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In the mid-1960s, the Russian writer Yulian Semyonov penned a series of novels that would have a profound impact on an aspiring KGB officer. This boy wanted to serve his country on the front lines of what he read were the elite Soviet security services. His Soviet schooling included stories of how the Chekists battled to save the revolution from imperialists, and fought the Nazis in World War II, known to Russians as the “Great Patriotic War.” Like millions of Russians, he then watched a movie based on the books, called “17 Moments of Spring.” It was about a GRU illegal, Stierlitz, who infiltrated the German SS and was able to help in his own small way to turn the tide of the war. That young man went on, after university, to join the KGB. He served abroad, but later quit the service after the collapse of the USSR. Still later, in a remarkable turn of events, he returned to head the FSB, and went on to become Prime Minister and then President of Russia for over 25 years now. That boy was President Vladimir Putin, and he has told this story of his reverence for the Stierlitz novels and movie many times to the Russian press. 

In his book KGB Literati, Filip Kovacevic details how the Russian security services meticulously cultivated books like the Stierlitz novels, along with many other works like it, to promote the KGB and Soviet state security. The KGB’s goal was to glorify the Soviet state and its people through sponsored works of fiction, and to inspire the young generation to serve the Communist cause and security apparatus. Putin’s detailing of the profound influence the “Stierlitz” novels had on him is typical of his generation of Russians, who were literally raised on this cult of Chekist fiction.

As Kovacevic details in his book, the KGB set out as a matter of policy to foster a myth of the “elite of the security services”—razvedchiki (intelligence officers). The same myth is fostered strongly today by Putin and his modern services (see Kevin Riehle’s study: FSB A Concise History, where he details the vast effort the FSB puts into fostering a positive image of their service in Russian popular culture). It was and remains a myth, however, and not one based on much reality. As such, it is important to study the origins of this state-sponsored, intelligence-driven fiction and culture; by focusing on the past, we can better understand Russia’s security state today.

Kovacevic makes a great contribution to this effort in his meticulously researched study. He chronicles how many novels and films like “17 Moments” were commissioned by Yuriy Andropov, the head of the KGB, and later General Secretary of the Soviet Union. Andropov personally ordered projects to foster respect for Soviet intelligence. Andropov was personally involved in the project and took a keen interest in what became a wave of KGB-sponsored fiction and TV/movie productions. Any Soviet citizen of the period will recall the heavy focus in the 1960s-70s on espionage, intelligence, and the Soviet mythology of Chekist/KGB heroes.

It can be fairly assessed as mythology, since in the period when the KGB was fostering the project, the Soviet state was falling apart under the weight of its own corruption. The KGB and other “elites” of Soviet society did not fight that corruption but fostered it. So the project was intended also, at least in part, to help prop up a broken system. 

Kovacevic’s work is filled with plenty of anecdotes, and the work is meticulously researched. He details several themes in this KGB literature, including subversion, which was a common plot and theme as enemies of the Soviet peoples were dramatized in stories about the evils of the West. Also featured were the excesses of capitalism and the varied and extensive alleged plots of the CIA to infiltrate and undermine their workers’ paradise and Soviet society (if only we had been so pervasive!). The Great Patriotic War was a deep scar for the Soviet people, and as such, the KGB fiction included a heavy focus on Nazis and their alleged legacies in the West – fantastical conspiracies involving Western intelligence services. This is an important theme that Kovacevic touches on, given that anti-Nazi ideology factors so heavily into the modern RIS’s false narrative on Ukraine.

There are many other narratives the author details with case studies of specific books. His study is not light reading. It details example after example of the various state-sponsored competitions with rewards for officers, cash incentives, and other methods used to motivate KGB officers to write their fake adventures. But the reader is rewarded with an understanding of the Russian Chekist mindset, so key to understanding modern Russian intelligence machinations. Prominent always is their insecurity regarding the U.S. and the West. If we are to defeat Russian imperialism and aggression, we have to understand this mentality, and Kovacevic helps significantly in this effort. 

Sean Wiswesser is a former senior operations officer with the CIA. He served multiple overseas tours and held senior leadership positions such as Chief of Station and in joint-duty assignments across the intelligence community. Sean is the author of the forthcoming book, Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War (Spring 2026), which examines the evolution of Russia's intelligence services, their fight against the West, and their role in modern hybrid warfare.