Monthly WIN Short-Form Book Review

Over the course of the Cold War, particularly during the Reagan administration, the question of Soviet and Eastern Bloc support for terrorist and revolutionary organizations was a topic of debate in media and intelligence circles. Reagan’s CIA director, William Casey, was adamant that extensive ties existed. In now-declassified memos, he argued with his analysts that their conclusions, especially on the question of Warsaw Pact direction and control of these groups, were timid and had “the air of a lawyer’s plea.”

Daniela Richterova’s excellent new book, Watching the Jackals, sheds new light on the question. Richterova, an academic specializing in intelligence studies at King’s College, London, undertook extensive work in the archives of Czechoslovakia's Cold War intelligence service, Státní bezpečnost (StB; State Security). Most Eastern European countries have declassified some of their Cold War files, but according to Richterova, none have gone as far as Prague. Since 2007, when new laws mandated release of historical intelligence records from the former Czechoslovakia, some 99 percent of StB files are now available to the public.

These archives are the heart of Watching the Jackals; the majority of the citations in this book are from StB files. The book focuses on StB support for Palestinian revolutionary and terrorist organizations, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian rejectionist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Abu Nidal

Organization, and uncategorizable but broadly pro-Palestinian actors like Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, aka Carlos the Jackal. Passing mention is made of StB liaison with other revolutionary movements, such the African National Congress of South Africa.

The StB's relationship with Palestinian groups dated from the 1950s, but it was in the 1960s when the StB's liaison with these organizations took off. Much of the action centered in Prague, where the PLO and its security branch, the Joint Security Service (JSS), had an office throughout the Cold War. The Palestinians found the Czech capital an agreeable location for training, meetings, and R&R. The StB in turn used its liaison with the PLO as a source of information on developments in the Middle East and as a means to recruit spies. The value of the PLO's intelligence varied: the StB concluded it was frequently contaminated by various organizational and personal grievances, a dynamic familiar to any intelligence officer who has dealt with revolutionary or irredentist groups.

StB contact with the PLO occurred elsewhere, as well, particularly in Beirut, at least up until 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon forced the PLO to relocate to Tunis. In fact, StB files reveal that as the Israeli army pushed into Beirut, the JSS entrusted its entire security archive to the StB rezidentura in Beirut. As Richterova notes, this was a remarkable example of trust, or perhaps desperation, on the PLO's part. The StB copied the files, before offering the KGB the opportunity to do the same.

Czechoslovakia's security relationship with the PFLP and Abu Nidal’s group was more fraught than that with Yasser Arafat’s PLO. These groups, along with Carlos the Jackal, were violent and capricious, offering less strategic utility for Prague. Their presence in Prague was a constant “reputational hazard" for the Czechs. To manage this, the StB's approach was threefold: to watch, to block, and if necessary to act. Surveillance was common, as numerous photos in the book suggest. At times, the Czechs would refuse entry to certain individuals. On rare occasions, including one epic confrontation with Carlos, the StB would expel operatives. The StB never arrested Carlos or any other “jackal.”

The StB sometimes had difficulty in tracking its revolutionary friends. The PLO and other organizations used an array of aliases and passports from around the world, including diplomatic documentation from other friendly countries, such as South Yemen. Before biometrics, even a police state like Communist Czechoslovakia found it challenging to keep tabs on individuals and organizations whose survival depended on secrecy and tradecraft.

Of note is what is absent in Richterova’s account. As the PLO and other groups carried out attacks across the Middle East and Western Europe, there is no evidence the StB took any steps to thwart terrorist violence outside its own borders. Intelligence was exchanged with Moscow and elsewhere within the Warsaw Pact, but nowhere in Watching the Jackals is there any indication that the StB shared information with the countries which were the victims of terrorist attacks during the Cold War era.

So how does CIA’s 1980s analysis fare in light of what Watching the Jackals tells us? Fairly well, in fact. Contact between the StB and terrorist groups was substantial and enduring, but fell well short of control. In addition to providing new insight on what was a topic of debate in the US intelligence community, Richterova’s book is also a fascinating study on the benefits and pitfalls of intelligence liaison between state and non-state actors.

Paul Kepp is former CIA Assistant Director for South and Central Asia. He is the recipient of the National Intelligence Exceptional Achievement medal, CIA Director’s Award, and the Donovan Award. During his career as a CIA Operations Officer in Africa, Asia, and Europe, he served five tours as Chief of Station. In retirement, Mr. Kepp has served on the editorial board of CIA’s journal, Studies in Intelligence, and as an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.