AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #45-10 dated 7 December 2010

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Latest International Spy Museum SpyCast® - Listen NOW.
Recorded December 6, 2010

David Kahn
Codebreaking - From Ancient Times to the Internet Era
Discussing modern, unbreakable codes and the
modern challenges and exciting careers ahead

David Kahn is the author of the classic book The Codebreakers. First published in 1967, the NSA was concerned the book might reveal sensitive secrets. Over the years, NSA changed from perceiving Kahn as "an enemy of the people" to depending on him as a popularizer of codebreaking. Join Peter Earnest and David Kahn as they discuss Kahn's career, some of the greatest triumphs of American signals intelligence history, and the challenges facing today's codebreakers. Listen NOW

15 December 2010, 1 pm - Washington, DC - LexisNexis will host its next Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table on "OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence."

LexisNexis will host its next Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table at the National Press Club on December 15, 2010. Doors open at noon, program to begin at 1:00pm. The focus will continue our theme of “OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence” and will explore the evolving role of traditional media and technology in the future.

The program will include keynote remarks by Mr. Douglas J. Naquin, Director of the DNI Open Source Center followed by a "perspectives" discussion with leading experts among our group of distinguished attendees. The discussion will be based on the future of OSINT as a recognized discipline in strategic and tactical national security decision-making.

Panelists will include:

  • Mr. Chet Lunner, former Deputy Under Secretary of Homeland Security in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
  • Ms. Suzanne Spaulding, Principal, Bingham Consulting and Of Counsel, Bingham McCutchen LLP
  • Mr. Jeff Stein, Washington Post SpyTalk columnist
  • Mr. Thomas Sanderson, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at Center for Strategic & International Studies, Transnational Threats Project

The OSINT Round Table was created to make a public space for discussion about the government’s needs for Open Source Intelligence in order to facilitate relationships between government officials and private sector leaders. We seek to foster an increasingly responsive open source intelligence infrastructure that meets the needs of national security decision makers.

Register to attend at

Teach Espionage and Counterintelligence

The University of Maryland University College is looking for a candidate to teach a graduate level course on espionage and counterintelligence. This course is part of the new Masters in Management: Intelligence Management program at UMUC. The Masters program is described here. The plan is to develop the course over the spring semester and teach it initially in the summer of 2011.
Course description: INMS 630 Espionage and Counterintelligence (3 credits)

An examination of the vulnerabilities of the United States, allied countries, and private businesses to espionage. Discussion covers case studies of espionage against America, including economic espionage against U.S. technology and business. Topics include the roles, missions, and espionage activities of foreign intelligence services. Major threat groups are assessed, and management issues related to countering these threats are evaluated. U.S policy issues and the management challenges of interagency cooperation among local, state, and international sources and public-private partnerships are explored.

UMUC employs many "practitioner-scholars" as adjunct instructors. As this program is in the Graduate School of Management and Technology, a PhD is preferred.

UMUC is the continuing and adult education arm of the University of Maryland system. All of the courses in this Masters program will be taught on-line using UMUC's WebTycho electronic classroom. It is the best on-line teaching software that I have encountered. UMUC has an excellent WebTycho training course for new instructors.

Please reply to


Timely Security Clearances Still a Problem. While significant overall progress has been made to improve the investigation and adjudication of personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner, the new report of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit stated, "certain agencies" nevertheless "continue to face challenges for meeting timeliness objectives."

With increasing concerns over the need for qualified intelligence analysts, linguists, subject matter experts, etc., especially in the areas of counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, the issue of timely security clearance processing and adjudication has become increasingly vital to national security.

The GAO audit report, Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum, stated that out of the 14 agencies included in its review, the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) met the 60-day timeliness objective in the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010 required by the personnel security clearance reforms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).

The majority of problems found by GAO are "largely attributable to the Department of Defense whose clearances comprise a vast majority of governmentwide initial clearances," GAO reported.

"Timeliness among the other executive branch agencies ranged from 62 to 154 days," GAO found, noting that "IRTPA and the recent Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 also require annual reporting on the progress made towards meeting objectives, including a discussion of impediments related to timeliness and quality."

IRTPA established an objective for all agencies to make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days. The majority of clearances are processed in line with the IRTPA 60-day objective.

GAO stated that "in light of long-standing problems with delays and backlogs, Congress mandated personnel security clearance reforms through" IRTPA, which "included requirements related to timeliness, reciprocity, and the creation of a single database to house personnel security clearance information.

In 2008, Executive Order 13467 established the Performance Accountability Council and GAO was asked to review the extent to which executive branch agencies investigate and adjudicate personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner, honor previously granted security clearances, and share personnel security clearance information in a single, integrated database.

GAO reviewed and analyzed Performance Accountability Council timeliness data for fiscal year 2009 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010. Congress's investigative arm also looked at "key clearance reform documents and conducted interviews with executive branch agencies, including members of the Intelligence Community, to discuss the three stated objectives."

"While the Performance Accountability Council has taken steps to assist in implementation of reform efforts, it has not reported on the impediments to meeting timeliness objectives for specific agencies not yet achieving this goal," GAO reported, adding that "Executive branch agency officials stated that they often honor previously granted personnel security clearances (i.e., grant reciprocity), but the true extent of reciprocity is unknown because governmentwide metrics do not exist."

GAO stated that "IRTPA generally requires that all personnel security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Agency officials stated that they grant reciprocity, but some noted that they have taken steps to obtain additional information before granting reciprocity. For example, officials stated that they may request copies of background investigation reports before they will honor a security clearance because information available in databases contain limited, summary level detail."

Continuing, GAO stated that "agency officials also reported that steps must be taken to conduct suitability determinations to ensure an applicant's character is appropriate for the position. The extent to which reciprocity is occurring is unknown because no metrics exist to consistently and comprehensively track reciprocity. Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database, steps have been taken to upgrade existing systems and increase information sharing."

According to GAO, "the Performance Accountability Council has opted to leverage existing systems in lieu of the single, integrated database required by IRTPA. Officials assert that a single database is not a viable option due to concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Therefore, a single search capability of existing databases is being used to address the IRTPA requirement. For example, information from two primary databases can now be accessed from a single entry point, allowing executive branch agencies to share clearance information with one another."

GAO said "the Intelligence Community agencies share information through a separate database. GAO recommends that the Performance Accountability Council collaborate with executive agencies to develop a plan to improve timeliness for those agencies not yet achieving the 60-day timeliness objective and metrics to track reciprocity."

In commenting on the GAO's draft report, the Performance Accountability Council concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. [Kimery/HSToday/1December2010] 

NSA Hunting Russian Mole in US Intelligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) is conducting a counterintelligence probe at its Fort Meade, Md., headquarters in a top-secret hunt for a Russian agent, according to a former intelligence official close to the agency.

The former official said the probe grew out of the case of 10 Russian "illegals," or deep-cover spies, who were uncovered last summer and sent back to Moscow after the defection of Col. Alexander Poteyev, a former SVR foreign intelligence officer who reportedly fled to the U.S. shortly before Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited here in June.

Col. Poteyev is believed to be the source who disclosed the U.S.-based agent network.

NSA counterintelligence officials suspect that members of the illegals network were used by Russia's SVR spy agency to communicate with one or more agents inside the agency, which conducts electronic intelligence gathering and code-breaking.

One sign that the probe is fairly advanced is that FBI counterintelligence agents are involved in the search.

"They are looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA is convinced reside at Fort Meade and possibly other DoD intel offices, like DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]," the former official said. "NSA is convinced that at least one is at NSA."

Some of the 10 illegals who were posing as U.S. citizens helped service Russian agents working inside the U.S. intelligence community, the former official said.

No other details of the investigation could be learned. [Gertz/DailyCaller/2December2010]

Syrian Spy Chiefs Deploying to Foreign Capitals. Syrian intelligence chiefs made discreet visits to London, Rome, Paris, Beijing and possibly Pyongyang in recent days, according to a new report, a development all the more intriguing in light of WikiLeaks' disclosures this week that President Bashar Assad might be willing to distance himself from Hamas.

The reasons for dispatching his senior intelligence officials abroad are not clear, but according to the Paris-based Intelligence Online newsletter, "Syrian intelligence services have been engaged in intensive diplomatic activity of late."

Gen. Ali Mamlouk, an Assad intimate and head of Syria's General Intelligence service, made an unannounced trip to London from Nov. 16 through 20, said the subscription-only newsletter. At his side was Gen. Tha'er al-Omar, described as head of the service's anti-terrorism component, and Gen. Hafez Makhlouf, the head if its internal branch, "who was traveling outside Syria for the first time."

U.K. officials "shrouded the visit in absolute secrecy," IO reported, citing sources in Damascus. Mamlouk went on to Paris on Nov. 22 to lay the groundwork for an upcoming visit by Assad.

In London, presumably, the Syrians met with their U.K. counterparts who, like the CIA, have found common ground with Damascus in combating al-Qaeda and its allies.

Mamlouk was said to have also met with lawyers from Matrix Chambers, who have been defending the regime during the U.N. inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. A final report in the long-running probe is considered imminent.

Assad described Hamas as an "uninvited guest" in a 2009 meeting with a U.S. congressional delegation, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, and likened its presence in Syria to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which his father crushed in the 1980s. Assad hinted that he might be willing to break with Hamas in exchange for "incentives," such as being allowed to buy U.S. commercial aircraft and parts.

Mamlouk was in Rome on Oct. 19 signing an anti-terrorism agreement, IO also reported, accompanied by his top foreign intelligence official, Zouheir Hamad, and his Brussels station chief, Fou'ad Fadel.

Just as Mamlouk was leaving London, meanwhile, another General Intelligence official, Gen. Bassam Merhej, described as "director of Assad's security and military bureau," was arriving in China.

"His real destination was probably Pyongyang, with whom Syria has a nuclear co-operation program," IO reported. A heavy water reactor obtained from North Korea was destroyed in September 2007.

A former deputy general director of air force intelligence, Mamlouk was appointed head of the General Intelligence service by Assad in June 2005 and is in frequent contact with his Gulf States counterparts, according to reports. [Stein/WashingtonPost/2December2010] 

White House Calls for Review to Stop Leaks. The White House has named a longtime counter terrorism official to head up an inter-agency review on the handling of classified and secret government files in the aftermath of the latest dump of sensitive documents by the website WikiLeaks.

Russell Travers, who has spent more than 30 years working inside the government's intelligence community, has been tapped to oversee a broad review of the handling of classified material and help come up with reforms to thwart another wide-scale theft of government documents, according to the White House.

The President's Intelligence Advisory Board will also conduct an independent review of how the executive branch shares and protects classified information. The board is tasked with ensuring that agencies have a proper understanding of the requirements in safeguarding classified information, getting a general sense of government officials' attitudes on leaks, and assessing how the government handles sensitive information and documents.

Travers, who is deputy director at the National Counter terrorism Center, will add the title of national security staff's senior adviser for information access and security policy.

Travers will "lead a comprehensive effort to identify and develop the structural reforms needed in light of the Wikileaks breach," the White House said in a statement.

Administration officials downplayed the damage caused by the leaks of confidential cables from U.S. embassies worldwide, but have vowed to prosecute anyone found to have played a role in leaking the documents to WikiLeaks.

Some of the leaked cables included U.S. diplomats retelling blunt talk from world leaders - who never dreamed their comments to American envoys would be made public - as well as snarky opinions by diplomats who believed cables would be seen only by colleagues in Washington.

"The fact is governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they think we can keep secrets," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said earlier this week. [Madhani/GovExec/2December2010]

Iran Says UN Agency Sending Spies, Not Inspectors. Iran's intelligence chief accused the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency of sending spies in the guise of inspectors to gather information about Iran's nuclear activities, state TV reported Saturday.

The claim was another sign that Iran has hardened its stance since the assassination a week ago of a prominent nuclear scientist and the wounding of another. Iran is to hold talks on Monday and Tuesday in Geneva with world powers trying to persuade it to curtail key elements of its nuclear work.

Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi said staff sent by the International Atomic Energy Agency had engaged in espionage and the Vienna-based agency must take responsibility for their actions. He did not elaborate or identify the inspectors Iran was accusing.

Iran has increasingly complained in recent months about the leaking of information gathered by the agency's inspectors to U.S. officials and other allies.

"Among the individuals the IAEA sends as so-called inspectors, there are spies from intelligence services. The IAEA must be held responsible for this," state TV quoted Moslehi as saying.

Iran says Monday's killing of nuclear scientist Majid Shahriari in a bomb attack and the wounding of another scientist in a separate attack in Tehran was part of a Western campaign to sabotage its nuclear program.

According to Iran, that campaign has included the abduction of Iranian scientists, the sale of faulty equipment and the planting of a destructive computer worm known as Stuxnet, which briefly brought Iran's uranium enrichment activity to a halt last month.

Iran's chief suspect is archenemy Israel, whose Mossad spy agency has a long history of assassinating foes far beyond the country's borders.

Moslehi again accused Israel's Mossad, Britain's MI6 and the CIA of being behind the daring attacks.

Iran has also expressed its displeasure with IAEA chief Yukiya Amano's report, issued this week, on its nuclear program. The report said Iran had fewer centrifuges functioning than previously believed, suggesting its uranium enrichment program was not progressing as fast as Iran hoped.

Iran says the IAEA should just inspect the nuclear facilities and not release details like how much uranium or how many centrifuges it has.

The U.S. and its allies suspect Iran's nuclear work is aimed at producing weapons. Iran says it only wants to enrich uranium to make fuel for power plants and not process it to the higher levels needed to make weapons. [AP/3December2010] 

Former Russian Intelligence Officer Dismisses Putin's Spy Claims. A former officer in Russia's military intelligence service has refuted Vladimir Putin's claim that Russian spies do not engage in torture or kidnapping, saying such methods are widespread.

In an interview with CNN earlier this week the Russian prime minister, himself a former KGB spy, claimed that Russia's spies were much more principled than their American counterparts and were not known to have been involved "in creating secret prisons, kidnappings or torture."

Historian Boris Volodarsky, a UK-based veteran of Russia's GRU military intelligence service, said however that Mr. Putin's comments were wide of the mark.

"Everyone knows about the methods that were and are used by the FSB security service and especially by the FSB's Special Forces in the Caucasus republics (in southern Russia) and in Chechnya," Mr. Volodarsky told Radio Free Europe.

"It is very well known that people are kidnapped, tortured and killed with the direct participation of employees from Russia's intelligence services." Mr. Volodarsky, who has written a book about the Kremlin's secret assassination squads over the years, also questioned Mr. Putin's other central claim that the 10 Russian spies deported from America this summer did no damage to US interests.

He said the group, including glamorous agent Anna Chapman, would have had a range of tasks to fulfill including identifying new agents to recruit. Their main task however would have been to act as a go-between for agents in the field by passing information between them and diplomats in the Russian embassy, he added.

Mr. Putin gave his interview to CNN in the same week as he and his country found themselves targeted in a series of leaked US diplomatic cables that portrayed Russia as a virtual "mafia state."

Mr. Putin rejected allegations that he had amassed a secret fortune through corruption in the Kremlin, or that he had probably known of the plot to murder Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006.

"These are mere insinuations, total nonsense, and it is very hard to imagine that diplomats are spreading this like tabloids," Dmitry Peskov, Mr. Putin's spokesman, told the Interfax news agency.

"If there are real diplomats behind these texts, it is frustrating and regretful that non-professionals are working in our country. One can only hope that eventually their professionalism will grow and they will stop using rumours as a basis for diplomatic correspondence."

President Dmitry Medvedev, who would have read US descriptions of him as little more than Mr. Putin's sidekick or more specifically that he was "Robin to Putin's batman", made it clear on Friday that he too was annoyed but said the leaks would not derail rapidly warming ties between Washington and Moscow.

"We are not paranoid. We do not tie Russia-US relations to any leaks. But at the same time, these are indicative," he said. "They show the entire extent of the cynicism of these evaluations." [Osborn/Telegraph/4December2010] 

Naval Intelligence Specialist Stationed at Bragg Investigated for Espionage. A Navy intelligence specialist stationed at Fort Bragg is under investigation for espionage after he allegedly sold top secret documents to an undercover FBI agent posing as a foreign intelligence officer, according to a search warrant filed in federal court on Friday.

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is investigating Bryan Minkyu Martin, of the Naval Reserve, after several staged buys of intelligence at two Spring Lake hotels.

A search of public records filed in an online federal court database indicated Martin had not yet been charged in connection with the case.

According to the search warrant, filed by Special Agent Richard Puryear with NCIS, Martin enlisted in the Navy on Nov. 30, 2006, and completed basic training on July 20, 2007. He received a top secret clearance on Sept. 20, 2007, and was subsequently stationed with the Navy Reserve unit Defense Intelligence Agency, according to the warrant.

He was assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg on Sept. 16 of this year.

Two months later, on Nov. 15, Martin met an undercover FBI agent in the lobby of the Hampton Inn on Bragg Boulevard in Spring Lake, according to the warrant. The special agent, posing as a foreign intelligence officer, brought Martin to his room, where Martin discussed his access to military computer networks and classified networks, according to the warrant.

Martin also told the agent that he was seeking "long-term financial reimbursement," and that he could be very valuable over a 15- or 20-year career, which he expected would take him to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the warrant says.

Martin offered to bring the agents two documents at their next meeting and accepted $500 in cash from the agent, according to the warrant.

At a meeting the next day at the same hotel, Martin produced two documents - one labeled "secret" and the other "top secret" and accepted $1,500 in cash, the warrant alleges. He agreed to meet the agent again on Nov. 19, when he produced 51 pages of secret and top secret documents, according to the warrant. He was paid another $1,500, according to the warrant.

Martin also failed to report the contacts to any member of his chain of command, according to the warrant.

The warrant authorized NCIS agents to search the room Martin was using on base, Room 315 at the Landmark Inn on Fort Bragg and his 2009 gold Nissan Altima. It does not address how Martin came under suspicion or how he came into contact with the undercover FBI agent.

Martin's status with the Navy wasn't immediately known. [Halpin/FAObserver/3December2010] 

Another Blow for MI5 Secrecy. Two appeal court judges have delivered a significant blow to MI5, which was already reeling as a result of recent rulings rejecting its claims for secrecy. It has done so in no uncertain terms, explaining why it dismissed the home secretary's application for judicial review of the July 7 inquest coroner's ruling that she did not have the power to receive sensitive evidence about the security service in a closed hearing.

The contention that the coroner can choose who can be present at closed sessions of an inquest puts her "in the invidious position of having to say that she trusts certain parties but not others", said Lord Justice Stanley Burnton. She may have to rely on the views of MI5, whose own responsibility the inquest is investigating. That, he added, would be an "undesirable situation".

Anyway, he continued, "the contention that the coroner has an implied power to hold secret sessions when she considers that it would be in the interests of national security to do so is hopeless".

MI5 appears to be up against a brick wall. The judges (Lords Justice Burnton and Maurice Kay) referred to other ways to prevent MI5 information being disclosed. One was the use of PII - public interest immunity certificates.

The trouble with that, as MI5 appears from the judgment to have pointed out, is that, "if the coroner is prohibited from taking such material into consideration, particularly in relation to preventability, there is a risk that she will reach a conclusion on less than full information and, for example, the security service may be subjected to criticism which may be unjust in the light of the contents of the PII material".

MI5 suggested that parts of the inquests could take the form of a closed hearing "from which all but the security service and their legal representatives and counsel to the inquests and those instructing them were excluded". The coroner could then consider the material but "be circumspect in her references to it in her final decision".

The problem with that, say those bereaved families pressing for openness, is that "there would be a decision based at least in part upon material which they will not have seen, which decision would lack intelligible reasoning".

The judges referred to attempts by James Eadie QC, counsel for the home secretary, to "attempt to pre-empt legislation which is either not yet in force or has been rejected in the recent past by Parliament - a reference to two failed attempts by the Labor government to allow some parts of coroners' inquests to be held in secret on national security grounds.

Then judges refer, too, to the possibility of transforming the inquests into a judicial inquiry. "One can conceive of practical difficulties but also pragmatic solutions. However, they are not matters for this court", Kay observes.

A possible solution, as the judges' ruling suggests, would be special advocates to be appointed. They would see the MI5 material but neither bereaved families nor their own lawyers would. And that would need a new statute. The problems facing MI5 in this case could give it more ammunition for the green paper the government promises next year with the aim of stopping intelligence information in the hands of MI5 and MI6 from ever being disclosed in any court hearings.

Meanwhile, Theresa May will have to make a decision on the July 7 inquests - whether to enable the bereaved families to see all the evidence about what MI5 knew about two of the suicide bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer; whether to seek PII gagging orders on large swathes of the MI5 material; or whether to turn the inquests into a judicial inquiry. [Taylor-Norton/Guardian/30November2010]

Russia Reshuffles Foreign Intelligence After Spy Scandal. Russia's foreign intelligence service, the SVR, is holding a minor staff reshuffle following the recent Russian - U.S. spy scandal, SVR Director Mikhail Fradkov said.

"We make constant changes to our personnel," Fradkov said. "Those who do not meet modern requirements are of course asked to leave quietly."

A spy row between Moscow and Washington broke out in late June when 10 alleged Russian spies were arrested in the United States. The spies were freed in a swap deal between the two countries.

Russian media reported that a man known only as Col. Shcherbakov, who was the chief of an SVR department handling all intelligence sources in the United States, was to blame for the exposure of the Russian intelligence officers working under assumed identities.

Fradvov agreed with comments made by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev earlier in November that the SVR must learn from the episode.

He also said the SVR would analyze documents leaked by the WikiLeaks whistleblowing website on Sunday.

"There is nothing good about these materials," Fradkov said.

The site disclosed comments made at a meeting in Paris in February between U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then French Foreign Minister Herve Morin. In it Gates describes Russia in blunt terms: "Russian democracy has disappeared and the government is an oligarchy run by the security services."

The main suspect in the leak of the documents, along with previous logs disclosed by the site, is jailed U.S. Private Bradley Manning, who had top-secret clearance as an intelligence analyst for the Army when he was stationed in Iraq.

The WikiLeaks website does not have a central office or any paid staff and its operations are run only by a small dedicated team and some 800 volunteers.

Wikileaks' founder, Australian activist Julian Assange, has no home address but he often pops up in Sweden and Iceland, where Internet anonymity is protected by law. He is being hunted by Pentagon investigators and is suspected of releasing confidential U.S. State Department documents. [Rian/30November2010] 

Pak Journalist Serves Legal Notices on 3 US Officials. A Pakistani journalist based in North Waziristan Agency has served legal notices, for the damages amounting to $500 million, on three top US officials for carrying out drone attacks in Pakistan's bordering areas and killing his family members.

Kareem Khan, a journalist by profession, through his counsel has served legal notices on US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, Director Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Leon Panetta, and CIA Station Chief in Islamabad, Jonathan Banks through US embassy in Pakistan. The legal experts have considered the notices as the first ever legal notices that have been served on top US officials holding them responsible for carrying drone attacks in the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan.

Kareem disclosed this in a jam-packed press conference along with his counsel, Mirza Shahzad Akbar at the National Press Club amid presence of national and international media. The journalist's brother, Asif Iqbal, his son, Zaenullah Khan along with a mason were killed in a drone attack on 31st of December, 2009 in Village Machikhel, Tehsil Mir Ali of North Waziristan. Asif Iqbal, a schoolteacher by profession, had graduated in English Literature from National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad while Zaenullah Khan was employed as a helping staff in a local school. The horrible incident took place when missiles were fired by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) also known as 'drone' on the 'Hujra', situated within the four walls of the ancestral house of Khan.

Kareem, during the press conference, said that all the three persons killed in the drone attack were innocent and had nothing to do with the 'so-called' war on terror, saying it was an extra-judicial killing by all means. "My house was severely damaged and that Hujra converted into rubble", he informed.

He through his counsel alleged that CIA acted on faulty intelligence gathered from locals who were given money in return.

The legal notice, a copy of which is available with The Nation, served on the US officials stated that CIA officials, being non-diplomat and non-armed forces members were operating drone attacks in Pakistan.

The notice stated that CIA Director Leon Panetta admitted the command and control of drone attacks in Pakistan as he was reported in the media saying that 'Drone attacks were precise and limited in terms of collateral damage'. "Our client's case is a clear contradiction of what Panetta is proudly saying", the legal notice added. Khan also challenged the precision of drone attacks specially questioned the precision of 31st of December 2009 attack wherein CIA took three innocent lives in a clandestine manner. Kareem Khan through his counsel has said that no law, custom or authority gave CIA the permission to carry out killings in the sovereign territory of another country, saying it was the illegal act of CIA and US. He has termed the drone attack on his house a clear violation of UN's Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the fundamental rights given to the citizens of Pakistan through the Constitution.

The counsel for Khan has through the notice said, "Our client demands of you to immediately stop drone attacks in Pakistan saving any future loss of innocent lives and to pay to him the sum of USD 500 millions as compensation money for the loss caused to our client within 14 days from receipt of this notice". The notice said that Khan would be entitled to institute proceedings in the court of law for the recovery of the referred sum if the respondents failed to reply the notice within stated time period.

Kareem Khan in the press conference said that drone attacks were carried out in the tribal areas by CIA from Langley, Virginia, USA and CIA's Islamabad Station Chief, Jonathan Banks coordinated such intelligence through the network of on ground spies. He also requested the Federal Government through the Ministry of Interior to put Jonathon Banks's name on the exit control list (ECL) till the settlement of the issue after his legal claim. He maintained that Banks was not a US diplomat therefore he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity and his involvement in execution of his son and brother simply made him a murderer who was to be taken to task. He also requested Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to take suo moto notice of the matter and order Pakistan's Government to protect its citizens from the American aggression.

Mirza Shahzad Akbar, the counsel for Khan, during the press conference said that he would pursue the case in a civil court of Islamabad and such notices could also be served on Pakistani officials for their alleged involvement. He termed it the responsibility of the US to respect the Pakistan's court once the proceedings were initiated. [Nation/30November2010] 

Judge Won't Release Witness Names Early in NSA Leak Case. A federal judge refused Monday to release the names of potential defense witnesses in a criminal case against a former NSA employee accused of leaking classified information to a reporter, calling the prosecutors' request "highly unusual."

The U.S. Department of Justice had argued that it needed to know witness identities now, months before the scheduled March trial, to ensure that they could be trusted with sensitive information. But attorneys for defendant Thomas Drake, who worked at the National Security Agency until mid-2008, said the government was overreaching.

Drake, who lives in Glenwood, was indicted under the Espionage Act in April on charges he illegally retained national defense information, obstructed justice and made false statements to agents for the FBI.

The 10-count indictment states that Drake gave classified information to a reporter, but does not charge him with leaking. Court documents do not name the reporter or newspaper involved, but sources have indicated it was a former national security correspondent for The Baltimore Sun.

Drake's defenders say he was trying to expose government waste and possible fraud, and point to his case as an example of hypocrisy within the Obama administration, which campaigned on a platform of transparency in government, yet has brought more leak prosecutions than the three previous administrations combined, including:

- Shortly after Drake was indicted, officials renewed a Bush administration investigation into New York Times reporter James Risen's confidential sources.

- Army Spc. Bradley Manning has been in custody since May for allegedly leaking classified military information to the online organization WikiLeaks.

- That same month, an FBI contract worker - Samuel Shamai Leibowitz of Silver Spring - was sentenced to 20 months in prison for leaking documents to a blogger.

- And in August, State Department contractor Stephen Jin-Woo Kim was indicted on charges of leaking information to a Fox news reporter about North Korea's planned response to U.N sanctions.

With each indictment, Department of Justice representatives condemned the willful disclosure of classified information. In the Drake case, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer said "national security demands that the sort of conduct alleged here - violating the government's trust by illegally retaining and disclosing classified information - be prosecuted and prosecuted vigorously."

Jesselyn Radack, a former DOJ adviser and whistleblower who viewed the proceedings Monday, called the series of prosecutions "very disconcerting." She works for the Government Accountability Project, which advocates for whistleblower protections.

Drake's "case in particular is even more disturbing," Radack said, "because the whistleblower went through all the proper channels, chapter, line and verse in terms of complaining internally."

Drake, who declined to comment Monday, worked for the NSA from 2001 through 2008. Early in his tenure, according to supporters, he and others complained about mismanagement of an expensive data collection program to the Department of Defense's inspector general and others within the federal government.

He's accused of later giving similar information to a reporter at a "national newspaper." News organizations and a government source familiar with the investigation identified Siobhan Gorman and The Sun as the reporter and newspaper referred to in the indictment.

Gorman published several articles in The Sun citing multiple sources in 2006 and 2007; she now works for the Wall Street Journal.

Drake has pleaded not guilty to all charges. [Bishop/BaltimoreSun/30November2010] 


CIA Source Who Built Case for War Swindles $10,000 from Iraq. The plump, smooth-talking stranger hailing himself as a patriot and liberator should have been enough reason for caution. And if that didn't ring alarm bells, a check of his name, Rafid Ahmed Alwan, through any internet search engine most definitely would have.

But neither instinct nor due diligence managed to stop the man the world knows as Curveball from swindling yet another government earlier this year - this time his own - in a $10,000 scam that reveals how little he has changed since his false claims helped the US come up with a pretext to invade Iraq almost eight years ago.

The return to notoriety of Curveball began in September last year when an unassuming member of Iraq's National Reconciliation Commission, Fa'al Niema Thehieb, took a call from an expatriate, now living in Germany, who said he wanted to return home to form a political party that could help the re-election campaign of Nouri al-Maliki.

The caller was Curveball, the most infamous of all Iraqi defectors in the lead-up to the 2003 war. He had stayed away from his homeland for a decade, during which time he had fooled the CIA and Germany's BND into believing Saddam Hussein had a secret biological weapons program that could be moved around the country on lorries.

His fabulous tales of dispensing biotoxins to the winds forever tainted the career of the then US secretary of state, Colin Powell, who used them in his abortive attempt to win United Nations support for the Iraq invasion.

This time around, however, his deception was on nowhere near as grand a scale.

"We spoke on the telephone and I invited him to Iraq," said Thehieb in his office in Baghdad recently. "I asked him to come here as a guest of the government."

Curveball was given a security detail and a room in a plush hotel - all paid for from government coffers. He arrived claiming he had formed a political group, which he called the Development and Reform party, which was to nominate in Baghdad and Najaf for the general election held on 7 March this year. He paid a $20,000 registration fee and sat down to meet Theheib.

"He said he had important information which may help the Government's re-election," said Thehieb. "He said he had played a role in the liberation of Iraq, but he wasn't specific. After a while it became clear to me that neither he or his friend had anything to offer. I told them that we could not support them after three days as our guests. I said this is their country and they are free to stay if they choose."

That's where it would have ended, if curiosity had not got the better of Thehieb, who wanted to send his teenage daughter abroad to study radiology.

Curveball said he could help her get started in Germany, where he remains under the protection of the German spy service, the BND, who according to a German documentary to be aired tonight on NDR Channel provided him with German nationality in 2008 after offering him protection for a decade.

"He told me it would cost $10,000 to help with her visa application and residency," said Thehieb. "He said the Germans would not treat my daughter as a potential asylum seeker if she had money in a bank account in Germany."

Thieheb sent the money to Curveball via a Western Union transfer last December. Curveball soon collected it, but Thehieb has not heard from him since.

Several months ago Thehieb registered a complaint with the Iraqi consulate in Frankfurt and has enlisted friends to help track Curveball down. "I know it won't be easy," said a somewhat sheepish Thehieb. "I've heard he owes the greengrocer a lot of money too."

Stories of Iraq's most famous defector misbehaving in his new home town of Karlsruhe have become legendary. He is reported to have developed a taste for whiskey and blondes. He gets around town in an old Mercedes, believed to have been given to him by the still-supportive German spy service. But despite the high life, things haven't always gone well for Curveball during his self-imposed exile. He was seen flipping burgers for a living at one point and his small flat could best be described as modest.

And then there's the failed foray into Iraqi politics. Curveball's party attracted only 1,311 votes in the March election, 663 in Baghdad and 648 in Najaf. He did just as poorly during an earlier tilt at public life ahead of provincial elections in 2008.

"This is life in Iraq," said Thehieb, with a sense of grudging admiration. "I don't care so much about the $10,000. But I admit, if I had known the full extent of what he had done, of course I wouldn't have done business with him.

"We can thank him for one thing though: he got rid of Saddam Hussein."

Others who dealt with their country's best-known fabulist seem bemused at their encounters.

"I didn't actually meet him, said Ziad al-Salehi, a spokesman for the Najaf Council, who ended up standing on Curveball's ticket. "He was vouched for by someone I knew and I joined up. But this is the first time I have heard about his reputation and the fact that he was the reason my country was invaded." [Guardian/1December2010]

Who is New Mossad Chief Tamir Pardo? Tamir Pardo was announced Monday as the new chief of Israel's Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, the Mossad.

Pardo, 57, served twice as deputy Mossad chief. He spent his entire career in the organization, serving as an IDF communications officer as well as in the elite commando unit Sayeret Matkal.

During his service in Sayeret Matkal he was under the command of Yoni Netanyahu, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's older brother, who was killed during Operation Entebbe in Uganda in 1976.

After completing his military service, Pardo was recruited to the Mossad, serving in various positions, including head of a department responsible, according to foreign publications, for operations in various destinations, which include wire tapping and photography.

Pardo also performed several management positions in the Mossas, primarily technology-related. Pardo is relatively inexperienced in the field of HUMINT, intelligence gathered by human agents. However, he was exposed to such activity during his position as deputy chief, as he was in charge of Mossad operations.

Pardo served as deputy chief under outgoing chief Meir Dagan from 2002 until 2005, when Pardo went on leave hoping to return to the position of chief.

During his absence from the Mossad, Pardo was a special operations advisor for the IDF. Pardo then returned to the position of deputy chief, after Dagan had caused the dismissal of his former deputy, suspected of leaking material to the press.

Pardo hoped that Dagan would retire and recommend him as his successor, but in 2009 Dagan's term was extended for another 6 months, which caused Pardo to finally retire from the Mossad.

Other potential candidates mulled over by Netanyahu were Shin Bet director Yuval Diskin, retiring Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin and Teva CEO, former Maj. Gen. Shlomo Yanai, who refused the offer.

The only blemish in Pardo's record is his involvement in the Galant case, in which IDF officials tried to sabotage incoming Chief of Staff Yoav Galant's candidacy by forging a PR document attributed to him. Apparently Pardo had known about the document before it reached Channel 2 reporter Amnon Abramovitch. However, Defense Minister Ehud Barak approved the nomination despite Pardo's involvement in the case.

Pardo's appointment is an attempt to diffuse criticism from within the Mossad, which has seen its directors come from outside of the organization. Many senior Mossad officials will undoubtedly approve of Pardo as chief.

In his new position, Pardo will have to deal with the Mossad's major challenge, which continues to be Iran's nuclear program. [Melman/Haaretz/29November2010] 

Oleg Gordievsky : Russian Spies: They Can't Take Their Eyes Off Us. There is little that changes in the world of espionage. The Russians have been spying on Britain since the days of Sidney Reilly, the "Ace of Spies", who was executed for his part in attempting to overthrow the Bolshevik regime in 1918. Ever since then, the Russian secret services have hated their British counterparts. But if Katia Zatuliveter is a spy, the Russians appear to have had a new kind of star.

Once, the role of an attractive young woman in an espionage tale was simply to be the honeypot, but Zatuliveter is suspected of being a serious agent, and probably a very effective one. Many of the agents deployed now are far more dynamic than in my day: they speak foreign languages fluently, work in important companies and institutions, and move between countries and jobs with ease. They are often better than the officers they work for - and, working within Parliament, would be worth more to Moscow than the whole of the KGB's London station.

In 1985, when I escaped from the Soviet Union, there were 25 KGB officers and 14 GRU officers - their military counterparts - working at the embassy in London. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, there are exactly the same number there now.

The operation in London is nowhere near as big as in the US or Germany, largely because of the number of expulsions - in 1971, 105 "diplomats" were thrown out; then, in 1985, another 31 were expelled; and in 1989, 11 went, followed by occasional expulsions ever since. But with a total of 39 officers, and at least 20,000 Russian students, along with numerous others working in banks and other companies, it is easier than ever to work and recruit here. If anything, the overall Russian espionage presence in Britain is now bigger and more active than in my time.

We viewed the golden age of spying for our country as having passed. We knew it was difficult to recruit agents in Britain and saw our job as just being an important department of state - albeit one as large as the rest of the embassy. The number of people actually working with contacts was no more than 28 and of those, only 10 were focused on political espionage, with the remainder working on industrial spying, and infiltrating the police and intelligence agencies.

In those days, Moscow demanded that each officer had about 10 contacts or acquaintances among British people. Not all were able to manage that - some were stupid, unsociable or just incapable, and it was a mistake to send them to London in the first place. One middle-ranking officer would take his money for operations but never left the office and never wrote a report. The agents they ran were just as bad, with some of them pretending to be helpful but doing nothing and not even bothering to report in.

A lot of the agents I inherited when I arrived in London in 1982 as "chief resident" at the embassy were ageing communists. Jack Jones, the union leader, was about the only one that did well. We had a couple of contacts in Parliament, but one of them was Scottish and I could never understand what he was saying, although I wrote up the reports anyway.

Recruiting British people has always been difficult because they are more careful by nature than other nationals - Italy and India were a different story. Italy must have had at least 50 agents and in India they would literally queue around the block offering themselves as spies. That is the way the Russians got their best agents - among them Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen (in the US), who came forward rather than being approached.

If Zatuliveter was a spy, it sounds as though she was recruited as a member of the public, rather than an employee of the SVR, the foreign intelligence agency that succeeded the KGB. That may well have taken place in St. Petersburg, where she was a student and where it was once the job of Vladmir Putin, now the Russian prime minister, to recruit students just like her. This was real, systematic spy work that started with recruiting undergraduates aged 17 or 18 and may, in her case, have continued with sending her to work on a postgraduate course in Bradford.

The new generation of agents is not just asked to work for the KGB but to recruit for themselves from among their circle of friends, working for the "future of Europe". By the time she arrived in Britain, she would have been well trained enough to launch a fantastic, but short-lived, career.

Zatuliveter was in a position where she had access to strategic, political and military secrets; where she was able to ask official questions of the British government, while working for a Member of Parliament; and all the time was meeting a string of influential and interesting people. No normal officer would be able to obtain such information, to go to the House of Commons or the European Parliament, or to meet such important contacts. She would have been a treasure for the London station.

It seems incredible that she was in this country for three years, dealing with potentially sensitive material, before MI5 stopped her. If she was a Russian officer, the Security Service's concern would undoubtedly have been to identify who was running her. But that would have been hidden very thoroughly because she would have been vulnerable as soon as they knew the identity of her Russian case officer. MI5 cannot have constant surveillance of suspects such as Zatuliveter. Most of its resources are devoted to counter-terrorism operations and if she was careful about when and where she met the officer controlling her, she would have been able to get away with her activities for a long time.

On the holiday she is said to have taken to Croatia, she would almost certainly not have been under surveillance. She might as easily have gone to Brussels or Strasbourg. If she was in Belgium, she could be sure that no one was watching her, unless a team had been sent from London, although France is not as easy. But it is most likely that a controller was in London - someone who knew which parliamentary and Cabinet committees should be looked at; and what questions needed to be asked.

So how was she identified? The Russian section of MI5, whose job it is to catch such spies, is not as good as it was in my day - it is staffed by a handful of young officers who are kept very busy.

I suspect that while Zatuliveter was apparently becoming an important agent, she will have dropped her guard. She seems to have believed she was invisible; with her short skirt and long legs, she probably thought she could divert attention from her activities, and for a while she may well have done, until MI5 caught up with her. For her, at least, the game is over. [Oleg Gordievsky was a colonel in the KGB and head of station in London. He worked as a double agent for MI6. He was arrested in 1985 in Russia and escaped back to Britain.] [Gordievsky/Telegraph/7December2010]


The West Has Built a Digital Maginot Line - And Chinese Spies are Sneaking Past, by Will Heaven. When one of Gordon Brown's advisers took a pretty Chinese girl to his Shanghai hotel room two years ago, he had no idea he was caught up in a classic spymaster's sting. In the Spectator this week, Fraser Nelson reminds us that the girl, who glided across a disco floor earlier that evening, was a honeytrap: "When he woke up, the bird had flown - and had taken his Blackberry with her, with all its various contact information."

That was January 2008. So I wonder how many times that snare was repeated during the Beijing Olympics later that year. Imagine: attractive spies, preying on hundreds of jaded, drunken spads who were on tour with their political bosses. A field day for the Ministry of State Security.

But the Chinese secret services are using much subtler methods, too. "We daren't even take our laptops into China," one FTSE100 banking director told Fraser. "They will swipe all the information at the airport." Even worse, they're carrying out most cyber attacks remotely, mining information that is stored on servers in the UK, from all over the world - making anything from the national grid to the banking system vulnerable, and each attack almost untraceable.

The question is: are we doing enough about it? "The most eloquent comment between what Britain can do and what it needs to do is that an extra �650 million is being spent on our cyber-defenses," writes Fraser. But at the moment, the West's digital "firewalls" look like a "digital Maginot Line" - and the Chinese are carefully sneaking past.

More terrifying is that it's not just the Chinese. You'll remember the Royal Navy's PR website was hacked last month by an illiterate Romanian. Well, take that as an embarrassing but quite harmless example of this global threat. As the deputy US Defense Secretary, William J. Lynn III reports in Foreign Affairs magazine: "Right now, more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to hack into the digital networks that undergird US military operations." The codename of one the first American counterattacks - "Operation Buckshot Yankee" - hints at the spread of the problem, and how many countries and organizations had to be hit back.

Sir John Sawers, the MI6 chief, noted the cyber threats faced by Britain in his unprecedented speech in October. He also said this, with a hint of relish:

"Machiavelli said that 'surprise is the essential factor in victory'. A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome surprises. And that some of our adversaries do."

The cyber war is now out in the open, but it's one that Fraser Nelson thinks were are losing. It's vital that the British secret services can get off the back foot quick enough to prevent a major breach - and that they have the resources to ensure that our enemies are surprised more often than we are. Otherwise, WikiLeaks will quickly start to look about as relevant as [Heaven/Telegraph/2December2010] 

Is Killing Our Only Option for Terrorists? by David Ignatius. Every war brings its own deformations, but consider this disturbing fact about America's war against al-Qaeda: It has become easier, politically and legally, for the United States to kill suspected terrorists than to capture and interrogate them.

Predator and Reaper drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, have become the weapons of choice against al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They have also been used in Yemen, and the demand for these efficient tools of war, which target enemies from 10,000 feet, is likely to grow.

The pace of drone attacks on the tribal areas has increased sharply during the Obama presidency, with more assaults in September and October of this year than in all of 2008. At the same time, efforts to capture al-Qaeda suspects have virtually stopped. Indeed, if CIA operatives were to snatch a terrorist tomorrow, the agency wouldn't be sure where it could detain him for interrogation.

Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, frames the puzzle this way: "Have we made detention and interrogation so legally difficult and politically risky that our default option is to kill our adversaries rather than capture and interrogate them?"

It's curious why the American public seems so comfortable with a tactic that arguably is a form of long-range assassination, after the furor about the CIA's use of nonlethal methods known as "enhanced interrogation." When Israel adopted an approach of "targeted killing" against Hamas and other terrorist adversaries, it provoked an extensive debate there and abroad.

"For reasons that defy logic, people are more comfortable with drone attacks" than with killings at close range, says Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism officer who now is a consultant with ERG Partners. "It's something that seems so clean and antiseptic, but the moral issues are the same."

Firing a missile from 10,000 feet is certainly a lower risk for the attackers than an assault on the ground. "The U.S. is reluctant to mount such capture-or-kill operations in the tribal areas for the same reason that the Pakistanis are: They fear that an elite team might be surrounded by hundreds of tribesmen," says Grenier.

Though the Pakistani government publicly denounces the drone attacks, it privately condones them. That's in part because the drones provide a military punch that the Pakistani military is unwilling or unable to match with conventional forces. But legal challenges are beginning, as in a $500 million lawsuit planned by a Pakistani man who told reporters this week that two of his relatives had been killed in a drone strike.

The reluctance to chase al-Qaeda on the ground, and perhaps capture its operatives alive, also comes with an intelligence cost. The United States and its allies lose the information that could come from interrogation, along with the cellphones, computers and other communications gear that could be seized in a successful raid. One reason that counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda were so effective in Iraq was that they utilized this cycle of raid, capture, interrogate, analyze, raid again.

The CIA began getting out of the detention business when the infamous "black sites" overseas were closed in 2006. At that time, 14 CIA detainees were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, but since then, only two more have been caught and transferred there; agency officials have been advised that Guantanamo is closed for new business. The only alternatives are Bagram air base in Afghanistan, for al-Qaeda operatives caught in the war zone, or detention and trial in the United States.

Don't misunderstand me: It's not that the Obama administration's limits on detention and interrogation are wrong. They have applied clear guidelines to what had been, before 2006, a murky area. The problem is that these rules, and the wariness of getting into more trouble, have had the perverse effect of encouraging the CIA to adopt a more lethal and less supple policy than before.

U.S. and Pakistani officials support drone attacks because they don't see a good alternative to combat al-Qaeda's operations in the tribal areas. I don't disagree with that view. But this policy needs a clearer foundation in law and public understanding than it has today. Otherwise, when the pendulum swings, the CIA officers who ran these supposedly clandestine missions may be left holding the bag.

So ask yourself: If you don't like the CIA tactics that led to the capture and interrogation of al-Qaeda operatives, do you think it's better to vaporize the militants from 10,000 feet? And if this bothers you, what's the alternative? [Ignatius/WashingtonPost/1December2010] 

Career Day for the Second Oldest Profession, by George H. Wittman. From the public's standpoint it was straight out of a Hollywood B Film. The bad guys of Russia's foreign intelligence organization, SVR, had sneaked into the United States but were all captured by the hardworking FBI. There even was the sexy glamour gal to spice up the story. The trouble was that Hollywood stopped making those films decades ago. Somebody on the other side obviously needed some coaching by Steven Spielberg.

The Kremlin gave its stars a hero's welcome when they were quickly exchanged for four Russians convicted of working for Western intelligence. Not a bad deal, Moscow congratulated itself in the media - eleven for four. The old days were back, implied the ex-KGB'er, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, as he sung with the released officers something akin to an old Soviet intelligence fight song. (Who knew they have songs?) Everything was done to cover up one of the worst run operations in the history of Russian foreign intelligence. 

From the beginning the entire concept was flawed. Infiltrating in a scatter shot manner ten (or more?) SVR "illegals" under various covers as U.S. citizens or legal immigrants spread around the Northeast and Middle Atlantic is just not operationally sound. Theoretically they were to develop political contacts with an aim ultimately to influence U.S. policy and/or gather classified information on such. Aside from Vicky Palaez, the El Diario columnist who was a well- known left-wing TV reporter in her native Peru, and her husband, Juan Lazaro, raised as a Soviet citizen though passing as a Uruguayan, the other intelligence personnel had no unusual background or technical strength that could aid in penetration of the American government/political scene.

The operational concept of introducing intelligence officers with assumed identities and little in personal qualifications other than knowledge of English and reasonable intellect into the American environment was unprofessional. To expect that over many years they would gain important access into the American official and political system indicates the U.S. operations division of SVR had a warped understanding of the American scene.

Normal tradecraft dictates infiltrated "sleeper agents" with no particular scientific or technical expertise generally are limited to support roles for communication, finance, and supply. Only in novels and films do they take on serious information-gathering assignments. Peer recruiting of indigenous agents among existing government bureaucrats, scientists, the media, and even political personalities has a far better chance of success. History has proved this and the KGB First Chief Directorate had known it for years. Russia's lineal descendant to this directorate, SVR, ignored is own lessons.

In spite of the winning face placed on their expensive, completely blown ten-year development operation, the Kremlin has been deeply embarrassed by the incompetent nature of the SVR activity. The old-fashioned public area dead drops and other WW2-era methods of contact is not the issue. The SVR well knows and has used burst transmissions and electronic ciphers. Sometimes the very old ways are safer - if slower. In this case it was just plain inadequate.

To have one senior deep cover officer act as the principal support and liaison contact for all ten in-place agents and regularly travel to the U.S. from Canada was another operational vulnerability. In the end the young glamour girl, Anna Chapman, telephoned her father (an ex-intelligence official) to ask what to do when she suspected she had been targeted by an American counter-espionage agent. Speaking "in the clear" over international phone lines, daddy told her to break off the contact immediately. He must have been appalled.

Apparently President Medvedev shares Anna's father's (Vassily Kushchenko) revulsion at the unprofessional aspect of this operation. The SVR director reports directly to the Russian president. Immediately the president's office started shaking up the self-satisfied staff chiefs of SVR's Sections S and PR who administered this totally unproductive long- term operation. Out of nowhere an explanation was offered by a major Moscow newspaper, Kommersant, that a certain "Colonel Shcherbakov" had fallen prey to the CIA and had been cooperating with it for many years. This otherwise unknown top Russian intelligence supervisor (safely now in the U.S. with his family) is pointed to as the reason why the project collapsed. Of course, except for the work of Vicky Palaez as a spotter and agent of influence in the Hispanic community, the rest of the project had been effectively without operational result other than development of its own cover.

The argument is now made in Moscow that a reunification of domestic and foreign intelligence as it was until 1991 under the old KGB is a necessary reformation to prevent such organizational and security ineptitude as has been proven to exist in SVR. Neither of the heads of the security committees of the lower and upper houses of parliament is as yet willing to support such a drastic move. No matter what happens, SVR will undergo a serious revamping. It is unimaginable to think Putin, still carrying a sense of personal responsibility for his alma mater, would allow anything less.

Maybe it's time to bring back some of the old Cold Warriors. This new crowd in SVR needs to go back to spy school - or at least stop reading those foreign intrigue novels. But who's complaining! [George H. Wittman writes a weekly column on international affairs for The American Spectator online. He was the founding chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy.] [Whitman/Spectator/19November2010] 



Teach Espionage and Counterintelligence: The University of Maryland University College is looking for a candidate to teach a graduate level course on espionage and counterintelligence. This course is part of the new Masters in Management: Intelligence Management program at UMUC. The Masters program is described here. The plan is to develop the course over the spring semester and teach it initially in the summer of 2011.
Course description: INMS 630 Espionage and Counterintelligence (3 credits)

An examination of the vulnerabilities of the United States, allied countries, and private businesses to espionage. Discussion covers case studies of espionage against America, including economic espionage against U.S. technology and business. Topics include the roles, missions, and espionage activities of foreign intelligence services. Major threat groups are assessed, and management issues related to countering these threats are evaluated. U.S policy issues and the management challenges of interagency cooperation among local, state, and international sources and public-private partnerships are explored.

UMUC employs many "practitioner-scholars" as adjunct instructors. As this program is in the Graduate School of Management and Technology, a PhD is preferred.

UMUC is the continuing and adult education arm of the University of Maryland system. All of the courses in this Masters program will be taught on-line using UMUC's WebTycho electronic classroom. It is the best on-line teaching software that I have encountered. UMUC has an excellent WebTycho training course for new instructors.

Please reply to

Seeking Forensic Accountants, Fraud Examiners, Computer Forensics and Security Pros, Accident Investigators and Reconstruction Experts

ROBERT J. GIROD CONSULTING, LLC is looking for consultants residing in the Midwest who are available for part-time consulting work.
1. Investigators with certifications in forensic accounting and/or fraud examination are invited to contact us. Consultants in this area must be: • A Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and/or; • A Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Experience in forensic auditing and fraud investigation is preferred, e.g. investigators for SEC (Securities & Exchange Commission), IRS-CID (Criminal Investigations Division), FBI, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Postal Inspectors, etc.

2. Investigators with certifications in computer forensics and security are invited to contact us. Consultants in this area must be:
• G AC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA) certified by the Certification organization; • Certified Computer Examiner (CCE) certified by the International Society of Forensic Computer Examiners; • Certified Computer Forensics Examiner (CCFE) certified by the IACRB, and/or
• a Certified Forensic Computer Examiner (CFCE) by IACIS. Experience in computer forensics and security and data mining is preferred, e.g. investigators for FBI, CIA, NSA, IRS-CID (Criminal Investigations Division), U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Postal Inspectors, etc.

3. Investigators with certifications in accident investigation and reconstruction are invited to contact us. Consultants in this area must be qualified in one or more of these areas of expertise: • aviation and aircraft accident investigation and reconstruction; • marine and boating accident investigation and reconstruction; • railroad accident investigation and reconstruction; • highway, motor vehicle, and pedestrian accident investigation and reconstruction, and/or • industrial / OSHA accident investigation and reconstruction.
Experience in multiple areas of accident investigation and reconstruction is preferred, e.g. investigators for NTSB, FAA, U.S. Coast Guard, OSHA, etc.
Interested persons for any of the three positions described below are encourage to contact Robert Girod at

Research Requests

Seeking Former CIA Chief of Base, Marty Hawkins: I am trying to find/contact Marty Hawkins who was my deputy COB in Danang, 71-72, I was Roger McCarthy's then Alan Seal/Marty Hawkins PRU advisor 70-72. Your assistance would be appreciated.
Reply to Pat Loomis at, COO Green Guru/Ecologic Designs at Tel 303-258-1611, Cell 303-589-0942, Fax 303-258-3076.


William Lyle Mosebey, Jr.  Mr. William L. Mosebey, husband, father, grandfather, patriot, farmer, woodsman, historian, and author, 72, of Wells Valley, died November 22, 2010 at his farmhouse near Enid. 
William was born March 23, 1938 in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, the oldest son of William Lyle and Edyth (Knepper) Mosebey; the grandson of Robert E. Lee Mosebey, and the great grandson of famous Confederate spy William Leslie Mosebey. 
In his youth Bill helped out on the family farm milking cows, bailing hay and planting crops - Bill still enjoyed spending time on a tractor maintaining his farm and helping his neighbors and family. As a kid Bill was an active member of the 4H Club, raising pigs, potatoes and strawberries, which fostered a lifelong love of farming and the outdoors. Bill joined the Future Farmers of America while attending Forbes Road High School in Hustontown where he graduated in 1955. He won a scholarship in a competitive examination given at Forbes Road High School and went on to attend the Pennsylvania State University graduating in 1959 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. 
After graduation he joined the United States Army and completed basic training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He continued his service as a reservist, training at both the DC Armory as well as Fort Indiantown Gap. He completed a jungle warfare training program at Fort Sherman in what was then known as the Panama Canal Zone, as well as a basic Airborne course and special forces training.
Feeling a further call of duty to defeat America's enemies, Bill joined Central Intelligence Agency in 1959 as a GS-5 and worked tirelessly throughout the Cold War to defeat Soviet-style communism. His career with the Agency spanned more than 34 years during which he served in India, Zaire, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Angola, Tanzania, Kenya, and finally Egypt. Bill served as Chief of Station in four of these locations as well as Chief of both Europe and Africa Divisions. Known to foes as "the most dangerous man in Africa" his arrival on station was a sure indication that the country was high on our Presidents' priority list. During his distinguished career with the Agency he earned many awards - among them the Meritorious Officer in Senior Intelligence Service award, Foreign Reserve Officer award, Exceptional Service Award, The William J. Donovan Award, Certificate of Distinction, Intelligence Medal of Merit (twice), and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal (our nation's highest award for intelligence work). During his service at CIA Bill became one of the most accomplished and beloved leaders in the Directorate of Operations rising to the rank of Major General. Bill came out of retirement to serve the Agency and his nation again after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. While many of his professional accomplishments will never be made public, his successes will remain legend among friend and foe alike. He retired in 1995 and returned to his farm in the Blue Ridge of Fulton County, where he pursued his interests in farming, fishing, hunting, and historical research. Bill was an avid hunter who hunted in eight African countries, and many locations in the United States and Canada. During his career as a hunter he collected trophies both great and small. Bill shared this passion with his children and grandchildren. Bill hunted in South Dakota in October and killed his first pronghorn with a 400 plus yard heart shot. 
Bill was a Benefactor Member of the National Rifle Association, and fierce advocate of the Second Amendment as it was written. He attended every NRA annual meeting since 1998, driving to locations as far away as Reno and Phoenix. Bill was also a lifelong member of the Wells Valley Presbyterian Church, where he served as an elder for several years, a member of the Everett Lodge No. 524, F. & A.M., a Life Member of the Pennsylvania State University Alumni Association, a member of the Pennsylvania Sheriffs Association, a member of the Whittington Center Gun Club, a Life Member of the Pennsylvania Rifle and Pistol Association, and an active supporter of the Civil War Preservation Trust.
Bill was a great storyteller on many, many topics. He had a wry and sometimes sarcastic sense of humor and enjoyed sharing his stories a great deal. He liked entertaining family and friends at his farmhouse, ice cream, pie, and doughnuts. A stack of photos of Bill and Carolyn's latest hunting trip was never far away. Bill was a fervent historian who read books on just about any topic. He was particularly interested in local history and in anything related to the Civil War. Bill published a historical note on the original settlers of Wells Township and for several years before his passing was working on a yet to be published family history. 
Bill is survived by his loving wife, Carolyn J. Mosebey, of Wells Valley, his daughter Tracy G. Mosebey of Arlington, VA, his son Geoffrey L.T. Mosebey, and two beloved grandsons, Connor L. and, Quinn D. Mosebey, of Altoona, PA. Bill is also survived by two sisters, Florence Pyle of Downingtown, PA, Rosemary Woodall of Hedgesville, WV, and one brother, Timothy Mosebey, of Wells Valley.
A memorial service will be held on Saturday, December 11, 2010 at 10:45 A.M. at the Howard L. Sipes Funeral Home, Inc., 873 Lincoln Way East, McConnellsburg, PA 17233 with Pastor Donnie Cross officiating. Visitation will be held from 10 A.M. till the start of the service at the funeral home. [Howardlsipes/6December2010] 

Horace W. Brooks. Horace W. "Pick" Brooks, 83, an intelligence analyst of maps and aerial images at the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1953 until he retired in 1995, died Nov. 10 at his home in College Park. He had prostate cancer.
He was born Horace Walter Brooks in Asheville, N.C. He received a bachelor's degree in mathematics from Howard University in 1951 and a master's degree in military science from the U.S. Army Training Center in Fort Benning, Ga., in 1964.
He served in the Army from 1945 to 1953 and was a member of the Army Reserve until 1978. At the end of World War II, he was stationed in Japan and was an infantry unit commander in Germany in the early 1950s.
He was a member of Holy Redeemer Catholic Church in College Park and St. Columbia Catholic Church in Oxon Hill. He was a board member with the Solidarity Union of the Archdiocese of Washington and the Fort Dupont Civic Association.
Survivors include his wife of 54 years, Marjorie Lucas Brooks of College Park; a daughter, Brenda D. Lipkowitz of College Park; two brothers, Booker T. Brooks of Washington and Charles Brooks of Chicago; and two granddaughters. [Wiseman/WashingtonPost/30November2010] 

Frank W. Lewis. For more than six decades, Frank W. Lewis mesmerized, mystified and miffed a circle of obsessed people by writing a devilishly quirky cryptic crossword puzzle for The Nation. But there were some bridges even he would not cross.
If the clue "BEFORE FALL" led to the answer "PRIDE" for example, drawing from the Bible, he conceded that it would be "carrying things a trifle too far," as he wrote in an essay, to use the clue "SUMMER."
Cryptic puzzles are in a universe by themselves, but even there Mr. Lewis was famed for the freewheeling, idiosyncratic approach he took in the pages of The Nation, where for years his mind-twisters leavened the magazine's weekly helpings of politically liberal reporting and commentary.
A cryptic puzzle usually gives two clues: one a definition, the other a play on words or letters, say an anagram. Mr. Lewis thought nothing of giving three clues. Or one. And, fueled by a huge vocabulary, his penchant for puns was puckish.
Mr. Lewis, whose day job for many years was to help spies solve top-secret codes at the National Security Agency, died of heart failure on Nov. 18 in Plymouth, Mass., his family said. He was 98 and had continued to create puzzles until a year ago.
After his death, even those who had yanked at their hair while attacking his puzzles praised his ingenuity.
"While we often cursed him, we never got tired of his puzzles," said Henri Picciotto, a math teacher and puzzle constructor who huddled with friends in Berkeley, Calif., every week to swing at the best that Mr. Lewis could heave.
Another respected puzzle maker, Richard Maltby Jr., the Broadway director, said, "Misleading the solver is the name of the game in cryptic puzzles, and Mr. Lewis misled delightfully."
Mr. Lewis got the job at The Nation after the man who had started the magazine's cryptic puzzle in 1943, Jack Barrett, died in a boating accident. (Will Shortz, puzzle editor of The New York Times, said The Nation's puzzle was the first regularly published cryptic in America, and by far the oldest.) Readers chose Mr. Lewis to succeed Mr. Barrett in a contest, and he published his first puzzle on Oct. 18, 1947.
He went on to please his masochistic loyalists by dishing out odd and excruciating challenges for decades, winning fans like Kurt Vonnegut and Leonard Bernstein - not to mention conservative Republicans who held their noses as they bought The Nation.
At first Mr. Lewis was paid $25 a week. After almost 40 years, he timidly asked his editor at the magazine, Judith Long, if she might intercede with "the brass" about a raise. Didn't a puzzle master who once gave a single letter as a clue - the clue, a capital S; the answer, LARGESS, deserve a raise?
He got the raise, to $100.
His profile was lowered a bit in 2008, when The Nation announced that his puzzle would begin appearing every other week. Readers were outraged. Psychology Today warned that the change meant the end of Western civilization, or at least signaled a decline in our standard of living.
Frank Waring Lewis was born on Aug. 25, 1912, in Salt Lake City. His father had emigrated from England with the family cattle, and after working as a cowboy was a postman.
The younger Mr. Lewis attended secretarial school and the University of Utah (later earning a degree in absentia) and passed the federal government's civil service test. He then headed for Washington, where he earned a master's degree in music from the Catholic University of America and took government secretarial jobs.
Col. William Friedman, who ran the Army's cryptography operations, was looking for very smart people on the eve of World War II. He heard about Mr. ewis, who was bored to tears in the civil service's death benefits section.
Colonel Friedman hired him as a civilian employee, and Mr. Lewis went on to help break the code used to coordinate Japanese ships. He became addicted to British puzzles while posted in England at the Bletchley Park decryption station at the end of the war. He then followed Colonel Friedman to the National Security Agency, where he won plaudits for his service, started the N.S.A. Glee Club and created English-style puzzles for an N.S.A. magazine.
Mr. Lewis's 2,962 puzzles for The Nation were proofread by his wife of 74 years, the former Sylvia Shosteck. She survives him, along with his sons, Larry and Frank; his daughters, Elaine Ryan and Wendy Lewis; four grandchildren; and one great-grandson.
Mr. Lewis published his last puzzle in the Dec. 21-28, 2009, issue of The Nation, which has since reprinted his old ones. It plans to hire a new puzzle maestro next year, but Ms. Long readily admits that there will never be another Frank Lewis or, as he once referred to himself in a cryptic clue, Swank Filer. [Mason/NYTimes/3December2010] 

Charles B. Woodward, CIA Analyst. Charles B. Woodward, 82, an analyst with the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence from 1952 to 1983, died Nov. 12 at the Heritage Hall nursing home in Leesburg. He had sepsis.
Mr. Woodward was an usher at Arlington United Methodist Church and chaired the parent activities group for the 16th Street Group Home in Arlington, where one his sons is a resident.
Charles Byron Woodward was an Arlington native and a 1946 graduate of Washington-Lee High School.
His wife of 60 years, Barbara Start Woodward, died in August.
Survivors include four sons, James R. Woodward of Broadlands, Charles B. Woodward Jr. of Reston, Harland S. Woodward of Silverdale, Wash., and Douglas R. Woodward of Arlington; and four grandchildren. [Wiseman/WashingtonPost/23November2010] 

Coming Educational Events


MANY Spy Museum Events in December, January and February with full details are listed on the AFIO Website at The titles for some of these are in detail below and online.

8 December 2010 - Ft Lauderdale, FL - The FBI's Infragard invites AFIO members [at no fee] to its conference at Nova Southeastern University. Topic: What makes an effective information security program for a small organization? This program promotes: . Awareness of the importance of need for IT security; . Understanding of IT security vulnerabilities and corrective measures. The interactive discussion will focus on those information security risks facing all small organizations and how those risks can be identified and managed.
Topics will include: . How your data is vulnerable; . What you can lose through an information security breach; . Practical steps to protect your operations; . How to use information security vendors and consultants; . How to evaluate tools and techniques based on your needs
FBI's INFRAGARD conference takes place at Nova Southeastern University. Morning session is about The Convergence of Physical and Information Security. The Afternoon conference is a Computer Security Workshop For Small Organizations.
To attend, contact FBI SA Nelson Barbosa to register at: or call 305-787-6130.
More information at
Location of event: Nova Southeastern University, The Carl DeSantis Building, 3301 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33314
*****AM Session: 10 AM - Noon - Speaking about The Convergence of Physical and Information Security
*****PM Session: 1 PM - 5:00 PM - Computer Security Workshop For Small Organizations: Sponsored by The Small Business Administration
(SBA), National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) and InfraGard

Thursday, 9 December 2010, 10:00 am – Washington, DC - Yolande Collected Intelligence on Egypt for Israel - Spy Museum Event.
Yolande Gabai (de Botton), a Jewish woman from Alexandria, risked her son's life and her own collecting intelligence in Egypt undercover as a reporter for the Palestine Post. Yolande was a courageous woman who loved Egypt and the Arab world, yet fought for the creation of an independent State of Israel.
Israel, 2010, video documentary 62 minutes English and Hebrew with English subtitles Director: Dan Wolman DC Premiere
Free! No Registration Required. More information at

Monday 13 December 2010, 5:30 pm - New York, NY - "Status of US Intelligence Capabilities" by former CIA Officer Aris Pappas, is theme of NY Metro Chapter Meeting
Speaker: Aris Pappas, CIA 32 years - Over this period he was an Analyst, Managed Operations, and held other Senior Positions. Now a Senior Director with Microsoft Corporation. Topic: "Status of Our Intelligence Capabilities"
Registration 5:30 PM Meeting 6:00 PM.
Cost $40. Includes three course buffet dinner, cash bar.
Location: Manhattan "3 West Club" 3 West 51st Street
Advance Reservations Required: Email or telephone Jerry Goodwin 347-334-1503.

Tuesday, 14 December 2010, 5:30 - 7:30 pm - Hampton, VA - "The Role of an Intelligence Analyst in Busting Colombian Drug Trade" at AFIO Hampton Roads Chapter Speaker's Forum. Victor Rosello speaks to the chapter on "The Role of an Intelligence Analyst in Busting Colombian Drug Trade"
Event location: McMurran Hall, Room 114, Christopher Newport University, Newport News
Guest speaker: Mr. Victor Rosello, Retired US Army Colonel 06, Military Intelligence
For more information or directions contact

Tuesday, 14 December 2010, noon - MacDill AFB, FL - SOCOM'S Mission by LTG Fridovich - at the AFIO Florida Suncoast Chapter

The featured speaker is Lt. General David Fridovich, Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), talking about the current state of world affairs, SOCOM's worldwide mission and the challenges it faces. Lt. General Fridovich has had a distinguished career, serving in critical roles around the world. He participated in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, in support of the United Nations Mission in Haiti. General Fridovich commanded the Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force in Operation JOINT FORGE, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, from January through July 2000. He assumed command of the 1st Special Forces Group in August 2000. He led Army Special Operations Task Force, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES, Zamboanga, Republic of the Philippines from January through June 2002. In January of 2005, General Fridovich assumed duties as Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific. He subsequently assumed duties as the Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command in 2007.
For more information or to make reservations, please contact Gary Gorsline, Chapter President, at (813) 995-2200 or by email at, or Wallace Bruschweiler, Chapter Vice President, at (727) 849-0977 or by email at

15 December 2010, 1 pm - Washington, DC - LexisNexis will host its next Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table on "OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence."

LexisNexis will host its next Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table at the National Press Club on December 15, 2010. Doors open at noon, program to begin at 1:00pm. The focus will continue our theme of “OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence” and will explore the evolving role of traditional media and technology in the future.

The program will include keynote remarks by Mr. Douglas J. Naquin, Director of the DNI Open Source Center followed by a "perspectives" discussion with leading experts among our group of distinguished attendees. The discussion will be based on the future of OSINT as a recognized discipline in strategic and tactical national security decision-making.

Panelists will include:

The OSINT Round Table was created to make a public space for discussion about the government’s needs for Open Source Intelligence in order to facilitate relationships between government officials and private sector leaders. We seek to foster an increasingly responsive open source intelligence infrastructure that meets the needs of national security decision makers.
Register to attend at

20 January 2010, 12:30 - 2:30 pm - Los Angeles, CA - AFIO Los Angeles hosts their annual meeting

The AFIO LA-Area Chapters holds their annual chapter meeting at the LMU campus. Pizza lunch will be served, this meeting is open only to L.A. Area chapter members in good standing, no guests. The meeting will cover our objectives and chapter officer elections for 2011. Please RSVP via email if you plan to attend the annual meeting.

Thursday, 20 January 2011, 11:30 am - Colorado Springs, CO - Credit Card Fraud - 'Tis the Season - the talk at the Rocky Mountain Chapter by the President of TLC Computer Repair, Jesus Damian
Damian will speak on Credit Card Fraud (CCF). Credit cards are extremely vulnerable to fraud and are used extensively by terrorists. The Internet functions as a mechanism to steal credit card information through hacking, phishing, and other means. An elaborate multi-million dollar CCF scheme by Pakistanis in 2003, was terminated in the Washington, D.C. area. Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are extensively involved in CCF. The surprise is how much money can be made at different levels of the schemes. To be held at the new location AFA... Eisenhower Golf Course Club House. Please RSVP to Tom VanWormer at

20 January 2011 - Arlington, VA - "Mexican Drug Wars" the topic at this Defense Intelligence Forum
The Forum meets at the Pulcinella Restaurant, 6852 Old Dominion Drive, McLean, VA The speaker will be Colonel Sergio de la Peña (USA, Retired), who will speak on Mexican Drug Wars: A Practitioner's Perspective.
A former Foreign Area Officer, Colonel de la Peña has eighteen years' experience in Western Hemisphere affairs with emphasis on stopping growth and transport of drugs. He now is Director of Business Development for the Americas for Military Professional Resources, Incorporated. He most recently worked with the Mexican government on countering the drug trade's effect on Mexican security. As Northern Command International Affairs Division chief, he worked closely with Mexican counterparts to craft the theater's security engagement strategy. He served in the International Army Programs Directorate in Army Training and Doctrine Command, as Army Attaché in Venezuela, as Army Section Chief in the US Military Group-Chile, and as commander of the US Military Observer Group-Washington. Colonel de la Peña was born in Chihuahua, Mexico. He was commissioned in Air Defense Artillery and is both Airborne and Ranger qualified. He holds a BS from the University of Iowa and a Masters Degree in Military Arts and Science.

Make reservations by 12 January by email to Include names, telephone numbers, and email addresses. For meal selections, choose among chicken cacciatore, tilapia puttanesca, lasagna, sausage with peppers, or pasta with portabello. Pay at the door with a check for $29 per person payable to DIAA, Inc. THE FORUM DOESN'T TAKE CASH! If you don't have a check, you'll have to have the restaurant charge your credit or debit card $29 and give us the restaurant's copy of the receipt when you check in.

For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events


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