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AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #16-99, 22 Apr 99

WINs are produced and edited for AFIO by Roy Jonkers, AFIO Executive Director

The WIN is now sent to 943 AFIO members and subscribers, up 9 again from last week. . We need to break 1,000 by 1 July -- and with your continued help we will succeed.

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ATTENTION: AFIO SYMPOSIUM -- - Business Intelligence and the Law

25 MAY '99, Rosslyn Virginia (DC area)

A superb list of speakers - limited number of seats -- See below Section IV for agenda and registration form.

AFIO members - please distribute this information to individuals or organizations that may benefit from attending.

Also please NOTE that Mr. Britt Snider, Esq., Symposium keynote speaker, is the Inspector General, CIA, not the General Counsel, as erroneously listed on the agenda previously distributed. .


KOSOVO -- Media reporting (UK Herald) indicates that the bombing of Kosovar civilians by US aircraft was caused by a Yugoslav deception, based on a compromised CIA clandestine operation.

The report states that NATO clandestine forces (British SAS) are on the ground in Kosovo directing airstrikes, and that Albanian KLA forces have been trained and equipped by CIA clandestine operations also to provide intelligence targeting information on Yugoslav mobile units.

The SAS is said to have about 70 men on the ground guiding allied jets and illuminating targets with laser designators. The KLA has thousands of fulltime/parttime guerrillas. Yugoslav mobile units, including regular army, police and other units, hunt out the KLA guerrillas. (Shades of Vietnam, except this time we support the other side -- de-stabilizing a recognized government and state).

The KLA CIA-run operatives were said to have individual ID codes for contact with their CIA handlers. In this instance the Yugoslavs allegedly captured some these KLA operatives, and are said to have obtained the codes. The Yugoslavs then reportedly used the codes to direct US fighters to the civilian targets, with the known results. NATO military officials were said to have been disgusted by the "spook screw-up" in trying to explain the disaster.

In this odd kind of war, and the subterranean worlds of clandestine operations, including armed actions and black propaganda, combined with the ongoing political spinmeistering, some of this is plausible, but all (or some) of this is not necessarily true. ( (RoyJ)

TERRORISM - - Osama bin Laden is probably preparing more terrorist attacks. The London-based newspaper Al-Hayat reported 19 April that a jailed member of the Egyptian Al-Jihad had said that Laden's umbrella group, the " International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," possesses biological and chemical weapons and plans operations against worldwide US and Israeli interests. The details of these planned attacks were allegedly contained on a computer disc which was obtained by the CIA in September 1998.

The US may be prepared to act on this threat warning. On April 15, the Afghan newspaper "Wahdat" reported that the US has been setting up bases on the Afghan border, presumably to launch operations against bin Laden. In addition to special operations by US commandos or agents, the US may be negotiating with the Taleban government to have them hand over bin Laden in return for as yet unspecified considerations -- possibly diplomatic recognition. (Stratfor, Global Intel Update, 20 April 99 (RoyJ)

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUDGET - DCI George Tenet is continuing to oppose disclosure of the Fiscal Year 99 intelligence budget information, and last week requested dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the Federation of American Scientists. The FY 97 and 98 budgets were disclosed in previous years ($26.6 Billion and $26.7 Billion, resp.), but the DCI argues that releasing the FY 99 budget would damage national security by disclosing spending trends that would be of high interest to foreign intelligence. The spending trends would presumably reveal the alleged recent increases to the intelligence budget. In addition to the lawsuit, the FAS has filed a Freedom of Information request for the FY 2000 budget. If denied, FAS will make it a part of the ongoing legal proceedings. (V. Loeb in the Wpost 19 Ap 99, p. A17) (RoyJ)

CIA DS&T APPOINTMENT - - The incoming director of CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) is Gary Smith, now director of the Applied Physics Laboratory at John Hopkins University. DS&T is the place that dreams up technical gadgets for espionage and other means of intelligence collection. At one time, this included satellites and the U-2, but these assets have long been moved to other agencies (NRO, USAF, NIMA). But the office remains an important locus of technical wizardry and imagination, and its importance is again growing with the advent of the Information Age. (V. Loeb, Wpost 19 Ap99, p. A17) (RoyJ)

FORMER CIA DIRECTOR UNDER SCRUTINY -- Former CIA Director John Deutch has been investigated for repeatedly mishandling classified information. Deutch apparently took sensitive intelligence materials home and worked on them on his unsecured personal computer - - even though he also had a secure CIA computer available. When agency technicians went to his home, after he stepped down as DCI in December 1996, to disconnect the secure computer, they discovered 31 classified documents on his personal computer, which was potentially vulnerable to hackers. One source stated "It's one thing to be sloppy. This was reckless." The Justice Department investigated the case for more than one year, but did not press criminal charges and referred the case back to the CIA. The CIA IG is now preparing a report. (Nwswk; PRNewswire 11 April 99; Photo: http://www/ (courtesy Larry Sulc) (RoyJ)


CHINESE ESPIONAGE AND US INTELLIGENCE - It is always useful to keep things in perspective, including the political football of Chinese espionage. Beijing has been accused of gathering intelligence from thousands of traveling government officials, students and businessmen. Guess what! Media sources have publicized the allegation that CIA has been doing exactly the same thing for decades. The CIA Domestic collection Division, now renamed the National Resources Division, has reportedly been coordinating the collection of nuggets of information from émigrés as well as American tourists, scholars and business executives returning from overseas, including those returning from China. During the Cold War this source only rarely provided intelligence or technical blockbusters, but the little bits and pieces, carefully assembled, were said to have been of great value. So hopefully we will not throw out the baby with the bathwater when we do the necessary tightening up of our security procedures. (based on V. Loeb, WPost Ap19, p. A17) (RoyJ)

KOSOVO - Since the US (with NATO support) started a war with Yugoslavia, and is currently "bombing the country back into the stone age" by destroying Yugoslavia's (including Kosovo's) civic infrastructure and manufacturing capability, and since we -- the public and former intelligence professionals -- must determine what is going on through the fog of media manipulation, black and white propaganda, hidden clandestine operations, diplomatic posturing and unknown secret diplomacy, we are left, as intelligence analysts, with scrutinizing open source insights from varying perspectives.

This WIN therefore includes a view from Russia, by Alexei Arbatov, and, as a separately transmitted WIN Addendum, a perspective from Rumania, by AFIO member Derrin Smith, based on interactions with a former Rumanian ambassador and Chief of Rumanian Intelligence.

Relative to the Arbatov piece, it must be seen in context. The Russian people in recent years have been betrayed by their ruling elites, who have robbed and emasculated the state, leaving only an eviscerated skeleton of a powerless beggar looking for handouts - - both as a government and as individuals. Furthermore, the top level of the Russian government is currently engaged in serious internal political wars. Therefore, although Russian public opinion may be accurately reflected by Arbatov, serious Russian actions are unlikely to be forthcoming. No power. They can be bought off. Nevertheless, Russia could usefully be included in a far-sighted diplomatic solution and can, if desired, play a constructive role in such an effort. Arbatov's piece provides a different view of the conflict - - essential for the intelligence analyst as well as the policymaker and the public.

Alexei G. Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma, presented an on-the-record address at the Atlantic Council on 20 April 1999. The topic of his talk was -- - The U-Turn in U.S.-Russian Relations.

Arbatov stated his belief that U.S.-Russian relations, in the wake of NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, are at the "worst, most acute, most dangerous juncture since the U.S.-Soviet Berlin and Cuban missile crises."

According to Arbatov, the U.S. views intervention in Kosovo as a humanitarian mission, while Russia sees it as a "blunt, indiscriminate intervention in violation of the U.N Charter and other international norms."

The intervention demonstrates "an outrageous disregard for the most fundamental principles of the post-Cold War world order." Arbatov criticized the U.S for having "double standards." "Moral justification for intervention," in Russia's view, "holds no water."

Arbatov asked rhetorically, "if the U.S. is willing to intervene in Kosovo, why, then,didn't the U.S. intervene in Russia when Moscow was committing atrocities in Chechnya." He added that, "there are many sons-of-bitches leading countries around the world," and criticized America for going after some and not others. In Arbatov's view, NATO's intervention is likely to increase the desire of oppressive leaders around the world to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction as a hedge against any future U.S. intervention.

Again, rhetorically, he wondered how the U.S. would react if the Commonwealth of Independent States intervened in Turkey because of its repression of Kurds. In his view, NATO's actions in the Balkans are no more valid.

Arbatov claimed that the effect of NATO's air campaign has been counterproductive in every respect:

* Serbs are now "victims" of NATO aggression

* Milosevic's position is "stronger than even he could have ever dreamed.

Milosevic has been transformed into a national hero in a besieged nation and, now, the only way to do away with Milosevic is to do away with the Serbs as a nation." Even democratic, pro-West elements in Belgrade have lined up behind Milosevic.

*The U.S. and NATO "totally disregarded Russia's position and backed away from its pledge to include Russia in European security decisions." The message that Moscow takes away from this is that, "since the end of the Cold War, the weak do not count, and this will be remembered by Russia for a long time to come."


* America's "monopoly of power leads it to arbitrary decisions and a disregard for the UN."

* "Secretary Albright's argument, that bombing Serbs (or Kosovars) is in their interest, is ridiculous."

* Kosovo's humanitarian catastrophe has been exacerbated and the Kosovar Albanians are fleeing from both Serbs and NATO bombs.

* A "moderate, local conflict in Kosovo" has now become an international crisis of the first order.

Arbatov asserted that, in Moscow, "apocalyptic scenarios are now being discussed, and there is now a unanimous perception that Russia's greatest threat is from the West." Russians fear that their own internal weakness will invite Western aggression. As a result, Russia's military modernization has become more urgent and the focus is shifting from local operations in the South to a large-scale Western offensive. Moscow will focus on improving its air defenses and nuclear forces.

Arbatov also declared that START II is dead, cooperation with NATO is frozen, cooperation on missile defense is out of the question, and Moscow's willingness to cooperate on non-proliferation issues is at an all-time low. Moreover, anti-U.S. sentiment in Russia is real, deep, and more widespread than ever, and the slogan describing NATO action - "today Serbia, tomorrow Russia" - is "deeply planted in Russians' minds."

He also noted a great change in the thinking of Russian youth, who have shifted from their admiration of American culture to Russian nationalism - reflected by the desire of many to join the Serbs in their fight against NATO. Arbatov stated that the goal remains preserving democracy in Russia, and if Moscow is successful, these anti-American feeling will remain significant.

Arbatov believes the current U.S-Russia crisis is more dangerous than the U.S.-Soviet Cuban missile crisis for three reasons:

* There is no tacit understanding between the two sides now on their respective spheres of influence. The Balkans are a gray zone, and the last line of defense for Russia. As an aside, Arbatov said that, when he is asked the question "Why do the Serbs mean so much Russians," he responds with the question "Why do the Albanians mean so much to Americans?"

* There is a great power imbalance between Russia and the West. As such the West does not consider serious concessions to Moscow's interests are necessary. On the other hand, Russia is so weak and humiliated, further concessions to the West are not possible.

* Russia is a young democracy. Khrushchev was able to "declare victory" after Russia backed down in Cuba and the Russian people did not know any better. In Russia today, it is no longer possible to trick the people and politicians' freedom of maneuver is circumscribed accordingly.

Arbatov indicated that Russia's perception is that NATO has changed from a defensive organization to one that is looking for a new enemy for its raison d'être through its out-of-sector missions. Russians liked the old NATO better. Russians who opposed NATO expansion and cooperation with the West are now saying "I told you so," and even pro-West Russians oppose NATO's action in Yugoslavia. Communists and nationalists in Russia believe Moscow should encourage Russian volunteers to fight with the Serbs, form an alliance with Belarus and Serbia, and support Milosevic with weapons. He said that Russia has three courses of action at this point:

* In effect, go to war by intervening immediately with volunteers, an alliance with the Serbs, and military support. Russia must draw the line here.

* Russia could stay out of the conflict and encourage the Serbs to make this conflict "NATO's Vietnam." The concern over this approach is that the cost would be too high in Serb blood and, ultimately, Russia itself would not be able to avoid getting involved in the fighting.

* Help find a political/diplomatic solution. This is Moscow's current policy but, to work, NATO must first make some concessions. NATO must stop bombing, stop trying to overthrow Milosevic, stop supporting the KLA, stop Kosovo's de facto movement toward independence, agree that follow-on forces not be under NATO control, and stop preparing Albania for war against Yugoslavia.

Arbatov asserted that Rambouillet is dead and a new political solution must be found. He also stated that Milosevic must make concessions, including:

* the withdrawal of Serb forces in a way that does not create a vacuum that might be filled by the KLA,

* agree to a peacekeeping force for a specified period, and

* grant Kosovo maximum autonomy without allowing it to secede.

Arbatov noted that the public comments by American officials are "increasingly militant," the objectives of the conflict are evolving, and that, by increasing the stakes, NATO is limiting its flexibility in achieving a diplomatic solution. He added that political democrats in Russia are under increasingly intense, McCarthy-like attacks by communists and nationalists. The democrats are trying to hold the line against these attacks, but cannot do so indefinitely. He asserted also that a NATO ground campaign likely would be the trigger for communist and nationalist views to prevail, and put Russia on the road to war with NATO.

Arbatov claimed that NATO "has already failed." The results of the use of force have done a disservice to the interests of the Kosovar Albanians, Russia, and European security. Now, Western politicians who supported military intervention have placed their own political careers on the line, and that they cannot admit to having made any mistakes.

Arbatov closed his prepared remarks by saying that he has devoted his professional life to improving U.S.-Russia ties, and that he has a great professional and personal stake in preserving the relationship. Describing himself as a "friend of America," he stated that he felt compelled to speak candidly about the effect NATO's military intervention has had on Russia.

Arbatov then answered several questions. The most noteworthy responses follow.

*Describing the security debate in Russia, Arbatov said that the democrats disagree with the communists and nationalists over what to do about NATO expansion, not their opposition to it.

*Arbatov asserted that Moscow has few levers with which to influence Milosevic.

*In response to a question about whether Russia is feeling "isolated" internationally, Arbatov commented that Russia will look for alliances elsewhere (specifically China, India, and Iran), but that these are not Moscow's "preferred" relationships. Arbatov affirmed that Russia's brightest future lies in cooperation with Europe and the West.

He also confessed that Moscow's response to NATO action in Yugoslavia is constrained by its need for Western economic assistance, but many in Russia are calling for a universal default on its debts and its own military intervention in the Balkans. He reiterated that President Yeltsin is trying to hold the line against this sentiment, but cannot do so indefinitely.

Asked about "echoes of 1914," Arbatov stated that the West too must remember the lessons of WW I, and that "Russia cannot forever sit on it hands."

Arbatov admitted also that all sides, including Milosevic and Russia have made mistakes in the Balkans since 1991, but that NATO's bombing has raised the consequences of these mistakes a new, unprecedented level.

Commenting on Russia's self-image as "weak," Arbatov stated that this perception obstructs any further concessions to NATO - in short, that Russia's credibility and dignity are on the line. Russia could well act in support of Milosevic and, in doing so, "dare NATO to fire the first shot of WW III." He added that the NATO-Russia Founding Act is now seen in Moscow as a mistake, NATO bombing being a blunt violation of that agreement.

Finally, Arbatov noted that, in sustaining a dialogue with Russia (even Track II), the U.S. and NATO should seek out the views of moderate communists and nationalists to have the best appreciation for what is going on in Russia today.

Comment: Arbatov had several points to make and he did so bluntly. While one would not want to overreact to his remarks, one would likely also want to avoid underestimating their significance.

A couple of broad conclusions might be drawn from his address. First, there may be still some danger in fostering Moscow's perception that its interests in the Balkans are being disregarded. Second, any diplomatic solution to the current crisis should include "face-saving" elements for NATO, Milosevic, and Russia. With a US initiative dealing from a position of military strength, a "tactical pause" in the bombing campaign for a publicly-specified period of time might be one way for all three sides to save enough face to make a diplomatic solution possible.

( The entirety of Arbatov's remarks is posted on the Atlantic Council's web site at ; courtesy T. Fergusson; (RoyJ)


EXPLOSION ABOARD THE IOWA, by Richard L. Schwoebel, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, 1999, ISBN 1-55750-810-0. This is not just a Navy book -- it is a book about investigations of the explosion aboard a US battleship that killed forty-seven crewmen. in 1989. Navy investigators concluded the explosion was not an accident. The author, who was head of the technical team hired by the Senate Armed Services Committee, came to a different conclusion. This is the story of the investigation, involving the Navy, the FBI, and Congressional committees, and in general, life in the DC bureaucratic and political arenas. Interesting and educational. (RoyJ)

BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR, by Mark Bowden, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. This new book covers the 3 Oct 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which a 100 man force of elite US rangers and Delta Force commandos took some 70 casualties, including 18 killed. It's a gripping story -- hard to put it down. Mostly it is about a furious all night firefight, but it does have some interesting intelligence insights. In addition to satellite imagery, SIGINT, and a robust HUMINT effort, they had a US Navy P-3 (EP-3?) surveillance aircraft with all types of day, night and all weather sensors circling the city 24 hours a day. Once the operation got underway, there were three special ops helicopters with color TV cameras that kept the scene under continuous surveillance so that commanders could monitor the action in real time. I recommend this one! (JdMac)


POLICE LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE -- Larry Sulc, an AFIO member, will be working as a volunteer for the Beaufort, SC, Police Dept., helping the latter in its intelligence activity. Any contribution of advice and/or information on this topic would be most welcome. Contact Larry directly at, or mail to: 24 Harbor River Circle, St Helena, SC 29902; or call - - - Tel: 843-838-0192 - -or - FAX (same number - but call first).

EMPLOYMENT SOUGHT - Former senior Army Special Operations Officer, excellent analyst and writer (editor's opinion), several years experience developing C3I requirements and systems architectures, is seeking permanent position. Contact AFIO, ref File J-122.

AFIO MEMBERS HELP WITH CORPORATE MEMBERSHIPS- - AFIO members are invited to let us know if are "decisionmakers" in corporate or professional offices that might be interested in becoming corporate members of AFIO, or if they personally know someone who is at the level where such a decision might be made in a corporation or professional or enterpreneural organization. WE NEED YOUR HELP! We need to improve our funding profile! Corporate Members will support a worthy cause AND receive benefits in return. Please let us know

AFIO invites corporations and professional offices to become corporate members. For more information contact the AFIO Vice President for Corporate Membership Programs, James ("Jim") Boginis, or AFIO at . (RoyJ)


Donald Huefner, CIA retired, who served a Vice President and Executive Director of AFIO 1978 - 1979, died April 21st at Fairfax hospital. There will be a Mass at Our Lady of Good Council, 8601 Wolf Trap Road, Vienna, Virginia, on Tuesday April 27th at 10:30 a.m. In lieu of flowers, the family requests donations to the American Heart Association or Our Lady of Good Council Catholic Church.


April 28 -- New Mexico Chapter meeting, at the East Officers Club, Kirkland AFB, NM, 11:30 a.m. For reservations contact Tom Smith (505 ) 293 3676 or mail to 12711 High Graham Rd N.E., Albuquerque, NM by noon April 27th. Subject: Round-table discussion of current events. Have an idea about Kosovo etc? Discuss it with the Chapter's Albanian expert (FBI ret). Interested in security at the Labs? Whether the Chapter should start its own Web page or email newsletter? AFIO members and guests are invited to attend and join the Chapter!

Contact Chapter President Saenz on membership

May 25 -- AFIO SYMPOSIUM , "Business Intelligence and the Law," Rosslyn Westpark Holiday Inn, Alexandria Va. (See agenda and registration form below, or visit AFIO's Website at

The AFIO event is held in conjunction with, and hosted by, OSS Œ99 which is conducted from May 23 - 26. (703) 242-1700,

June 14 -- AFIO LUNCHEON, Fort Myers, Va. AFIO members and guests, $26. Others $29. Make out check to "AFIO" and send with note including name, address, tel/email info, to AFIO, 6723 Whittier Ave, McLean, Va 22101-4533.

June 24 - 28, Great Lakes Naval Base, IL. AFIO MIDWEST Chapter 10th annual Intelligence Seminar at Great Lakes June 24, 25 and 26, followed by at tour of the Joint Reserve Center at Fort Sheridan on the 27th, and sessions as well as dinners on 27 and 28 June at the Eagles Nest at the Great Lakes Base. Contact President Angelo Diliberti

OTHER CONFERENCE: The Women's Institute of International Relations is sponsoring a "Strategy 2000 Conference, on Monday, April 26th, at the ROA building, Capitol Hill, from 2 till 5 p.m. Call Nancy Greene, 202 638 6801.



Tuesday, 25 May 1999, 0700 (registration starts) - 18:30 (reception closes), Holiday Inn, Rosslyn, Virginia.

Seating is limited to 100 individuals. First come, first served.

See our Website to download registration form or copy the entries below. This is a first clas symposium - highly recommended.

AGENDA: Speakers

(1) Britt Snider, Esq, keynote speaker, CIA Inspector General, -- Contemporary intelligence and counterintelligence legal issues affecting US business community.

(2) FBI National Security Division - - Economic Espionage Overview

(3) Edward O'Malley, former Deputy Director of the FBI for CI - - Criminal Enforcement Trends and Procedures relative to Business Secrets and Intellectual Property.

(4) Professor James Chandler -- Civil Enforcement Trends and Procedures re: Intellectual Property and Business Secrets.

(5) Rosemary Lark - - Business Intelligence: Corporate America Meets James Bond.

(6) Theodore Shackley (CIA ret) -- Business Terrorism - You are the Target

(7) Panel : Neil Livingstone, Gary Stubblefield, Bob Quigley - - Global Options -- Protecting Your Business Assets // Preemptive Strategies and Case Studies.

(8) Reception and Mixer.


Please complete form and send form and check to: AFIO, 6723 Whittier Ave, Ste 303A, McLean, Va 22101-4533.







FEES: $125 for AFIO members, and members of SCIP, NMIA or ABA.

$165 for all others -- NOTE that this fee includes a one-year subscription to the AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes (email) and an AFIO membership for US citizens who are interested and eligible.

Mail check and Registration Form to AFIO at address above.

WIN #16-99 KOSOVO ADDENDUM , 23 Apr99

This ADDENDUM does not represent an AFIO position. As with the WINs the Editor is confident that recipients make up their own minds. The purpose of this ADDENDUM is to provide additional information from a source not available to most, prepared by an AFIO member, who submits it as an effort to contribute to understanding and solution of this sad affair.

WIN ADDENDUM - AFIO Member Derrin Smith on Kosovo Political Settlement, based on conversations with former Rumanian Intelligence Director, Dr. Ioan Talpes, who was previously interviewed by US agencies.

WIN editor comment:

No public discussion, or even understanding, is of much influence on policymakers unless it is fairly widely held and becomes politically potent, or conforms to their ideological receptivity ( This goes for intelligence as well).

At the current stage of the conflict, we can observe that concentrated atrocity manipulation and publicity is shoring up public support for the US/NATO efforts; that the decisonmakers (US and NATO) have staked their political personae on the "success" of current undertaking (past mistakes and shifting objectives be damned); and that it is fairly clear that a segment of the US foreign policy elite has been heavily influenced by an anti-Serb bias for years, which in turn has led to the curent asymetric moralizing (we supported the noxious Croats in doing it to the Serbs in the Krajhina, but the Serbs may not do it in Kosovo).

This anti-Serb bias seems to have provided both an impetus to the current bombing action and threatens to impede, if one judges only from official pronouncements and in the absence of knowledge about secret diplomatic maneuvering, what is clearly needed: a cold-eyed view of what needs to be done to get a even-handed political settlement that fits into a longer range view and strategy for Balkan stability.

A Negotiated Settlement to the Balkans Conflict

By Dr. Derrin Smith

Purpose. The purpose of this white paper is to propose a negotiated settlement to the Balkans conflict of 1999. The objective of these recommendations is to provide an alternative to NATOís proposed ground military intervention in Yugoslavia and to encourage a cessation to hostilities.

Executive Summary of the Settlement. The negotiated outcome most likely to succeed will be for the redefinition of Yugoslaviaís borders and the division of Kosovo under terms that are unilaterally acceptable. This will involve a solution that leaves a significant portion of Kosovo under strictly Serb control, with a smaller ethnic-Albanian region also established that has total autonomy from Belgrade. NATO and UN peacekeeping forces will be permitted in the Albanian autonomous region but not in the Serbian region.

This resolution makes Milosevic a hero throughout Yugoslavia for maintaining a large landmass that would otherwise have been lost entirely (like Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and originally all of Kosovo). It allows NATO to appear successful by achieving an autonomous region for the ethnic Albanians with a military peacekeeping force presence. It allows the KLA to disband and quit fighting a guerilla war by making it appear that they ìwonî independence and self-rule for the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

So, the Serbian government ìwinsî and NATO ìwinsî and the KLA ìwins.î Other solutions using force, including long term continuation of air strikes or the proposed military ground intervention to create a NATO enforced military ìpeaceî for the ethnic-Albanian Kosovars, will likely result in total destruction of the Kosovo region.

Situation Assessment. Events in the Balkans during the last month have been most enlightening. It appears that many of the actions undertaken by NATO and the U.S. State Department have had an impact nearly exactly the opposite of the stated ends. Specifically:

Goal: NATO bombing was to force Milosevic to capitulate and agree to international demands for a military peacekeeping presence on Serbian territory.

Result: Milosevic has not capitulated and probably will never agree to military occupation of Serbian soil.

Rationale: The history of the Serbísóresisting the Turk occupation in 1389; resisting the Nazi occupation despite a million casualties in World War II; resisting Warsaw Pact demands for military operations on Serbian territory during the Cold Waróindicates that the cultural psyche will not permit the Serbian people to yield to an international military occupation.

Goal: Protect the ethnic-Albanians from human rights abuses at the hands of Serb militia and the Yugoslavian regular army.

Result: Ethnic cleansing by forced relocation has accelerated at a factor of probably ten times beyond anything that had occurred previously. Destruction of ethnic-Albanian villages and personal property exploded as soon as NATO actions commenced.

Rationale. The NATO bombings took away any incentive that Milosevic had for restraint. The bombing enabled him to accelerate annihilation of the remnants of the KLA in Kosovo. The removal of the UN peacekeeping monitors prior to the bombing enabled him to engage in unparalleled ethnic cleansing by forced relocation unhampered by local intervention or observers.

Goal. To destabilize the Milosevic regime and force a change in leadership in Yugoslavia.

Result. The NATO attacks on Yugoslavia have consolidated the general population in support of Milosevic. He has become a national hero due to the ìsiege mentalityî created among the general population once the bombing of their territory began.

Rationale. It immediately became the general Serbian mindset that the international community was engaged in methodical elimination of the Serbian population and that they were battling for their own survival. Looking at the colorful Serbian history as warriors, they will die before they will yield.

Goal. To unify the NATO allies and neighboring Balkan states with a concerted military action against a common enemy.

Result. The NATO military action has resulted in the destabilization of Macedonia and Albania due to massive influx of refugees that they are ill equipped to handle. Anti-NATO protests in Greece, Italy, Romania and else where are becoming an increasing cause of concern for NATO allies. The proposed use of land forces will accelerate divisiveness within NATO, which will be made worse when the body bags start arriving home. Friends and foes alike are using the entire operation very discreetly against U.S. interests. They are subtly singling out the U.S. as a provoker of wars and loose cannon that Europe has to control, thus mustering support for German and French plans of a stronger European determination of all regional events. Anti-Americans throughout Europe, therefore, are having a field day.

Rationale. NATO actions will not go unopposed, from within and without. The Balkan states are far more interested in a regional solution between the Balkan neighbors than a forced solution from Paris, London, Washington or even the UN in New York.

Goal. Minimize Russian influence throughout the Balkan region by creating relationships and alliances that favor the West.

Result. The NATO actions have moved Yugoslavia into a preliminary mutual defense treaty with Russia. Major parties in Russia, both the Nationalists and the Communists, are keen to enter the Balkans conflict on the side of Yugoslavia to bolster their own agendas. Romania has real concerns about being caught in the crossfire between Russia, Yugoslavia and NATO. Hungary is now playing both sides of the fence despite being a NATO member nation.

Rationale. Russia has a major interest in supporting the Serbs, even if it is not exactly obliged to do so. It is Moscowís only chance to play a power role in Europe. Although Yeltsin is working frenetically to play the moderator and peacemaker, his influence is waning and more extremist calls for intervention on behalf of the Serbs are amplifying.

Goal. Force President Milosevic to accept the terms of the Ramboulliet agreement under threat of NATO punishment if Yugoslavia refuses.

Result. The contact groupís insistence that the KLA be accepted and included in the negotiations made Ramboulliet a non-starter. There is no chance of a resolution to the crisis based on the Ramboulliet conditions.

Rationale. Citizens throughout Yugoslavia, including many reasonable Kosovars, consider the KLA a terrorist organization. Holbrookeís impromptu visit to the KLA, complete with rather blatant propagandizing of his KLA visit via CNN televising some months ago, destroyed any limited credibility that he may have had with Milosevic and the government of Yugoslavia. The U.S. negotiatorsí contention that Belgrade could retain its sovereignty of rule over a Kosovo that had wider autonomy from Yugoslaviaówhen we were officially recognizing a non-Yugoslav, non-Serb military (the KLA) as a legitimate army in Kosovoówas patently absurd. Furthermore, Albrightís formulation that Belgrade had to accept autonomy for Kosovo, or else had to recognize under threat of force that Kosovo would have complete independence from Belgrade, undermined any possibilities for constructive negotiations.

In short, miscalculations by the NATO allies have been severe. Personalities in the U.S. State Department have caused the U.S. President and National Security Council to ignore earlier warnings by intelligence experts, Balkans experts and the Department of Defense against military intervention and in favor of a negotiated settlement. U.S. foreign policy and NATO actions have, almost without exception, caused a result the opposite of the stated intent. The Serb population has united behind a dangerous president and is rapidly developing a survival mentality. Regional destabilization is being accelerated and NATO unity will be increasingly challenged in coming weeks and months.

Ground Forces Issues. Introduction of ground forces into Kosovo, even using an overwhelming number of military personnel, will not resolve the problem. Ground warfare will cost many more lives and cause much more damage to the region than other options. The operation will not be the sort of push-over affair that we experienced during Desert Storm. This is because:

*The weather and terrain do not favor the allied forces and capabilities to the extent the Kuwaiti and Iraqi weather and countryside did;

*The Serb militia and Yugoslav regular military are in highly dispersed, defensive positions or in small, mobile units;

*NATO attempts to rationalize the likely actions and strategy of the Serbian military forces into a coherent military strategy and order of battle will be inaccurate. The combatants faced by NATO arenít disciplined enough in mass maneuvers and integrated operations to be called ìsoldiers.î Based on their history they are much more comfortable simply being ìkillersî and will extract a serious toll on any invading forces;

*The psychology of the Serbian defenders will be that of experienced warriors fighting for survival. Unlike the masses of Iraqi military ready to surrender at the first sign of U.S. military, the dispersed Serbian forces are more likely to fight to the death in small, aggressive, mobile units.

Unlike the Kuwaiti population and even the Iraqi villagers, the NATO ground forces are unlikely to be welcomed by Serbian civilians and, in fact, will probably be resisted with all available force. The NATO calculations for armed Serbian combatants should be adjusted to allow for significant civilian militia that will respond to Milosevicís call to arms to defend Yugoslavia and greater Serbia from international aggression. NATO calculations must also be adjusted to allow for significant Russian assistance including mercenary forces, regular military volunteers, as well as light and heavy arms.

For NATO forces to be completely successful in controlling both the cities as well as the countryside, they should be prepared to virtually exterminate the Serbian population.

The best parallel in recent history for the United States policy makers to consider is not Desert Storm, or Grenada, or Panama, or Somalia, or even Vietnam. The best parallel is the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Despite an overwhelming military machine it is not possible to control a large land mass when you are battling a fanatical, dispersed enemy that has significant support of a local populace.

Other Options. In addition to the proposed negotiated settlement or military ground intervention, it is important to consider what other options might be explored:

Removal, by assassination, of President Milosevic.

This would require an overwhelming military presence and/or extraordinary special operations. The U.S. would have to first reopen the Pandoraís box that was closed in the 1970ís. We would have to overturn our current legislation against the U.S.-sponsored assassination of foreign leaders. In any event, Saddam Hussain and a few others may be adequate proof that our time is past due to revisit this restriction. However, such an assassination option would be an intervention against the president of a sovereign nation. Milosevic, for all his faults, is a president who was duly elected by democratic process and was put in power by the collective will of the citizens.

Return to uneasy peace and occupation.

Immediate cease-fire by all combatants followed by UN civilian peacekeeping escort of ethnic-Albanian Kosovars back to their villages and homes; UN-sponsored rebuilding of Kosovo under civilian observers. There would be no NATO military presence in the borders of Kosovo. Presumably, however, NATO would never have initiated military actions if it were felt that civilian peacekeeping forces would be adequate to protect the ethnic-Albanian Kosovars. This solution simply returns the region to the pre-bombing status quo; albeit with a significantly weakened KLA and significantly strengthened regional influence that can be exercised by Milosevic.

Summary Recommendations. Initiate an immediate cease-fire by all combatants and initiate the negotiated settlement as defined in the opening sections of this white paper. Belgrade is actively interested in drawing new lines for the frontiers to come and is very ready to negotiate. Military ground force intervention in Kosovo, however, will be the worst U.S. foreign policy disaster since the 1960s.

There is no doubt that President Milosevic, a freely elected President of an independent nation, is dangerous, possibly mentally unstable and is currently engaged in crimes against humanity. However, unless NATO forces are willing to engage in genocide against the Serbian people at levels unprecedented in recent history, there is no military solution to this crisis.

During the NATO meetings and other discussions to be held in Washington, D.C. during the next two weeks, it is strongly recommended that Dr. Ioan Talpes be invited to speak to the convened decision-makers. Dr. Talpes has a significant history throughout the Balkans; he also has a history with President Milosevic and it can be anticipated that President Milosevic may be amenable to a solution advocated by Dr. Talpes.

About the Author. Dr. Derrin Smith is a former intelligence officer and technology expert who is currently engaged in business activities as an investment banker in the Balkan region. This white paper summarizes Dr. Smithís assessments and recommendations following a recent month spent in the Balkans, during which he consulted with regional experts about solutions to the Kosovo crisis. Two of these experts are as follows:

Dr. Ioan Talpes, well regarded Balkans expertóHe was the Romanian Ambassador to Bulgaria from 1997-to-1998 and received their highest award for service. Dr. Talpes served as Director of Romanian Foreign Intelligence (SIE) during 1993-to-1997 under BOTH the Iliescu and Constantinescu administrations. Prior to that he was Presidential Advisor for Military Affairs and Social Order from July 1990 until 1992 and Chief Editor of the Military Publishing House 1987 to 1990. During his service as Director of the SIE, Dr. Talpes undertook a radical reform of its strategic goals and operational philosophies, establishing the first contacts and institutionalizing the first collaborative arrangements between the SIE and both the CIA and FBI. Dr. Talpes also initiated the negotiations between the Government and Romaniaís Hungarian minority which led to the formation of the Council of National Minorities and he has been one of the prime movers behind Romaniaís pro-NATO policy during 1994-to-1997.

Dr. Larry Watts, Eastern European and small states internal security expert. Dr. Watts is a long time Romanian specialist and former RAND consultant; was the Senior Consultant for the Carnegie-sponsored Project on Ethnic Relations from 1991-to-1997 and has been based in Bucharest continuously since 1991. Dr. Watts has worked on ethnic mediations in Hungary, Romanian, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Russia. He also worked as Counsel to the Romanian Foreign Minister on the conclusion of the basic treaty between Hungary and Romania in 1996. Dr. Watts has also been direct advisor to the last three Ministers of Defense and the last two Chiefs of the General Staff in Romania on military reform issues.

Dr. Smith may be reached in the U.S. at (303)-832-8220

Dr. Talpes may be reached in Romania at (011)-409-258-0980

Dr. Watts may be reached in Romania at (011)-401-231-4887

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