence Professional
• Individual Rights vs. Collective Rights: A Moral Dilemma In Intelligence During National Emergency Situations?
Conference Location: Mt. Washington Conference Center, 5801 Smith Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21209; Information/Directions:
Registration till December 31, 2007 - Registration fee covers 3 meals on Friday and 2 meals on Saturday
$ 370 Conference Registration. Late Registration after January 1, 2008 Registration fee covers 3 meals on Friday and 2 meals on Saturday $ 395 Conference Registration
A limited number of suites are available at the conference center Suites, $150.00 a day [check in is Thursday, Tax and gratuities included] Mail To: International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA), P.O. Box 23053, Washington, D.C. 20026. Further information available from:

Saturday 23 February 2008, 11:30 am - Seattle, WA - The AFIO Pacific Northwest Chapter hosts a meeting at the Museum of Flight. The cost for the meeting will be $15 which will cover tea, juice and coffee.
The meeting will be offered in three parts:
Part 1: Welcome and Socializing – Starting at 11:30pm
Part 2: Starting at 12:30pm
Our AFIO guest speaker is retired USAF Major Loody Christofero.
Major Christofero has a fascinating history having flown in WW2 in the China, Burma, India theatre of operations. He has a wealth of exciting stories having flown 73 missions in a C46 Commando across “The Hump” the Himalayan mountains. It was the only way to get supplies into China to support the Chinese troops fighting the Japanese. Major Christofero was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, two Air Force medals and a Presidential Citation.
Part 3: At 2:00pm
At 2 pm we have arranged for our members and guests to adjourn to the to the main theatre to hear a presentation:
Vietnam Panel: “The Tet Offensive 40 Years Later”
On the Vietnamese Lunar New Year of 1968, the North Vietnamese forces launched a country-wide offensive known as the “Tet Offensive.” While it was a military disaster for the communists, news of the offensive led to widespread disaffection with the war among the American public. Forty years after this historical turning point, meet several of the men who served in uniform during this controversial conflict, both on the ground and in the air. The panel will include Colonel James Carlton who flew B-52s and then OV-10s over South Vietnam, Capt. Jonathan Hayes who flew F-4s over North Vietnam, and noted author Kregg Jorgenson who volunteered as a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) with H Company – 75th Airborne Rangers.
Again, the cost for the meeting will be $15 which will cover tea and coffee, payable in advance, which covers all of the above.
All ROTC friends are also asked to join for this event. The cost for ROTC members will be $5 payable at the door.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you will be attending and with how many quests. or 206 729 9700

6 March 2008 – San Francisco, CA – The AFIO Jim Quesada Chapter hosts Joe P. Russoniello, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of California. Mr. Russoniello will speak on how the U.S. government prosecutes terrorism cases.
The meeting will be held at United Irish Cultural Center, 2700 45th Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94116 (between Sloat and Wawona). 11:30 AM no host cocktails; noon - luncheon. $25 member rate with advance reservation; $35 non-member rate or at door. RSVP to Mariko Kawaguchi (please indicate meat or fish) no later than 5PM 2/27/08:, (650) 622-9840 X608 or send a check to P.O. Box 117578 Burlingame, CA 94011.

10 -11 March 2008 - Laurel, Maryland - 2008 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) is jointly sponsored by JHU/APL and the University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). It is also co-sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Department of State, and the National Intelligence Council. For 2008, the theme of integrating strategy, analysis, and technology to counter adversaries utilizing unrestricted warfare approaches. The focus will be on the DoD Campaign Plan for the War on Terrorism: Integrating Strategy, Analysis, and Technology in Support of the U.S. War on Terror Campaign. I am thrilled that Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM, has agreed to give the keynote address. Over the two days we will have four other featured speakers [Dr. Thomas Mahnken, ODUSD(Policy); Prof. Bruce Hoffman, Georgetown University; Dr. Stephen Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations; and Prof. Peter Feaver, Duke University], five roundtable panels, and a panel of senior-level government representatives responsible for various aspects of the War on Terror Campaign.
2008 registration details can be found at the symposium website:

Thursday, 13 March 2008, 3:00 PM - Reston, VA - The Washington Area Chapter of the International Association for Intelligence Education hosts a speaker on Intelligence Analysis. This first in a series of interviews by this group will be with Robert Clark (author of “Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach”) interviewed by Marilyn B. Peterson. Location: The Forum, 1892 Preston White Drive, Reston, VA 20191. To register: Bill Spracher at 202-231-4193 or Non-members are welcome and refreshments will be provided by i2, Inc.

Thursday, 20 March 2008, 6:30 pm – Washington, DC -“The Bomber Behind the Veil: Muslim Women and Violent Jihad– Farhana Ali, Rand Corp. policy analyst, at the Spy Museum. Beware the mujahidaat. Farhana Ali, an international policy analyst with the Rand Corporation, is one of the few researchers focused on these Muslin female fighters. She has charted an increase in suicide attacks by Muslim women since at least 2000, in new theaters of operation, including Uzbekistan, Egypt, and Iraq. These attacks are arguably more deadly than those conducted by male jihadists, in part due to the perception that women are unlikely to commit such acts of horror, and when they do, the shock or “CNN factor” of their attacks draws far greater media attention. She discusses their place in Islamic history, their psychological profile, and the likely shelf-life of this disturbing trend. Tickets: $20. Visit for tickets.

26-28 March 2008 - Raleigh, NC - The Fifth Raleigh Spy Conference at the NC Museum of History - Not to miss. Topic: CIA’s Unsolved Mysteries: The NOSENKO Case, Double Agents and Angleton’s Wilderness of Mirrors features top experts in counterintelligence to discuss unresolved issues from the Cold War:  Tennent "Pete" Bagley-- will discuss his book on KGB defector Yuri Nosenko, with its mysterious connections to Lee Harvey Oswald and John F. Kennedy that kicked off 40 years of unresolved internal strife  
Dave Robarge, Chief Historian for CIA and expert on infamous counterintelligence chief James Angleton, will discuss the controversy created by the former chief of counterintelligence for the Agency by his obsessive hunt for a Soviet mole. 
Brian Kelley, the wrong man in the Robert Hanssen spy case - and former counterintelligence officer for CIA, will use examples of defectors and double agents he uses as case models for courses he teaches to train espionage agents. 
Jerry Schecter, former correspondent for Time magazine in Moscow during the Cold War, and respected expert and author of books on Cold War espionage, was on hand to witness for the press the important cases of defectors and double agents in the heat of the Cold War. 
David Ignatius, former foreign editor - now columnist for the Washington Post - and author of espionage fiction, is respected in the "community" for his insights on the impact of defectors and double agents on the craft of espionage. 
Conference Costs: General Public: $250.00 Seniors: $175.00
AFIO Members, Teachers, Intelligence, Students, Military only $145.00!
Early registration available: Contact Jennifer Hadra at 919-831-0999 or More information and frequent updates at:

17-19 April 2008 - London, UK - The German Historical Institute in London hosts "Keeping Secrets" conference. The German Historical Institute in London is hosting a conference entitled "Keeping Secrets:  How Important was intelligence to the conduct of international relations from 1914 to 1939." Among the scholars expected to speak are Zara Steiner, General William Odom, Christopher Andrew, Ernest May, Paul Kennedy, Gerhard Weinberg, Mark Lowenthal, Richard Aldrich, Georges-Henri Soutou, and David Kahn. The conference will take place at the institute in central London from 17 to 19 April. For further information write Karina Kurbach at <>

23 - 25 June 2008 - Monterey, CA - The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) hosts 4th Annual Conference at the Naval Postgraduate School. The event is sponsored by Lockheed Martin. The theme: Creating Intelligence Studies Education Programs and Academic Standards." Speakers will include: Richards Heuer, Maureen Baginski, Joe Finder, Amy Zegart, Guillermo Holtzmann, and Ernest May. Fee: $400. Checks to IAFIE Conference, POB 10508, Erie, PA 16514. Or email

For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events


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