Book Reviews

Author: Ronald Drabkin, William Morrow, 2024

Reviewer: Former National Counterintelligence Officer for East Asia David A. Gutschmit

In "Beverly Hills Spy", Ronald Drabkin has authored a compelling narrative centering on the complex journey of a spy whose espionage in the years leading up to World War II should be more well known. Englishman Fredrick Rutland was a decorated hero of the First World War, a pioneer in the field of naval aviation, and an expert in warship design. He also betrayed Great Britain, helped build the Japanese Navy that enabled Japan's onslaught in the Pacific, and spied for Tokyo against the United States in the runup to Pearl Harbor.

 Drabkin successfully showcases the multiverse of vulnerabilities and motivations that made Rutland an ideal target if not an ideal agent. Japanese Naval Intelligence showered Rutland with cash and enabled an extravagant lifestyle in pre-war Los Angeles, capitalizing on his taste for the high life. One of his frequently exasperated handlers noted that Rutland was paid almost ten times as much as Japan's most senior naval officers. They also played to his large if not narcissistic ego, reinforcing his self-image as an irreplaceable authority on naval matters, and a high roller who could interact at the highest levels of U.S. society. Looming in the background is the resentment Rutland felt for his homeland's obsession with class, for which, being from a blue-collar background, he blamed his failure to rise in the Royal Air Force during the interwar period. Finally, as pressure mounted on Rutland from U.S. authorities, his overconfident efforts to protect himself by belatedly aligning with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and British intelligence as a double or even triple agent smack of magical thinking.

The author weaves several other interesting themes around the periphery of the Rutland drama. He documents the hostility and lack of cooperation between ONI and the FBI as war approached; a sad commentary on the pre-War state of the U.S. "intelligence community" that rings true. The ONI establishment on the West Coast was fixated on counterespionage and counter-sabotage threats, at the expense of trying to ferret out Tokyo's war plans and intentions. The FBI resented ONI's poaching on its domestic turf; but was focused an alleged Communist menace until late in the game.

Somewhat more surprising is Drabkin's description of Tokyo's wider espionage operations in the United States. Beyond Rutland, these were generally characterized by incompetence, relying on untrained and undisciplined line navy personnel rather than professional intelligence officers. The exception is Yoshikawa Takeo, the most gifted of Tokyo's naval intelligence operatives, who provided valuable intelligence on the disposition of U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor and surrounding facilities from his arrival in Honolulu in March 1941. For the most part, these are woven smoothly into the master narrative centering on Rutland himself. However, at some points the pace of the book is slowed by somewhat stilted dialogue which is not clearly documented, underlining an overall lack of footnotes/endnotes.

 It is not surprising that several major questions surrounding Rutland linger. The most poignant chapter in the book describes bewildered FBI agents following Rutland around Washington during a visit in the summer of 1941 as he shuttled between ONI Headquarters and the British and Japanese embassies looking for a way out as the Bureau, and the war, closed in. Drabkin affords Rutland considerable benefit of the doubt, maintaining that, in the course of looking for financial and physical self-preservation, he was sincerely trying to warn Washington and London that war was imminent - that his allegiances were clear in the end. While he did make it back to London courtesy of MI-5, he spent the first two years of the war in confinement and died an apparent suicide in January 1949 in a small apartment in Wales. Drabkin speculates that somehow Rutland was still enough of a potential embarrassment four years after the end of the war to have been eliminated by one or another of the allied services he tried to con. Rutland would have delighted in this fantasy.

David Gutschmit, former National Counterintelligence Officer for East Asia, is a retired CIA Operations Officer. In addition to numerous tours with the Directorate of Operations in the foreign field and at headquarters, he held assignments at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Counterintelligence Executive/Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the U.S. Naval War College. He currently teaches intelligence studies to graduate students at New York University, Columbia University, and Georgetown University, focusing on economic and industrial espionage and comparative intelligence systems.

by Nicholas Eftimiades, Vitruviun Press, 05 January 2025

Review by Randal Phillips*, Former CIA East Asia Division Chief (acting), Chief of China Ops, COS Beijing

Nicholas Eftimiades has once again provided a thoroughly researched and comprehensively detailed roadmap of China's intelligence apparatus. This not only builds upon and updates his seminal 1994 book Chinese Intelligence Operations, it provides the reader with a detailed understanding of China's "whole-of-society" espionage activities that dwarf the approach of any other nation.

Eftimiades painstakingly provides the reader with factual details derived from analyzing over 850 known espionage cases of how that "whole-of-society" approach works in practice today. He starts with an overview of the legal framework that has been put in place in the Xi Jinping era that explicitly mandates that any Chinese organization, business or individual must cooperate with China's security and intelligence apparatus, if requested. He then layers upon this how multi-faceted the number of players are in China conducting espionage, including state-owned and private business entities, the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department, research and academic organizations, individuals sensing a business opportunity off of stolen intellectual property, and of course, China's formal intelligence agencies.

Perhaps most interesting from my perspective, given a career at CIA working on China issues, is the analysis provided on China's intelligence objectives. A perennial question was always to identify how the Chinese leadership decided upon its clandestine collection priorities, and how this was communicated up and down the chain of command to its Order Book Herebevy of collectors, particularly the Ministry of State Security and the PLA's Joint Intelligence Bureau. Eftimiades quite effectively details how this process is tied to China's domestic and global security and economic development requirements, particularly that laid out very transparently in the "Made in China 2025" policy blueprint seeking a dominant position for China in 10 critical industries. Whereas in days past it could be said that Chinese espionage efforts were in many ways quite scattershot in function, almost in a "target of opportunity" fashion, it is clear that today China has a more streamlined and focused set of collection priorities against which they unleash their vast resources.

Perhaps no less compelling from my perspective is Eftimiades' superb use of the 850 plus espionage cases to explain how significantly China's espionage players have altered their tradecraft and taken on a truly global collection effort. Particularly in the Xi Jinping era, the various espionage arms – particularly the MSS – have been both incentivized and browbeat into being more aggressive in their pursuit of their requirements. This includes more daring targeting of individuals in operating environments around the world, and greater confidence in using bountiful social media approaches and financial incentives of various forms. This can be seen as part and parcel of Xi's pursuit of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and an element of a more confident China on the world stage.

It's hard to truly wrap one's arms around the global impact of China's espionage activities, both in terms of the economic impact well into the trillions of dollars lost, but also in the enormous scope of China's campaign that dwarfs the capabilities and resources of target nations to combat these efforts. Eftimiades provides a great service to all readers, whether those in government or in the private sector in the crosshairs of this battle, to truly begin to understand what is happening here. I would say that this book provides in a concise 180 pages a tremendously useful description of the challenge, and an opportunity to understand what will be required to mount an effective defense.

*Randal Phillips is Founder and President of HFBB Associates, a bespoke strategic geopolitical and financial risk consultancy on China and Asia issues. Randy previously spent 28 years with the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations, serving a number of tours abroad in Asia, including most recently as COS Beijing. He also served as Chief of China Operations and Acting Chief of East Asia Division in CIA HQS.

Randy has a B.A. in Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs from Miami University and a Master of International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is fluent in Mandarin and Bahasa Indonesia. Randy can be reached at randalphillips@hfbbassocates.com

by Joe Keogh, Joe Ball, Greg Moore Amazon Books 16 May 2024
Review by John Driscol* Former CIA Executive, Directorate of Operations

 As mentors on the topic of marketing new ideas into a hierarchical and doctrinally driven organization, the authors are unimpeachable. Collectively, they bring almost a century of experience in intelligence operations that they have applied to teaching methods of promoting change and new thinking. This skill is sorely needed in the Intelligence Community (among others), making this book a worthy read.

The 9-11 Commission Report observed “four failures” that contributed to the deadly attacks on that day. “Failure of Imagination” was paramount among them, and all intelligence organizations still struggle with that today.“Bureaucracies are not known for fostering imagination,” states the 9-11 Commission Report. The observation is so understated as to be almost comical, were it not for its consequences. This book, comprising eight chapters, provides a roadmap for the intrepid officer who cares more about his country than about himself and is willing to make the effort to challenge “the way we do things.”

In the 1960s, Dr. George Land did landmark work on creativity for NASA in an effort to identify the most creative people for the Apollo Program. They were needed for the most challenging problems. Dr. Land developed a successful test for creativity. NASA applied it and that put America on the moon in 1969. Dr. Land did not stop there: he tested five-yearolds, ten-year-olds, fifteen-year-olds, and adults with the same test. His findings were stunning. Among the five year-olds, 98% scored in the “genius” range of creativity. By age 10, the percentage dropped to 30% and, by age 15, it sank to 15%. For adults, the rate was 2%. The results seem to indicate that we are all born creative and with imagination, but it is systematically driven out of us.

My 30-plus-year career saw many creative, innovative ideas and efforts fail. Good ideas, whose time was right, had the necessary funding, and were led with commitment, but could not produce the change they desired. The authors identify many of the conventional roadblocks that are encountered, offer sound advice and ideas to navigate them, and provide excellent examples of past events that illustrate the concepts.

Chapters two and four are particularly illuminating. They focus on capturing attention for your ideas — how to brief them successfully — and the barriers to innovation. Each chapter offers specific and practical advice in these areas and offer much to think about. Officers at all levels would benefit from an examination of the tips offered in these two chapters.

The authors have done yeoman research in the area as well. Excellent examples accompany each chapter. They also explore the intellectual underpinnings of innovation, resistance to change and emotional intelligence as a barrier to innovation. The combination of theory, example, and practical tips make the book a worthy read — not just for intelligence officers, but for anyone trying to produce needed organizational change.

If there is a criticism, it is that the book is long overdue.

*John Driscol is a former CIA Executive who has developed short-duration, high-impact leadership development programs for CIA, FBI, DEA, ICE, CBP, ODNI, the US Departments of State and Treasury, and the US Air Force. During his three-decade career at CIA, in addition to serving in command positions domestically and overseas, he also established the first Directorate of Operation’s unit to focus on talent management and career development in ways more commonly seen in top-tier private sector corporations, the US military, and other agencies of the Intelligence Community that were more evolved in these areas. 

by Robert Hutton, Pegasus Books, 03 September 2024

Review by Jeffrey Uncapher, former defense industry reporter, longtime AFIO member

First, this is a very well researched book on the life and times of Dudley Clark and his A Force, set against the backdrop of wartime Cairo and the events in the Middle East. Clark, an obscure British military officer, was born into a successful family who raised him to become a young subaltern in the First World War. Due to fortuitous circumstances of his upbringing, he developed a lifelong interest in the theatre, magic and the arts of illusion, which he put to use in operations during the war. Using excellently sourced notes from family members and friends, Clark is described as a very bright and focused man who knew that creating illusions in the mind of his audience was key to controlling their reactions or, in the case of war, their actions.

The book is replete with examples of tradecraft, on all sides, that shifted the fortunes of war at critical times. The insights of Japanese intelligence gathering is particularly interesting. Hutton fleshes out incidents such as the posting of Colonel Bonner Fellers to Cairo and the impact of the Italians copying the American code books, which lead to Rommel receiving his intelligence on US interests as fast as Washington DC did until the British figured out what was going wrong in the desert. The cast of characters in this passion play are a fascinating group of spooks as well. The work that Clark did was replicated many times over as the war progressed and eventually his deceptions became more macabre and well known.

Mr Hutton has written a beautiful tribute to a most fascinating man, who cross-dressed (his arrest by the Spanish police for that practice did not phase him nor his handlers for long). The book is impeccably sourced and fills a much needed gap in the understanding of the war in the Middle East and Africa. Mr. Hutton is a fine writer and great researcher. This is an excellent book.

Jeffrey Uncapher is a former reporter in the defense industry and aerospace realm. He has published works in magazines, including Defense Daily, Military Space, and Special Warfare. He served in the US military and in the community for the last thirty five years. He is a long term member of AFIO and has a special interest in HUMINT.