Weekly Intelligence Notes #02-02
14 January 2002

WIN # 02-02 dtd 14 January 2002

Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINs) are produced by Roy Jonkers for non-profit educational uses by AFIO members and ISIS associates. Don Harvey contributes articles to the WINs.

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C O N T E N T S of this WIN 
[HTML version recipients - Click title to jump to story or section, Click Article Title to return to Contents]

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
            Bush Comments on FY-01 Intelligence Authorization Act
            FY-02 Intelligence Authorization Act Highlights
            Israeli Arms Shipment Seizure

SECTION II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENCE

            NIC Estimates of 2015 Missile Threat to U.S.

            DoD Nuclear Posture Review 2002

            Ruling Libya No Picnic

 

SECTION III - CYBER INTELLIGENCE

            Go Hack Thyself

            US Secret Service Electronic Crime Task Forms

            New Website for Office of Counterintelligence Executive

            FBI NIPC Advisory 01-030.3

            IRS Laptop Black Hole

            Virtual Cyber Court Created

 

SECTION IV - BOOKS AND SOURCES

            Rutgers Publishes Nuremberg Trial Documents Online

 

SECTION V - LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

            Al QAEDA Manual

            Alleged Israel Espionage

 

SECTION VI - MISCELLANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS

            AFIO National Luncheon

            Cold War Medal

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SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

 

PRESIDENT BUSH COMMENTS ON THE FY-01 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT --

            President Bush: "Today, I have signed into law H.R. 2883, the 'Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.'The Act authorizes appropriations to fund United States intelligence activities, including activities essential to success in the war against global terrorism.

            Regrettably, one provision of the Act falls short of the standards of comity and flexibility that should govern the relationship between the executive and legislative branches on sensitive intelligence matters and, in some circumstances, would fall short of constitutional standards. Section 305 of the Act amends section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, which relates to executive branch reports to the Congress under the intelligence oversight provisions of the National Security Act.

            Section 305 purports to require that reports submitted to the congressional intelligence committees by the executive branch on significant anticipated intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures always be in written form, with a concise statement of facts pertinent to the report and an explanation of the significance of the activity or failure."

            The President continued by stating that he would construe this section of the Act in a manner consistent with his "constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties," and also within "the statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods and other exceptionally sensitive matters." As the authors of the Constitution envisioned, there will always be 'dynamic tension' between the branches of government, including on the subject of intelligence. (Jonkers) (White House, 28Dec01)

 

THE FY-02 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT HIGHLIGHTS -- The following are selected unclassified unofficial highlights, providing a tiny glimpse of the scope of the Act, listed in sequence of sections:

(1) Makes the Coast Guard an element of the Intelligence Community (sec. 101(12), sec. 105);

(2) Authorizes $212 million for CIA-RDS for FY 2002 (sec. 201);

(3) Requires reports of significant anticipated intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures to be in writing (sec. 305) (see President's remarks above);

(4) Provides that within 120 days of enactment, the DCI shall submit to HPSCI and SSCI a report re whether and to what extent the Intelligence Community has implemented IC-relevant recommendations in the reports of the 'National Commission on Terrorism;' Phase III of the 'US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century' (report dated February 15, 2001); and the second annual report of the advisory panel (established by sec. 1405 of the FY 99 Defense Authorization Act) to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving WMD.

If the DCI does not implement recommendations, he must report on the reasons of WHY NOT. (sec. 306);

(5) Allows for judicial review under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (sec. 307);

(6) Specifies that the DCI must be consulted on the appointment of a Director of Department of Energy Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (sec. 308);

(7) Requires CIA and Intelligence Community Inspectors General to transmit non-credible as well as credible complaints/allegations to agency heads (sec. 309);

(8) Provides that a comprehensive review of current protections against unauthorized disclosure of classified information be carried out by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy, the DCI, and heads of other USG entities the Attorney General deems appropriate; report due to Congress by May 1, 2002 (sec. 310);

(9) Suspends for one year certain existing provisions of law relating to DTSPO reorganization (sec. 311);

(10) Provides that National Counterintelligence Strategy, and each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment produced under PDD-75 (December 28, 2001), and any modification of either, may only take effect if approved by the President, and that those documents shall be submitted to HPSCI and SSCI (sec. 312);

(11) Directs that not later than three months after enactment, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the effect and efficacy of alien terrorist removal proceedings, including why the Attorney General has not used such proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1534 in the past and the effect on the use of these proceedings after enactment of the USA Patriot Act (sec. 313);

(12) Makes technical amendments to the FISA and/or the USA Patriot Act, such as: extend from 24 to 72 hours the time for judicial ratification of an emergency FISA surveillance or search; in a multipoint wiretap FISA court order, require specification if known of the nature and location of each facility or place at which the electronic surveillance will be directed;

(13) amends sec. 501(a)(1) of the FISA to conform to sec. 501(b)(2) of the FISA, sec. 214 of the USA Patriot Act, and the legislative history of sec. 215 of that Act, by adding the phrase "to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a [US] person or"; clarify that the intelligence exception in 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f) from chapters 119, 121, and 206 of title 18, U.S. Code is not limited by sec. 203(b)(2) of the USA Patriot Act; clarify that 50 U.S.C. 1805 (as amended by sec. 225 of the USA Patriot Act), re "Immunity for Compliance with FISA Wiretap," applies to physical searches (and pen-trap requests) as well as to electronic surveillance; and, correct and/or conform certain statutory cites (sec. 314);

(14) Provides that DCI shall rescind the existing 1995 CIA guidelines for handling cases involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns, issue new guidelines that more appropriately weigh and incentivize (sic) risks to ensure that qualified intelligence officers can and should swiftly gather intelligence from human sources in such a

fashion as to ensure the ability to provide timely information that would allow for indications and warnings of plans and intentions of hostile actions or events, and ensure that such information is shared in a broad and expeditious fashion so, that to the extent possible, actions to protect American lives can be taken (sec. 403);

(15) Gives the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force authority to transfer or reprogram such funds as are necessary from (their) military department O&M accounts, for infrastructure and quality-of-life improvements at Menwith Hill Station and Bad Aibling Station, and at the appropriate time, for costs associated with the closure of Bad Aibling Station; and prescribe certain related budget reporting requirements (sec. 502);

(16) Modifies the authorities relating to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking, by requiring annual Presidential certifications and annual Presidential reports to Congress (sec. 504);

(17) Establishes an undergraduate training program for NIMA employees (sec. 504);

(18) Provides that DCI shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be provided or conducted by a provision of the FY 2002 Intelligence Authorization Act (including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations or a classified annex to that Act), that involves DoD-intelligence or intelligence-related activities, shall be prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or an appropriate DoD official designated by the Secretary of Defense; and any such report, review, study, or plan shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified in the provision concerned, to the HASC, HAC, HPSCI, SASC, SAC, and SSCI (sec. 505);

(19) Give NSA Security Protective Service (SPS) authority paralleling CIA's (sec. 506).

NOTE: Of this sample of contents, note particularly sections in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 18 above. ( (Jonkers)

 

ISRAELI ARMS SHIPMENT SEIZURE -- The cargo vessel Karine-A was seized in the Red Sea by an Israeli boarding party last Thursday (10 Jan 02). Its cargo included Katyusha long- and short-range surface rockets, long- and short-range mortar bombs, anti-tank mines, C-4 explosives, Sagger and LAW anti-tank rockets. The arms were reportedly loaded on the ship by Hezbollah operatives off the coast of Iran. The Israeli government stated that they were meant for the Palestinian Authority, using the captured ship captain, speaking from an Israeli jail, as cover. U.S. intelligence sources were cited stating that the ship seized was the third vessel attempting to smuggle arms to Palestinian-controlled areas and that the first two had escaped capture. There is disagreement about the role and extent of US Intelligence in supporting the tracking and capture scenario. The real inside story of 'who and how' may not be known for some time, if ever.

 Iran has for years provided clandestine arms support for the Hezbollah guerillas in Lebanon (who have been contesting Israel's prolonged occupation of parts of Lebanon and Syria) to the tune of $7-20 million per year. It is conceivable that Iran could also have provided clandestine support to the Palestinian groups (Islamic Jihad and Hamas) fighting the Israeli forces occupying the remaining portion of their homeland left to them (who frequently employ counterproductive terrorist tactics). But Stan Bedlington, a former CIA counter-terrorism expert stated that "Iran doesn't ship arms to Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. It's contrary to its methods of operation." Bedlington also noted that given the size of the shipment, "which could equip a small army of terrorists," Hezbollah was the probable end-client. "They are the only group capable of absorbing a shipment of that magnitude."

            Tehran has predictably denied any involvement. The Palestinian Authority, fingered by the Sharon government as the main culprit and prospective recipient, also denied involvement.

            Whatever the game was, and whoever were the players, it is clear the arms were for meant for use against Israel. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in an interview on C-Span TV, "From the standpoint of the ship that the Israelis intercepted ... They clearly had very good intelligence that those weapons were going to be used against them." US intelligence quite probably played a role in this interdiction. (Jonkers) (UPI 8Jan02 / R. Sale and E. Lake) (WTimes 15Jan02 p. A1) (PJK)

 ( http://www.unitedstates.com/news/farticle/728539?20020108204702)

 

SECTION II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENCE

NIC ESTIMATES OF 2015 BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE US -- According to the National Intelligence Council "Most U.S. intelligence community agencies project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face threats from North Korea, Iran and possibly Iraq, ... in addition to the strategic forces of Russia and China." More specifically,
            (1) Russia's missile force of about 700 ICBMs and a dozen missile submarines with 200 missiles and 900 warheads, likely will decrease to a total of fewer than 2,000 warheads ( regardless of arms control).
            (2) China's current small force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs capable of hitting the United States, and about 12 CSS-3s that can hit targets in Russia and Asia, will be modernized. Chinese ICBMs will increase several-fold by 2015, to number about 75 - 100 road-mobile ICBM systems ( far below that of projected Russian or the US systems and warheads).
            (3) North Korea is continuing to work on its Taepo Dong missiles.       
            (4) Iran is building both long- and short-range missiles and has Shahab-3 missiles with ranges of up to 806 miles "that could be launched in a conflict."
            (5) Iraq also "wants a long-range missile and probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-variant missiles."
            The report states the proliferation of missile goods, mostly from Russia, China and North Korea, has boosted efforts of developing nations to build missiles. It was issued in response to requests from the Senate Intelligence Committee to produce annual threat assessments, and made public as a reminder "that the threat from ballistic missiles remains and continues to grow."
            In context, the recent turn-around in intelligence estimates of the ICBM threat to the US from small states is said to be caused by the adoption by the IC of "mirror-imaging" capability projections (based on the US industry capabilities), set in motion by the Rumsfeld report. Also in context, by 2015 the political leadership landscape will have changed a good deal - no more Saddam, for example (mortals expire) - and new technologies will be emerging or have emerged ('black' systems, or open to all). (Jonkers) (NY Times, 10 Jan 2002, Pg. 1 & WTimes 10 Jan02, p. 7 / /B. Gertz)

US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 2002 -- An unclassified summary of the 2002 NPR was provided 10 January. It states that sole reliance on offensive nuclear forces in inappropriate for deterring potential adversaries in the 21st century, and articulates a new strategy for US nuclear forces. "The NPR defines a New Triad of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that include nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research, development, and industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. The New Triad is supported by enhanced intelligence and adaptive planning capabilities."
            The document goes on to say:   "New thinking is required for a new era. Rather than one ideological opponent and military peer who behaved in a relatively familiar and predictable manner, the US today faces an increasingly complex security environment in which surprise in the dominant strategic consideration. As a result, Cold War-style strategic arms control is a process incompatible with the flexibility required by US planning and forces in today's strategic environment. It is also a process incompatible with our goal of establishing a new strategic framework with Russia based not on distrust and hostility but mutual cooperation, common responsibilities and interests.

            The NPR replaces the traditional threat-based approach to planning with a capabilities-based approach that allows unilateral reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to the lowest possible number consistent with national security requirement and alliance obligations." (OSD, 10 Jan02 //K. Kellems) (http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/01/npr-foreword.html)

 

RULING LIBYA HAS BEEN NO PICNIC -- Col. Moammar Gadhafi was nearly overthrown in 1971, according to just-declassified British documents. Diplomats said Gadhafi almost found himself stripped of power by the Revolutionary Council in that year. Also in 1971, an attack on his motorcade failed and a bomb placed in his plane did not detonate. Besides these two assassination attempts, he also survived a nervous breakdown and attempted suicide.
            As the son of a nomadic family, Gadhafi rose high, but not without a price to be paid. Vehemently opposed to corrupt Arab governments manipulated by dominating Western powers and interests, and Western (primarily British) oil dominance within his country, he led a 'Free Officers' movement in a military coup against King Idris in 1969. But it was no picnic to withstand the ire of the West and rule the country -- only a few years later, he found himself in a Cairo clinic under treatment for a breakdown. Indian diplomats told their British counterparts at the time that Gadhafi had tried to kill himself.

            Not reflected in these old British documents, of course, is Gadhafi's more recent survival of the US/British attempt to kill him by a surprise air attack on his residence in Tripolis -- they only got his young daughter. This attack was in reprisal for a disco bombing in Berlin that killed US servicemen, in which Libyan intelligence operatives were implicated. Libyan agents have also been indicted for the PANAM 707 bombing over Lockerbie, which was reportedly done in revenge for the earlier US downing of an Iranian airliner. Both aircraft carried only civilian passengers.
 The eccentric leader -- who today has apparently recognized existing power realities and seems to have moderated his pro-active opposition to US, British and Israeli policies in the region -- is allegedly protected against internal domestic assassins by an elite female security bodyguard (not bad when you can get it), and stubbornly holds on to power. (Jonkers) (BBC/London 1 Jan 02; WTimes 01/01/02) http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/01012002-085531-6974r.htm

 

SECTION III - CYBER INTELLIGENCE

 

GO HACK THYSELF -- To defend themselves against a rising tide of electronic attacks, companies, agencies and other organizations should routinely try to crack their own secure systems, according to a report " Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow" issued by the National Research Council. (Levine) (http://www.newsbytes.com/news/02/173481.html)

 

U.S. SECRET SERVICE ELECTRONIC CRIME TASK FORCES FORMING -- There are eight new United States Secret Service (USSS) Electronic Crimes Task Force branches being formed throughout the country, and, if you live in the USA, one of them is probably close enough for you to get involved. We Need You To Join Us! - And we really mean it! Now more than ever, we need to work together to help prevent and prosecute the ever-growing threat of electronic crimes. (Levine)

(http://www.infosecnews.com/opinion/2002/01/09_03.htm)

 

NEW WEBSITE FOR OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE -- The new NCIX Web site is now up and running - check <http://www.ncix.gov/> Includes a pamphlet "Be Alert," discussing the foreign intelligence collection threat to both US Government and business travelers, and including basic steps to mitigate the threat, and how to report suspicious incidents. <http://www.ncix.gov/pubs/misc/pub_be_alert.html>

http://www.ncix.gov/pubs/index.html (Jonkers)

FBI NIPC ADVISORY 01-030.3 -- Update on critical vulnerabilities of Microsoft's Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) service in Windows XP, Millennium Edition and Windows 98 or 98E systems. This could lead to denial of service attacks and system compromises. MS has released a software patch and security bulletin. SW patch at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-059.asp . The NIPC encourages recipients of this advisory to report computer intrusions to their local FBI office http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm or the NIPC. (FBI SA G. Harter <gharter@leo.gov>)

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE LAPTOP BLACK HOLE -- The IRS has lost or misplaced 2,332 laptop computers, desktop computers and servers. Over the past three years, according to a recent report by Treasury Department auditors. The IRS has "reported a material weakness in inventory controls" every year since 1983. Happy news for those getting nailed by IRS auditors! (Jonkers) (Levine's Newsbits) (http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,49615,00.html)

 

VIRTUAL CYBER COURT CREATED -- Michigan Governor John Engler signed a bill Wednesday creating a 'virtual' state court, where lawyers can file briefs online and put in their court appearances by teleconference. The court is expected to begin work by October, Engler said. (Levine) spokesman. http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/071207.htm

http://www.newsbytes.com/news/02/173524.html

http://www.nandotimes.com/technology/story/214715p-2074059c.html

 

SECTION IV - BOOKS AND SOURCES

 

RUTGERS TO PUBLISH NUREMBERG TRIAL DOCUMENTS ONLINE -- Rutgers has announced that starting January 10, the Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion will begin online publication of documents from Cornell University's Donovan Collection. The Donovan Collection contains the materials of US General William J. Donovan, who served as special assistant to the US chief of counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. (J. Wilhelm) (P. Koestler)
http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/publications/law-religion/
http://www.researchbuzz.com/,

 http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-2002016216,00.html

 

SECTION V - LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

 

AL QAEDA MANUAL - -Tony D writes: Ref. (WIN 48-01)

The version on the DOJ website appears to be more complete.

See http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1.pdf

 

ALLEGED ISRAEL ESPIONAGE -- Bob S. writes: Re: win 01-02 -- the alleged Israeli compromise of Comverse equipment. The situation is worse than you think -- there are only three major COTS (commercial off the shelf) teltap vendors in the western world and ALL of them are foreign. There are many second tier players of course, but those three have the lion's share of the market. Comverse traditionally has been known for voice recording. All three are now racing to offer COTS systems that will do pen register (phone number info only), voice, modem/Internet, and fax in one package. Two major US players have not supplied highly competitive COTS systems in the past, instead traditionally selling R&D and systems integration services along with their equipment.

These systems are, of course, very expensive and require lots of company-funded development. Due to those facts and other high barriers to entry (knowledge of Title III minimization and evidentiary rules, understanding of technical specs for how long data can reside at each portion of the IT system, name recognition, the procedures/methods that the USG uses to procure systems, cultural issues in the US Defense Industry, and the like), it has been difficult for a domestic provider of Title III systems to emerge and be competitive. From what I understand, for Title III system procurements, there has been NO preference in state, local, or federal US contracts offices for a domestic provider - always the LOWEST COST vendor with a compliant COTS solution has a big leg up, although good company marketing helps provide an edge, of course.

 

To put Title III wiretaps in perspective, there are only about a couple of thousand Title III wiretaps authorized each year - in a land of 300 million people (you can probably get the exact statistics on FAS or a similar web site). I enjoy my civil liberties as much as the next person, but I do find that in all the fuss about Carnivore and CALEA that people don't seem to appreciate the actual percentages (and absolute numbers for that matter) involved. Another thing is that the vast majority of the day-to-day work is done by the pen registers, not by listening to people's conversations or reading their email (those things require human input and lots of time to get correct enough for prosecution purposes, particularly when a foreign language or regional dialect is involved, whereas finding links between telephone numbers isn't nearly so resource consuming). Knowing that a guy is associating with known criminals is a very useful lead/break in the early stages of many investigations. (As you know, similar tradeoffs/constraints exist in the Intel community).

 

SECTION VI - MISCELLANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS

AFIO NATIONAL LUNCHEON - The 28 January Luncheon at Tyson's Corner, Virginia, is SOLD OUT - Wait list only.

COLD WAR MEDAL -- The New COLD WAR medal has been approved for everyone who was on Active Duty from September 2, 1945 to December 26, 1991. (M Rhinehart & T. Newcomb)

ARTICLE BY AFIO MEMBER - "Quieting the Silent Option," is an opinion piece by Tom Carroll of the Colorado Chapter on assassination and the War on Terrorism, published in the national Review, available online at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-carroll112901.shtml

 

NMIA SYMPOSIA -- The 'Defense Intelligence Status' (DIS 2001) symposium (conducted by the National Military Intelligence Association) is being held on12 February 2002. The Counter Intelligence (CI 2001) symposium (conducted by the National Military Intelligence Association and the Operations Security Professionals Society) is being held on 13 February 2002. Both events will be conducted at the TRW facility in Fairfax, VA on 1 Federal Systems Drive - excellent facility and lots of free parking. Both events are being conducted at the Unclassified level. Contact NMIA at (301) 840 6642 for information and registration.

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