WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE NOTES (WIN)
#38-00 dtd 22 September 2000
WINs are intelligence commentaries produced and edited by Roy Jonkers, based
on public media sources, for AFIO members and subscribers. Associate Editor
Don Harvey contributed articles to this WIN.
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SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ELECTIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA -- $77 MILLION HELPS FOES OF MILOSEVIC --
Charges of Chinese influence-buying in the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign
caused a political storm in Washington that has yet to fully abate. By some
measures, however, that episode pales by comparison to American political
interference in Serbia, locus of a $77 million U.S. effort to do with ballots
what NATO bombs could not -- getting rid of a prime US propaganda-designated
bogeyman, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. By having him painted as a
war criminal, however much necessary to give our policies in Yugoslavia and
Kosovo a veneer of moral rectitude, the process of replacing him as a
political leader has not been made easier.
In the run-up to national elections on Sunday, 24 September, U.S. agencies and
contractors have been working to strengthen and support the opposition to
Milosevic. They have helped train opposition organizers, equipped their
offices with computers and fax machines and provided opposition parties with
sophisticated voter surveys, and funneled support to student groups, labor
unions, independent media outlets, even Serbian heavy metal bands that stage
street concerts as part of a voter registration drive called "Rock the
There are signs of success - Milosevic is said to be running behind his
principal opponent in the polls. But there also is evidence of a potential
backlash. Kostunica, the opposition's front-runner, makes a point of telling
audiences that he accepts no Western aid. US bombing of cities has not been
popular among the Serbs. Milosevic's posters show a picture of another leading
opposition figure -- former deputy prime minister Vuk Draskovic -- kissing the
hand of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.
US policy also fosters the further disintegration of Yugoslavia and isolation
of Serbia by promoting the separation of Montenegro from Serbia through
(media-announced) covert action, and the contest in Montenegro is another
locus of activity. The Pentagon yesterday began a global shift of forces to
bolster the U.S. military presence in the Balkans. A carrier battle group led
by the USS Abraham Lincoln left Thai waters ahead of schedule and headed
toward the Persian Gulf, which will free up another carrier group, led by the
USS George Washington, for movement to the Adriatic Sea. This is good
old-fashioned political hardball -- with money, bullets, information
manipulation and covert action. Stand by for the next act and hope for the
best in this sorry tale. (Wash Post Sep 19, 2000 Pg. 1 // Lancaster &
THE INVESTIGATION OF DR. DEUTCH -- The Pentagon acknowledged on September
20th that it had sat on its hands for well over a year before even trying to
assess the actual or potential damage done to national security by Dr. John
Deutch's lack of elementary security practices during his tenure as Deputy
Secretary of Defense. RADM Quigley, USN, faced the press this week and engaged
in double-speak trying to explain this lack of action, in spite of CIA offers
to DOD of documentation and access to computer discs. But regardless of
official foot-dragging, the probe is now in process and continuing.
Dr. Deutch reportedly used unsecured computers as well as his America Online
account at home to access classified defense information (along with other
internet sites) in the early to mid-1990s.
Ironically, the alleged violations occurred after Deutch issued a memo
reminding Defense Department employees that only "properly reviewed and
cleared" information should be placed on computer systems accessible to
the public. The situation was exacerbated because Dr. Deutch declined
departmental requests to install secure computer systems in his residence.
"The evidence we obtained clearly establishes that Dr. Deutch failed to
follow even the most basic security precautions," according to an
internal DOD memo.
Deutch developed work habits at the Defense Department and the CIA that
included using a variety of unsecured computers at home and carrying computer
memory cards and disks with official information in his shirt pocket. One
unanswered question is the whereabouts of some floppy disks he used to store
classified military and intelligence data until he transferred the information
to larger personal computer memory cards. A probe by the CIA inspector general
determined that Deutch had four of these cards containing nearly 100,000 pages
of information, including his daily journal.
Deutch served as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology
from April 1993 to March 1994, when he became Deputy Secretary of Defense, a
job he held until he was appointed CIA director in 1995. He left the CIA in
December of the following year.
There is no explicit evidence that computer hackers or spies obtained
classified information as a result of Deutch's actions. It is not clear from
the documents available to the media at this time precisely what kinds of
classified information Deutch was working on at home. Generally, cases similar
to Deutch's have not led to criminal charges, but have been handled through
The case has been compared to that of Wen Ho Lee, a fellow scientist, but not
a member of the old-boy network and part of a minority being publicly targeted
from some quarters. In both cases discs are missing. But regardless of excuses
made for either Dr Deutch or Dr Lee, any time someone knowingly downloads
classified material on a personal system (particularly if connected to the
internet), it is done willfully and with bad intent -- even if the intent is
only to circumvent the official system.
On the other side of the coin, these people (and many others in our
work-obsessed society) deal with tasks and problems that cannot be contained
in 8-10 hour workdays in the office. No excuse, but an explanation -- people
in a corner may take shortcuts.
Without going overboard on this topic, for the problem is probably widespread
(and Deutch - and Wen Ho Lee - may only be the tip of the iceberg and
'unlucky' scapegoats), it leads one to question the role and impact of the
recently prevailing political climate on security-consciousness (widely
condemned by security officials as disastrous during most of the current
administration), or alternatively, the entire classification system. Perhaps
the materials potentially compromised, described in such cataclysmic terms for
the media initially, were not so important after all. Perhaps too much is
classified and really available in open sources. Perhaps the entire
classification system and associated procedures need a bottoms-up review. (AP
- L. Margasak // Phil. Inquirer Sep 21, 2000; Wash Post Sep 16, 2000 Pg. 1 //
Vise&Loeb) (courtesy C. Griffith) (Jonkers)
GLOBAL HAWK RECONNAISSANCE -- The US Joint Forces Command has completed
a year-long evaluation of the Global Hawk long-endurance unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) . The Command has recommended that it be put into production,
calling it "militarily useful."
Global Hawk has demonstrated it can fly 1,200 nautical miles and orbit the
area of interest at 60,000 feet for 24 hours in a single 32-hour mission. The
system can gather imagery of a 200 x 200 mile area in 24 hours, or
alternately, up to 1,900 narrow-field-of-view spot observations. System
operators have demonstrated the capability to send imagery from Global Hawk to
an F/A-18 in as little as nine minutes. Four Global Hawks are currently
operational. Plans are in place to buy two per year, and there is interest in
pushing that rate to six for more efficient production, even though the Air
Force has about a $400 million production funding shortfall over the next five
to seven years. (Aviation Week 18 Sept '00, p. 34) (Harvey)
SECTION II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENT
WE'LL NEVER KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT WEN HO LEE -- A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER'S PERSPECTIVE -- The press has fully reflected the embarrassing
conclusion of the case against Wen Ho Lee, including Judge James Parker's
apology and indictment of Administration officials. In a Letter to the Editor
published in the Wall Street Journal, Stuart
Herrington, former career CI officer, provides his perspective, presented here
in condensed form.
The series of miscues and errors that saw the Los Alamos investigation
compromised in the media are not unprecedented. One need only to recall the
late 1980's case against foreign service officer Felix Bloch, captured on
videotape passing an attaché case to a known Soviet intelligence officer,
only to have the investigation blown in the press. Mr. Bloch, considered
guilty by all familiar with the case, but no fool, went to ground, protested
his innocence and was never prosecuted. The Lee and Bloch cases underscore a
fundamental aspect of the spy-catching art: to make an espionage case against
a suspect, government investigators must pursue their quarry covertly. One
leak to the media, and the alerted suspect is unlikely to communicate with his
foreign agent handler again, or commit other compromising acts.
Concerning Beijing's targeting of our military secrets, we would do well to
remind ourselves that virtually all governments - our own included - spy to
obtain information in support of their nation's security and interests. The
outrage about espionage should be directed at more deserving targets.
(1) Those responsible for the deplorable degradation of security at DOE
facilities during the past eight years. Security specialists generally urge
prudent security measures. Management (scientists and academicians are the
hardest to handle) object because they see them as inconvenient, expensive and
restrictive of the free exchange of ideas. Or, incredibly, in the case of Ms.
O'Leary's Energy Department, somehow demeaning to those unfortunate souls
whose lower access levels would restrict their forays into top-secret files
and areas. This leads to unauthorized disclosures and finger-pointing.
Management, sensing danger becomes more Catholic than the Pope and full of
excessive zeal. Then, after the heat is off, things return to normal and
security officers relapse into frustrated apathy.
(2) Government officials who failed to see the Lee case as a potentially
serious breach of security. If the FBI affidavit requesting authority to
intrusively investigate Mr. Lee was packed with the same kind of
probable-cause information these requests normally contain, denying the FBI
the requested authority was an egregious error by the Justice Department.
(3) The individual or individuals who condemned the investigation by airing it
in the media. In 1988 the New York Times,
demonstrating commendable restraint, suppressed a story on suspected Army spy
Clyde Lee Conrad, who, as a result, went to jail. Could not the Lee case have
been handled the same way?
(4) Those in the public arena who promoted charges that Lee was merely a
victim of racism. As Intelligence professionals know, Chinese (as well as
other nations') intelligence services place a high priority on spotting,
assessing and recruiting agents from their national overseas communities. If
investigators had not focused on Lee, an ethnic Chinese US citizen with access
to nuclear secrets, who had traveled to China (on government business), they
would have been negligent.
Herrington concludes by saying that this affair was so abysmally mishandled
that we'll never know whether Mr. Lee was a nuclear spy who got away with it,
or a mild-mannered scientist who was unfairly accused and persecuted. But the
American people can take no pride or comfort in what the Wen Ho Lee case tells
us about how we keep the nation's nuclear secrets at a time when
nuclear-weapons proliferation is one of the principal threats we face. (Wall
St. Jrnl Sep 15, p. A18 // Stuart Herrington) (Jonkers)
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENHANCEMENTS -- A study conducted by the CIA last
year found that less than half of the intelligence community's analysts had
access to any collaborative tools other than the few available on the
classified intranet known as INTELINK. Various cultural and technical hurdles
continue to stand in the way of cooperation and data sharing among agencies.
"The [intelligence community] has a cultural tradition that impedes
information sharing because agencies retain a stovepipe mentality and
organizational competitiveness," according to John Gannon, Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence. "Lack of trust in the personnel,
policies and systems of other agencies within the intelligence community is
widespread and pervasive."
Obstacles to intelligence sharing include:
* Limited connectivity across agencies.
* Basic search-and-retrieval tools and complicated stovepipe databases.
* Limited ability to share data and collaborate on-line.
* Limited ability to process and filter information and handle non-English
* Limited ability to retrieve past production information, access knowledge
base, or update customers.
Programs are underway to change the situation. Gannon has laid out three
priorities to enhance collaboration among analysts and agencies:
(1) enhanced connectivity, (2) interoperable databases and (3) new analytical
tools. Technologies are being deployed to address each one.
CIA, for its part, plans to install a new virtual workspace, known as
"CIA Live," throughout the Directorates of Operations and
Intelligence. It is a means for CIA officials to share information, work on
the same projects simultaneously, and locate subject-matter experts throughout
the agency who are online and available to lend assistance, at the click of a
mouse. "CIA Live" is a partial solution that includes:
* Chat room and instant messaging.
* Buddy list to alert analysts when an individual expert is online.
* Electronic, or shared, whiteboard. A user can post an image, for example,
and share it with another individual, then either individual can annotate the
image in real time.
* Shared applications -- analysts will be able to share text documents.
Many of these features - available for 18 months or more - are already being
used in the non-government corporate
communities through virtual
workspaces, networks and offices.
The DCI will also support the expansion of the Defense Intelligence Agency's
'Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture' program. JIVA is DIA's
next-generation collaboration tool focused on automated, real-time analysis,
production and dissemination of intelligence products. JIVA aims to create a
"federated environment across organizations. By fiscal 2001, which begins
Oct. 1, JIVA capabilities will be on 20,000 desktops across the intelligence
The issue of enhancing collaboration among analysts at various agencies goes
to the heart of the criticisms of intelligence performance and activities,
including calls for a complete overhaul of the intelligence community.
Intelligence experts and critics argue that the Internet has turned the notion
of "central intelligence," into an oxymoron. They agree, however,
that the initiatives now under way are a sign that the DCI is serious about
tearing down walls.
(Fed Computer Wk // D. Verton// 08/28, 07/17,07/24/00)
SECTION III - CYBER NEWS
No reports this week.
SECTION IV - BOOKS & LETTERS
LETTER ON CIA RELEASE OF CHILE DOCUMENTS -- A Washington newspaper's
recent slant on the story of CIA's refusal to release some documents relating
to the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende triggered a 'Letter to
the Editor' by Richard Stolz, former chief of the CIA Directorate of
Operations from 1988 through 1990.
Several parts of Mr. Stolz's letter are quoted below:
-- "Case officers--like journalists--must protect their sources."
-- "Some people have charged that CIA and other government agencies may
resist declassifying some information because it is embarrassing. But in the
case of Chile, the embarrassments already are common knowledge."
-- "The CIA does not randomly operate rogue operations. Covert actions
are subject to rigorous approval procedures in many federal departments and in
-- "Often, indeed, too often, the Operations Directorate has been prodded
by the White House, the Defense Department, the State Department and others to
"not just stand there--do something! -- Well, the CIA doesn't just stand
there; it does what it is ordered to do. It should be allowed to protect the
people who risk their reputations, their fortunes and, at times, their lives
to help." (Wash Post 4 Sept '00, p. A24) (Harvey)
IRAQ'S SCUD BALLISTIC MISSILES: An Information Paper, by the DOD Office
of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, released July 27th, 2000. The
DOD report examines Iraq's Scud ballistic missile program and the use of the
Scuds against coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.
During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched more than 90 of the short-range
ballistic missiles. A Scud missile struck a warehouse used as a temporary
barracks for U.S. soldiers and was responsible for the largest single American
casualty event of the war: 28 people died and more than 100 were injured.
Although Iraq had produced both chemical and biological warheads for their
Scuds, they did not employ them during the war. According to the information
paper, the threat of massive U.S. retaliation and technical difficulties
encountered in testing chemical/biological warheads deterred Saddam Hussein
from taking this course. No chemical or biological agent warheads were found
in the debris of Scud missiles.
Some veterans thought that Iraq launched more Scuds at coalition forces than
actually occurred. Scuds broke up on re-entry or after Patriot missile
intercepts and debris hit the ground in separate areas. This, together with
numerous false alarms, and Patriot missile fire on false targets, contributed
to this impression.
Information papers are reports of what DoD knows today about military
equipment and/or procedures used in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. This paper and all
other reports published by the special assistant's office are posted on the
GulfLINK website at: < http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/scud_info/
> (.Media release No. 470-00, 27 July 2000) (Jonkers)
SECTION V - ODDS AND ENDS
WW II Special Operations - Nuclear physicist Niels Bohr was rescued in
the nick of time from German-occupied Denmark. While Danish resistance
fighters provided covering fire, he ran out the back door of his home,
stopping momentarily to grab a beer bottle full of precious "Heavy
Water" (for nuclear weapon research). He finally reached England still
clutching his bottle. Which contained beer. I suppose some German drank the
bottle of Heavy Water. (courtesy Milligan // Marples).
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