Weekly Intelligence Notes #37-01
17 September 2001

WIN #37-01 dated 17 September 01

WINs include commentaries on intelligence-related issues and events, produced by Roy Jonkers for AFIO members and for subscribers.

S P E C I A L  N O T E S
This WIN is still overshadowed by the tragedy of September 11th. A torrent of information is being released by the media and commentators. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft are providing continuing mature counsel and leadership, while the Government's intelligence operations are taking place in secret, as they should. The ubiquitous intelligence leaking in Washington appears to have abated a bit.

NOTE 2) We have posted a statement on the terrorist attack on our Homeland on our Website (www.afio.com). It includes a reference to what AFIO can do for members with relevant expertise. Also, a proposed AFIO "Letter to the President" has been submitted to the Board for approval. It will be provided to you soon. In addition, the AFIO Executive will, through the WINs, the Website and special communications, address issues that may be of use in members' discussions with the public.

NOTE 3) We have been inundated with hundreds of emails, letters and phone calls. They are appreciated. Please excuse a delay in responses!

NOTE 4) As to the AFIO Symposium and Convention on 2/3 November, White House Intelligence Director Mary Sturtevant has confirmed her participation as a speaker, as has DCI Intelligence Community Management Staff Director Joan Dempsey. Honorary Board Member Shirley Temple Black regrets that she has another engagement. We are honored that former DCI James Woolsey has graciously consented to be the keynote speaker at the AFIO Awards Banquet. All speakers will be authoritative on the attack on the US Homeland on September 11th and the continuing battle against terrorism.




IRA TERRORISTS TRAINING COLOMBIAN REBELS -- The arrest of three suspected Irish Republican Army members in Colombia, on charges of training local rebels, indicates the country's largest guerrilla group is laying the strategic and tactical groundwork to expand Colombia's civil war into densely populated urban areas such as Bogot�, Medellin and Cali. An urban strategy spells a bloody sea change in guerrilla war tactics.

The incident exposed links between the FARC, Colombia's largest guerrilla group, and the IRA that extend to still-unidentified groups or individuals in Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The widening ripple of violence could affect foreign commercial concerns still active in Colombia, such as U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. and Canada's Alberta Energy Co. And there are signs that the FARC may be considering attacks on U.S. military and civilian contractors elsewhere -- a possible 'asymmetric' response to the massive US military and special forces intervention in the country.

The arrested IRA operatives are skilled in the use of mercury-tilt switches designed to blow up people in cars and radio-controlled "command" bombs for use against armored vehicles, technologies that would significantly enhance the FARC's explosives-handling capabilities. They are also believed to be experts in the design and manufacture of increasingly effective homemade mortars for use against military and political targets in Northern Ireland and England. British security sources reportedly believe that the IRA members were schooling FARC rebels in mixing high-powered synthetic explosives to extend the range of homemade gas cylinder mortars. The FARC needs to extend the roughly 400-meter range of its homemade mortars because of better defenses at military compounds built with American aid. This implies the guerrillas are considering attacks on the compounds, which typically house U.S. military and civilian defense personnel assigned to Plan Colombia, an anti-drug initiative.

Colombian officials have described the FARC-IRA link as a "business relationship" in which the IRA trades advanced explosives-handling techniques for drugs, cash or illegal weapons. Colombian security experts believe the IRA members were part of a much larger Cuban-led undercover operation training the rebels. No matter the cause and effect, the US-drug war or the indigenous guerilla war, the chicken or the egg, this region promises to become the source of increased intelligence priorities and expanded military involvement. (Jonkers) (Boston Herald, 2 September 01) (courtesy L. Sulc)

IRAQI TERRORISM -- Aman, the Israeli military intelligence service, is giving publicity to intelligence reports pointing to Iraq as a sponsor of terrorist activity. They state that Iraq has established ties with Al-Qaeda. They identify two the Lebanese Imad Mughniyeh, head of the special overseas operations for Hizbullah, and the Egyptian Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri, senior member of Al-Qaeda and possible successor of the ailing Osama Bin Laden, as terrorist masterminds being used by Iraqi intelligence. The Israeli sources claim that for the past two years Iraqi intelligence officers were shuttling between Baghdad and Afghanistan, meeting with Ayman Al Zawahiri.

"We've only got scraps of information, not the full picture," admits one intelligence source, "but it was good enough for us to send a warning six weeks ago to our allies that an unprecedented massive terror attack was expected. We believe that the operational brains behind the New-York attack were Mughniyeh and Zawahiri, who were probably financed and got some logistical support from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (SSO)."

According to the Aman sources of this publicity, experts on Iraq and Saddam Hussein also believe that Iraq was the state behind the two terror masterminds. "In recent months, there was a change, and Iraq decided to get into the terror business. On July 7th, they tried for the first time to send a suicide bomber, trained in Baghdad, to blow up Tel Aviv airport (Foreign Report No. 2651)." Clearly, among the potential targets of the US anti-terrorist war it appears that Iraq will probably soon loom large, for a number of reasons. The Aman publicity given to sensitive terrorist intelligence may be to prepare the ground for this event. (Jonkers) (JANES TERRORISM AND SECURITY MONITOR) (courtesy Tony Newcomb)


AL-QAEDA -- During the 1980s, resistance fighters in Afghanistan developed a world-wide recruitment and support network with the aid of the USA, Saudi Arabia and other states. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, this network, which equipped, trained and funded thousands of Muslim fighters, came under the control of Osama bin Laden.
Al-Qaeda ('The Base') is a conglomerate of groups spread throughout the world operating as a network. It has a global reach, with a presence in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and in the West Bank and Gaza. Since its creation in 1988, Osama bin Laden has controlled Al-Qaeda. As such, he is both the backbone and the principal driving force behind the network.

THE LEADER - Osama bin Laden, alias Osama Mohammad al Wahad, alias Abu Abdallah, alias Al Qaqa, born in 1957, is the son of Mohammad bin Awdah bin Laden of Southern Yemen. When he moved to Saudi Arabia, Osama's father became a construction magnate and renovated the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, making the Bin Ladens a highly respected family both within the Saudi royal household and with the public. At Jeddah University, Osama bin Laden's worldview was shaped by Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian of Jordanian origin. An influential figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam is regarded as the historical leader of Hamas. After graduation, Bin Laden became deeply religious.

At the height of the foreign Arab and Muslim influx into Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1984- 1986, Bin Laden spent time traveling widely and raising funds in the Arab world. He recruited several thousand Arab and Muslim youths to fight the Soviet Union, and helped to channel several billion dollars' worth of Western governmental, financial and material resources for the Afghan jihad. He worked closely with Pakistan, especially the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the Saudi government and Egyptian governments, and the vast Muslim Brotherhood network.
When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Bin Laden decided to form a group that could unite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. Although Soviet troops withdrew that year, they installed the pro-communist leader Najibullah in Kabul. Al-Qaeda drew from the vast financial resources and technical expertise mobilized during the decade-long anti-Soviet campaign to fight and defeat the Najibullah regime. After Iraq's 2001 invasion of Kuwait, the failure of Saudi rulers to honor their pledge to expel foreign (US) troops when the Iraqi threat diminished led Bin Laden to start a campaign against the Saudi royal house. He claimed the Saudi rulers were false Muslims and it was necessary to install a true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime deported him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994.
Meanwhile, the National Islamic Front, led by Hasan al Turabi, came to power in Sudan and sent a delegation to Pakistan. Bin Laden had moved his infrastructure of well-trained and experienced fighters from Pakistan to Sudan beginning in 1989 and remained there until international pressure forced him to return to Afghanistan.

THE ORGANIZATION - Al-Qaeda is organized with Bin Laden, the emir-general, at the top, followed by other Al-Qaeda leaders and leaders of the constituent groups. Horizontally, it is integrated with 24 constituent groups. The vertical integration is formal, the horizontal integration, informal. Immediately below Bin Laden is the Shura majlis, a consultative council. Four committees - military, religio-legal, finance, and media - report to the majlis. Handpicked members of these committees - especially the military committee - conduct special assignments for Bin Laden and his operational commanders. To preserve operational effectiveness at all levels, compartmentalization and secrecy are paramount.
Al-Qaeda membership is estimated at between 3,000-5,000 men, most of whom fight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and are designated the 055 Brigade. It has camps in Khost, Mahavia, Kabul, Jalalabad, Kunar, Kandahar, and depots in Tora Bora and Liza.
There are no female members. In terms of recruitment of experienced fighters, Bin Laden has benefited from his vast Mujahideen database, created during the anti-Soviet campaign.

Bin Laden's cadres are drawn from a 50,000 strong pool of two generations of Afghan veterans. The first generation fought in the multinational Afghan campaign in 1979-89, the second generation in campaigns in Tajikistan, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt. These fighters are devout Muslims inspired by Islamic scholars and are willing to sacrifice their lives for Islam.

Al-Qaeda support and operational cells have been detected and neutralized in Italy, Germany, UK, Canada, USA, Tanzania, Kenya, Yemen and Albania, but they have since been replaced. Cells have also been identified in about 50 countries including Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and the Philippines.
THE IDEOLOGY -- Al-Qaeda owes its extensive support and operational infrastructure to its broad ideological disposition. Bin Laden's ideology appeals to both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern groups that are Islamic in character. Although an Arab, Bin Laden advocates pan- Islam, not pan-Arabism. His thinking in this direction was greatly influenced both by Azzam, his Palestinian mentor, and to a lesser extent by Hasan Turabi, the spiritual leader of Sudan.
Bin Laden supports three types of groups. First, groups fighting regimes led by Muslim rulers which they believe are compromising Islamic ideals and interests (as in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia). Second, groups that are fighting regimes perceived as oppressing and repressing their Muslim populace (as in Kosovo, India and Indonesia). Third, groups fighting regimes to establish their own Islamic state (as in Palestine, Chechnya, Dagestan and Mindanao). Bin Laden has also directed his efforts and resources to fight the USA, a country he sees as a direct threat to Islam, closely followed by Europe, Israel, Russia and India in importance as targets.
Al-Qaeda's broad ideology has enabled it to infiltrate many Islam- driven groups. Most of Al-Qaeda's membership is drawn from the two Egyptian groups: Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Gamaya Al Islamiya). Two Algerian groups, the GIA of Antar Zouabri and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat - GSPC) of Hassan Hattab developed ties with Al-Qaeda early on, but large-scale penetration of Algerian groups came in 1997-8.

Bin Laden also cemented ties with Jaish Aden Abin al Islami of Yemen, and members of several small Islamist parties from Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and elsewhere also joined. With the exception of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), Al-Qaeda links with Asian Islamist groups, notably those fighting in Kashmir, developed in the second half of the 1990s.
Other Al-Qaeda constituent or affiliated organizations include Jamaa essalafya lid Daawa wal Q it al, en Nahda, Sipah e Sahaba Kashmir, Hizb-al-Islami in Kashmir, Harakat ul Mujahjideen and Harakat-ul Jihad in Kashmir, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the Islamic Party of Turkistan.
Due to fears of penetration, especially since the embassy bombings, Al-Qaeda is becoming more discreet in its decision making process, with fewer operatives knowing the next target. Target selection, preparation and acquisition remains confined to Bin Laden and a handful of leaders in the military committee.
SUPPORT SOURCES -- Bin Laden's state sponsors have included Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan has not supported Bin Laden's terrorist campaigns but it does assist several hundred Afghan veterans currently serving directly under Al-Qaeda, notably Harakat ul Mujahidin which is engaged in fighting Indian troops in Kashmir.
Bin Laden's funding sources vary. His personal inherited fortune is in the region of US$280 to $300 million according to the estimates of Western intelligence agencies. Wealthy Arab well-wishers in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf states, continue to support Bin Laden and sympathetic organizations. Bin Laden is also known to siphon funds from overt Muslim charities. A wide variety of banks in the Gulf are used, with Bin Laden front organizations transacting businesses. The transfers of funds occur via international banks in the Gulf where his brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa is based.
He is responsible for managing a part of the financial network and manages significant investments, notably in Mauritius, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. His businesses range from trade in diamonds to fish. Despite some sources saying he has been disowned, Bin Laden has received significant funds from wealthy donors including his family. Funds are transferred through a number of banks in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. US authorities were able to trace $5,000 transferred by Bin Laden to the operational group in Yemen that attacked the USS Cole.
However, overall evidence suggests the extent of Al-Qaeda funding is limited, a result perhaps of successful US attempts to block finance to and from Al-Qaeda or of limits on communication placed on it by the Taliban.
MODUS OPERANDI -- Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman, direct a number of support and strike operations using their own support activists and attack teams. Al-Qaeda's elite consists of experienced Egyptian, Algerian and Yemeni cadres. Al-Qaeda has a high capacity for infiltrating any Muslim community irrespective of size and geographic location. Individually, Al-Qaeda members have joined Muslim communities from New Zealand to India, and the organization has infiltrated both authoritarian and democratic states. In the authoritarian states of the Middle East, especially in the oil-rich Gulf, Al-Qaeda enjoys the support of Islamic philanthropists and foundations. In emergent democracies, it infiltrates by providing goods and services to Muslims in need. In democracies, it operates by forging links with influential Muslim communities with the aim of soliciting and channeling their support to Muslim communities in need elsewhere.
As the 1998 bombings and September 2001 plane missions demonstrated, several Al-Qaeda infiltrators were sleepers for several years. In some cases, members who have left have been re-approached by Al-Qaeda leaders for assistance, and have returned to the fold. The Western intelligence community believes there are sleepers in Europe and North America waiting to be activated State response The fight against Al-Qaeda poses several challenges. Bin Laden has built an organization difficult to disrupt, degrade and destroy. The intelligence community is unfamiliar with the network's fluid and dynamic structure and the past offers little guidance. The time- tested strategy to destroy a politically motivated armed group is to target the core and penultimate leadership, but in Bin Laden's case, this is a difficult proposition.

Al-Qaeda is resilient for four principal reasons:

(1) It is the symbol of resistance against Western domination. Although Bin Laden is a veritable icon of terrorism to the West, in parts of the Islamic world he is seen as the only leader that can stand up to the big Satan (the USA) and the little Satan (Israel). To draw maximum support, Al-Qaeda created the 'World Islamic Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders'. As such, Al-Qaeda has a ready base of recruits, supporters and sympathizers. To deepen and widen Al- Qaeda's reach, Bin Laden departs from tradition and embraces a pan- Islamic view. As a result, Al-Qaeda draws the support of both Arab and non-Arab Muslims. With time, Al-Qaeda's vast active and potential support base will grow and mature;

(2) Al-Qaeda has built strategic depth by maintaining leadership and operational links with some of the largest and deadliest Middle Eastern and Asian terrorist groups. As an experienced practitioner, Bin Laden's stature and personal relationships with the leaders of these groups facilitated Al-Qaeda links. Bin Laden's generosity with funds and, more importantly, words of praise, has enabled him to cement strong working relationships at both leadership and operational levels. Although conceptualized, planned and even financed by Al-Qaeda, the targeting end of terrorist operations will be by constituent groups such as GIA, MILF, and ASG. Attributing individual attacks and finding the perpetrators will be a long process;

(3) Landlocked Afghanistan provides Al-Qaeda with a political, security and geographic shield, which, by imposing sanctions, the international community has only strengthened. Afghanistan's isolation has major implications for intelligence collection, especially for the generation of high-grade intelligence, which usually comes through human sources. Without people-to-people contact it is difficult to influence their thinking;

(4) Al-Qaeda physically and/or ideologically penetrates international and domestic Islamic NGOs throughout the world. Thus the Al-Qaeda infrastructure is inseparably enmeshed with the religious,-social and economic fabric of Muslim communities worldwide. Host countries such as the UK, Canada, Australia, and even the USA, are hesitant to investigate Islamic charities, including foreign charities.

Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda is not invulnerable. Thanks mainly to US intelligence agencies, Al-Qaeda suffered gravely since the embassy bombings in '98, and will suffer more after the September 2001 missions. There remains a high capacity to replenish losses and wastage. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda can be destroyed with the allocation and sustained application of resources, political courage, legal and diplomatic tools. The key to disrupting, degrading and destroying Al-Qaeda lies in developing a multipronged, multidimensional and multinational strategy that targets the core and the penultimate leadership and the network's sources of finance and supplies. That is what is being done. (Slightly edited version of excellent report in Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 2001, Special Report /// written by Phil Hirschkorn, Rohan Gunaratna, Ed Blanche, and Stefan Leader) (courtesy PJK)


INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES -- Congressional sources indicate that proposed intelligence legislation will include provisions designed to remove impediments imposed on CIA, FBI and Defense Department intelligence agents over the past quarter century.

For those who are searching for a reason for the so-called "intelligence failure" so horribly on display last week one answer proposes that it was the result of political and legal attacks on our Intelligence establishment and operations going back to the 1970s witch hunts of the Church committee.

A key reason that we don't have the intelligence we need to thwart terrorism is that we have spent many years actively discouraging good agents from getting it. If one had to single out the moment that our nation moved from an intelligence to anti-intelligence footing, it came 26 years ago this week, when front pages across America featured a photograph of Senator Frank Church, the Idaho liberal, brandishing a special dart gun that ex-CIA director William Colby had brought to the committee hearings. In Senator Church's view, the CIA was a "rogue elephant on the rampage," and the image of the dart gun underscored the accusation that our agents were goon squads.

That was the same year that CounterSpy magazine published the names of CIA agents around the world.

Human source intelligence particularly has been reeling ever since. Under President Jimmy Carter human intelligence (espionage) was slashed and dozens of CIA's most experienced operations officers were sacked. Similar actions were taken in the Department of Defense. The leadership at the time clearly chose intelligence technology over human intelligence ( which was most likely to involve them in trouble on the Hill) to satisfy their primary intelligence collection needs. A second wave of pressures from Congressional and human rights advocates during President Clinton's administration further restricted the types of agents that could be used -- they had to be scrubbed for their human rights credentials. A host of other Congressionally mandated restrictions came in, including those preventing the CIA from using cover as journalists, clergy or aid workers.

Over at the FBI, meanwhile, Congressional and media inquisitions led to similar administrative changes. Dedicated field agents who had spent their careers investigating groups such as the Weather Underground--with the tacit approval of several Presidents--suddenly faced the prospect of criminal indictments. The prosecutions were nixed, but President Ford's Attorney General, Benjamin Levi, handed down similar restrictions. Under the Levi guidelines, agents could not begin investigating suspect groups until after a crime had been committed. Agents tell us that such were the restrictions that they were not even allowed to collect newspaper clippings.

The street agents got the message, and though restrictions were eased during the Reagan years, counter-intelligence has never fully recovered. The best and the brightest left the Bureau for criminal work, where it was still possible to catch bad guys. As Attorney General John Ashcroft notes, it's easier today to get a wiretap on a suspected drug dealer than on a terrorist. And other requests by Mr. Ashcroft--such as his plea to allow wiretapping authority to be directed at a person (who may use several phones) rather than one specified line, or to monitor financial dealings of suspected terrorists--suggest just how out of touch the legal framework is. It speaks of the perverse incentives today that among the Bremer Commission's recommended reforms is having intelligence agents know they are insured against personal liability lawsuits.

Many years ago, after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan said such attacks were harder to spot because of an attitude that "spying is somehow dishonest and let's get rid of our intelligence agents. " And that was done. Our message must be that there are greater evils in this world than U.S. intelligence agencies, and that espionage and related clandestine operations are an essential part of our national defense. (Jonkers) ( adapted from Wall Street Journal editorial - -"How America Dismantled its Intelligence Capabilities", Sept 18, 2001)


NIPC WARNS OF DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE [DDoS] ATTACKS -- The National Infrastructure Protection Center, the FBI's cyber security agency, issued an advisory Tuesday warning against the possibility of increased distributed denial-of-service attacks coming as a result of the last week's terrorist attacks against targets in New York and near Washington, D.C.(Levine 19 Sep 01)

TERRORISTS USED INTERNET -- There is new evidence suggesting the terrorists who carried out last week's attacks in New York and Washington used the World Wide Web to help coordinate their deadly efforts. "They used the Internet and they used it well," an FBI official said of the 19 men who hijacked four passenger airliners last Tuesday, steering three of them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.(Levine)

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION TO BE REVISED -- The Bush administration will ask for more power to eavesdrop on phone calls, the Internet and voicemail messages, according to an outline of a bill obtained by Wired News. In response to last week's catastrophic terrorist attacks, President Bush plans to ask Congress to approve far-reaching legislation that rewrites U.S. laws dealing with electronic surveillance, immigration and support for terrorists.(Levine)

HACKER DECEPTION ALTERS NEWS STORIES ON PRESIDENT BUSH -- A computer security researcher was able to edit and alter wire stories posted on Yahoo.com's SecurityFocus.com. The researcher rewrote a story, subtly changing some facts and attributing faked comments to President George W. Bush.(Levine)

HACKERS STRIKE MIDDLE EASTERN SITES -- Saying the U.S. government hasn't sufficiently responded to last week's terrorist attacks, a group of vigilante hackers has taken matters into its own hands and defaced some 200 to 300 Middle Eastern government Web sites and those of Palestinian Internet service providers. The group says it plans to destroy Web servers and Internet access in Afghanistan. "This is the 21st century, the world of technology belongs to us," says a 21-year old computer security worker from Ohio who uses the name "Hackah Jak." He is the founder of the group of 60 computer professionals from around the world who call themselves the Dispatchers.(Levine)

NIMDA WORM MAY BE PEAKING -- The outbreak of the Nimda computer worm, which has spread rapidly across the Internet, appeared to have peaked Wednesday for the powerful server machines that drive the Web, but the number of infected PCs may never be known, computer security experts said. (Levine) http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/025805.htm

A "TARPIT" THAT TRAPS WORMS -- Network administrators now have a hacking tool that can help them strike back at malicious attackers. "LaBrea" is a free, open-source tool that deters worms and other hack attacks by transforming unused network resources into decoy-computers that appear and act just like normal machines on a network. But when malicious hackers or mindless worms such as Nimda or Code Red attempt to connect with a LaBrea-equipped system, they get sucked into a virtual tarpit that grabs their computer's connection -- and doesn't release it.(Levine) http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,46964,00.html

TECH FIRMS JOIN FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM -- The use of existing and emerging technologies is essential to the fight against terrorism, analysts say. Counter-terrorism is now one of the nation's top priorities, President Bush said last week. The government has already allocated billions of dollars to the cause, and US agencies such as the CIA and the FBI are expected to bulk up their staffs and resources in the near future.(Levine)

TECHNOLOGIES TO PROTECT PASSENGERS -- Governments and airlines seeking to reduce the threat of airplane hijackings by terrorists have a wide range of security technologies to choose from. Much of the spotlight will be on biometrics systems, which identify travelers by fingerprints, the patterns in their retinas, their voices or other individual characteristics. (Levine)


PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2000, U.S. Department of State (Publication 10822), April 2001. US policy is described succinctly: (1) Make no concession to terrorists and strike no deals; (2) bring terrorists to justice for their crimes, (3) isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior, and (4) bolster the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the US and require assistance. Last year's policy stands today, except that it is now enforced by the US military and unrestricted clandestine operations.
The scope of terrorism in the year 2000 - (seemingly a long, long time ago): 19 US citizens were killed, seventeen of whom were part of the crew of the USS Cole. The other two died in conflicts in East Timor and in Sierra Leone. The number of anti-US attacks increased from 169 in 1999 to 200 in 2000 -- but this was mostly because there were 152 attacks against a pipeline in Colombia, considered a US target. Terrorist attacks on the US or US citizens in the year 2000 were either suppressed or suspended.  International incidents exceeded the US totals greatly, with 423 incidents killing 405 persons, mostly in Africa and Asia (354).   This publication, published recently, is an excellent historic document on the topic, with a country-by-country rundown and useful appendices listing incidents chronologically, describing terrorist groups throughout the world, and providing statistics as far back as 1981 as well as geographic displays. (Jonkers)

WINs are produced by Roy Jonkers for AFIO members and for WIN subscribers. Associate editors John Macartney and Don Harvey contribute articles to the WINs. Opinions expressed are those of the editor(s) or writers cited with each article. For back issues, membership information and symposium info, check the AFIO Website www.afio.com

For comments, contact the editor Roy Jonkers at� afio@afio.com
For back issues of the WIN, check the AFIO Website� www.afio.com
For AFIO Website�requests/comments, contact � afio@afio.com

Back to Top

About AFIO | Chapters & Chapter Activities | Membership | Corporate | Weekly Intelligence Notes | Event Schedule | Bulletin Board | Legislative | Careers | Donations | Book Reviews | Search | AFIO Store | | Other Sites | Home Page

AFIO Central Office
6723 Whittier Avenue, Suite 303A
McLean, Virginia 22101-4533
Telephone: 703 790 0320 | Facsimile: 703 790 0264
Email: afio@afio.com