Monthly WIN Short-Form Book Review

Damien Van Puyvelde succinctly describes the history, key players and evolution of this flagship intelligence service and its role in French national security since World War 2. Van Puyvelde, an authoritative intelligence researcher and author of a growing number of noteworthy books and articles, offers his readers a carefully analyzed and objective study of the most essential elements of the French Directorate General for External Security (DGSE). This is the first comprehensive English-language history of a major French intelligence service since Douglas Porch’s seminal 1995 book, The French Secret Services, which Van Puyvelde singles out in his introduction. This book enlightens (or brings up to speed) intelligence scholars on one of the few global intelligence services. It is a serious, scholarly book, so readers seeking the print version of the excellent TV series Le bureau des légendes that is based on DGSE will be disappointed. But this is certainly not the author’s objective or the value of this work.

Readers will learn, however, that despite France’s reputation for bureaucracy, DGSE is a remarkably agile and adaptive intelligence service. Van Puyvelde attributes this to persistent terrorism threats to France; to policymakers’ support due to DGSE’s closer integration within French government; and recent reforms and investments (p.6). A reader may also conclude that other factors may be its comparatively small size (yet global reach) and the determination of its leaders. Those who have worked with the French services know that the French are fighters.

Van Puyvelde opens with an abridged account of DGSE’s beginnings, with necessary references to key events that shaped it and the whole of French intelligence, such as the Dreyfus Affair, two world wars and its role in solidifying France’s positions in Africa. Later in the book he also refers to other highlights such as the well-known Rainbow Warrior fiasco, the counterterrorism fight and the apparently understated French analysis of Russia before the Ukraine war (p. 114, 150-151)¹. After pinpointing DGSE’s role in the first of two hierarchical “circles” of the French intelligence community (IC), Van Puyvelde maps out DGSE’s recent restructuring, from a directorate-based model to cross-directorate mission centers, each focused on specific issues. This essentially mirrors CIA’s 2015 re-organization². Reorganizations under this model shorten or streamline operational decision-making by transferring the decisions from the directorates to the mission centers.  Van Puyvelde’s multiple references to DGSE’s (and the French President’s) action arm, the renowned Service Action, are also illuminating.

In addition to the bread and butter of its HUMINT and analysis missions, the service’s new Technical and Innovation Directorate (DTI) is the steward of French SIGINT and imagery collection and analysis. Readers may infer that this concentrates more capabilities, resources and influence in the hands of the DGSE, and probably makes its all-source analysis more seamless. DGSE’s partners in the French IC are the best judges of how smooth that technical output reaches them. Van Puyvelde precisely describes DGSE’s unique personnel framework and its structural relationships with the French military, as well as the stratification between DGSE operations and analysis. The politics of diverse work forces aside, few experienced intelligence leaders can make a convincing case against having a cadre of officers with different backgrounds and capabilities to meet rapidly changing security threats and opportunities. As Van Puyvelde points out, the percentage of women in DGSE lags behind those of their British counterparts (p. 43). Since 1995, four Defense Ministers, two Foreign Affairs Ministers, one Interior Minister and one director general (DG) of the internal service of France have been women, so it would not be abnormal for one of the many qualified women in French government (or the service itself) to one day become DGSE’s Madame la Directrice générale.

The author presents a flowing chronology of leaders of DGSE and its predecessor organizations along with descriptions of what each leader brought to the service, their accomplishments and what impact each had. They have come from a range of backgrounds:  military, industry, diplomacy, and administrative state. Van Puyvelde explains how, as terrorism rose in political importance in the 2000s in France, successive DGs used the circumstances to increase the responsibilities and resources of the service (p. 57-58). Over time, DGSE became more civilianized and better integrated within the French government. Since 2017, the DGSE has reportedly enjoyed the support of French President Macron, who has proven to be an avid consumer of intelligence (p.77). Consequently, Macron apparently expected more of DGSE during the string of stunning French reversals in the Sahel between 2017 and 2024³. DG Silberzahn established a Strategy Directorate (DS) in 1989 to more closely align the service with the needs of the French government and exploit its foreign liaison partnerships. DGSE leadership now attracts the administrative elite of France at the DG level and below (p. 151). Seasoned French diplomats have been placed in key positions, particularly under the terms of DGs Bajolet and Émié, both Ambassadors of France. In a further sign of DGSE’s integration into the French government, the highly respected Patrick Calvar served on a rotation as head of DGSE’s directorate of intelligence (DR) for two years before becoming DG of the French internal service, the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI)⁴. 

Bajolet also brought DGSE into favorable public light, by starting the service’s communications cell and the think-tank Interaxions, becoming a more public face of the service, and cracking open its doors to more realistically present its officers and culture in Le bureau, a very successful and recommended series, Le bureau des légendes (The Bureau). Bajolet’s achievements may have been unfortunately blotted by his role in an incident that concluded during the book’s publishing: the Duménil Affair. This stemmed from a legal dispute with a businessman who DGSE suspected of defrauding it while he managed contingency funds entrusted to it for a French government in exile in the event of foreign occupation such as the capitulation of 1940⁵. DGSE’s clumsy attempts to recover the funds were carried out by Bajolet’s distant underlings and were out of character for this distinguished diplomat and intelligence leader. Early this year, Bajolet was convicted for aiding and abetting DGSE’s attempted extortion⁶.

Van Puyvelde can shine only so much light onto DGSE’s activities, but his descriptions and analysis of its covert activities (p. 93-102) are helpful. DGSE officers often serve as intermediaries in hostage rescues (p. 97-98), and their DGs can also engage in high-level diplomacy. The reader senses that DGSE accepts higher levels of operational risks. Van Puyvelde rightfully argues that DGSE’s overall experience and expertise in Africa remain assets that French policymakers and the service are unlikely to relinquish (p. 150). France’s recent setbacks in Africa may likely be momentary and even reversible to a point, once France’s Africa policy has undergone a necessary reset and once security partnerships with Russia have proven to be novelties. DGSE may therefore find itself once again immersed in their historic pré carré.

Maintaining a wide range of contacts with individuals and groups on different sides of issues is the hallmark of an intelligence officer worth their weight in intelligence reports. Institutionally, DGSE practices this at a higher level than most services. Its repertoire of operational contacts is vast. It speaks with individuals and groups that their western peers cannot reach or engage.   Van Puyvelde demonstrates how DGSE’s institutional cooperation with fellow intelligence services, managed by the DS, is a force multiplier and extends its reach. Like all good services, DGSE will have differences with its partners, adjusts accordingly, and moves on. 

This highly recommended book is part of the Concise Histories of Intelligence series by Georgetown University Press. Impressively researched, the book expertly and clearly presents the necessary elements of DGSE that professionals and scholars need in order to appreciate this top-tier service. Van Puyvelde also provides an added benefit to his readers with a generous 18-page bibliography and meticulous notes, each full of highly reputable source material. Van Puyvelde writes here about DGSE and not the French IC, so readers should be aware that the less visible DGSI, DGSE’s internal counterpart, is a formidable peer in the French IC and deserving of an equally insightful English language history of its own. This reviewer looks forward to reading his next work.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

Charles Long is the pen name for a retired CIA Operations Officer.  During his career in Africa, Europe and South Asia, he served as Chief and Deputy Chief of Station and Chief of Base, and had extensive experience with America’s foreign intelligence relationships.